168 Mo. App. 259 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1913
This action is based on a policy of life insurance. The judgment in the trial court was for the defendant.
Plaintiffs are the children of Almond B. Cockerill, and it appears from an agreed statement of facts that the defendant, in January, 1899, issued to him a policy of life insurance for ten thousand dollars, payable to his wife, or in the event of her dying before him, to his executors, administrators or assigns, “or to such other beneficiary as may be designated by the insured as hereinafter provided, at the home office of the company in the city of New York.” The policy contained the further provision that the insured could at any time “change the beneficiary or beneficiaries by written notice to the company at its home office,” etc.
On the 7th of March, 1903, Cockerill changed the beneficiary from his wife to these plaintiffs, his children. About two years afterwards, on the 20th of March, 1905, he changed from the. latter beneficiaries to his executors, administrators and assigns.
Cockerill’s wife died in July, 1905. In August, 1910, he and the defendant agreed that the policy should become ‘ ‘ a paid-up policy for $1348. ’ ’ In about a year thereafter he died. The defendant then paid the latter sum to his administrator.
Plaintiffs’ claim is that Cockerill’s wife and children became possessed of a vested interest at the de
“Any policy of insurance heretofore or hereafter made by any insurance company on the life of any person, expressed to be for the benefit of any married woman, whether the same be effected by herself or by her husband, or by any third person in her behalf, shall inure to her separate use and benefit, and that of her children, if any, independently of her husband and of his creditors and representatives, and also independently of such third person effecting the same in her behalf, his creditors -and representatives; and a trustee may be appointed by the circuit court for the county in which such married woman resides, to hold and manage the interest of any married woman in such policy, or the proceeds thereof. In the event of the death of such married woman before her husband, the said policy shall inure to the children' of such marriage, to the exclusion of creditors and executors and administrators of said husband, any technical words or phrases in the policy to the contrary notwithstanding. ’ ’
The reasoning in plaintiffs’ favor is like this: That the insurance is a Missouri contract and that the insurance laws of Missouri therefore became a part of it (Cravens v. Life Ins. Co., 148 Mo. 583) and that such Missouri law (the above statute) forbids a change of beneficiary; thus leaving the policy payable to the wife and children, or, in case she died, to the children alone.
Defendant agrees that the policy is a Missouri contract and that it embraces the Missouri statute. Defendant concedes that if the. policy had been payable to the wife and had not contained a privilege of substituting another beneficiary, her interest would
It is the general law that though a life policy is made payable to a certain person as beneficiary, yet if the' right to change the beneficiary is reserved in the policy, it may be done, thereby divesting the original beneficiary. [U. S. Casualty Co. v. Kacer, supra; Blum v. Insurance Co., supra; Nally v. Nally, 74 Ga. 669.] Does the statute nullify or forbid such reservation? Plaintiffs insist that it does. The question was determined by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Eves v. Woodmen of the World, 153 Mo. App. 247, wherein it was decided that the statute did not interfere with the contractual right of the parties to qualify the interest of the wife.
In the course of the opinion in that case it is pointed out that while the Supreme Court has not construed the statute, it has stated the general law to be that the interest of a beneficiary in a life policy is vested unless a right of divestiture is reserved. [Blum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 197 Mo. 513, 523; U. S. Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 313-317. See, also, remark of Goode, J., in Diehm v. Insurance Co.,
Plaintiffs lay much stress on the concluding clause of the last sentence of the section, providing that if the wife died before the husband, the policy should inure to the children to the exclusion of creditors, etc., “any technical words or phrases in the policy to the contrary notwithstanding.” We think that clause finds its only application to the sentence in which it appears. It seems not to apply to or affect any other part of the section. The Legislature, by an expression indicating such intention, could have forbidden a change though the right were reserved in the policy; but it has not done so by that clause. That clause has not the breadth of application to other parts of the statute as the clause in section 5858, Revised Statutes 1889, referred to in Smith v. Life Ins. Co.,
But here again plaintiffs insist that the proceeds of a policy payable to the wife was her separate property, exempt from execution under other statutes, and that therefore the purpose of exemption ought not to be considered as the purpose of the Legislature in enacting the statute under consideration, as it was altogether unnecessary. However this may be, the necessity for or the congruity of statutes is not a safe guide in construction. It is not infrequent that the same thing is comprehended in different statutes; and it is not uncommon to find in the statute the existing common law enacted into statutory law.
Again, plaintiffs say their construction of the statute is borne out by the action of the Legislature found in the revision of 1899, section 7895, carried into the revision of 1909 as section 6944, amending the statute as it was when this policy was issued. The latter section, besides other amendments, gives the insured husband the right to change beneficiaries if they shall become divorced. And plaintiffs ask, why give the right if they become divorced unless it was the understanding that without that right was granted, it would not exist? The answer is that the amended statute grants the right in cases where no reservation for a change had been made in the policy. As to such, as we have seen, no change could be made prior to this amendment.
The judgment is affirmed.