*1 sum, Second, In remanding this case Hearing Committee conclud- ed respondent “deliberately Board, in a acted con- majority expresses several manner that prejudice which, submit, resulted in and dam- are sim- respectfully cerns I age by to his client to properly his failure not in the Committee ply reflected present an appeal to the District of Colum- needless, dis- Board And there reports. bia I Appeals.” agree Court cannot subject of client ne- on turbing dicta my colleagues that the Committee here was glect. evaluating respondent’s “effectiveness ante presenting appeal,” his [client’s] Rath- professional skills sense. er, commenting the Committee was simply
on respondent’s or- failure follow court
ders with respect and other- carry
wise to out the his profes- basics of obligation.
sional Finally, disagree I following with the dis- ROBINSON, Repre Dorothy Personal my colleagues present: tinction of Rosa L. of the Estate sentative complete While a an by attorney failure Walls, Appellant, represent his client —as situation in In re Whitlock —seems rele- UNIVERSITY, Appellee. HOWARD to a vant determination of client neglect attorney, an persuaded we are not No. 81-1450. Hearing Board and its Commit- Appeals. of Columbia Court of District tee should also undertake an evaluation an in present- effectiveness Nov. 1982. Submitted ing appeal. his Decided Jan. Ante will every there case be an area judgment by of tactical on
lawyer, client, behalf of the that a disci-
plinary authority second-guess. should not Thorup,
See In re D.C.App., 432 A.2d obviously But there can professional responsibilities
defaults basic
during representation course of
which an attorney should be called
account. (Failing Compe- DR 6-101 to Act
tently). evaluating neglect and related violations,
ethical the Board on Professional lim-
Responsibility and this court should not disciplinary the reach of the process complete
to “a attorney failure
represent his client.” Ante at 1361. The
majority, crafting the sentence contain-
ing language, may intended to neglect inquiries hope
limit so I sharply; Be- language
not. But their is worrisome. length disciplinary
cause the reach
into areas of is more attorney presented
directly pending in other cases court,
before this fur- will comment subject
ther here.
1365
proposed testimony of appellant’s expert testimony which the trial court witness — “changed later would have profound- found ly” scope of the trial. Record at following day, appellees moved to *3 expert restrict witness’ testimony to previously pursuant matters disclosed to Claxton, D.C., Charles R. Washington, for Super.Ct.Civ.R. ruling 26. was No made appellant. trial on that motion until Hugh Donovan, Md., E. Silver Spring, for trial, 8,1980, day second December when appellee H.W. Williams. granted. (Record 50.) it was at The court O’Donnell, John D.C., Jude Washington, prejudice” noted the “intolerable to risk to for appellee D.H. Pendergrast. in appellees having adequate time prepare testimony; meet the new Mahoney, Jr., John F. but D.C., Washington, recognizing for also appellee the additional testimo- Howard University. ny significant part would been a NEWMAN, Before Judge, Chief case, suggested the court that a TERRY, KERN and Judges. Associate might be appropriate. mistrial Rec- 6-7.) ord at KERN, Judge: Associate The day, appellant requested next Appellant Dorothy Robinson, L. personal mistrial; however, granted was the court representative for the estate of Rosa L. upon appellant’s conditioned the mistrial Walls, challenges the propriety of trial paying Appellant object costs. did not at court’s assessment of against certain costs imposition that time to the of costs. (Supp. her following two and one-half days trial 9-11.) at Record which ended in a mistrial. 7, 1981, Accordingly, July on the trial In April appellant filed this action directing court entered an order in behalf of the Walls grant- estate and was “per diem” pay costs of each $250 ed leave proceed in forma pauperis by an counsel and defense to each individual de- order of the court waiving payment by her (Rec- who prevailed fendant on the merits. of “all court costs” and relieving her from 15.) ord A new in September at trial held “prepayment of witness (Record fees.” at appellees; in a verdict resulted 25.) That order also stated that trial, following were costs would be required to pay “all taxable costs $3890, against appellant in the amount of and appropriate witness pro- fees” from the fees representing witness $140 $3750 ceeds any (Id.) recovery. pursuant July 7 order as awarded 24, 1980, On pretrial November after the “per diem” costs. conference had been days held and only commenced, before trial appellant’s attor- makes two here Appellant arguments ney First, notified defense counsel of additional she appeal.1 contends trial appellees appeal 1. The judgment, contend that was this case were from the order it untimely it untimely since was filed on October not filed since it was until judgment case, [Sep- days The order of is dated November later. in this the order 29,1981, file-stamped February actually appealed and is October tember] from is the 1981; however, taxing specific the docket sheet reflects that amount. Trilon order costs in a Corp., judgment Leasing actually D.C.App., order of Plaza Co. Allstate verdict and were September (Record Technically, entered on 35-37 judgment, presence February appeal A rendered in the order October entered, parties, pur- premature, is deemed to be since the time the poses appeal, taken, yet taxing of a notice when entered in the the order costs was not “fi- i.e., docket, September 29, required by civil 1981. D.C. 11- § nal” as D.C.Code Therefore, App.R. 411(a)(3). However, by 721(a). if the the time added). taxing (emphasis applicable court abused its discretion in costs The against her because she was obli proceeding party court rule relieves pauperis forma and was pay they therefore relieved or as gation costs advance any obligation costs, accrue; pay absent provides no mechanism for misconduct, showing of bad faith or other by anyone of costs eventual she against unless recovered pauperis litigant. Super. than the in forma Second, appellees. appellant maintains Ct.Civ.R. 54-11. that, even if the award of costs long-established It is a rule that pauperis unsuccessful in party forma proceed pauperis leave to in forma does proper, the trial court abused its discretion responsi from the ultimate absolve ordering payment diem” “per litigation:3 the costs of bility paying (1) statute, rule, because no or practice permitting pro effect statutes authorizes the award of unspecific *4 ceedings ordinarily in pauperis forma costs, (2) diem” because diem” the eventual pauper not to relieve the from appellees’ attorneys costs awarded to payment merely postpone of costs but fees, actually attorney not be may determination of payment until final showing awarded absent a of “unwarrant C.J.S., 146, at case .... Costs § [20 ed, oppressive, or vexatious Wis conduct.” 385.] Associates, consin Wis Avenue Inc. v. 2720 in person proceeding pauperis A forma 20, Coop., consin Avenue A.2d D.C.App., 385 eventual ordinarily not relieved of the (1978).
24 in the of an ad- payment of costs event against verse determination the case Am.Jur.2d, 47, Costs at him. § 38.] [20 assertion, may
Appellant’s first
that costs
may
against
arguing
properly
not be
an unsuccessful
that costs
awarded
in for-
plaintiff
pauperis,
against
party proceeding
forma
not well
assessed
relies
Harris v.
appellant
upon
pauperis,
founded. The District
Columbia statute ma
806,
Harris,
318, 424 F.2d
authorizing
permit
U.S.App.D.C.
the courts to
137
parties
826,
50,
denied,
27
91
proceed
pauperis
only
forma
refers
cert.
400 U.S.
S.Ct.
court held
(1970), in which the
“pre
waiver of
and costs L.Ed.2d 55
-payment”
“fees
1981,
the District of Columbia
security
or
the intent of
therefor.”2 D.C.Code
Catz,
W.Va.1978);
Guyer,
panel,
In Forma
Federal
submitted to
final.
was
Pauperis Litigation:
Stan
case in
filed after
In Search of Judicial
criminal
which
655,
sentencing,
dards,
(1978); An
conviction but before
we dismissed
660-61
31 Rut.L.Rev.
jurisdiction.
Moreover,
not.,
v.
for lack of
West
274
20 A.L.R.Fed.
States, D.C.App.,
proceed
United
1367
Parasole,
pauperis
(E.D.N.Y.
in forma
statute is
avail-
v.
66
“to make
F.R.D.
390
indigent,
able to the
Calendine,
with his
1975);
common
see Marks
v.
citizen,
fellow
full range
of civil reme-
F.R.D.
”
dies
contrived
court or
....
legislature
opinions
Some
have contained lan
322-23,
Id. 137
U.S.App.D.C.
424 F.2d at
were
guage suggesting that costs
assessed
810-11.
indigent
rule that an
parties
in forma
against
pauperis
because
is not
entirely
responsibility
relieved
a malicious or friv
they
proceeding
for the
litigation
costs of
is not inconsistent
Carlson,
v.
E.g.,
olous manner.
Duhart
indigent
Harris:
it ensures that an
Cir.1972),
(10th
denied,
cert.
F.2d
party, like
any
litigant, will
ac-
958, 93
410 U.S.
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 692
cess to the
courts
of dis-
resolution
(1973);
Cingliano,
Perkins
F.2d
putes,
weigh
litigation
but will
the costs of
(4th Cir.1961); Holsey
Bass,
against the
pro-
likelihood
success before
(D.Md.1981). However,
F.Supp.
ceeding in court.4
required
the court is not
conclude
that,
Finally,
be
contends
finding
make such a
malice or
bad faith
cause the
District
Columbia in forma
against
in order to assess costs
a party
pauperis statute
provisions
contains no
ex
proceeding
prepayment
without
costs un
pressly permitting the courts to
assess
may
der D.C.Code
15-712. Costs
against an
pauperis
in forma
at the
party proceeding
in for-
suit,
conclusion of the
had no
trial court
pauperis
ma
at the conclusion of an unsuc
*5
authority
points
to do so here. Appellant
to
case,
suit as
any
according
cessful
in
other
the fact
statute, by
that
the federal
con
Super.Ct.
to the standards
applicable
trast,
explicitly states
“[j]udgment
that
54(d) and
exercise
Civ.R.
in the
of the
may be rendered for costs at the conclusion
equitable
court’s
discretion.7
”
of the suit or action as in other cases ....
1915(e).
However,
U.S.C.
the failure
§
II
of the District of Columbia statute to in
The
is
question then
whether
clude such
provision
a
is not
in
significant
awarding
trial court abused its discretion in
light of
practice
the established
the appellees following
costs to
the mistrial
courts
assessing
in
against
indigent
costs
by appellant’s
which was necessitated
eve-
plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis.5
request
expand
scope
of-trial
of her
Moreover, the
pro
federal statute
does
testimony.
expert
vide any new authority to the
courts
federal
to assess costs.
It states
at
posture
that costs
The
this case
the time costs
may
cases,"
taxed, following
assessed “as in
e.g.,
initially
grant
were
pursuant
mistrial,
54(d).6
to Fed.R.Civ.P.
like that in
very
Maldonado
a
much
Par-
fact,
Harris,
656-58,
Catz,
explained
plaintiff.
Guyer,
citing
supra,
in
the court
at
provid[es]
prosecu-
(1494).
“D.C.Code
§
for the
c. 12
11 Hen.
by indigents
prepay-
tion of all suits
without
deposit
upon presentation
ment or
of costs
54(d) states that “costs shall be
6.Fed.R.Civ.P.
satisfactory
plaintiff
evidence that
indi-
prevailing party.”
as of course to the
allowed
gent
deposit
and
unable make
Id.
costs.”
54(d)
substantially
Super.Ct.Civ.R.
identical
added).
(emphasis
at
at 811
F.2d
federal statute.
provisions
statutory
5. Most
been con
have
courts,
exercising
in
their discretion to
7 Some
permit
strued to
the con
for costs at
suit,
costs at the
award
conclusion
they,
clusion
the Dis
of the suit because
like
impose
upon
indigent
costs
declined
statute, only encompass pre
trict of Columbia
disparity
of economic
where there is wide
Litigation
of costs.
Hid
Costs:
parties. See Maldonado
between the
resources
Indigent,
den
Barrier to the
56 Geo.L.J.
Parasole,
at 390.
66 F.R.D.
the first
n. 55
Since the enactment of
think,
argued,
appellant
we
has not
and
do not
pauperis
year
1494 the
forma
statute in the
necessarily
contrary
constitutes
result
that a
prevailing practice
has
tax costs
been to
discretion.
abuse
against
pauperis
unsuccessful
forma
Inc.,
trial.
Service,
finally imposed, following the second
McKee Auto
D.C.
askevas v.
Paraskevas,
circumstances,
we conclude
App.,
Under
this court held the assessment of costs
that there was no abuse
discretion
against
plaintiff
to be a
condition
proper
upon
conditioning
of a mistrial
plain
to the dismissal of a lawsuit when the
trial,
first
the costs of the
paying
sought
proceed
tiff
in order to
dismissal
against appellant
costs
assessment
those
had
second suit he
instituted
at
conclusion
as a matter of course
(based
another
same cause
pursuant
54(d).
to Rule
the suit
dam
significantly greater
action but for
ages).
the trial courts in Paras-
Because
Ill
“could,
giv
possibly
kevas
and
should” have
turn,
appellant’s contention
finally,
We
plaintiff
elect as
opportunity
en the
that,
properly
even if costs were
af
prosecuted
to which case
her,
prop-
costs are not
“per diem”
firmed the
of costs.8 162 A.2d
award
recoverable items of costs.
erly
us,
In the case
the trial court
before
“Costs,”
to those
used to refer
as
should,
could, and
have insisted
possibly
recov
is entitled to
prevailing party
items a
her
appellant proceed
to trial with
course,
construed
matter
has been
er as a
pretrial
state-
evidence
limited
litigant’s
something less than
to mean
order;
per-
and the
pretrial
ments
the suit.
expenses in connection with
total
mitting
to take a mistrial
ordinarily
fees
Court fees and witness
her
she
probably gave
trial court
more than
circum
but, absent unusual
recoverable
right
had a
to ask.9
stances,
parties
person
must
their
bear
object
did
Appellant apparently
attorney
expenses
expenses
al
and the
imposition
of costs
the time
fees.
lodging
travel
granted.
from
mistrial was
Nor
it clear
Miller,
& A.
Federal Practice
Wright
C.
the record that
unaware
126;
Hodge
(1973), at
see
Procedure
if a
might
be awarded
mistrial
Cir.1977).
Seiler,
(5th
558 F.2d
*6
con-
Further, appellant
not
granted.
does
a
to assess
authority
The
court
appellees
“prevail-
that
were not the
tend
a matter
partly
as costs
particular
item
of Rule
ing” parties
meaning
within the
(or
rule),10
partly
and
54(d)
the
costs in
of statute
court
question
time the
921,
1857,
(1980),
Getz,
64
275
100
L.Ed.2d
case is
to Williams v.
U.S.
S.Ct.
8. This
also similar
aof
App.D.C.
(D.C.Cir.1901),
affirmed
trial court’s dismissal
the
we
the
17
388
which
case,
remarkably
prejudice,
stay
proceed-
similar
with
use of a
court sanctioned the
complet
enforcing
pay
proceedings
ings
had been
to
facts. Pretrial
as a means of
an order
trial,
suit,
ed,
days
reasoning:
remained before
previous
“It has
and
two
the costs of a
plaintiff sought
expand the testi
long
practice
rule
...
when the
been an established
bring
mony
expert
in new
non
of an
witness to
action
been
that where a former
has
suited,
discontinued,
liability.
by
refused to
prossed,
The trial court
or
or
the
theories
non
permit
of testimo
plaintiff,
action
the last-minute modification
that a second
direction
continuance;
ny
the
and when
to be
and denied a
same
not
allowed
for the
prosecuted,
cause would
go
without,
plaintiff
the trial
precedent,
forward with
refused to
as a condition
testimony,
dis
court
paid.”
the
Id. at
additional
action
without
the costs
the former
v.
Although
by
plain-
court in Giovanetti
the case. The
missed
the action taken
University Hospital,
Georgetown
22
493
(and apparently
F.R.D.
in Wil-
tiffs
Paraskevas
denied,
831,
dismissal,
80
(D.D.C.1958),
liams)
actually
voluntary
361 U.S.
as
cert.
was
81,
(1959),
mistrial,
dis
4
73
likewise
distinguished
L.Ed.2d
view their
S.Ct.
from a
prejudice
facts.
reasoning
persuasive
on similar
as this
missed
as
a case such
one,
essentially
re-
where the mistrial was
(1966
example,
and
by
pro-
1920
voluntary
party
28 U.S.C.
10.For
sult
ceeding.
action
permits
Supp.1982)
to tax
the federal courts
fees,
fees,
printing
copying and
witness
court
expenses,
Center,
Washington Hospital
such items as costs.
Taylor
and other
v.
denied,
such
no
(1979),
Code contains
D.C.App.,
446
District
Columbia
1369
custom, practice,
matter of
and usage.
responsible
er in
one party
cases where
Newton
Co.,
v. Consolidated Gas
265
expense
U.S.
for inconvenience and additional
78,
481,
44
(1924);
S.Ct.
68
909
L.Ed.
Ad
v.
Eg.,
other.
Schneider Lockheed Air
Gotthardt,
lung
103 U.S.App.D.C.
87, 105-106,
Corp.,
U.S.App.D.C.
craft
(1958). However,
F.2d
(1981),
denied,
even as to
658 F.2d
cert.
special
items of
representing
costs not
cus
102 S.Ct.
In the present
searching
we conclude
she was still
additional
fact,
that the trial court did not abuse
discre
its
critical evidence.
trial
taxing
tion in
diem”
sought
costs to
had not
appellant
observed
grant
after
of the mistrial. The
continuance and that
this was a case in
award
clearly
fishing
a lesser sanction which
for an
“not
*7
8,
prejudice
than the dismissal with
Given
expert.”
which Su
Record
factors,
per.Ct.Civ.R. 41(b) permits
implicit
the trial court’s
which we
Taylor
upon
affirmed on
comparable
conditioning
facts
v.
the mistrial
Center,
Washington Hospital
finding
Other
a
of a
of misconduct
supra.
costs was
level
for an
required
courts
held
assessment
for
bad faith
have
the
of costs
tantamount
attorney’s
are
The trial court
ordinarily
prop-
items which
not
taxable
award of
fees.11
“costs,”
explicit
defining
Super.
Roadway Express,
Piper,
provision
Language
v.
Inc.
767,
2464-2465,
appear
447
100 S.Ct. at
Ct.Civ.R.
does not
to be intended
U.S. at
finding
complete listing
specific
suggests
faith is
to be a
costs
that a
bad
the
which
Thus,
(and
properly
required
it is not sufficient
that
taxable in the District courts.
thus that
opinion
Supreme
adjura
implied).
that
dealt
we are mindful of
it be
the
Court’s
attorney’s
tion
“the
tax
fees taxed
that
discretion ...
costs should
with an award of
attorney,
sparingly
party;
be
a
and the Court had
with reference to ex
an
not
exercised
specific
penses
specifically
already
for
a remand
more
not
allowed
statute.”
held that
Co.,
findings
required
other
We
Oil
for
reasons.
Farmer v. Arabian American
379 U.S.
attorney’s
227,
411,
235,
416,
fees
85
has
to do
United
equity
the
by awarding
(D.C.App.1976).
“against
par-
Cys,
fees
a
re
second order altered or merely explained Carr,
the first. As I read it did not estab-
lish one rule for civil appeals and another
rule appeals. for criminal short, I believe that the precedential
effect of West and Cys remains undiluted.
Because appellant did not file a notice of thirty days entry “within after
the ... order from which the
taken,” D.C.App.R. 4-II(a)(l) (emphasis
added) i.e., thirty within Febru- days after — ary hold, 1982—I would basis of
West and Cys, jurisdic- this court lacks
tion to her appeal.2 entertain HOWELL,
Marquis Appellant, Stetler, D.C., Bradley Washington, S. appellant. STATES, Appellee. UNITED Fisher, Atty., John R. Asst. U.S. No. 80-963. Harris, Stanley Atty., whom S. U.S. Michael District of Appeals. Columbia Court of Farrell, Mary McLaughlin, W. A. Asst. Attys., D.C., Washington, U.S. were on
Argued Sept. En Banc preargument appellee. memorandum for Decided Jan. NEWMAN, Judge, Before Chief KERN, NEBEKER, MACK, KELLY, FER- BELSON, REN, PRYOR and Associate Judges.
NEWMAN, Judge: Chief rehearing en we consider On this banc 8,1981, vacat- this court’s order of October ing opinion August our follow- reversing appellant’s conviction death, ing notification dismissing pro nunc tunc as States, by Harvey D.C. required v. United A.2d 36 We conclude that App., 385 direct re- pending when an dies opinion on the merits. Judge jurisdiction, Kern’s 2. Were I to conclude that case and we had join majority’s disposition of
