222 Conn. 402 | Conn. | 1992
This is a landowners’ appeal from a judgment of a committee of three state trial referees (trial court), who, exercising the powers of the Superior Court, reassessed the damages for the taking by eminent domain of the plaintiffs’ real property in the town of Westport. The plaintiffs claim that the trial court should have: (1) found that a residential subdivision was the highest and best use of the undeveloped land; and (2) employed the appraisal methodology used by both parties. We affirm.
The undisputed facts are as follows. The subject property before condemnation consisted of 32.01 acres and is located at the intersection of Post Road East and Compo Road North in Westport. In January, 1988, the defendant, the town of Westport, filed a certificate of taking on the Westport land records whereby it took title to an undeveloped 29.495 acre portion of the plain
The plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, claiming that the defendant had undervalued their property.
I
The plaintiffs first claim that by rejecting their appraisal method, i.e., the lot method, in which fair market value is determined by the value of finished lots
“ ‘The owner of land taken by condemnation is entitled to be paid just compensation. . . .’ ” Minicucci v. Commissioner of Transportation, 211 Conn. 382, 384, 559 A.2d 216 (1989); Conn. Const., art. I, § 11. The amount that constitutes just compensation is the market value of the condemned property when put to its highest and best use at the time of the taking. Minicucci v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra; Cappiello v. Commissioner of Transportation, 203 Conn. 675, 681, 525 A.2d 1348 (1987); Budney v. Ives, 156 Conn. 83, 88, 239 A.2d 482 (1968). In determining market value, “ ‘it is proper to consider all those elements which an owner or a prospective purchaser could reasonably urge as affecting the fair price of the land . . . .’ Budney v. Ives, supra.” Greene v. Burns, 221 Conn. 736, 745, 607 A.2d 402 (1992). “ ‘The “fair market value” is the price that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller based on the highest and best possible use of the land assuming, of course, that a market exists for such optimum use.’ Mazzola v. Commissioner, 175 Conn. 576, 581-82, 402 A.2d 786 (1978).” Minicucci v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra, 384. “The ‘highest and best use’ concept, chiefly employed as a starting point in estimating the value of real estate by appraisers, has to do with the use which will most likely produce the highest market value, greatest financial return, or the most profit from the
While we agree that all the appraisers operated under the assumption that a residential subdivision was the highest and best use of the property and that they all used the lot method to determine its fair market value, we do not agree that the trial court, in rejecting the lot method, failed to consider the highest and best use of the property. The trial court rejected as too speculative, given the evidence presented, the lot method of determining the fair market value of the proposed residential subdivision. The trial court instead determined that, under the facts of this case, the proper method for arriving at the fair market value was to evaluate the land in its condition at the time of the taking, i.e., raw and undeveloped, “ ‘with consideration given to any increment or enhancement in value due to the property’s present adaptability to subdivision development.’ (Emphasis added.) 4 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) § 12.3142 [1] [a], pp. 12-335-356.” Minicucci v. Commissioner of Transportation, 211 Conn. 382, 385, 559 A.2d 216 (1989). In order to value the land, the trial court had at its disposal evidence of sales of comparable land in addition to the raw data used by the appraisers in applying the lot method. Because the trial court specifically stated that it had considered the property’s use as a subdivision in valuing the land, we conclude that it did not reject such proposed use as the highest and best use of the land.
II
The plaintiffs next claim that the trial court improperly refused to establish the fair market value of the
At trial, the plaintiffs offered evidence tending to show that the residential property could be subdivided into forty-six one-half acre lots with a value of between $227,000 and $250,000 per lot. By utilizing the lot method, i.e., multiplying the value per lot by the number of lots, the plaintiffs’ experts appraised the residential portion of the property at values within the range of approximately $10,400,000 to $11,500,000.
A
Initially, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly interpreted Minicucci to stand for the proposition that the lot method valuation is invalid as a matter of law when dealing with undeveloped land. We disagree.
The trial court rejected the lot method because it concluded that the plaintiffs’ evidence as to the value of hypothetical completed subdivision lots was too speculative, not because it was improper as a matter of law. In rejecting the lot method, the trial court concluded that “[i]n the instant case there are a multitude of uncertainties present, as elucidated previously, that make the ‘lot method’ approach to valuation improper.” Further, we do not agree with the proposition that “the
B
The plaintiffs next claim that the trial court’s reliance on Minicucci for the proposition that the use of the lot method is improper where no attempts have been undertaken to subdivide the property is, once again, misplaced. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court, in the following excerpt from its decision, required the plaintiffs to take certain steps towards subdivision before it would validate the lot method. “Neither appraiser gave any consideration to the fact that . . . Langer owned this property since the early 1960’s and neither he nor his estate . . . made any effort whatever to undertake a subdivision of any part of the subject property. No application for a subdivision was ever filed nor any plan prepared, similar to Minicucci where [the] plaintiffs owned their property for 14 years and never attempted to undertake any subdivision of it.”
While we agree with the plaintiffs that they need not take specific steps toward subdivision in order for the lot method to be considered, evidence of any attempts to prepare for a future subdivision tend to make such use more reasonably probable and less speculative. As the proponent of a hypothetical highest and best use is able to progress along the spectrum from raw land with few or no improvements to, ultimately, a completed subdivision, the weight to be assigned such evidence will be enhanced. 4 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) § 12B.14 [1] [b], pp. 12B-175-179. We conclude that the trial court did not mandate that any particular steps toward subdivision were required as a predicate to valuing the land on such a basis.
C
The plaintiffs next claim that because there was no dispute among the experts that the highest and best use of the property was as a subdivision and because there was no conflict about utilizing the lot method for appraising the land, the trial court was required to accept this method of determining fair market value and, therefore, it abused its discretion in rejecting the unanimous opinion of the four appraisers in their adoption of this method. We disagree.
D
The plaintiffs next claim that, based on the facts of this case, the trial court improperly rejected the lot method of valuation because: (1) in French v. Clinton, supra, in which a conceptual marina was the highest and best use, this court approved of the lot method of valuation even though the condemned property was, with the exception of a small dwelling, undeveloped; and (2) the subject property was more amenable to subdivision than the condemned land in Minicucci v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra, and, therefore, the lot method should have been used. A review of the trial court’s findings with respect to the report of the plaintiffs’ appraisers discloses the following.
The plaintiffs argue that French represents the modern approach in eminent domain cases when undeveloped land is under consideration for valuation. In French, the condemned property consisted of 6.78 acres and contained a small cottage. “The trial court found that, due to the proximity of the property to Long Island Sound and the shortage of dockage and winter storage space available to the boating public, a small craft marina was the highest and best use of the premises. The [trial] court found in particular that a conceptual marina site plan proposed by the plaintiffs, which included 89 boat slips, year round storage for 100 boats and a winter storage shed for 50 boats, could be accommodated on the property.” French v. Clinton, supra, 199. The plaintiffs contend that since the still undeveloped marina was used in determining the fair market value of the property, the still undeveloped residential
While French supports the proposition that the lot method of appraisal may be used in appropriate cases, in such cases, the proponent must offer credible evidence of the costs of the hypothetical subdivision and persuade the trier that, but for the taking, it would have occurred in the reasonably near future. Tandet v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 179 Conn. 293, 299, 426 A.2d 280 (1979); see United States v. 47.3096 Acres, Etc., In Oxford Township, 583 F.2d 270, 271-72 (6th Cir. 1978). The plaintiffs failed to satisfy these threshold considerations for using the value of the completed lots in determining fair market value. Our holding in French v. Clinton, supra, does not mandate a different result.
The plaintiffs next argue that Minicucci does not reject, as a matter of law, the lot method, and that their property did not contain the types of visually determinable impediments to the development of a subdivision as found in that case. We agree. Minicucci v. Commissioner of Transportation, 211 Conn. 382, 384-86, 559 A.2d 216 (1989) (where undeveloped property contained a very steep slope, wetlands, rocky conditions and was heavily wooded and the landowners gave no hard evidence as to the costs of dealing with these impediments, the lot method was not an appropriate tool for appraising the property). The plaintiffs contend that because their land is better suited to development and they have offered evidence of the costs incident to preparing the land for a subdivision, the trial court should have adopted the lot method of valuation. We disagree. Despite the subject property’s greater adaptability to development, it was well within the trial court’s discretion, given the speculative nature of the evidence, to conclude that it was not “reasonably probable that the land would in fact be subdivided
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Although the plaintiffs seek a new trial on the value of the entire parcel, their appeal focuses solely on the value of the residentially zoned portion of the land.