2 Stew. 429 | Ala. | 1830
The bill prays a specific performance of the ante miptial contract, as far as the appellant is interested, and for relief against the operation of the judgment at law which the appellee has obtained against her. The answer does not deny any of the material facts charged, but rests the defence on the legal and equitable validity of the appellees title, and the confirmation it has received from the judgment at law rendered m his favor, in the suit between the same parties, and which has been recently affirmed in this Court.
That the estate was an inheritance of which the wife was seized; that the marriage actually took place; that there was issue of the marriage capable of inheriting; and that the wife had died previous to the institution of either suit; are facts which are not understood to he com
Hence the entire controversy resolves itself into the question, what is now the legitimate effect of the ante nuptial contract. If the judicial determination which has been hadwaslegal, or if it has a binding influence at present, it is conclusive of the right, unless it is the province of Chancery, subsequent to the decision at law, to arrest the recovery, and establish it on other and contrary principles. It appeal’s from the views taken of the case in the former decision, and the authorities on which it was founded, that this Court was then of opinion that the right to the curtesy was sustainable, as well on the principles of equity as of law. It is true the opinion expressed more confidence as to the legal right, but it rested the decision mainly on Chancery authority.
In that decision, the case of Roberts v. Dixwell,
The decisions above referred to, being urged in favor of the heir of the wife, after her death, in opposition to the right of curtesy, the vice Chancellor said “ that as the two conflicting,opinions of Lord Hardwicko could not be reconciled, recourse must be had to principle and analogy; that, as at law, where the wife, during coverture, is seised of an estate of inheritance, the husband, having had issue by her capable of inheriting the estate, is entitled to the curtesy; so where the wife is seised of an equitable estate of inheritance, and has issue capable of inheriting it, the husband is equally entitled to the curtesy; that in "this case she had an equitable estate of inheritance, notwithstanding the rents and profits were to be paid to her separate use for life; that by the receipt of the rents, she was seised of the estate, and having issue capable of inheriting, the husband must be entitled to the curtesy. ”
The settlement in the case of Morgan v. Morgan, appears to have been more effectual and absolute than in the case at bar. There the conveyance was to trustees, in trust, for the separate use for the wife, for life, with power to her to appoint the fee by deed or will, and for want of appointment, in trust for her, her heirs and assigns; from which it might plausibly have been contended, the inten
The case mainly relied upon, in opposition to the right of curtesy,
When the case of Lecatt v. Smoot 4’ Nicholson, was determined at a former term of this Court, I expressed what I conceived to be a sound interpretation of this ante nuptial contract, executed by Lecatt, previous to his intermarriage with Ann Sertill The subject is doubtless one of deep interest to the parties
It then becomes important to inquire, whether this Court is now bound by an interpretation which they gave to the same contract, though between different parties, in a case on the law side of this Court, though in the present case we sit as a Court of equity.
That the rules of construing a contract are the same in both Courts, though the mode of proceeding and administering relief be different, is a proposition too'plaintoadmitof debate. If a Court of law having competent jurisdiction, interpret a given contract, and decide that it does no 11 ake away the right to curtesy, a Court of equity is concluded by such decision on the same matter, and between the same parties; but generally it is otherwise when the suit is between different parties.. But where the Judges to-day sitting as a Court of law, undertake to interpret a contract, and to decide on rights growing out of that contract; to-morrow, the same Judges sitting as a Court of equity, though in a case between different parties, ought to be governed by the principles of their first interpretation and decision, unless they believe it was manifestly wrong. If, in the case of Lecatt v. Smoot & Nicholson, a majority of the Court were of opinion that Lecatt’s right to the curtesy could not be defeated by the marriage contract, it would at least argue much inconsistency for them now to act in direct opposition to their former opinion, and give a new construction to the same contract; though they sit as Chancellors, and the case is between different parties.
For the reason alone, therefoi’c, that a majority of the Court are not ready as yet, to recede from their former construction and opinion, I do not dissent from the judgment now pronounced by the Court.
Believing the opinion of the Court in this case to be at variance with correct legal rule, with entire respect, I feel it due to myself to express the reason why I have yielded to it my acquiescence. The reason is briefly this: this Court, at July term, 1828, in a case at law between these parties, in which the same subject matter was in controversy, held that the ante nuptial
The principle of the opinion of the Court, according to my conception, is this: that the husband cannot be divested of his curtesy, by an agreement entered into with his wife previous to, and in contemplation of their marriage, unless that agreement renounces it in totidem verbis. If there be any authority savouring of this notion, it has eluded my researches, and doubtless those of the counsel for the appellee. The authorities by which the opinion of the Court is attempted to be sustained, when examined, will, I apprehend, be found to lend it no assistance. The case of Tabb v. Archer, if it can be used in this case for any purpose, will, when examined entirely, be found to be an authority adverse to the positions which it is quoted as evidencing.
If the ante nuptial agreement was presented to a conveyancer as a memoranda, from which to draft a marriage settlement, would he not so draw it as that the husband’s right to the curtesy would be relinquished, according to the rules of law as heretofore ascertained? Most certainly he would What else can be meant by these words: “ That the said Littleton Lecatt, by these presents, renounces all claim, right, title, or interest to any part or or parts of the estate, of the late Thomas Surtill, in right of the said Anne Surtill, his intended wife,” than a renunciation of all “claim, right, title, or interest,” which the appellee might acquire, immediately on his marriage with “ Anne Surtill,” or on any contingency. This is a question to which it seems there can be but one answer.
I will not pursue the subject any farther, as I am denied the privilege of dissenting, but will remark, that whenever an analogous case shall come before this Court, I will treat it as res integra, in its adjudication.
Decree affirmed.
I Atk. 606.
Clancy on Rights of married women, p. 193.
3 Atk. 693.
5 Mod. 408.
Meth. Epis. Church vs. Jaques, 3 John. Ch. R. 77.
7 John Ch a. 229. ’ ’