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Robinson v. United States
697 A.2d 787
D.C.
1997
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*2 рretrial during a hear- April On SCHWELB, RUIZ, Before KING and an oral motion ing, prosecutor made Judges. Associate indictment, surplusage, from the strike substance allegation that the controlled SCHWELB, Judge: Associate heroin. Robin- by Robinson was distributed Royce by jury R. Robinson was convicted motion. He ex- attorney opposed the son’s of distribution of a controlled substance. On noting that he surprise, plicitly disclaimed appeal, conviction Robinson contends his previous fall. DEA 7 the had received because, claims, he must be reversed government acknowledged He also judge constructively amended the indictment. an indictment properly have secured Robinson bases this contention on the fact of a controlled for distribution specified that the con- specific substance al- identifying the without allegedly distrib- trolled substance which he distributed, the defense and that legedly heroin, whereas the evidence at uted as to information could then have obtained drug in fact established by requesting a identity of that substance cocaine. contended, how- particulars. Counsel bill Judge King are of ever, “went fur- prosecutors that because amendment, that there was no constructive to, they ... did they have didn’t ther — by any prejudiced not vari- Robinson was they’re I submit put in the heroin ance, there- and that the conviction should by it bound now.” Wooley v. United fore be affirmed. comprehensive re judge, after a The trial (D.C.1997), however, authorities, that there concluded view of the today, another of this court holds division She ex amendment. was no constructive facts, substantially the indict- similar [only] becomes plained that “a variance constructively amend- ment ih that case was at trial when facts constructive Wooley’s cоnviction must be ed and that the offense go to an essential element Ruiz, a member of who is reversed. from the charged are different and the facts division, join but who does the Robinson charged support that would the offense facts judges in agrees with the Woo- opinion, alia, on Relying, inter in the indictment.” required. Because four ley that reversal is (D.C. States, 591 A.2d 233 Carter judges in the two divisions of the six 1991), judge held that the reversal, cases and because the two voted for offense, not an element distinguishable, Robinson’s readily are not allegation in the surplusage the she struck as conviction is reversed. distributed that the substance Robinson was heroin. I. later, days at the commencement Three jury or about June On proper, read to the trial charging Robinson an indictment returned revised, contained no the indictment as controlled substance distribution of a 33-541(a) pre prosecutor heroin. The (heroin), reference to in violation of D.C.Code sold showing that Robinson Agency sented evidence Drug Enforcement sub- The Section Compliance pursuant 33 D.C.Code Agency's Drug Enforcement DEA 7 is the

1. The Custody Certification of 556.” "Report of Chain from the facts that would packet drugs to one Hamilton.2 are different Foster guilty.3 charged in the returned verdict of This indict support appeal followed. ment.” Giles United (D.C.1984) (emphasis original); see II. Johnson, at 1384. Be supra, 613 A.2d amend can no constructive cause there attorney acknowledged open Robinson’s *3 an departure affects essen ment unless the he court that received the DEA 7 several Rosenthal, element, 9 tried, States v. tial United before case that he months the was (2d 1016, 1021 Cir.1993), surprised by trial F.3d was not at the disclosure cocaine, drug that was Robin [cjonvictions sustained generally have been prejudice. son suffered no In absence upon they are long proof as the as prejudice, the case on whether the turns corresponds to an that was based constructively judge indict amended part clearly A set out in the indictment. by granting pretrial motion to strike ment unnecessary to inde- by allegation drug that the distributed allegations pendent of the of the offense If was Robinson heroin. there a con may normally proved be treated a use- amendment, structive then the absence of may ignored. averment ‍‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍that be less irrelevant, prеjudice to Robinson is Miller, 130, 136, States v. 471 U.S. United right “[deprivation of such a be [to basic (1985) 1811, 1815, 105 S.Ct. tried on indictment returned (citations quotation marks and internal omit- grand jury] too to ... is far serious be ted). Miller, Supreme explicit- In Court as harmless error.” Stirone v. dismissed ly rejected proposition “the that it constitutes States, 361 U.S. 80 United S.Ct. drop to from an unconstitutional amendment If, 252 on the allegations that are un- an hand, there was no constructive clearly con- necessary to an offense that is (or amendment, merely a variance at within it.” Id. S.Ct. tained variance),4 something than then re less only apрropriate upon showing versal States, prejudice, Berger v. United addressing claims of constructive In 629, 630-31, 79 L.Ed. 1314 amendment, consistently courts] have “[the (1935); Johnson v. United 613 A.2d permitted significant flexibility proof, pro- (D.C.1992), Robinson’s con given notice of that the defendant was vided must viction be affirmed. criminality proven at trial.” the core of (citations Rosenthal, at 1021-22 departure an A from the indictm terms omitted). quotation marks A con- internal ent5 “becomes a constructive amendment of the indictment oc- go to an structive amendment when facts introduced trial essen if, if, prosecution rеlies at charged, element of the offense and the curs tial technically present there was 5.In 2. The transaction between Robinson Hamil- by an who was was described officer watch- from the indict- departure ton trial terms point. ing from a concealed observation Other before the The indictment amended ment. recovered cocaine from Hamilton. officers began, on an indict- and Robinson was tried defense, claiming for the Hamilton testified allegation he that included no ment drugs, denying that he had he had found respect, In heroin. distributed was light bought In their them from Robinson. for in that case indict- differs from verdict, jurors Hamil- must have disbelieved formally amended in advance ment testimony. ton’s acknowledge, are how- We constrained trial. ever, was an unconstitutional con- that if there govern- 3. The instructed requiring reversal in Woo- structive prove required disagree proposition ley with which —then —a Robinson was cocaine. distributed stand, for likewise cannot Robinson’s conviction surplusage goes 4. We have stated that removal cases two the distinction between an indictment is neither constructive and not to substance. form See, е.g., v. a variance. Williams amendment nor (D.C.1994) n. 3 (citations omitted). “complex distinctly ample trial on a notice of the “core of crimi- of facts differ receivéd nality” charged, and be- ent from that which the set forth with which he was rely in the indictment.” on a com- Jackson cause the did not distinctly plex of facts different from those denied, alleged judge’s striking cert. S.Ct. (1966) 157, 17 in- (distinguishing allegation charging from the the heroin Stirone). not constitute a constructive strument did amendment.

We have held that the of the con- trolled by Judge substance is not element of the is bolstered Gur Our conclusion Carter, suprа, offense of distribution. opinion for the court Unit fein’s excellent (2d Cir.), sought reversal of his conviction ed 581 F.2d 305 because, him, according proof showed *4 although

that he had sold heroin to an under- the defen officer, police cover not know that the he did of heroin dants were indicted for distribution in substance was fact heroin and believed possession heroin with intent to dis evidence, however, instead that it was cocaine. This court re- it. There was tribute jected prosecution question may contention that have been drugs that in required prove jurors the defendant that judge charged the cocaine. The identity selling: guilty knew the of the he was if they could find the defendants appeal, the de substance was cocaine. On This is not a case where a defendant has charge argued judge’s “re fendants charged with the commission of one impermissible in an sulted informal offense and convicted of another. See Sti Id. at 310. amendment of the indictment.” States, [supra Appellant rone v. ]. disagreed: The court charged with the unlawful distribution in appel controlled substance violation of only alleged variance [T]he 541(a)(1), § and he was con D.C.Code nature of the lants is the exact 33— cоcaine; time, involved, victed of the unlawful distribution of a heroin or provision The object proved controlled substance. Code at trial are place, people, and question does not alleged Count Two respects all define the distribu terms distinctions between the substance of the indictment. Whether varying tions controlled substances. difference makes no was cocaine or heroin statutory framework, Under the § the statute cited under 21 U.S.C. differ mate ence between heroin and cocaine is a vari Such Count Two of the indictment. applicаble penalty. ance, rial as to an affecting neither Government’s cannot imposed[6] case nor the sentence added; (emphasis 591 A.2d at 234 footnote defen ability of the prejudiced Adams, accord, omitted); v. charge dants to make their defense (3d Cir.), 1099, 1116-17 759 F.2d § they violated 21 U.S.C. (count (1985) omitted). (citations al of indictment sufficient footnote Id. at 311 Stirone, identify specific drug). though it not did distinguished Gurfein opinion Judge Ferren’s case which animates Miller, Giles, Johnson, together Read applicable to grounds equally supports affirmance of Carter the case bar: identity Robinsоn’s conviction. Because the Appellant upon Stirone v. United an element relies of the controlled substance ‍‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍not ], offense, that a defendant indisputably [supra for a rule because Robinson statute, of- and that the "different Con- ment of the offense 6. Unlike the federal the District’s implicated. Car- provided fense” ter, of Stirone is not Act at the relevant trolled Substances Considering supra, at 234. punishment times that for distribution whole, not as a we do believe potentially from that for Knuckles heroin was Wooley,supra, opin- been different if the that the result would hаve of cocaine. See distribution held, Farrell, J., brought pursuant prosecution We have had been ion of 697 A.2d at 787. however, counter- than its federal punishment does District’s statute rather that this difference in part. an elc- make the of the substance not notwithstanding prosecution s proper charges cannot be tried on made in the was not prove allegation in charged indictment indictment. Stirone was in the failure Star”); weapon with a “Arminius Western violation of the Hobbs Hamilton, Act, interference with United States U.S.C. (10th (indictment Cir.1993) shipments Pennsyl- interstate into & n. 5 of sand 1129-30 used caliber re proof alleged vania. that defendant .38 The allowed if robbery; that even shipments of court held of interference with steel volver states, Pennsylvania prove that the firearm into other failed revolver, charged caliber there was that it convict if it .38 used amendment, type of because found that Stirone had interfered with ei- constructive shipments. weapon The is not element of offense ther sand the steel Supreme evidence at trial nor Court reversed Stirone’s convic- “neither the tion, reasoning implied that Defendant could be courts could instructions knowingly presume anything other than to know that convicted carrying during using would have also indicted Stirone for the a firearm violence”); shipments. interference with the steel to a crime of relation (10th Buren, Van problem essence Stirone Cir.1975) (defendant had who been indicted was that an element of the Hobbs Act fatal for distribution of cocaine claimed vari violation, necessary to out a make federal ground proof ance on the showed distri crime, was interference with interstate *5 cocaine; hydrochloride, of not bution cocaine jury charge, The which commerce. al- held that there was no variance be court wholly lowed conviction a set facts hydrochloride prohibited cause cocaine “is a charged, unrelated to the facts led the statute”); subject grand jury that Court to conclude (7th Moser, 1089, v. 1091-92- agreed might uncharged not have that the Cir.1975) (indictment charged defendants set of facts a sufficient constituted interfer- LSD; with distribution evidence showed ence with interstate commerce for Hobbs described the material as that defendants Act violation to have occurred. mesсaline; psilocybin rejected de quoting approval Id. at 312. After with variance, holding of fatal that fendants’ claim “distinctly Leventhal’s com- pro all three substances was distribution of plex facts” 123 841, § hibited 21 U.S.C. defen 279, 263, 359 F.2d dis- rights therefore not dants’ substantial were page supra, Judge cussed Gurfein affected). similarity Given the between concluded: light instant case and single The set of here facts involved authority, weight as the we what view tabling operation for controlled sub- are satisfied that there was no constructive particular place. time stance at a The in this casе. operative the same whether the were substance was heroin co- controlled III. We that the variance was caine. conclude not substantial.... should view that Robinson’s conviction Our not with the be affirmed is consistent added). (emphasis Id. law, sense. but also common fully other rel Knuckles is consistent with See, prosecution is more than a e.g., v. “A criminal evant ease law. (8th McIntosh, Cir.), may game government 1456-57 merely game and the lost be- U.S. 130 checkmated S.Ct. (1994) according played not its officers have (specific type of firearm cause States, 273 to rule.” McGuirе United possession an offense not element (1927); violence; L.Ed. during a incorrect S.Ct. firearm crime of weapon see United States v. as “Arminius West specification Ceccolini surplusage, and may be struck as ern Star” (1978). proceeding, in a acquittal In a criminal as judgment of of motion for denial case, foregoing single misstep by significant civil counsel in the difference between present case. scenario and the pleadings formulation of not be deci should Gibson, Conley to the outcome. sive Cf. appeal on Robinson bases his the Grand 99, 103,2 L.Ed.2d 80 Jury He of the Fifth Amendment. Clause requires claims that the Constitution reversal regardless of the absence of of his conviction present found Robin- prejudice. constitutional claim must His guilty on son the basis of abundant evidence. proposition that the trial stand or fall on the grounds of his asserted reversal Fifth Amendment judge violated the guilt. conviction have no relation to his prosecutor’s pretrial motion to granting the There is no claim that Robinson’s trial was surplusage as an strike from the indictment unfair, unconstitutionally or that he was any allegation affecting element of the seized, government searched or or that the alleged. We think inconceivable Rather, any way. him in abused Rob- Fifth who wrote the Amendment inson demands his conviction be set a result. In our ‍‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍could have intended such aside on the basis of an inadvertent error in view, impor position Robinson’s trivializes brought to the indictment. This error was ac protection. tant Judicial constitutional his than three counsel’s attention more days ceptance position of that recalls and did months before sworn “impregnable cit appellate when courts were slightest not have the effect on his reаdiness “any technicality” adels of and ordained for trial. proceeding, no mat error in the course of a believing There exists no rational basis for technical, the trial required either ter how would have refused a new appellate court to order court or the indict Robinson if correct information had Wright, Arthur R. trial.” Alan Charles Mary Kay provided to the of the con- Kane, Federal Prac Miller & contrary, (1995) trolled substance. On the we must at 441-42 tice and Procedure body presume (footnote the members of that omitted); Orthope R. & G. see also *6 conformity in with their Prosthetics, would have acted Inc. v. Cur Appliances dic and oaths, they (D.C.1991) and that would have made their tin, (quoting 596 A.2d Wright Miller). decision to indict or not to indict on the basis & evidence, indulging hy- of the without some entails sub of a conviction “The reversal private pothesized highly improbable v. Me stantial social costs.” United any perceived prejudice regarding differ- 938, 942, chanik, 106 S.Ct. culpability heroin and co- ences between accept are These costs ques- down to the caine. The case thus boils denied a has been able where the defendant tion whether we must reverse the conviction guilt of or the issue fair determination of pleading guilty because of a innocence, tips of interests but “the balance trial, which was corrected before error way an error has decidedly the other when slightest not make the difference which did the trial.” of had no effect on the outcome to the conduct of the case. for of a conviction “[Ajppellate Id. reversal played no role in alleged has error which effectively in the trial Robinson conceded that, in bringing judgment about the —and original would have court that the indiсtment view, exactly seek what is [Robinson] our any mention sufficient if it had omitted ‘encourages litigants to abuse ing here— heroin, him out. authorities bear of and the public to judicial process and bestirs the 788, supra. If the p. See discussion States, 603 it.’” Allen v. United ridicule him of an jury had indicted for distribution (en (D.C.1992) banc) (quoting A.2d substance, and if the unspecified controlled Arsdall, v. Van Delaware disclosed that substance had been of (1986)). than three particulars in a bill trial, law is or not believe that “[W]e would do then Robinson months before theory that preoccupied so with complaint. should be had nо conceivable basis have disregarded.” view, practical consequences must be appreciable legally there is no our versed, remanded for dismiss- and the case is Helm A.2d (D.C.1989). charging with Robinson The courts Knuck al of indictment heroin, les, prejudice to without rely, distribution and the cases which we decisions, charging new Rob- they return of a indictment principled wise delivered tempered with of cocaine. ly puri of doctrinal inson distribution considerations earthy ty in the abstract with measure ordered.8 So probable realism as of the fram to intent ers of Constitution thе kind situa RUIZ, concurring: Judge, Associate presented. ought tion here We to do case, judgment in like agree I this same. Wooley (D.C.1997), today, must be re- also decided

IV. because we cannot have confidence versed Wooley of which was convicted crime noted, I, previously Judge King and the same as the crime for which he was judgment. colleagues affirm the would Our grand jury. In this indicted us, however’, agree with and four of do court, prosecutor, at the trial instance judges Wooley case the six this language in the deleted the indictment this favor reversal the two convictions. Of which Robinson was specified Farrell, four-judge majority, Judge (heroin) distributing charged with order joins, Judge whom Steadman reaches that trial, prove, prosecutor allow the case-specific comparatively result on nar distributing cocaine. The Robinson grounds predicated, row which are as we question in this is not whether there has case opinion, ‍‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍understand the on the different the grand amendment of been constructive drugs treatment of various under the Dis jury’s but whether actual trict’s Controlled Substances Act. See case amendment of this (Farrell, J., 786-787 concur dispute requires There is reversal.1 ring). Judge As between Farrell’s charging terms of court altered upon grounds broader relied developed by fit Ruiz,7 Judges King Ferren and prosecution subsequent presentation former latter. vote over the This grand jury. stark circumstances judges means that two of the six my two crystallize danger Wooley adopted and Robinson the ex dissenting) “concurring” colleagues’ (really (and pansive reading skeptical Stirone that, prejudice to Robin- conclusion absent Knuckles) approach to Jackson and articu *7 son, his conviction not be set aside— should by Judgе lated Ferren. a guilty beyond found reasonable doubt once jury “a by a after a fair trial —because of V. by single misstep” prosecution and “an reasons, foregoing inadvertent error in the indictment.” See For the notwith- view, the standing join grand Under that judges views of the who ante quaint technicality. kind opinion, re- is a That Robinson’s conviction is Order, appear Judgment erro- judges and Commitment 7. These to believe that Knuckles wrongly neously 697 A.2d at decided. See that he had been convicted stated J.). Ferren, (opinion Judges Farrell and distribution of heroin. distinguish n. id. at 786-787 Steadman J., (Farrell, necеssarily concurring), but do states, government's brief amendments 1. As reasoning. reject Judge Gurfcin's charging terms of indict- occur "when altered, effect, by literally are or ment either judge erred 8. Robinson’s contention grand jury prosecutor court has last or after acquittal judgment denying is his motion for passed upon them.’’ v. United Johnson merit, right jury had credit without for the (D.C.1992). In this prosecution and to disbelieve Fos- witnesses charging were literal- terms of the indictment testimony. ter Hamilton’s Patton request ly by the at the (D.C.1993). altered Because reversed, objection prosecutor of defense being and over the do is Robinson’s conviction complaint regarding the counsel. Robinson’s not reach reasoning, though facially appealing as missible differences between what is con “common sense” with the benefit of grand jury’s tained 20/20 indictment and the hindsight provided through the lenses presented at trial. That is the difficult petit verdict, jury’s simply point misses the question, defining when the constitutional protection by offered the Fifth Amend- line particular has been crossed in a case. Jury ment’s Grand Clause. There repeat is no need to their painstaking analyses bearing here. What is worth The Fifth Amеndment to the United mind, however, any analysis is that must be provides per Constitution that “[n]o purpose consistent with the of the Grand son shall be capital, held to answer for a Jury provide community-based Clause to a crime, otherwise pres infamous unless on a check before the full force of the law enforce entment or Jury.” indictment of a Grand power government— of the federal The language of the limiting prosecutors judges brought —can government’s power “h[o]ld answer” Thus, bear particular any on a defendant.3 persons who have been indicted analysis permits supplanting judg by grand jury imposes prece condition grand jury prosecutor ment of the or a government’s dent on the authority prose very purpose protec defeats the Bain, parte cute. Ex 121 U.S. tion intended Amendment. Fifth See 781, 787, (1887), S.Ct. 30 L.Ed. 849 over Russell v. United 369 U.S. separate ruled grounds by 82 S.Ct. 8 L.Ed.2d 240 Miller, 105 S.Ct. inquiry Whether the is framed terms of (1985). Thus, petit “broadening” whether there has been jury’s verdict cannot retroactively cure charge, Judge as Ferren’s prosecution. Moreover, unauthorized Wooley emphasizes, or whether the concepts traditional of constitutional error prеsented “nucleus same analysis, where there has been a violation of operative legally facts” or the “same crime a constitutionally-mandated “structural” fea petit jury, understood” as the Far ture of a criminal proceeding, harmless error Wooley specifies, rell’s concurrence inapplicable. result, As a rever underlying question is the same: do we Fulminante, required. sal is See Arizona v. know, certainty required with the to safe 279, 309-10, 1264- guard the Fifth Amendment’s structural con (1991); 113 L.Ed.2d Vasquez v. Hil protection, stitutional that this lery, what the intended when it re (1986) (holding unlawful exclusion of against turned an indictment this defendant? grand jurors of defendant’s race to be struc question asking That is a what error).2 tural grand jury might done had if Each of concurring opinions Wooley presented present with the same facts explains slightly different terms how to grand jury’s ed trial. Because the action distinguish permissible imper- between is a precedent government’s condition to the *8 analysis applied 2. Harmlessness charges. adoption is under the less or unfounded in 'Its plain timely error rule where there has been no prefer- our Constitution the sole method for - States, objection. Johnsоn ‍‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍ring charges in serious criminal cases shows -,-, 1544, 1548-50, 117 S.Ct. high place the it held as an instrument of (1997). case, In this there was a justice.' Costello v. United 350 U.S. timely objection. [76 100 L.Ed. 397] (1956). provide Its historic office has been to grand jury integral part 3. The is an of our con- action, against arbitrary oppressive a shield or heritage brought stitutional which was to this by insuring that serious accusations criminal Framers, country with the common law. The brought only upon judg- will be the considered English most of them trained in the law and representative body acting aof of citizens traditions, accepted grand jury the as a basic judiсial under oath and and instruction guarantee liberty; of individual notwithstand- criticism, guidance. ing periodic ficial, super- much of which is overlooking history, grand Mandujano, relevant the United States v. jury (1976). continues to function as a barrier to reck- 96 S.Ct. prosecution, have, exactly opposite proceeded the trial must come to the as would grand jury grand Judge the did. Based intended. What the conclusion that Leventhal jury intended, course, only jury grand of can based known fact that the be on the “by presented force and the evidence to it. In most indicted for a crime cоmmitted cases, however, violence, by put reviewing ignorant against a is and resistance fear,” ting fact. at F.2d at the in id. grand logical assumption has It is in this that I take with context issue jury presented with evidence U.S.App. Jackson v. United D.C. in with a manner consistent defendant acted (1966), upon by F.2d 260 relied both description. type aggressive con concurring opinions Wooley by my in satisfy description a frontation that would Jackson, colleagues Judge in In this case. fear,” “against in putting resistance Leventhal concludes that the crime of which however, unlikely description satisfy jury cоnvicted within was contained stealthy snatching” of “sudden or seizure statute, robbery same although not within that formed the basis on which statutory specific quoted language actually involving tried and convicted grand jury’s indictment. Id. at surreptitious taking complainant’s wal conclusion, at 262. from That unassailable bag let from while waited at bus her she itself, the face of the still indictment does not Therefore, stop. Id. 359 F.2d at 261. at question address whether the defendant language it is all self-evident offense,” convicted the “same that the same facts were the indictment conduct, factual sense of the same juries. petit presented grand to both grand jury indicted him. See Stirone v. hypothesizing upon The kind of which Jack places son's is based 270, 272-73, Thus, position evaluating unknown ev untenable that, Judge Leventhal asserts unlike Sti- only attempt judge can idence that rone, petit jury both the guess at from the face of the indictment. presented single Jackson were with “a set Jackson, facts,” supra, judicial efficiency can create Concerns 359 F.2d at and that trial the temptation to affirm the conviction facts,” prosecution “not did add new set of jury guilty to be be- defendant fоund Thus, Id. at F.2d at 264. there was yond difficult a reasonable doubt. this no fatal variance. law, best-intentioned area of the where the easily into im- judicial assumptions slip can quarrel legal I do not with rea Jackson’s permissible judicial second-guessing of the question soning, but I it can be whether judicial opin- grand jury, important that it is employed in the usual ease. Jackson’s squarely in favor of constitu- come down ions sweeping distinguishing from Sti- assertion Judges ought not to tionally practice. sound impermissible; rone is unwarranted reading grand tea leaves engage in simply nothing language therе is government provides the when reindictment nor in itself Leventhal’s ensure simple and direct means to justify the statement constitutionally autho- its presented at trial as were same facts were rized. jury.4 presented grand The court in Wooley like the court simply have information whatsoever presented to the about what evidence gleaned from than as can be appellate itself. Another

judge considering indictment in Jackson and, submit, have, justifiably complaining the date underlying property witness on any

4. The court did refer question by and violence.” force the case as one but summarized facts, obtaining supra, involving single "a set of

Case Details

Case Name: Robinson v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: May 29, 1997
Citation: 697 A.2d 787
Docket Number: 95-CF-758
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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