56 Mich. 135 | Mich. | 1885
This is a controversy between attorney and client. In 1876 Robinson employed Hawes to perform legal services for him, at a stipulated price j)er day and disbursements and expenses. Under this arrangement defendant attended to a largo amount of litigation in which plaintiff was directly and indirectly interested, when in August, 1883, he received into his hands, as attorney for plaintiff, the sum of $5922.25, being the avails of a suit compromised and settled by the parties, and refused to pay over to the plaintiff the sum so received, but offered to and did pay over $3722.25, retaining $2200, which he claimed he had a right to retain and apply on his charges for services in that and another suit, called the Sanborn suit. He afterwards made out and presented a bill for professional services, which he claimed he
The second count is the same as the first, except that it alleges it to be the duty of defendant to pay the sum to plaintiff on demand, and that afterwards, and on the 15th of August, 1883, the plaintiff demanded of defendant'"the said sum of money, and that defendant refused compliance. The third count is in trover for converting $5922.25. The plea was the general issue.
On the trial the plaintiff produced himself as a witness, and counsel for plaintiff offered to prove by him the facts and circumstances set forth in the affidavit for the writ of capias, and he did not propose to show any other facts and circumstances in support of plaintiff’s case. Defendant’s counsel then objected to the evidence proposed to be given by said offer as immaterial, and not sufficient to make out a ■cause of action against defendant under the declaration. The court sustained the objection, to which ruling the plaintiff excepted, and the court then directed the jury to render a verdict for the defendan’t, which was done. The shape in which the case was finally disposed of was the same as if the
It was proper for the court to consider the facts and circumstances stated in the affidavit, and also to draw from such facts and circumstances all inferences which a jury would be justified in drawing from the facts and circumstances proved.
The facts shown by the affidavit were that a special agreement was made between the plaintiff and the defendant, when plaintiff engaged the professional services of defendant, as to the compensation to be paid for such services that he had settled with and paid defendant in full for all services, excepting the following: (1) A balance of $60-for services in the suit, in the Supreme Court, of Robinson v. Bennett 50 Mich. 560; (2) charges claimed by defendant, but not admitted by plaintiff, in two suits of Pack v. Duffield, and three suits of Pack v. Blanchard, aggregating $260; (3) charges of defendant, but not admitted by plaintiff, in the suit of Robinson v. Duffield, of $65; and (4) charges of defendant, in the so-called Maynard compromise,, of $298.05; making a total of $6S3.05 ; that after the decision of the Supreme Court the entire controversy involved in the litigation was compromised and settled between plaintiff and Hon. A. B. Maynard, one of the counsel for Bennett, by which Maynard agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of $5922.25 • that defendant received said sum of $5922.25, paid by Maynard in his professional capacity as attorney of plaintiff on the 15th day of August, 1883 ; that said defendant thereupon pretended that he had a right to retain of said amount the sum of $2200, which plaintiff denied.
The facts above stated show that, at the utmost, according to the affidavit, the defendant’s claim did not exceed $683.05 against plaintiff, and that amount would be the greatest sum he would be entitled to retain out of the moneys received by him, conceding for the purposes of this question that he
, In a case where there is a disagreement between the, attorney and client as to the amount due him for professional services, and the attorney retains in good faith what he believes to be justly his due, he would not be liable to the client in this form of action ; he would not be guilty of professional misconduct or a violation of professional duty. But the evidence in this ease shows that the amount retained was far beyond the amount owing to defendant, and also that the pretext upon'which the defendant claimed the right to keep it was unfounded in fact; and the inference to be drawn is that it was not detained by defendant in good faith, or in the honest belief that it was fairly due to him from the plaintiff. The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence
Reversed and a new trial granted.