delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Wе granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision in
People v. Robinson,
I.
On August 31, 1991, the petitioner, Sidney Robinson (Robinson), entered a convenience store in Grand Junction and robbed the clerk at knifepoint. During the robbery, Robinson’s fingers were covered with tapе and he was wearing a cap and sunglasses with one lens missing. After Robinson left the store, the store clerk pushed an alarm button and called the police. An automatic surveillance camera in the store had rеcorded the robbery.
Upon viewing the surveillance camera videotape, one of the investigating officers, Detective Robert Russell (Detective Russell), recognized the robber on the videotape as Robinson. Detective Russell recognized Robinson based upon a previous encounter with him. 1 The police subsequently searched Robinson’s residence and seized a knife of the type used in the robbery, clothing, eyeglass frames, and a roll of tape. The police then arrested Robinson, who confessed to the robbery during questioning.
At trial, the surveillance camera videotape and photographs of the videotape were shown to the jury. The district court also permitted Detective Russell to testify that he had viewed the videotape of the robbery and that, in his opinion, the robber in the videotape was Robinson. The jury subsequently cоnvicted Robinson of one count of aggravated robbery and one count of crime of violence. The court of appeals affirmed these convictions.
II.
Robinson asserts that the trial court violated the Colorado Rules of Evidence by admitting into evidence Detective Russell’s testimony identifying Robinson as the robber in the videotape. Specifically, Robinson contends that Detective Russell’s lay opinion testimony was not helpful to the jury because the detective was in no better position than the jury to determine whether the robber in the videotape was Robinson.
Rule 701 of the Colorado Rules of Evidence governs the admission of opinion testimony by a lay witness:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony, in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception оf the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
CRE 701. Although we have ruled extensively on CRE 701, we have never addressed the specific issue of whether CRE 701 permits a policе officer to give lay opinion testimony that the accused is the robber depicted in a videotape taken by an automatic surveillance camera. However, several federal jurisdictions have аddressed this issue as it relates to FRE 701, which is identical to CRE 701, and we turn to these jurisdictions for guidance.
A significant majority of jurisdictions which have addressed this issue has held that a lay witness may testify regarding the identity of a person depicted in a surveillance photograph if there is some basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than the jury.
See, e.g., United States v. Jackman,
Among the courts in the majority, a few have based the admission of lay opinion testimony on the fact that the defendant’s appearance in the photоgraph or videotape was different from his appearance at trial.
Farnsworth,
Various jurisdictions among the majority have also differed on the level of familiarity the witness must have with the defendant. In
United States v. Jackson,
Instead of any particular amount of sustained contact, we require a lay witness to have sufficient contact with the defendant to achieve a level of familiarity that renders the lay opinion helpful.
(Emphasis added.) However, the Ninth Circuit excluded lay witness testimony in
United States v. LaPierre,
All of the courts among the majority agree that a lay witness who has substantial familiarity with the defendant, such as a family member or a person who has had numerous contacts with the defendant, may properly testify as to the identity of the defendant in a surveillance photograph.
Jackman,
III.
Robinson argues that lay opinion testimony regarding the identity of a person depicted in a surveillance photograph should only be admitted where (a) the lay opinion is *384 based on the witness’ “intimate familiarity” with the defendant’s appearance at or about the time of the robbery; and (b) the defendant has altered his appearance between the time of the robbery and the time of the trial. We reject this argument.
First, we adopt the majority view and hold that a lay witness may testify regarding the identity of a person depicted in a surveillance photograph if there is some basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than is the jury. Moreover, the lay witness need only be personally familiar with the defendant, and the intimacy level of the witness’ familiarity with the defendant goes to the weight to be given to the witness’ testimony, not the admissibility of such testimony. Additionally, the defendant’s appearance need not have changed from the time of the photograph to the time of trial, so long as the lay opinion testimony is helpful to the jury. Thus, we hold that, although the witness must be in a better position than the jurors to determine whether the image captured by the camera is indeed that of the defendant, this requires neither the witness to be “intimately familiar” with the defendant nor the defendant to have changed his appearance.
In the case at bar, we must determine whether the trial cоurt properly allowed Detective Russell to testify that Robinson was the robber in the surveillance photograph. The determination of whether a witness may render an opinion pursuant to CRE 701 is a question for the trial court, and that determination is not subject to reversal unless clearly erroneous.
Farley v. People,
The record before us indicates that the robber depicted in the surveillance photographs was wearing a cap and sunglasses. The record also indicates that the photographic image of the robber in the videotape is unclear as to the robber’s identity. Thus, although Robinson’s appearance did not change from the time the photograph was taken to the time of trial, lay opinion testimony by a witness familiar with Robinson’s appearance would have been helpful to the jury in determining whether Robinson was indeed the robber in the photograph.
See Allen,
Moreover, Detective Russell was personally familiar with Robinson because he had previous “face-to-face” contact with Robinson. Although Detective Russell was nоt intimately familiar with Robinson, his personal familiarity was sufficient to be helpful to the jury.
See Jackson,
Because Detective Russell’s lay opinion testimony in this case was helpful to the jury, we hоld that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such testimony.
IV.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Detective Russell’s lay opinion tes *385 timony regarding the identity of the robber in thе automatic surveillance camera videotape. We hold that Detective Russell’s lay opinion testimony was helpful to the jury in that he was more likely to correctly identify Robinson from the photograph than wаs the jury. We therefore affirm the court of appeals.
Notes
. Detective Russell had previously arrested Robinson on charges which did not result in convictions. This information was not admitted into evidence at trial.
.
Several jurisdictions have expressly rejected the reasoning in
Calhoun. See, e.g., Jackman,
. Although a defendant’s appearance may not have changed from the time of the photograph to the time of trial, subtle changes in dress or an unclear photographic image may make a lay witness’ opinion testimony particularly helpful in identifying the person in the surveillance photograph.