222 Mass. 336 | Mass. | 1916
This is an action on a policy of health and accident insurance. There was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was taken ill on October 9, 1909. A certificate of an attending physician states that on December 16, 1910, he still was unable to do any work.
It was a condition of the policy that “F. Failure to make any payment on or before the date when the same is due shall terminate this Policy. . . . J. Cancellation. — This policy shall terminate and cease to be in force upon failure to pay a premium when due.”
The jury found that the period for which the plaintiff was entitled to recover ended on October 18, 1910. The policy provided :that “proof ... of any sickness for which claim can be made, must be furnished to the Company . . . within thirty days from the. date ... of the termination of disability.” Such proof was filed with the company on January 2, 1911. It is contended that this was not a compliance with the policy and that the plaintiff’s .claim thereby is forfeited. The policy provides for two different sick benefits, one, “Benefit No. 6,” a “Sickness Indemnity” payable: when the “insured by reason of sickness is necessarily and continuously confined within the house,” and the other, “Benefit No. 7,” “Non-Confining Sickness Indemnity,” payable when “the insured shall be wholly and continuously disabled from performing every duty pertaining to any business or occupation.” The equivalent of “disability” occurs in this clause and not in “Bene
The ground for recovery of “Benefit No. 6,” which the plaintiff claims, is stated in the policy to be that “the insured by reason of sickness is necessarily and continuously confined within the house.” This clause was embodied in its exact words in a request for instructions. The denial of this request was error. A policy of insurance is a written contract. Its terms are to be given a reasonable construction. Each party is entitled to have the contract interpreted according to the words used, and not stretched to include gratuities to one whose misfortune may excite sympathy. A stipulation that there can be no recovery, except for a period while the insured is continuously confined within the house, is a reasonable one. It is for the parties to decide whether they want that kind of insurance. Presumably, the rate charged was based on the unlikelihood of such sickness continuing for a long period as compared with a simple disability sickness. The contrast between a benefit payable for a sickness which confines the insured continuously within the house, and one which merely disables him from all business or employment, is distinctly made in the policy at bar and a different rate of benefit is payable for each kind of sickness. It is an elementary rule in the interpretation of contracts that whenever reasonably practicable every word shall be given effect. It must be presumed that words have been employed for the purpose of expressing the intent of the parties. The word “con
The plaintiff signed two releases of all claims under the policy, one attached to a draft for $50 and the other a separate instrument. He testified that an agent of the defendant, after some discussion about settlement, said to him: “‘Here is a draft; that is for money that you have got to have. . . . That is the receipt I must return to the company, but this receipt goes without the filling. . . . That is a draft for money that is coming to you, and sign up here. . . . That is the receipt that I must return to the company, that you received the money. . . . Sign here;’” and that the receipts were not read to him. The plaintiff contended in substance that this was a payment of the first month’s instalment of the sick benefit, and that he was induced by the false representations of the agent to sign the releases without reading them or knowing their contents. The plaintiff kept the draft with the release attached several days, and then collected it. That is a strong argument as to the fact of knowledge by the plaintiff. The case is close upon this point, but we incline to the opinion that it cannot quite be said as matter of law that a representation that a paper is a receipt, when in truth it is a release under seal, may not have been found to have been a material false representation. Freedley v. French, 154 Mass. 339. McNamara v. Boston Elevated Railway, 197 Mass. 383. Barry v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 211 Mass. 306, 310.
The plaintiff was not obliged to tender to the defendant the $50 paid him when the release was signed. That might be treated as a payment ón account. Bliss v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad, 160 Mass. 447.
The result is that the answer to the first question cannot be pronounced erroneous in law. It is an issue quite separate and
But there was such error in the refusal to give appropriate requests for instructions, that the answer to the second question must be set aside and a new trial had.
So ordered.