Rockwood Casualty Insurance Company (“Rockwood”) issued a workers’ compensation policy to the Carousel Hotel (“Carousel”) in October of 1997. Thereafter, Carousel failed to pay the premiums, prompting Rockwood to mail a Notice of Cancellation (“notice”) to Carousel on December 20, 1997. On March 7, 1998, one of Carousel’s employees sustained a work-related injury. The employee filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“Commission”) and impled the Uninsured Employers’ Fund (“UEF”). The Commission found the employee’s claim legitimate and concluded that Rockwood should pay.
The issue before this Court is whether the notice mailed by Rockwood to Carousel complied with the statutory requirements found in Md.Code (1997, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 19-406 of the Insurance Article Within that issue reside two questions: (1) Does the statute require actual notice or is service complete upon mailing, and (2) If the employer is a corporation or partnership, does the statute require the insurer to give notice to an agent or officer of the corporation or to a partner, or is notice addressed to the entity sufficient?
We hold that the notice mailed in this case did not comply with the statutory requirements and that, therefore, Rock-wood’s attempt to cancel Carousel’s insurance failed.
FACTS
In October of 1997, Rockwood issued a workers’ compensation insurance policy to Carousel with coverage from Decern *105 ber 23, 1997, through December 23, 1998. 1 On December 30, 1997, Rockwood sent a Notice of Cancellation to Carousel by certified mail, cancelling the policy for failure to pay premiums, effective February 2, 1998. The notice was addressed simply to the “Carousel Hotel, 11700 Costal Highway, Ocean City, Md. 21842.” Rockwood also mailed a copy of the notice to Carousel’s insurance agent in Willards, Md. 21878. Both parties agree that the post office failed to produce evidence that the notice had been picked up or delivered to Carousel. The “Mail Loss/Rifling Report” of the USPS notes “no record of delivery.” In addition, the certified mail return receipt, dated July 1998, states “no record of delivery.” On February 27, 1998, Rockwood conducted an insurance cancellation audit of Carousel’s records at the hotel.
On March 7, 1998, Genora Hodge, a Carousel employee, sustained a work-related injury, prompting her to file a workers’ compensation claim. Rockwood argued that Carousel was uninsured because Rockwood had sent a proper notice, cancel-ling the insurance before the injury occurred. As a result, the employee asserted a claim against the UEF. The Commission found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and that Rockwood was responsible to pay. The Commission determined that Rockwood had issued a workers’ compensation policy to Carousel and that Rockwood’s notice did not comply with the statutory requirements. Consequently, Rock-wood had not successfully cancelled Carousel’s insurance before the injury to Ms. Hodge occurred.
Rockwood sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Worcester County. Both Rockwood and UEF filed motions for summary judgment on the question of whether Rockwood’s notice was effective. On January 6, 2003, the Circuit Court for Worcester County, Judge Eschenburg presiding, granted UEF’s motion, affirming the Commission. Rockwood appealed and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported
*106
opinion. We granted
certiorari. Rockwood Casualty v. Hodge,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Md. Rule 2-501(e), summary judgment may be granted if “the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” When making a summary judgment decision, the trial court must not determine any disputed facts. Rather, considering the undisputed material facts, the court must decide if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
In making that decision, we must independently review the record to determine if a genuine dispute of material fact exists.
Id.
We only proceed to the question of law if there is no genuine dispute of fact.
Jurgensen v. New Phoenix Atlantic Condominium,
DISCUSSION
Rockwood argues § 19-406 of the Insurance Article does not require actual notice. Moreover, Rockwood argues that § 19-406 gives the insurer the option, but does not require the insurer, to provide notice of cancellation to an agent or officer *107 of an employer that is a corporation or to a partner if the employer is a partnership. By contrast, the UEF argues that the statute requires actual notice and requires the insurer to notify appropriate officials of corporate or partnership employers. The Court of Special Appeals held that the statute required Rockwood to send the notice by registered mail, or to prove actual notice in some other way. The Court of Special Appeals also held that Rockwood should have provided the notice to an agent or officer of Carousel Hotel.
The 1997 version 3 of § 19-406 provided, in pertinent part:
(a) General requirements. — An insurer may not cancel a workers’ compensation insurance policy before its expiration unless, at least 30 days before the date of cancellation, the insurer:
(1) serves on the employer, by personal service or registered mail addressed to the last known address of the employer, a notice of intention to cancel the policy; and.
(2) files a copy of the notice with the State Workers’ Compensation Commission.
(b) Notice to corporations and partnerships. — Notice under this section may be given:
(1) if the employer is a corporation, to an agent or officer of the corporation on whom legal process may be served; and
(2) if the employer is a partnership, to a partner.
Md.Code (1997), §§ 19-406(a), 19-406(b) of the Insurance Article. In addition, Article 1 section 20 states in pertinent part:
The term “registered mail” when used (1) in any section of this Code or of any code of public local laws ... includes and may be applied as the term “certified mail.” Both terms mean the uses, procedures, and fees provided and generally referred to by the United States Post Office *108 Department. A provision in any such law, charter, resolution, ordinance, rule, regulation, or directive, for the use of one type of such mail, may be interpreted and applied to authorize the use of the other type of such mail as an alternate.
Md.Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol.), Art. 1 § 20. 4
As noted by this Court in
Oaks v. Connors,
The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Fish Market v. G.A.A.,337 Md. 1 , 8,650 A.2d 705 (1994). See also Jones v. State,336 Md. 255 , 260,647 A.2d 1204 (1994); Parrison v. State,335 Md. 554 , 559,644 A.2d 537 (1994); Rose v. Fox Pool,335 Md. 351 , 358,643 A.2d 906 (1994). The first step in determining legislative intent is to look at the statutory language and “[i]f the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” Jones, supra,336 Md. at 261 ,647 A.2d 1204 . See also Parrison, supra,335 Md. at 559 ,644 A.2d 537 ; Rose, supra,335 Md. at 359 , 643 A.2d
*109 906; Outmezguine v. State,335 Md. 20 , 41,641 A.2d 870 (1994).
See also Greco v. State,
In view of the plain language of Article 1 section 20, we hold that serving the notice by certified instead of registered mail was acceptable, even though the 1997 statute said registered mail. We do not agree, however, that simply mailing the notice, whether or not it arrived, was sufficient. The language of the statute implies otherwise.
Section 19-406 of the Insurance Article requires the insurer to
serve
the employer with notice and gives the insurer two ways to accomplish service: personal service or service by certified mail.
5
To “serve” is defined as, “[t]o make legal delivery of (a notice or process) ... [t]o present (a person) with a notice or process as required by law....” Black’s Law
*110
Dictionary 1399 (8th ed.2004). The term implies actual receipt. If the Legislature intended some lesser standard, it could have just required the insurer to
send
or
mail
the notice to the employer by regular mail. Instead, it requires the insurer
to serve
the notice by personal delivery or by certified mail.
See Moss v. P.A. Trucking Co.,
We note that the USPS definitions of both registered and certified mail include statements that the sender of either type of mail can obtain verification of delivery upon
*111
request. In fact, Rockwood admits in its brief that “the primary purpose behind the requirement of registered mail is
to ensure delivery
and to easily determine the date of delivery[.] [Certified mail fulfills this purpose because it allows for a receipt
of delivery.”
(Emphasis added.) In the case at bar, such a request apparently was not made until months after the notice was mailed and never delivered. Moreover, paragraph (d) of § 19-406 requires the employer to secure other insurance coverage “[wjhenever an employer
receives
a notice under this section.” Md.Code (1997, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 19-406(d) of the Insurance Article. (Emphasis added.) It is clear that the Legislature’s purpose in passing § 19-406 was to ensure that employers actually receive notice before coverage is cancelled, so that employers have the opportunity to secure other insurance coverage. Considering that purpose assists our interpretation of the notice requirements of the statute. As stated in
Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
legislative purpose is critical, that purpose must be discerned in light of context, and that “statutes are to be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose to be accomplished.... ” The purpose, in short, determined in light of the statute’s context, is the key. And that purpose becomes the context within which we apply the plain-meaning rule.
(Quoting
Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dept.,
In addition to the plain language of the statute, precedent from this Court supports our interpretation that the insurer must prove that it complied with the statutory requirements of
serving
the employer with notice of the termination of coverage, before an attempted termination is effective. Discussing the purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act,
7
*112
we stated in
Polomski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
In reality, the Act protects employees, employers, and the .public alike. To be sure, the Act maintains a no-fault compensation system for employees.... At the same time, however, the Act also recognizes the need to protect employers from the unpredictable nature and expense of litigation, and the public from the overwhelming tax burden of “caring for the helpless human wreckage found [along] the trail of modern industry.”
Polomski,
We have frequently repeated and applied the statutory mandate that “[t]he Workers’ Compensation Act ... should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes. Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant.”
Harris,
In this case, interpreting the statute to require insurers to prove that they served the employers with notice as required by the statute protects injured claimants. Such an interpreta *113 tion guarantees advance notice of the loss of coverage to employers and provides them an opportunity to secure other coverage for the benefit of their employees.
In
Pressman v. State Accident Fund,
The statute requires notice both to the Commission and the employer and specifies the mode of serving notice on the employer — by delivery or by registered letter — and spells out the reason for notice to the employer — so that “when an employer receives notice” he shall immediately secure proper compensation coverage for his employees.
Pressman,
In
State Accident Fund v. Gardner,
In making that decision, the Court of Special Appeals discussed the requirements of the statute and noted that its purpose is “to get the notice of the cancellation to the employer so he or she will immediately secure proper compensation coverage to replace that which is to be cancelled.”
Gardner,
In addition to our conclusion that the statute requires actual notice to the employer before a cancellation is effective, we also hold that if the insurer can show that it mailed the notice by certified mail to the last known address of the employer, as stated in the statute, the insurer enjoys a presumption that the notice actually arrived. As noted in
Fidelity Casualty Co. of New York v. Riley,
In the case at bar, there was evidence presented (albeit by Rockwood themselves) that the notice was never delivered to the employer. In such a case, the presumption that the notice actually arrived is rebutted. As stated in
Pressman,
“[i]t is generally held that the burden of proving
*116
notice is on him who must give it.”
Pressman,
If the presumption that the properly-addressed letter arrived is rebutted, the insurer must then prove by other evidence that the employer received actual notice, or that the employer intentionally refused to receive the notice, amounting to an evasion of service. 9 No such proof was *117 offered by Rockwood in this case. The undisputed material facts in this case show that Rockwood failed to prove that it provided notice as required by the statute, entitling UEF to summary judgment on that issue. 10 There can be no presumption of receipt of notice where the undisputed evidence shows that there was no delivery.
In support of its argument that § 19-406 of the Insurance Article does not require actual notice, Rockwood relies on COMAR 14.09.01.04(B)(3), arguing that it supports the notion that service by mail ought to be complete upon mailing.
11
This section of COMAR is located in Title 14-Independent Agencies, Subtitle 9-Workers Compensation Commission, Chapter 01-Procedural Regulations. The writers of COMAR note at the beginning of Chapter 01 that the authority for the regulations in this chapter is derived from the Labor & Employment Article. Specifically noted among others, are §§ 9-309 and 9-6A-07 of the Labor & Employment Article. Section 9-309 gives the Commission the power to adopt regulations to carry out Title 9 of that Article.
*118
Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 9-809 of the Labor & Employment Article. Section 9-6A-07 gives the Commission the power to adopt regulations to carry out subtitle 6A of Title 9. Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 9-6A-107 of the Labor
&
Employment Article. By contrast, there is no similarly empowering provision located in Title 19, Subtitle 4 of the Insurance Article. As previously noted, the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.
O’Connor v. Baltimore County,
Rockwood also argues that even if actual notice of cancellation is required by the statute, it complied with that provision by conducting an insurance audit of the employer. As correctly noted by the Court of Special Appeals, the audit took place only two weeks before the injury and more than three weeks after the attempted date of cancellation. Even if the audit could be considered actual notice to the employer, notice was not given in time. The statute requires that the employer receive thirty days notice before a cancellation. Md.Code (1997, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 19-406(a) of the Insurance Article.
In addition to its argument that actual notice is required, UEF asserts that the statute requires the insurer to *119 give notice to an agent or officer of an employer that is a corporation or to a partner of an employer that is a partnership. Rockwood argues that the Legislature has given insurers the option either to serve the notice on the “employer,” or if the employer is a corporation or a partnership, to serve “an agent or officer of the corporation on whom legal process may be served” or “a partner.” The Court of Special Appeals held that the notice must be provided to “any principal of the policyholder” or to “an agent or officer of the entity upon whom process could be served.” In view of our holding that the notice in this case did not comply with the statute (because there was evidence that it was never delivered), we do not need to address UEF’s additional argument. We will discuss it briefly, however, because the parties raise it and the statute addresses it.
As previously noted, the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the legislature.
Oaks,
Notice under this section may be given:
(1) if the employer is a corporation, to an agent or officer of the corporation on whom legal process may be served; and
(2) if the employer is a partnership, to a partner.
(Emphasis added.) The commonly understood meaning of the word “may” is “has discretion to; is permitted to.” A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 552 (2nd ed.1995). It does not mean “must.”
See Heery Intern., Inc. v. Montgomery County,
It appears that the Legislature has given insurers the option either to serve the notice on the “employer,” under § 19-406(a)(1), or if the employer is a corporation or a partnership, to serve “an agent or officer of the corporation on whom legal process may be served” or “a partner.”
See Conklin v. Byram House Restaurant, Ltd.,
The term “employer” is not defined in the statute. Both parties in the case at bar, however, refer to “Carousel Hotel” as the employer. Whether Carousel Hotel is a corporation, partnership, unincorporated association, or sole proprietorship, the parties have not taken a position. Consistent with our construction of the notice provision, the legal structure of the entity is not controlling. Anyone authorized by the “employer” to receive the mail may accept delivery. Rockwood mailed the notice to the employer, as permitted by section 19-406(a)(1). 13 As it turns out in this case, no one at Carousel Hotel received the notice that was mailed “certified mail.” If someone authorized by Carousel Hotel to receive the mail had accepted and signed for the mail and Rockwood could prove' *121 delivery by presenting the return receipt, the notice provisions of section 19-406 would have been satisfied. 14 If the Legislature intended otherwise, it would have used the term “shall” instead of “may.”
We disagree with UEF’s argument that the usually permissive term “may” should be construed in this case to mean “must” because of the context or purpose of the statute. As previously stated, the purpose of this statute is to make sure that employers receive notice of the loss of insurance so that they can obtain new insurance to cover injured employees.
Pressman,
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that § 19-406(a) permits an insurer to choose whether to serve notice of cancellation of insurance by personal delivery or by certified mail. Service by certified mail, however, is not complete upon mailing. The statute contemplates actual delivery of notice. We also hold that notice in the case of an employer that is a corporation or a partnership may be given to the employer pursuant to § 19-406(a) or to an agent or officer upon whom legal process may be served pursuant to § 19-406(b). The notice mailed in this *122 case did not comply with the statutory requirements of actual delivery and, therefore, Rockwood’s attempt to cancel Carousel’s insurance failed.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS IN COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AND COURT OF APPEALS.
Chief Judge BELL joins in the judgment only.
Notes
. We note that the “Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Information Page” notes "Carousel Hotel” as the insured, located at 11700 Coastal Highway, Ocean City, Maryland.
. We also granted the motion of UEF to change the caption of this case to: Rockwood Casualty Ins. Co. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund.
. The current version of this section of the code substitutes "certified mail” for “registered mail” in subsection (a)(1). The legislature made that change in 2000. 2000 Md. Laws, Chap. 124.
. As noted in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, the Domestic Mail Manual issued by the United States Postal Service (USPS) describes registered mail as follows:
Registered mail is the most secure service that the USPS offers. It incorporates a system of receipts to monitor the movement of the mail from the point of acceptance to delivery. Registered mail ' provides the sender with a mailing receipt and, upon request, electronic verification that an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was made.
Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), S911, § 1.1, available at http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm/s911 .him. In addition, the Domestic Mail Manual, in relevant part, describes certified mail as follows:
Certified mail service provides the sender with a mailing receipt and, upon request electronic verification that an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was made.... Certified mail is dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary mail.... No insurance coverage is provided.
Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), S912, § 1.1, available at http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm/s91Z.htm.
. By the express terms of the 1997 statute, the insurer has two methods to effectuate service of the notice of intention to cancel insurance. The insurer may serve the employer by means of personal delivery. In the alternative, the insurer may elect to send notice by registered mail to the employer's last known address. In review of the predecessor sections of § 19-406 since 1914, the statute has consistently required service of notice of cancellation by delivery to the employer or by registered letter. See 1914 Md. Laws, Chap. 800, § 30 ("Such notice shall be served on the employer by delivering it to him or by sending it by mail, by registered letter, addressed to the employer at his or its last known place of residence ...”); Md.Code (1957), Art. 101, § 19(e) (stating the same thing exactly); Md.Code (1957, 1991 Supp.), Art. 48A, § 482 H ("An insurer may not cancel a workers' compensation insurance policy . .. unless . .. the insurer: (1) Serves on the employer, by personal service or registered mail addressed to the last known resident address of the employer, a notice of intention to cancel the policy ... ”). The comparable section in the 1997 version changes nothing except to remove the word “resident” from the phrase "last known resident address of the employer.” Md.Code (1997), § 19-406(a)(l).
.
Cf. Young v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
. We recognize that § 19-406 of the Insurance Article is not a part of the Workers' Compensation Act, which is located in Title 9 of the Labor & Employment Article. Nonetheless, as it is clearly a related statute,
*112
we think a brief discussion of it illuminates the case at bar. The commonsensical approach to interpreting statutes includes a review of the general statutory scheme in which the statute in question is found.
Frost v. State,
. The statute discussed in
Pressman
was Md.Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol.) Art. 101 § 77(a), the section of the code that discussed the method of cancellation of workers’ compensation insurance for the “State Accident Fund.”
Pressman,
. Although the facts are not before us in this case, we think it necessary to mention that § 19-406 is silent regarding how to notify an employer that is evading service. Because the statute fails to give any clear direction to the insurer about how to proceed in terminating the policy, particularly in non-payment of premium situations, we encourage the Legislature to re-examine this fairly "ancient” statute. It may be that the Legislature intended to leave the matter for resolution by the parties pursuant to the express terms of the contract of insurance. Unfortunately, if that was the intention of the Legislature, it is not contained in the language of the statute. In addition, the statute is unclear whether the General Assembly intended that notice to a non-paying insured be treated in a manner like Md. Rule 2-121(b) (Process-Service-In-personam) (Evasion of service).
In view of our holding that the statute requires actual notice, we note that in such a case, deliberate ignorance or intentional avoidance of notice is the equivalent of actual notice.
See State v. McCallum,
. In a case where the insurer has proof of mailing the notice by certified mail to the last known address and the
employer
presents evidence that the notice was never received, the case could not be resolved by summary judgment because a material fact would be in dispute.
See Gardner,
. The section states:
Service may be made by delivery of a copy or by mailing it to the address most recently stated in a paper filed by the party or attorney, or if not stated, to the last known address. Delivery of a copy means handing to the party or attorney, or leaving it at that person’s office with an individual in charge, or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office, or, if the office is closed or the person has no office, leaving it at the person's usual place of residence with an individual of suitable age and discretion residing there. Service by mail is complete upon mailing.
. We note also that the Commission in this case found that Rockwood did not comply with § 19-406, despite the COMAR provision relied upon by Rockwood. While we do not know if Rockwood made the COMAR argument before the Commission, we assume the Commission is aware of its own regulations and still decided that Rockwood’s notice was not effective. We ordinarily show some deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations.
MTA v. King,
. Rockwood entered into the agreement for insurance with the "Carousel Hotel.” As previously noted, the “Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Information Page” notes, simply "Carousel Hotel” as the insured. Rockwood mailed the notice of cancellation of that insurance policy to the "Carousel Hotel."
.
See Employers’ Liability Assur. Corporation v. Perkins,