5:05-cv-01581 | W.D. La. | Feb 1, 2008
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
JAYN ROBISON CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-1581
VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.
CARDIOLOGY ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Cardiology
Associates, L.L.C. (Record Document 63) and two Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
filed by Plaintiff Jayn Robison (Record Documents 64 and 65). Cardiology Associates,
L.L.C. (“Cardiology Associates”) moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff Jayn
Robison (“Robison”) possesses no valid copyright because (1) the collection letters at issue
are not subject to copyright, and (2) she failed to provide proper notice of copyright when
she used the letters in the 1970s. Conversely, Robison moves for partial summary
judgment on the issues of originality and copying, maintaining that (1) her collection letters
contain the minimum degree of creativity required to satisfy the originality standard, and
(2) Cardiology Associates copied her letters within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 106. For
the reasons which follow, Cardiology Associates’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment
(Record Document 63) is DENIED; Robison’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with
Regard to Copying (Record Document 64) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
and Robison's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with Regard to Originality (Record
Document 65) is GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In September 1990, Robison registered a series of collection letters with the United
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States Copyright Office and obtained a Certificate of Registration (“certificate”). See
Record Document 63, Exhibit J. On the certificate, Robison listed 1986 as the year in
which creation of the work was completed. See id. She did not complete the lines
designated for date of first publication. See id. These lines were to be completed only if
the work had been published. See id. These copyrighted letters are now the subject of
the instant action for copyright infringement. The letters are attached to Robison’s
complaint and are also exhibits in the summary judgment record. See Record Document
1, Exhibit A; Record Document 65, Exhibit A.
Based on Robison’s deposition testimony, Cardiology Associates contends that she
drafted and published the letters at issue in the 1970s while employed with Hollier & Marks,
a medical group. See Record Document 8, Exhibit I at 29-30. This time frame is well
before the 1986 date reflected in the certificate and the 1990 copyright date. However, in
her deposition, Robison also stated that the letters she copyrighted in 1990 were created
in 1986. See id., Exhibit I at 28. Likewise, in a later filed affidavit, Robison attested that
the copyrighted letters were not in existence when she worked for Hollier & Marks and that
she did not publish the letters prior to the time she filed her copyright application. See
Record Document 67, Exhibit 2. Below are pertinent excerpts of Robison’s deposition:
Q. Let’s go through some of the allegations of that complaint. . . . Okay.
This lawsuit revolves around a series of letters that you have allegedly
written; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. When did you write those letters? When did you create those letters?
A. 1986.
Q. When in 1986, do you recall?
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A. No, I don’t.
Q. And just –
MR. BENSON: I want her to rely on her memory right now.
BY MR. BENSON:
Q. Ms. Robison, if you would don’t refer to any materials. . . .
Q. . . . So sometime in 1986. Was it when you were working for LIG or
after that?
A. It could have been before, it could have been after, I do not know.
Q. Okay. What prompted you to write these letters, to draft these letters?
A. For the purpose to help – I had drafted the letters before then, and I
had used them.
Q. Well, hold on. I asked you a minute ago when you created these
letters and you told me 1986; is that not correct?
A. Formally 1986.
Q. My question –
A. Then I don’t know, a period of years before that I have been drafting
working on them, so as far as giving you an exact date I cannot give you that.
Q. Can you give me an approximate date?
A. In the ‘80s.
Q. Early ‘80s?
A. I'm sorry, I just don't have a date for you. I can’t pull one out.
Q. So you drafted these letters after you worked for Hollier and Marks,
correct?
A. I used them while there, so it had to have been before then.
Q. So you drafted these letters in the ‘70s?
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A. No.
Q. Okay. Well, follow me. Didn’t you cease employment with Hollier and
Marks in 1980?
A. Okay. I see. Yes, it would have been the ‘70s.
Q. When you wrote these letters, were you employed with Hollier and
Marks?
A. I was.
Q. Did you write these letters to help Drs. Hollier and Marks collect their
accounts receivable?
A. I wrote them for my own personal use and satisfaction.
Q. You didn’t – did you use them in your employ with Hollier and Marks?
A. Yes.
Record Document 8, Exhibit I at 28-30.1 Further, Cardiology Associates claims that
Robison used the letters in the 1970s without placing the appropriate copyright notice on
them. It also argues that Robison falsely swore on the application for registration of
copyright that the letters were created in 1986 when, in fact, they were created in the
1970s.
In September 2001, Robison was hired by Cardiology Associates as an
administrator/office manager. See id., Exhibit I at 16. Dr. Ralph Baucum served as her
supervisor. See id., Exhibit I at 17. During this employment, Robison placed one or more
of her collection letters into Cardiology Associates’ billing computer software. See id.,
Exhibit I at 39-40. According to Robison, she advised Cardiology Associates that her
1
This exchange occurred at pages 28-30 of the deposition transcript. Finally, on
page 48 of the transcript, defense counsel showed Robison “these letters” and handed her
a copy of the complaint and attachments. Record Document 8, Exhibit I at 48.
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letters were copyrighted at this time. See id., Exhibit I at 40. Cardiology Associates used
Robison’s collection letters in the course of its collection efforts and such use was with
Robison’s knowledge and consent. See id.
On Friday, April 30, 2004, Cardiology Associates terminated Robison. See id.,
Exhibit I at 16. Shortly after her termination, Robison requested that Cardiology Associates
stop using her collection letters. See id., Exhibit I at 43-44. Cardiology Associates agreed
to this request. See id., Exhibit I at 44. According to Robison, she called Dr. Baucum of
Cardiology Associates on the Monday following her termination and requested that
Cardiology Associates stop using her letters and return hard copies of her letters that she
had left in her office. See id., Exhibit I at 43. Dr. Baucum confirms this phone call, but can
only place it to within a month of Robison’s termination. See Record Document 64, Exhibit
A at 20. Notwithstanding, there is no dispute that Robison requested that Cardiology
Associates cease using her collection letters sometime in May 2004. Despite such
request, Cardiology Associates did not contact its computer service about changing its
collection letters until September 2004. See id., Exhibit C & Exhibit D at 21-23.
Between May 2004 and January 2005 and subsequent to Robison’s request to stop
using her collection letters, Cardiology Associates distributed at least eight six collection
letters to its delinquent accounts. See Record Document 64-3 at ¶ 5. The only collection
letters on Cardiology Associates’ computer system during this time frame are contained
in the record at Record Document 64, Exhibit E. See id. at ¶ 6. Cardiology Associates
admits that the letters contained in Exhibit E are the letters it sent out to its patients
between May 2004 and January 2005. See id. at ¶ 7. Robison maintains that the letters
contained in Exhibit E are substantially similar to two of her collection letters, which are
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contained in the record at Record Document 64, Exhibit F.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 5, 2005, Robison filed the instant action against Cardiology
Associates alleging copyright infringement. See Record Document 1. Cardiology
Associates filed its answer on September 16, 2005, denying the allegations set forth in the
complaint and asserting defenses. See Record Document 5. Cardiology Associates filed
a first motion for summary judgment. See Record Document 8. The Court denied the
motion, finding that summary judgment was not appropriate at that stage of the litigation
because there was insufficient clarity of fact on issues material to the case. See Record
Document 21. The Court noted that further discovery may resolve some of the factual
disputes in this case. See id. The instant motion for summary judgment and motions for
partial summary judgment were filed on October 31, 2007. See Record Document 63-65.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317" date_filed="1986-06-25" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Catrett">477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). “Rule 56(c) mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
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Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254" date_filed="2002-03-18" court="5th Cir." case_name="Stahl v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.">283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). If the movant
demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, “the nonmovant must go
beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275" date_filed="2001-10-17" court="5th Cir." case_name="Littlefield v. Forney Independent School District">268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001). Where
critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a
judgment in favor of the nonmovant, then summary judgment should be granted. See
Alton v. Tex. A&M Univ., 168 F.3d 196" date_filed="1999-04-08" court="5th Cir." case_name="Travis Alton, Travis Alton v. Texas A&m University, Thomas Darling Malon Southerland Robert H. Dalton M.T. "Ted" Hopgood, Major General">168 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1999).
II. Copyright Infringement.
For Robison to prevail on her claim of copyright infringement, she must show (1)
ownership of a valid copyright and (2) unauthorized copying. See Peel & Co., Inc. v. The
Rug Market, 238 F.3d 391" date_filed="2001-01-24" court="5th Cir." case_name="Peel & Company Inc v. Rug Market">238 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2001). Cardiology Associates has moved for
summary judgment based on the first element, ownership of a valid copyright. Robison
has moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of originality, one requirement of
a valid copyright, and copying. The Court will now examine the two elements of copyright
infringement separately.
A. Ownership of a Valid Copyright.
“Ownership of a valid copyright is established by proving the originality and
copyrightability of the material and compliance with the statutory formalities.” Norma
Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little, 51 F.3d 45" date_filed="1995-04-27" court="5th Cir." case_name="Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc., Plaintiff-Counter v. John D. Little, John D. Little and Lorianne Little, Defendants-Counter">51 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).2
2
“Plaintiff’s ownership . . . breaks down into the following constituent parts: (1)
originality in the author; (2) copyrightability of the subject matter; (3) a national point of
attachment of the work . . .; (4) compliance with applicable statutory formalities; and (5) (if
plaintiff is not the author) a transfer of rights or other relationship between the author and
the plaintiff so as to constitute the plaintiff as the valid copyright claimant.” 4-13 Nimmer
on Copyright § 13.01 (2007). Constituent parts 3 and 5 are not pertinent to the instant
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“Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the prima facie case, and Defendant bears the
burden as to defense.” 3-12 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.11. Title 17 U.S.C. § 410(c)
provides:
In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or
within five years after first publication of the work SHALL constitute prima
facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in
the certificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a
registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court.
17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (emphasis added). While the certificate constitute prima facie evidence
of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate, the presumption is
rebuttable. Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc., 51 F.3d 45" date_filed="1995-04-27" court="5th Cir." case_name="Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc., Plaintiff-Counter v. John D. Little, John D. Little and Lorianne Little, Defendants-Counter">51 F.3d at 47.
In this case, Robison has presented her certificate, stating that 1986 was the “year
in which creation of [her] work was completed” and that her work had not been published.
See Record Document 63, Exhibit K. The Court must accept Robison’s certificate as prima
facie evidence of the validity of the copyright, including originality, copyrightability, and
compliance with statutory formalities. Further, the Court must also accept the certificate
as prima facie evidence that Robison created the letters in 1986 and had not published the
letters as of 1990, both of which are facts contained in the certificate. The Court will now
determine whether Cardiology Associates has rebutted the Section 410(c) presumption.3
matter.
3
Relying on Robison’s deposition testimony regarding use of collection letters in the
1970s, Cardiology Associates argues that “since plaintiff published these letters more than
five years before she registered them with the Copyright Office, she is not entitled to any
presumption of validity under the Copyright Act.” Record Document 63-2 at 23. Yet, as
noted above, Robison stated in her certificate that she created the letters in 1986 and had
not published the letters as of the date of her copyright application in 1990. The Court
must accept the certificate as prima facie evidence of these facts. Cardiology Associates’
contention that the letters were created and published in the 1970s will be entertained in
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1. Originality.4
Robison’s certificate is prima facie evidence for everything it contains, including the
fact that she authored the letters. Thus, the burden shifts to Cardiology Associates to
demonstrate that she copied from prior sources and was not original. See 3-12 Nimmer
on Copyright § 12.1. If Cardiology Associates offers such proof, then the burden shifts to
Robison to overcome that evidence. See id. However, it is not “sufficient for [Cardiology
Associates] to offer evidence of prior similar works in the absence of evidence that
[Robison actually] copied from such works.” Id.
Originality “means only that the work was independently created by the author (as
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree
of creativity.” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340" date_filed="1991-03-27" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.">499 U.S. 340,
345, 111 S. Ct. 1282" date_filed="1991-03-27" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.">111 S.Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991). Courts have held that “the requisite level of creativity
is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice” and most works “make the grade quite
easily, as they possess some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble or obvious it
might be.” Id. Most importantly, the Feist court distinguished originality and novelty:
Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it
closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the
result of copying. To illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant of the
other, compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original
and, hence, copyrightable.
Id. at 345-346, 111 S.Ct. 1287-1288.
To disprove originality, Cardiology Associates argues that Robison copied from
the Court’s analysis of whether Cardiology Associates has rebutted the Section 410(c)
presumption.
4
The Court is entertaining cross motions for summary judgment on originality.
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earlier letters in the public domain, that she added nothing of any significance to the
collection letters already existing in the public domain, and that her letters do not contain
any ideas, but rather are tools used to attempt to collect debts.5
Again, Robison’s letters are contained in Record Document 65, Exhibit A. From her
deposition testimony, it is clear that Robison had read other collection letters. But with her
letters, she sought to create collection letters that achieved the goal of collecting the
account, but were also sympathetic, unoffending, cooperative, and non-threatening. See
Record Document 8, Exhibit I at 49-50. According to Robison, she was “trying to give the
patients options without making them feel threatened.” Id., Exhibit I at 51. In the letters,
Robison expressed that the account is now due, we realize that you (the patient) have
hardships, we realize that real life happens, and we are willing to work with you to settle
the account. See id., Exhibit I at 49. Robison sought to achieve these goals with her
terminology and phraseology. See id., Exhibit I at 57. Phrases from her letters include:
• We regret having to take these measures and have tried working with
you in order to clear this account.
• We can at this time still make financial arrangements with you to clear
the account and cancell [sic] legal procedures.
• It is my intent to work with you and to set up a payment schedule that
is reasonable and financially accepted to you. I do not want to cause
5
This final argument is easily dispelled. Robison’s letters clearly and concisely
convey numerous ideas: an assertion that the recipient owes money to the sender; a
request for payment; a non-threatening and cooperative approach to the debtor; and a
threat of action adverse to the debtor if payment is not forthcoming. See Record
Document 73, Exhibit A. Further, defense expert Dr. Perlman identified fifteen separate
ideas in Robison’s letters. See Record Document 80, Exhibit A at 14-18. Robison is not
claiming a copyright in these ideas, but rather in the particular way that she expressed the
ideas in her letters – that is, the actual language that she used, which is subject to
copyright. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201" date_filed="1954-04-12" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Mazer v. Stein">347 U.S. 201, 217, 74 S.Ct. 460, 470 (1954).
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any undo [sic] financial stress however this account needs to be taken
care of.
• Your account has been presented to me in order to try to establish [a]
payment plan suitable to you and your financial obligations in order to
clear the account.
Record Document 65, Exhibit A.
a. Independent Creation by the Author.
Robison has consistently testified that she independently created the letters.
Likewise, defense expert Dr. Alan Perlman, a Ph.D. in the field of linguistics, testified in his
deposition that he did not believe that Robison’s letters were directly copied because he
did not see “specific and point-for-point similarities in the actual wording.” Record
Document 65, Exhibit D at 21-22.
Cardiology Associates has come forward with no competent summary judgment
evidence that Robison copied her letters from earlier letters. It is attempting to establish
that Robison copied from the public domain by arguing that her works are substantially
similar to works in the public domain. Such an inferential attack on originality appears to
be permissible. See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262" date_filed="2001-12-03" court="2d Cir." case_name="Judi Boisson v. Banian">273 F.3d 262, 269-270 (2nd Cir. 2001)(noting
that scholars disagree whether inferential proof of copying by the copyright holder is
permissible and declining to decide the issue in view of the defendant’s lack of evidence).
Under the case law, the necessary access must have taken place prior to the time Robison
created her work. The Boisson court reasoned:
Defendants also failed to show that [public domain works] similar to
[Plaintiff's work] were so widely disseminated or known as to infer that
Boisson reasonably would have seen one before designing her own works.
Boisson, 273 F.3d 262" date_filed="2001-12-03" court="2d Cir." case_name="Judi Boisson v. Banian">273 F.3d at 270.
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In our case, the only alleged pubic domain letters identified by Cardiology
Associates are contained in Exhibit L of Record Document 63. A cursory review of the
letters reveals that the language appears to be dissimilar to Robison’s letters.
Notwithstanding, the public domain letters are the result of a Google.com search and
Cardiology Associates has provided no competent summary judgment evidence as to
when the letters contained in Exhibit L were created. Some of the public domain letters
contain no date; some are dated October 29, 2007, presumably the date the Google.com
search was run; and others are dated 2003 or 2004. Thus, there is no way to determine
if these public domain letters were even in existence prior to Robison’s creation of her
letter, whether the creation occurred in the 1970s or in 1986. Further, there is no record
evidence as to the content of the public domain as it existed prior to the creation of
Robison’s letters. Without proof that Robison copied from public domain letters, the mere
existence of similar works cannot defeat the originality of Robison’s letters. See Feist
Publications, 499 U.S. 340" date_filed="1991-03-27" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.">499 U.S. at 345-46; 111 S.Ct. at 1287-1288; Boisson, 273 F.3d 262" date_filed="2001-12-03" court="2d Cir." case_name="Judi Boisson v. Banian">273 F.3d at 270-271.
Cardiology Associates also relies heavily upon Fifth Circuit case law for the principle
that “originality . . . means that the material added to what is in the public domain must
have aspects of novelty and be something more than a trivial addition or variation. If what
is added does not itself give some value to a public domain composition, or serve some
purpose other than to merely emphasize what is present and subsisting in the pubic
domain, it is not entitled to copyright.” Donald v. Zack Meyer’s T.V. Sales and Service, 426
F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970); see also Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little, 51 F.3d
45, 47 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[A] work may be protected by copyright even though it is based on
. . . something already in the public domain if the author, through his skill and effort, has
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contributed a distinguishable variation from the older works. However, a ‘distinguishable
variation’ must be substantial and not merely trivial.”). These cases are easily
distinguishable. In Donald, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s form contracts were
insufficiently original to merit copyright protection. Yet, this determination was based on
an examination of the plaintiff’s forms and specific earlier works. Donald, 426 F.2d at
1029. In Little, the court was able to compare the alleged infringing ribbon flowers with the
ribbon flowers that already existed in the public domain and concluded that there was
nothing new in the design of the flowers themselves. Little, 51 F.3d 45" date_filed="1995-04-27" court="5th Cir." case_name="Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc., Plaintiff-Counter v. John D. Little, John D. Little and Lorianne Little, Defendants-Counter">51 F.3d at 48. In our case, as
discussed in much greater detail above, this Court is unable to compare Robison’s letters
with specific earlier works that existed in the public domain prior to the creation of her
letters.
b. Minimal Degree of Creativity.
Cardiology Associates contends that Robison’s deposition testimony establishes
that her letters lack creativity. During her deposition, Robison was repeatedly asked what
made her letters different from any other collection letter; what novelty or originality did her
thought process add to the letters; and what about the letters was novel. First, many of
these questions go to novelness and the Feist court clearly held that originality does not
require a showing of novelty. See Feist Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. 340" date_filed="1991-03-27" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.">499 U.S. at 345; 111 S.Ct. at
1287. Moreover, Robison’s answers to this line of questioning demonstrate what is original
about her letters – the phraseology and expression of the collection concepts contained
in the letters. See Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135" date_filed="1992-07-28" court="5th Cir." case_name="Hodge E. Mason and Hodge Mason Maps, Inc. v. Montgomery Data, Inc.">967 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1992)
(discussing the idea/expression merger doctrine). It is true that the concept contained in
her letters is contained in all collection letters – you owe money, we would like to work with
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you, but if you do not pay we will sue. Yet, Robison is not claiming a copyright in the
concept, but rather her expression of that concept. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201" date_filed="1954-04-12" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Mazer v. Stein">347 U.S. 201, 217,
74 S. Ct. 460" date_filed="1954-04-12" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Mazer v. Stein">74 S.Ct. 460, 470 (1954). Her expression of the collection concept was meant to be
sympathetic, unoffending, cooperative, and non-threatening. Again, she was “trying to give
the patients options without making them feel threatened.” Record Document 8, Exhibit
I at 51. Cardiology Associates cannot defeat Robison’s copyright by its allegation that the
ideas and concepts in Robison’s letters can be found in earlier public domain letters. See
Kamar International, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059" date_filed="1981-09-28" court="9th Cir." case_name="Kamar International v. Russ Berrie">657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981). The
copying of an idea but not of its expression does not constitute infringement. See 3-12
Nimmer on Copyright § 12.11 n. 51.3. Likewise, the copying of the idea but not the
expression from a prior work does not derogate from originality. See id.
Here, the particular way that Robison chose to express her ideas, no matter if those
ideas were in the public domain, is original to her. It required some degree of creativity on
her part to select the language, terminology, and phraseology that she used to express
those ideas. This expression is what plaintiff sought to protect via copyright. Even Dr.
Perlman, the defense expert, stated that Robison’s letters “contained . . . some degree of
creativity in the phraseology of the content of [the] letters” and that the author of such
letters exhibited “at least a minimal degree of creativity” in creating the letters. Record
Document 65, Exhibit D at 89-90.
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that Cardiology Associates has not come
forward with enough evidence to rebut the Section 410(c) presumption with respect to
originality. Cardiology Associates has failed to come forward competent summary
judgment evidence establishing the content of the public domain as it existed prior to the
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creation of Robison’s letters or that Robison copied from such public domain letters.
Moreover, in light of the terminology and phraseology of Robison’s letters which expressed
a sympathetic, unoffending, cooperative, and non-threatening collection concept,
Cardiology Associates has not come forward with evidence to defeat the presumption that
Robison’s letters contained at least some minimal degree of creativity. Summary judgment
in favor of Robison on the issue of originality is granted.
2. Copyrightability.
It is clear from a review of the Second Motion for Summary Judgment that
Cardiology Associates seeks summary judgment on the issue of originality. Yet, a similar
request on the issue of copyrightability is not so apparent. At times, it appears that
Cardiology Associates has merged the elements of originality and copyrightability. See
Record Document 63-2 18-19. In its motion, Cardiology Associates states:
It is undisputed that plaintiff has registered what purports to be a
copyright of these letters with Copyright Office. However, the Copyright
Office can register only works where “the material deposited constitutes
copyrightable subject matter.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(a). That issue is a question
of law for this Court to decide. 1 M. Nimmer, Copyright § 12[10][B][3]
(1973); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972" date_filed="1980-03-25" court="2d Cir." case_name="A. A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., and Michael MacDonald Mooney">618 F.2d 972, (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841" date_filed="1980-10-06" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Angrist v. United States">449 U.S. 841, 66 L. Ed. 2d 49, 101 S. Ct. 121 (1980).
Simply put, plaintiff’s purportedly copyrighted letters are nothing more
than standard, run-of-the-mill collection letters. Plaintiff is attempting to
copyright something that has been in the public domain for decades and to
which she has added nothing new, original, or novel. This exercise of
judgment and discretion by the plaintiff (or, more specifically, the lack
thereof) is not the type of “original work” that is intended to be protected by
the Copyright Act.
Id. at 19. The Court construes this argument as Cardiology Associates’ request for
summary judgment on the issue of copyrightability.
Title 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) states that “when, after examination, the Register of
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Copyrights determines that, in accordance with the provisions of this title, the material
deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter and that the other legal and formal
requirements of this title have been met, the Register shall register the claim and issue to
the applicant a certificate of registration.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (emphasis added). Under
Section 410(a), the Copyright Office conducts “a substantive examination within its
particular expertise to determine validity: whether the work falls within the subject matter
of copyright.” 3-12 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.11. Further, the statute clearly states that
a certificate will be issued only if the material deposited constitutes copyrightable subject
matter. Robison was issued such a certificate in 1990. Thus, there is not only the Section
410(c) presumption in place, but also a strong indication that the Copyright Office
determined that Robison’s collection letters were copyrightable subject matter.
The Court considered, and ruled on, Cardiology Associates’ argument that the
copyrighted letters are standard, run-of-the-mill collection letters in its analysis of the
originality issue. Yet, in the context of copyrightability, Cardiology Associates’ bare
assertions are simply not enough to carry their burden of rebutting the statutory
presumption of validity on the issue of copyrightability. Cardiology Associates has offered
no proof to overcome the presumption and/or the Copyright Office’s determination that
Robison’s collection letters were copyrightable. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor
of Cardiology Associates on the issue of copyrightability must be denied.
3. Compliance with Statutory Formalities.
Again, under Section 410(c), there is a presumption in favor of Robison that she has
complied with all statutory formalities, including notice formalities under 17 U.S.C. §
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405(a).6 Cardiology Associates may rebut this presumption by showing, for example, that
she did not register her work within five years after first publication. See Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Rockingham Venture, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 38" date_filed="1995-05-26" court="D.N.H." case_name="Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Rockingham Venture, Inc.">909 F.Supp. 38, 43 (D.N.H.1995). Based on the
deposition testimony set forth in the factual background section of the instant
Memorandum Ruling, Cardiology Associates contends that Robison’s letters were
published in the 1970s, thereby placing the letters in the public domain without proper
copyright notice and invalidating any copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 405(a).
6
17 U.S.C.A. § 405 states:
(a) Effect of Omission on Copyright.–With respect to copies and
phonorecords publicly distributed by authority of the copyright owner
before the effective date of the Berne Convention Implementation Act
of 1988, the omission of the copyright notice described in sections
401 through 403 from copies or phonorecords publicly distributed by
authority of the copyright owner does not invalidate the copyright in a
work if–
(1) the notice has been omitted from no more than
a relatively small number of copies or
phonorecords distributed to the public; or
(2) registration for the work has been made before
or is made within five years after the publication
without notice, and a reasonable effort is made
to add notice to all copies or phonorecords that
are distributed to the public in the United States
after the omission has been discovered; or
(3) the notice has been omitted in violation of an
express requirement in writing that, as a
condition of the copyright owner's authorization
of the public distribution of copies or
phonorecords, they bear the prescribed notice.
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Conversely, Robison maintains that her deposition testimony is ambiguous and later
affirmatively stated in an affidavit that the copyrighted letters were not in existence when
she worked for Hollier & Marks in the 1970s and that she did not publish the letters prior
to the time she filed her copyright application. In that same affidavit, Robison attested that
none of the collection letters disseminated by Hollier and Marks contained any copyright
notice. See Record Document 67, Exhibit 2.
At this stage, the Court believes that Cardiology Associates has rebutted the Section
410(c) presumption as to compliance with statutory formalities, specifically notice under
Section 405(a). At a minimum, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to when the
copyrighted letters were created and when they were first published - the 1970s or 1986.
This threshold factual determination must be resolved by the trier of fact before this Court
can determine if Robison lost her copyright protection by placing her letters in the public
domain in the 1970s. The factual determination is also key in determining whether
Robison falsely swore on the application for registration of copyright that the letters were
created in 1986 when, in fact, they were created in the 1970s.7 Accordingly, summary
judgment on the issue of compliance with statutory formalities is denied.
B. Unauthorized Copying.
Copying is a “shorthand reference to the act of infringing any of the copyright
owner’s . . . exclusive rights” under 17 U.S.C. § 106. Dun & Bradstreet Software Services,
Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197" date_filed="2002-09-24" court="3rd Cir." case_name="Dun & Bradstreet Software Services, Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc.">307 F.3d 197, 206 (3rd Cir. 2002). Of relevance here,
7
“The presumption generally is not overcome by an ‘innocent misstatement.’ It may
be overcome, however, by proof of deliberate misrepresentation.” Whimsicality, Inc. v.
Rubie's Costume Co., Inc., 891 F.2d 452" date_filed="1989-12-15" court="2d Cir." case_name="Whimsicality, Inc., Cross-Appellee v. Rubie's Costume Co., Inc., Cross-Appellant">891 F.2d 452, 455 (2nd Cir. 1989).
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Section 106 provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work; [and]
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1-3).
Direct evidence of copying is rarely available; thus, “factual copying may be inferred
from (1) proof that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work prior to creation of
the infringing work and (2) probative similarity.” Peel & Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 391" date_filed="2001-01-24" court="5th Cir." case_name="Peel & Company Inc v. Rug Market">238 F.3d at 394. In
determining access, the court must weigh “whether the person who created the allegedly
infringing work had a reasonable opportunity to view the copyrighted work.” Id. Further,
in the Fifth Circuit, “if the two works are so strikingly similar as to preclude the possibility
of independent creation, copying may be proved without a showing of access.” Id. at 395.
The probative similarity element necessitates “a showing that the works, when compared
as a whole, are adequately similar to establish appropriation.” General Universal Systems,
Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131" date_filed="2004-07-20" court="3rd Cir." case_name="Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. President United States">379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).
Once a plaintiff establishes factual copying, she must then show that the copying
is legally actionable by demonstrating that the allegedly infringing work is substantially
similar to protectable elements of the infringed work. See id. at 142; Peel & Co., Inc., 238
F.3d at 395. Here, “a side-by-side comparison must be made between the original and the
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copy to determine whether a layman would view the two works as substantially similar.”
Id. Typically, the question of substantial similarity is for the trier of fact, yet “summary
judgment may be appropriate if the court can conclude, after viewing the evidence and
drawing inferences in a manner most favorable to the nonmoving party, that no reasonable
juror could find substantial similarity of ideas and expression.” Id.
In this case, the record evidence easily establishes that Cardiology Associates had
access to Robison’s collection letters. The letters were on Cardiology Associates’ billing
computer software during Robison’s employment. After her termination, Robison
requested that the letters be removed from the computer software and that her hard copies
be returned. See Record Document 8, Exhibit I at 43-44. Robison never received her hard
copies and Cardiology Associates did not contact its computer service about changing its
collection letters until September 2004. See id., Exhibit I at 44-45; Record Document 64,
Exhibit C & Exhibit D at 21-23. Based on this evidence, Cardiology Associates had more
than a reasonable opportunity to view the copyrighted work. See Peel & Co., Inc., 238
F.3d at 394. Summary judgment is therefore granted on the issue of access.
Yet, the Court declines to make such a finding on the issues of probative similarity
and substantial similarity. A side-by-side comparison of the letters contained in Record
Document 64, Exhibit E (the two letters Cardiology Associates sent to its delinquent
accounts between May 2004 and January 2005) and Exhibit F (Robison’s copyrighted
letters) does, in fact, show similarities. See Record Document 81, Exhibit A. Cardiology
Associates’ letters carry over a misspelling of the word “undue” from Robison’s letter. See
id. Moreover, one of Cardiology Associates’ letters is exactly the same as one of
Robison’s letters except for the deletion of four words. See id. Yet, this Court is reluctant
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to make subjective determinations regarding the similarity between the two sets of letters.
The Court must also view the evidence and draw inferences in favor of Cardiology
Associates, the nonmoving party on the issue of copying. Because findings of probative
and substantial similarities are based on subjective determinations and in light of the legal
standard applicable, the Court finds that reasonable jurors could differ on their findings as
to whether the two sets of letters are probatively and /or substantially similar. Accordingly,
summary judgment on the issues of probative similarity and substantial similarity must be
denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Second Motion for Summary
Judgment (Record Document 63) filed by Cardiology Associates. Robison’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment with Regard to Copying (Record Document 64) is granted on
the issue of access and denied on the issues of probative similarity and substantial
similarity. Robison’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with Regard to Originality
(Record Document 65) is granted. This case will proceed to jury trial on the following
issues: (1) infringement, specifically (a) whether Robison complied with statutory
formalities, such that she owns a valid copyright, and (b) the issues of probative similarity
and substantial similarity; (2) willfulness; and (3) damages.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 1st day of February,
2008.
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