63 F. 222 | 4th Cir. | 1894
(after stating the facts). The foregoing were the principal averments of the bill of the receiver of the bank. To this bill the defendants demurred, and the court below sustained the demurrers. The original bill was defective for lack of precision in several of its clauses charging negligence; but this defect seems to have been cured by two amended bills, filed by leave, and does not seem to have been made by the court below the ground on which the demurrers were sustained. The appeal to this court is from the decree below sustaining the demurrers. The case is here, therefore, on the question whether the president and directors of this hank were liable, and should be held responsible, for the losses sustained by the bank through their negligence in the particulars set out in the bill of complaint and its amendments.
Counsel for the defendants rely, in their contention that the directors of the bank should be exonerated from blame and exempted from liability, chiefly on the decision of the supreme court of the United States in the case of Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132-174, 11 Sup. Ct. 924. That decision is a valuable contribution to the law of the perplexing question, how far, in what cases, and under what circumstances directors of national banks should be held liable» for losses sustained'by these banks as the result of neglect of duty on their part. These officers receive no compensation. They are under no compulsion to give regular attendance to directors’ meetings, and 1 o their official duties. They are chosen for their exceptional character and standing in the community, and for their supposed knowledge of its business, and of the pecuniary responsibility of those who borrow from the bank. The most valuable directors are those who are indifferent to any advantage or prestige which the position may give them, and who serve the hank from motives which could not be compensated by money. The courts, therefore, in dealing with instances of gross and glaring negligence on the part of directors of banks, are under perplexing restraint lest they should, by severity in their rulings, make directorships repulsive to the class of men whose services are most needed; or, by laxity in dealing with glaring negligences, render worthless the» supervision of directors over national banks, and leave these institutions a prey to dishonest
In the case at bar we have an essentially different state of facts to consider. The frauds and irregularities which resulted in the ruin of the bank went on through a period of more than three years, during all of which time the defendant directors were in office. Many of these irregularities were not things of secret occurrence and sudden development. They were such as must have been known to the defendants, if they gave even the most casual attention to the affairs of the hank. The embezzlement of Bowden, the $45,000 loans to the Aorthrops and to Kerchner, and the losses resulting, were facts that could not have eluded the most cursory attention of the directors to their duties. In respect to their omission to register the mortgages, it is a mistake to suppose that the directors of national banks cease to be such, and that their duty to the bank lapses, when an examiner is put in charge of its funds, properties, and hooks by the comptroller of the currency. It is incumbent upon them to give attention to these affairs even more specially after the examiner takes charge than before. In the case at bar it was especially their duty to register the mortgages held by tbe bank from Mitchell, Boatwright, and tin* Aorthrops. Their duty was the more special and urgent in inspect to these securities in consequence of (he fact that the management of the affairs of the hank had been taken from its own executive officers and committed to a temporary
In respect to tbe action of the defendants, or some of them, in. checking out their deposits two months before the suspension, in full knowledge that such an event must occur, there could he no adjudication except after plenary proofs. That depositors generally are at liberty to check out the entire funds at their credit before suspension is clear; but even they, after suspension, are entitled only to such percentage of their deposits as the assets of the bank will liquidate. If directors are depositors, and know two months or more before suspension that that event is inevitable, and that the bank can pay only a percentage of its deposits, and yet check for the whole of their own balances, thereby diminishing the percentage to which other creditors would be entitled, they certainly defraud, to the extent of the diminution, the creditors whose interest they are relied upon to protect, and should be held to strict accountability. In the present stage of this case the incident is of importance only in showing that the defendant directors were not prevented by any special circumstances from giving close attention to the affairs of the bank when their own personal interests were seriously involved.
On the whole case as shown by the record, we are of opinion that the court below erred in sustaining the demurrers to the hill as finally amended, on the grounds stated in the opinion of the learned judge below, and that the decree must be reversed. The case must go back to the court from which it came, the demurrers there filed must be overruled, and tbe case proceeded in on plenary proofs to a decree on the merits.