191 A. 619 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1936
Argued October 23, 1936. Appellant, a registered and licensed master plumber in the City of Philadelphia since 1925, in order to be re-registered for the years 1932, 1933 and 1934 paid to the city an annual fee of $25. for registration and licensure and an additional fee each year of $5. for the approval of his bond in the amount of $250. These fees were collected from him by virtue of the provisions of the Act of May 7, 1931, P.L. 101, amending Secs. 1 and 2 of the Act of June 7, 1911, P.L. 680, 53 P. S. § 4071, by increasing the annual registration fee from $1. to $25. and requiring the giving of the bond above mentioned.
Contending that the Act of 1931, supra, was unconstitutional, appellant filed his bill in the court below to *145 restrain the defendant city officials from enforcing its provisions and to require them to refund $24. out of each fee of $25. collected from him and to return the three $5. fees paid for the approval of his bonds. The city filed preliminary objections in which they averred the legislation under which the moneys had been collected was constitutional.
Pending argument, the legislature further amended Secs. 1 and 2 of the Act of 1911, supra, by an act approved July 2, 1935, P.L. 561, 53 PS (Supp.) § 4071. By this amendment the annual registration fee was reduced to $3. and the bond requirements of the Act of 1931 were eliminated.
The Act of 1911, supra, provides for the examination and registration of plumbers and regulates the business of plumbing in cities of the first class, making it unlawful for any person to engage in that business without first having registered and obtained a license. Under this act and later amendatory acts plans must be filed, inspection made and approval given by the Department of Public Health, for the various types of plumbing work covered thereby. By its second section the annual fee for registration or re-registration was fixed at one dollar for master plumbers. As stated, the Act of 1931, supra, increased the fee to $25., and provided for a bond.
It was averred in the bill that there were approximately 1600 plumbers registered for each of the three years in question; that "the total revenue derived by the City of Philadelphia from registration and re-registration fees of $25. each . . . . . . was approximately $40,000 per year; and that the total expenditures incurred annually . . . . . . in connection with said registration, re-registration and licensing of the said master plumbers, and the maintenance of said registration and *146 license service . . . . . . never [exceeded] the sum of $4000."
Plaintiff also alleged that the provision of the Act of 1931, supra, requiring him to give bond in the sum of $250., ". . . . . . conditioned to indemnify the city and property owners against loss by reason of [his] failing to comply with the acts of assembly and the rules and regulations of the Department of Public Health in the performance of the work done by [him]. . . . . .", was unconstitutional and void.
After argument upon the preliminary objections the court below held the provisions of the Act of 1931 attacked by the bill constitutional; this appeal from the decree dismissing the bill followed.
Appellant does not contend that the state may not, under its police power and in order to protect the health of its citizens, enact legislation regulating the plumbing business. Legislation of this type has frequently been upheld as within the state's police power: Beltz v. Pittsburgh,
Conceding the state's inherent power in this regard, appellant's contention is that the charge of $25. for registration is not so reasonably proportionate to the cost of regulation or supervision of the plumbing business by the city as to constitute it a license fee and therefore *147 within the police power of the state to impose, but is so unreasonable as to amount to a tax imposed for revenue purposes and therefore subject to the various constitutional limitations upon taxation.
A revenue tax may not be imposed under the guise of a police regulation, and this principle applies equally to the state or a municipality as a subdivision thereof. As Mr. Justice ELKINS stated in Kittanning Boro. v. American Natural Gas Co.,
However, a license fee imposed by or in pursuance of legislative enactment is presumed to be reasonable, and it is incumbent upon the party alleging its invalidity to show facts which make it so: Kittanning Boro v. American Natural Gas Co.,
supra, and cases cited at page 213; City of Pittsburgh v.Streng,
Whether or not a particular license fee is reasonable depends of course upon the type of business licensed and the extent of regulation undertaken. In City of Tucson v. Stewart (Ariz.) 40 Pac. (2nd) 72, 96 A.L.R. 1492, the court, quoting at length from Fletcher Oil Co. v. Bay City,
In the case just cited the court held invalid a city ordinance, providing, inter alia, for a license fee of $60. a year for the first year and $30. thereafter for the *150
registration of electricians, as being a revenue measure and beyond the police power of the municipality; but it was pointed out that the electrical code of the city provided other charges for inspection, viz., $2. per hour for the time actually spent by the city authorities in inspecting. Detroit Retail DruggistsAssn. v. City of Detroit,
Applying these principles to the case now at bar, we have this situation. Appellant had the burden of showing in the court below that the fee was wholly out of proportion to the expense of the municipality in regulating the installation and maintenance of plumbing throughout the entire city. The facts averred in his bill must, for present purposes, be considered as established and we may assume that he has pleaded his whole case.
His argument is that only the actual cost to the city of the registration and licensing of plumbers may be considered in determining the reasonableness of the fee, and, as his bill alleges only one tenth of the amount collected was actually expended for that purpose, it should be held so unreasonable as a matter of law as to amount to a tax for revenue. But the costs of registration are not the only ones entering into a determination of the reasonableness of the license fee. InPottsville Boro. v. Pottsville Gas Co.,
The license fee therefore may properly include not only the actual cost of registration, but also any reasonably probable cost of supervision, inspection, examination or regulation which may be carried on by the city. An examination of the Act of 1911, and its amendments in force at the time appellant's bill was filed, discloses that it provides a comparatively comprehensive system of regulation for the plumbing business in cities of the first class. Section 5 provides for the filing of plans in connection with the construction of plumbing work in any building (subject to certain exceptions), and their rejection or approval by the Department of Public Health. Section 7 provides for inspection of drainage, sewage or plumbing work by the city authorities before it is covered over. These, and other sections of the act, show that registration is far from being the only supervision *152
undertaken by the city the cost of which may properly be included in the license fee. An illustration of the application of the principle here involved is found in American BaseballClub of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia,
Agnes v. Sioux City,
Our conclusion as to the $25. fee is that appellant has not pleaded a state of facts from which a court could determine as a matter of law that these fees were so disproportionate to the reasonably probable expenses of licensure and regulation as to make them taxes for revenue purposes.
Concerning the fees for the approval of appellant's bonds, a similar requirement for electrical contractors was held valid in City of Tucson v. Stewart, supra. The court there reviewed numerous cases on this subject, including cases where the municipality required bonds of plumbers, and pointed out that although there is a split of authority on the point the better reasoning holds such a requirement valid as within the police power. The statutory requirement for the bonds in the present case was, we think, valid under our constitution; it was not a local or special law, as appellant contends, because the bond was conditioned upon the observance of the plumbing code regulations, and these being admittedly valid, a bond so conditioned is based on such a substantial distinction as would prevent the law requiring it from being considered special or local legislation. The result might be different had the bond been conditioned merely to indemnify property owners for any damage done in the course of the plumbing work.
Having concluded, for the reasons stated, that the fees imposed by the amendatory Act of 1931 were reasonable license fees, it is unnecessary to consider the additional questions argued in the briefs.
Decree affirmed at the costs of appellant. *154