179 Ky. 598 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1918
Opinion op the Court by
Affirming. '
Tlie appellants are contestants of the will of Miss Columbia Buckner, a maiden lady wlio died in February, 1915, at tlie age of nearly 93 years. The will was, executed on February 28, 1911, when the decedent was v88 years of age. The contestants are collateral relatives -of the decedent, the nearest relationship of any of them being a nephew.
The usual grounds of such a contest, that of mental incapacity and undue influence, are urged as causes for rejecting the will. Upon a trial of the contest in the county court the will was probated, and from that order and judgment' the contestants prosecuted an appeal to tlie circuit court, in the trial of which a similar verdict was returned by the jury empaneled to try the case, and from the judgment rendered on that verdict probating the will and dismissing the contest this appeal is prosecuted.
By her will the testatrix devised her farm in "Warren county, consisting of about two hundred acres, her one-half interest in tlie household and kitchen furniture, and some live stock to Miss Ella Myrtle" Tarrants, a young lady who had lived with, looked after and cared for the decedent and performed household duties for a period of seventeen or eighteen years. To her sister-in-law, Mrs.
A condensed statement of the facts, sufficient however to understand the issues, is that the decedent owned about two hundred acres of land in Warren county, located on Barren river about three miles from the city of Bowling Green. As much as or more than fifty years ago her father, Major Archibald Buckner, deeded the farm to his daughter, the decedent, by an absolute deed. After the death of her parents the decedent continued to live upon the place, and it seems that her brother, Jim Buckner, lived with her, as did his wife, Mrs. Lizzie Buckner. About the year 1893 the brother died, but his widow continued to live with the decedent upon the farm. In 1906 John Robinson, who was the husband of decedent’s sister, died, and the sister moved upon the place and lived there until her death some five or six years thereafter.
For about eighteen years before the death of the decedent the principal devisee and contestee, Miss Ella Myrtle Tarrants, who was then .a poor girl 16 years of age, went to the home of the decedent as a servant girl under a contract by which she was to do the general household duties, including cooking, washing, milking, &c., for. her board and four dollars per month. She faithfully did that work upon those terms for more than fifteen years, when, according to the testimony, she began to do outside work such as attending to the garden, and perhaps work of other character, when her wages were increased from four to five dollars per month, which she received until the decedent’s death. A year or two after Miss Tarrants went to the place under the terms specified, the decedent sustained a fall of some character in which she received an injury to her back which forever disabled her from walking or otherwise getting about unassisted, and from that time on she occupied a rolling chair. When it would be necessary for her to go to her meals Miss Tarrants would have to lift and support her to and from the table. For a number of years before her death, on account of her physical afflictions, she became more troublesome, and duties arose in looking after her similar to those necessary to bestow upon helpless children. These, according to the testimony, were practically
Upon the trial eight witnesses, including appellants, testified in their behalf upon the issue of the testatrix’s mental capacity, while nine witnesses, including Miss Tarrants, testified for appellees upon the same subject. The eight witnesses mentioned introduced by contestants upon that point gave it as their opinion that the testatrix
Some twelve or more years before the execution of the will in contest she executed another, which is now destroyed, but in which, according to the testimony, she devised her farm to Miss Tarrants and her then living sister, Mrs. Kobinson, in equal shares, all of it to go to Miss Tarrants after the death of her sister. The latter was dead when the will in contest was executed, and there was no longer any occasion for provisions to be made for her.
Upon the issue of undue influence there is a total want of testimony, unless it might be said that the fact that Miss Tarrants went after Mrs.- Davenport on the morning of the day the will was executed is a circumstance showing activity on her part and a possibility of her having influenced the testatrix in her determination to execute the will.
In the brief of counsel for contestants we are not pointed to any fact furnished by the record, aside from the general statements of appellants’ witnesses as to their opinion, showing a want of mental capacity on the part of the testatrix except the fact of her age and physical infirmity. But neither of these in law, standing alone, is sufficient to destroy one’s capacity to execute a will. The question is always one to be inquired into, like any other fact, and to be ascertained from all the testimony and circumstances surrounding the transaction. In the early case of In re Higdon’s Will, 6 J. J. Marshall 444, the testatrix was 85 years old. The facts in that case upon the matter of the age of the testatrix, her physical condition, as well as circumstances under which she executed the will, bear a great similarity to those of like character in the instant case. This court by Judge Robertson, in reversing the judgment of the trial court setting aside the will, in the opinion said: “It is true that she was about 85 years old; and that all of her faculties were perceptibly decayed, and her memory, especially, very much impaired. But her mind was only somewhat torpid, not unsound; the occasional languor and absence, and even apparent imbecility of her mind, were only the natural and ordinary consequences of her old age, and were, in kind and degree, only such as may be expected to mark such extreme longevity'as 85 years old. Only benumbed with years, her mind was always rational, and when it acted, was consistent and intelligent. She seemed to be well acquainted with her property and
There seems to have béen much more convincing evidence of mental impairment in that case than is found in this record. As in that case so in this the testatrix was “well acquainted with her property and its value, and generally superintended the management of her own affairs.” A similar question was involved in the cases of Ligon v. Osborn, 155 Ky. 328; Watson v. Watson’s Heirs, 2 B. Mon. 74, and Sechrest v. Edwards, 4 Met. 163. In the latter case, after rehearsing the evidence, the court sums up its conclusions thus:
“But .after mature consideration of all the evidence on both sides, we are of the opinion that, although the mental capacity of the testator was, to some extent, impaired by old age and physical infirmities, the facts decidedly preponderate in favor of his testamentary capacity at the time of the publication of the contested paper.(McDaniel’s Will, 2 J. J. Mar. 331; Elliott’s Will, Ib. 340; Watson v. Watson’s Heirs, 2 B. Mon. 74; Reed’s Will, Ib. 79; 1 Jarman on Wills, 53, 54).”
The proper rule for measuring the necessary mental capacity sufficient to enable the testator to execute a will, as has been many times declared by this court, is that he should have sufficient mental capacity to take a survey of his property, to know its value, to know the objects of his bounty and his duty' to them, and to dispose of his property according to a fixed purpose of his own. Wise v. Foote, 81 Ky. 10; Phillips v. Phillips, idem, 332; McDonald v. McDonald, 27 Ky. L. R. 609; Meuth v. Meuth, 157 Ky. 793, and many other cases which might be cited. The same and other cases define undue influence to be an influence obtained over the mind of the testator to such an extent as to destroy his free agency and to constrain him to do against his will what he would otherwise refuse to do, whether exerted at one time or another, or exerted directly or indirectly, provided it so operated upon his mind at the time of the execution of the will; but any reasonable influence obtained by acts of kindness or by appeals to the feeling or understanding and not destroying free agency is not undue influence. See authorities, swpra, and Hobson on Instructions, section 629, and notes.
The instructions in this case, and of which no complaint is made, fully cover the above definitions, and, ac
We can not afford to indulge in speculation, as counsel for appellants would have us do, concerning the probable reasons why the will was executed as it was1, or why it was executed at all.
To show undue influence sufficient to invalidate a will there must be not only an opportunity to exercise such influence, or a possibility that it was exercised, but the testimony must go further and show facts or circumstances from which the jury would be authorized to infer that it was actually exercised. Brent v. Fleming, 165 Ky. 356.
It is insisted that the testatrix, with the known regard which she had for her relatives as well as her pride in her family name, would have thereby been induced to give them not only more of her property, but especially would she have been disposed to entrust to their keeping her prized heirlooms, but we can not inquire into her mind for a reason for her failure to do the latter, if she did, but must look only to the record. From it we see that she did devise a number of apparent keepsakes to her different relatives, and if she possessed other articles of a similar nature the record does not show it. It is sufficient for us to say that there is abundant testimony to sustain the verdict of the jury upon both of the propositions submitted to them, and we can not see that the verdict is even against the preponderance of the testimony, much less not sustained by it.
It therefore results that the judgment must be and it is affirmed.