36 Vt. 69 | Vt. | 1863
Gibson under whom the defendant claims title, entered into possession of the premises sued for, under a
This very demand of a deed was a distinct concession that the legal title was in the plaintiff, and effectually precludes, the defendant from insisting that Gibson had for years been holding adversely to the plaintiff’s title.
Gibson entered into possession under a contract of purchase, which conceded the plaintiff’s title, and his holding was subservient to it, and could never become adverse, until soiue event
If Gibson had fully performed the contract on his part, so as to entitle himself to a deed by the terms of the contract, the plaintiff would perhaps be bound to take notice that he was claiming title in himself, without being specially notified of it.
But in this case he did not perform the contract so as to be legally entitled to a conveyance, and if he did in fact set up a claim of title in himself it could not affect the plaintiff, until distinct knowledge of such adverse claim was brought home to her, and until such notice she had a right to suppose Gibson was holding in submission to her title as he originally entered, and the defendant did not claim any such notice had been given. Ripley v. Yale, 18 Vt. 220 ; Greeno v. Munson et al., 9 Vt. 37 ; Hall v. Dewey, 10 Vt. 593.
The county court were clearly right in their ruling that the defendant could not stand upon his claim of adverse possession.
The other point made in the court below is not now insisted upon. It is well settled that one tenant in common may recover the whole land in ejectment against one having no title. Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt. 388 ; Johnson v. Tilden, 5 Vt. 426.
Judgment affirmed.