Taneka Dorshell ROBINSON v. STATE of Arkansas
No. CR-13-778
Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Oct. 29, 2014
2014 Ark. App. 579
The State has failed to establish that this court has jurisdiction of this appeal under
Appeal dismissed.
Dustin McDaniel, Att‘y Gen., by Pamela A. Rumpz, Ass‘t Att‘y Gen., for appellee.
BILL H. WALMSLEY, Judge.
Appellant Taneka Robinson appeals from the Crittenden County Circuit Court‘s revocation of her probation. Robinson argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a probation officer‘s report in violation of her right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. We affirm.
On May 5, 2006, Robinson pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. She received five years’ probation and, among other things, was ordered to pay a fine and costs, totaling $1,500. She was ordered to pay that sum at the rate of $50 per month beginning July 1, 2006. On June 2, 2009, the State filed a petition to revoke, alleging numerous violations of the terms and conditions of her probation. An arrest warrant was issued on June 3, 2009, but could not be served on Robinson until May 25, 2012.
On June 5, 2012, a hearing was held on the State‘s petition to revoke. Virginia House with the Crittenden County Sheriff‘s Department testified that Robinson had made no payments whatsoever toward her fine and costs. A ledger sheet was admitted into evidence without objection.
Mary Marshall, a probation officer, testified that Jim Russell was Robinson‘s original probation officer and that he had prepared a violation report on May 14, 2009. Robinson objected to its introduction into evidence on the basis that the report was hearsay. The trial court ruled that the report was admissible pursuant to
The violation report indicates that Robinson failed to pay the fine and costs as ordered, admitted to using and tested positive for controlled substances on numerous occasions, last reported to her probation officer on July 1, 2008, failed to notify the probation office of her new address, failed to attend GED classes, failed to complete drug counseling, and failed to pay probation fees.
Robinson admitted committing many of the violations listed in Russell‘s report.
In September, the trial court noted that, while Robinson had not done as promised, she had made two substantial payments in July and August 2012. Because of these efforts, the trial court continued the hearing until March 2013 to give Robinson additional time to comply. The trial court then continued it to May 24, 2013. At the hearing, the judge stated,
You made certain claims to me about what you could do to pay fines and costs and all that. I mean, just two months, you said, I can pay it all by September, and you did not do that. I gave you another chance because you had made some effort to do it. I continued it until September. You have not done what you had promised to do, but you made an effort, so I continued it not just a couple of months, I continued it six months. Then, I do not know what happened on March 26th, but we rescheduled it for today. And so that would be eight months. In that eight month period not one thing.
Robinson explained that she was no longer working, was forced to move, owed $1,000 on an electricity bill, was seriously ill, and was caring for her sick child. Robinson added that it was hard because she was a single parent and did not have any help. The trial court sentenced Robinson to serve two years in prison.
In order to revoke probation, the trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant inexcusably violated a condition of probation. Reynolds v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 705, 2012 WL 6200321. The State has the burden of proof but needs to prove only one violation. Id. We will not reverse the trial court‘s decision to revoke unless it is clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Id. When the determination of a preponderance of the evidence turns on questions of credibility and weight, we defer to the superior position of the trial court to decide these matters. Id.
On appeal, Robinson argues that she was denied the right to confront and cross-examine Russell as to the contents of his violation report. Robinson argues that the State‘s only excuse for failing to produce Russell as a witness was that he was no longer employed as a probation officer. Robinson complains that the trial court did not make a specific ruling on whether the State had demonstrated good cause for Russell‘s absence. Robinson maintains that, once the report was introduced into
Although the rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule, are not strictly applicable in revocation proceedings, the right to confront witnesses is. Jones v. State, 31 Ark. App. 23, 786 S.W.2d 851 (1990).
While Robinson raised her confrontation-clause argument below, she failed to develop that argument and to obtain a specific ruling on the issue. As such, her argument is not preserved for review. Rodriguez v. State, 372 Ark. 335, 276 S.W.3d 208 (2008). In any event, the trial court‘s determination that Robinson violated the terms and conditions of her probation by failing to report and by using marijuana was supported by the evidence, including Robinson‘s own testimony.
Moreover, even if the trial court erred in admitting the report, any error was harmless.2 Without considering the violations listed in the report prepared in May 2009, the trial court found that Robinson had, since that time, failed to pay the balance of her fine and costs as promised under oath and even after the trial court permitted her an additional eight months to fulfill her promise. The trial court was not required to believe Robinson‘s excuses for not making a single payment over that span of time. The evidence showed that Robinson was capable of working; she chose to quit her job, despite her financial obligations; and she had testified earlier that she received support from family members. There was evidence to support a conclusion that Robinson made no effort to pay the remainder of what she owed and that her failure to do so was willful and inexcusable. Because the trial court determines credibility and there is a lower burden of proof in revocation proceedings, we cannot say that the trial court‘s decision was clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the revocation of Robinson‘s probation.
Affirmed.
HARRISON and GRUBER, JJ., agree.
