Robinson v. StateRobinson v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Springer
OPINION
By the Court,
Springer, J.:Appellant Termaine Robinson was charged with statutory sexual assault of a fourteen-year-old female. Robinson, who was seventeen years old when the crime was committed, was certified under
There is no question but that Robinson would be entitled to the requested instruction except for the fact that he was seventeen at the time that the crime was committed, and
The question presented on this appeal is whether a minor who has been certified to stand trial as an adult on charges of sexual assault is entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of statutory sexual seduction. We answer that question in the affirmative.
If Robinson had been a “real” adult criminal defendant (over eighteen), he would have had the benefit of a statutory sexual seduction instruction and might have been convicted of this lesser crime. As it is, Robinson is a synthetic adult criminal defendant (under eighteen), who has been unwillingly subjected to adult “criminal proceedings” by virtue of
Although the sexual seduction statute refers to sexual acts “committed by a person 18 years or older” against a “person under the age of 16,” Robinson is a court-declared adult and is no longer a child in the eyes of the criminal law. See In the Matter of Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 664 P.2d 947 (1983).2 The fact that
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The Nevada Legislature has defined statutory sexual seduction as a crime only applicable to persons over the age of eighteen. Robinson was seventeen at‘the time of the sexual attack. The majority concludes that “[t]o consider Robinson as an adult ‘in the eyes of the law’ and as a person who is competent to violate the sexual seduction statute is reasonable and does no violence to the meaning of the statute.”
I could not disagree more fervently. Statutory sexual seduction is an age-based offense. The age parameters selected by the legislature and inserted into the definitional language of the statute are at the core of the criminal conduct. The only reason the majority opinion does no violence to the language of
The intent behind a “statutory rape” law is not to protect persons of tender years from sixteen- and seventeen-year-old attackers. Are we to see the incomprehensible, a boy of sixteen or seventeen years being convicted of statutory sexual seduction for assaulting one of his peers? The majority brings the unthinkable to fruition and creates law.
If this is not enough to shock the conscience, I point to another colossal flaw in the majority opinion. In accordance with Nevada’s adult certification laws, the adult court system lacks jurisdiction to convict Robinson of statutory sexual seduction. Under
To get around this jurisdictional dilemma, I presume that the majority is not only suggesting that Robinson is over eighteen for the purposes of statutory sexual seduction, but that he is also over the age of eighteen for the purposes of adult certification under NRS Chapter 62. Yet if this is the case, there was simply no reason for Robinson to have been certified to stand trial as an adult in the first place. In the alternative, the majority may be suggesting that Robinson is over the age of twenty-one and, thus, any violation of
I cannot condone circumventing a specific element of criminal activity and specific jurisdictional language merely to afford Robinson the benefit of a judicially created instructional doctrine. See In re Frederick, 604 P.2d 953, 954 (Wash. 1980) (juvenile offender could not be convicted of first-degree escape because statutory definition specifically required that individual be an adult); see also State v. Pitts, 714 P.2d 582 (N.M. 1986) (whether or not a minor can be convicted of a crime hinges upon particular language of applicable statute). Robinson’s argument is with the Nevada Legislature and not this court.3
If one accepts the majority’s rationale, Robinson has miraculously received the benefit of an additional year of life. He is over eighteen. Perhaps this court should contact government authorities and inform them that Robinson has failed to register for selective service. In addition, perhaps Robinson should present the majority’s opinion to his local voting authority and proclaim that he is eligible to vote in the upcoming elections. Although these are absurd propositions, I submit that the majority opinion rests upon the same footing.
Notes
Although Robinson has not raised an equal protection claim in this appeal, it does appear that the State’s treatment of Robinson would not pass even rational-basis scrutiny.
“Once in a given case transfer is decided upon ... the youth is no longer presumed to be a child in the eyes of the law and no longer entitled to the grace provided by the Juvenile Court Act in that particular case.” Seven Minors, 99 Nev. at 433, 664 P.2d at 951. If Robinson is no longer a child in the eyes of the law and is not entitled to the grace given to children under our juvenile law, then Robinson should be treated as an adult with respect to the sexual seduction statute,
Of course this reasoning would apply equally to Robinson’s possible conviction, on remand, of statutory sexual seduction. Robinson has been certified as an adult and should receive the benefit of an adult instruction on statutory sexual seduction. After receiving this benefit, he will not in the future be heard to say that he is not competent to be convicted of statutory sexual seduction because he was under eighteen at the time the alleged acts were committed.
1. If a child 16 years of age or older is charged with an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile division of the district court, after full investigation, may retain jurisdiction or certify the child for proper criminal proceedings to any court which would have jurisdiction to try the offense if committed by an adult....
(Emphasis added.)
We have held that where a charge falls outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the district court may convict the juvenile of the certified crime and any lesser included offenses. Dicus v. District Court, 97 Nev. 273, 275, 625 P.2d 1175, 1177 (1981). Yet even if the rule in Dicus were applicable, statutory sexual seduction is not a lesser included crime to sexual assault. Slobodian v. State, 98 Nev. 52, 639 P.2d 561 (1982) (sexual assault can be committed without necessarily committing statutory sexual seduction; therefore, statutory sexual seduction is not a lesser included offense).
I can also foresee a scenario where Robinson is convicted of statutory sexual seduction and then files a habeas corpus petition in federal court, wherein he claims it was a violation of due process to have been convicted by Nevada’s adult court system for a crime it was impossible to commit.