Rocha v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation

May 24, 2017
15-16908
Versions:

MEMORANDUM***

Reuven Rasooly appeals the district court‘s dismissal with prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the State of California, the California Department of Child Support Services (“DCSS“), Contra Costa County, and two Contra Costa County employees, G. Boyd Tarin and Melinda R. Self (collectively, “Defendants“). We affirm.

1. The district court correctly dismissed Rasooly‘s claims against Contra Costa County, Tarin, and Self under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as barred by res judicata. Rasooly‘s federal action involves the “same cause of action,” i.e. the same primary right, as his state court suit—a right to recoup payments alleged to have been wrongly collected by Defendants. See San Diego Police Officers’ Ass‘n v. San Diego City Emps. Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009). While Rasooly purports to allege different damages in his Second Amended Complaint, those additional fees are derivative of Defendants’ initial collection.

The parties to Rasooly‘s federal and state court actions are either the same or in privity. See Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal.4th 888, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d 297, 301 (2002). All of the Defendants except Self were parties to Rasooly‘s suit in state court. Self is in privity with two parties to the state court litigation: Linda Dippel and Contra Costa County, Self‘s employer. See Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass‘n, 60 Cal.App.4th 1053, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 87 (1998). Dippel and Self were in the same legal position as supervisors of Tarin‘s actions in the DCSS child support collection proceeding against Rasooly. See id. at 90 n.12. Contra Costa County, as Self‘s employer, is vicariously liable for actions taken by Self within the scope of her employment. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2. Vicarious liability is sufficient to establish privity here; Self would have been entitled to assert the same prosecutorial and litigation immunities invoked by the County in the earlier litigation. See Burdette v. Carrier Corp., 158 Cal.App.4th 1668, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 185, 196-98 (2008). Finally, the circumstances do not warrant an equitable exception to preclusion. See Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13, 193 P.2d 728, 732 (1948).

2. The district court dismissed Rasooly‘s claims against the State of California and DCSS as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Rasooly waived this issue by failing to address it in his briefing. Armentero v. I.N.S., 412 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005).

AFFIRMED.

William Anthony Romaine, Attorney, Law Office of William A Romaine, Hanford, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Mary Horst, Deputy General Counsel, AGCA—Office of the California Attorney General, Fresno, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

MEMORANDUM***

Linda Rocha appeals the district court‘s order granting California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation‘s (“CDCR‘s“) motion for judgment on the pleadings on res judicata grounds. We affirm.

1. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Rocha timely filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the district court‘s entry of judgment in favor of CDCR. ER 1-2. The district court‘s earlier judgment in favor of Defendant Groves (who at that point was the only defendant who had been served) did not trigger the 30-day window to file a notice of appeal because the judgment resolved only the claims against Groves and the district court went on to adjudicate Rocha‘s claims against CDCR. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 872 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. The district court correctly held that res judicata barred Rocha‘s claims, a decision we review de novo. United States v. Liquidators of European Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011). Res judicata requires: “(1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between parties.” Id. at 1150 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg‘l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003)).

3. Regarding the first requirement, we agree with the district court that there was an identity of claims between the two lawsuits because both stemmed from the same transactional nucleus of facts: an alleged pattern of retaliation that ultimately resulted in Rocha‘s termination. Rocha failed to identify any barrier to raising all of her claims during the first lawsuit. See Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713-14 (9th Cir. 2001). The final two elements are met because Rocha previously filed a lawsuit against CDCR that resulted in a Rule 68 judgment, as Rocha acknowledges.

AFFIRMED.

Notes

*
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**
The Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. The Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
***
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.