18 So. 2d 29 | Fla. | 1944
Meanwhile appellee moved to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that the decree was voidable because the parties had never been married, and to dissolve the garnishment on the specific grounds of the absence of any legal marriage, the *466 failure of the testimony to prove the plaintiff's charge of adultery, and the unjustness of the allotments for alimony.
It seems only necessary to state, with reference to these aspects of the assault, that they were not only calculated to introduce issues foreign to the controversy, but they obviously constituted a collateral attack upon the final decree, and could not, therefore, be recognized as causes for dismissal or dissolution of the action in garnishment.
Added were the general grounds of the insufficiency of the motion for the writ of garnishment and the illegality of the proceeding, and it is under these that we must search for the defects which the trial judge considered fatal to appellant's case when he sustained appellee's position.
Although appellant's original motion is not very definite, it may be gleaned from it and the writ eventually issued that the amount she sought to collect was the sum of (1) the alimony which had accrued pursuant to the decree and (2) fees and costs which were reduced to judgment in that decree. It seems that the latter item would be governed by the general law relative to garnishment after judgment, but it occurs to us that the former does not fall in the same category.
Allotments for permanent alimony do not become liens when made because from their very nature they are indeterminate and inconclusive. Dickenson v. Sharpe,
It has been insisted by counsel for the appellant that the garnishment proceeding in the lower court was not instituted under Chapter 77, Florida Statutes, 1941, and F.S.A., but that she relied only upon Section 65.13, Florida Statutes, 1941, and F.S.A. The purpose of the latter, originally enacted as Chapter 4973, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1901, was *467 twofold: to extend the remedy of garnishment to cases arising from the noncompliance with orders for the payment of alimony and suit money; and to impound monies due public officials.
After stating the first proposition the Legislature was at pains to prescribe the procedure to be followed where the money represented the salary due a public official, but omitted further reference to wages of an individual not in the public service. Abridged to contain only the language applicable to cases like the present one the law simply provides that "So much as the court in its discretion may order of the moneys or other things due to any person . . . whether the head of a family or not residing in this State when the money or other thing is due for the personal labor or service of such person or otherwise, shall be subject to . . . garnishment to enforce the orders or decrees of the courts of this State for alimony, suit money or support, or other orders or decrees made by the courts of this State in suit for divorce or alimony." Garnishment is an exclusive statutory remedy, unknown to the common law, and we are unable to see how one seeking its advantages to effect the payment of allotments made in a final decree of divorce under Section 65.13, supra, could proceed without reference to any other statutory provision.
It is observed that Section 65.13 does not furnish a comprehensive, independent method of garnishment, but only extends the remedy to certain cases and certain salaries. It is necessary to look elsewhere in the laws of the state to determine the steps which must be taken to obtain advantage of the remedy, and these are found in Chapter 77, supra. In Sections
We are familiar with the case of Reynolds v. Reynolds,
The judgment is affirmed and the cause remanded without prejudice to apply for permission to amend the motion for garnishment in accordance with the views we have expressed.
Upon petition for rehearing the original opinion was modified, and this the revised opinion, is now substituted for the original, which is withdrawn. The petition for rehearing is denied.
BUFORD, C. J., BROWN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.