65 F. 856 | 4th Cir. | 1895
The appellant, as receiver of the First National Bank of Wilmington, N. C., sought to enjoin the appellees, the city of Wilmington and its collector of taxes, from enforcing the collection of a tax assessed upon certain shares of bank stock alleged to have been illegally listed. It appears that the capital stock of Ihe bank consisted of 2,500 shares, of the par value of $1.00 each, and that 1,096 of these shares, valued at $76,720, the properly of persons residing in the city of Wilmington, were returned by the cashier and listed by the tax lister in said city for taxation in the name of the bank. By the law of North Carolina, (Pub Acts 1893, c. 226, § 42), these shares should have been listed in the names of the individual shareholders, aud the taxes assessed thereon should have been paid by each respective shareholder at the place of his domicile. It is provided by the same statute (Id. c. 826. 86) I hat, if (here is any error in the assessment roll in the name of ihe person, the name may be changed, and the error corrected In the manner therein prescribed. It is further provided (Id. c. 826, § 78) that in every case where a person claims that any tax or any part thereof is, for any reason, invalid, he may pay the same, and within 20 days may demand repayment thereof; and, if the same is not repaid in 90 days, he may sue for its recovery, and recover judgment against the city, town, or county imposing the tax for the full amount paid, with interest, etc. Assuming that it was Illegal to list these shares for taxation in the name of the bank in solido instead of in the names of the individual stockholders to whom th.e> belonged, it would seem that the revenue laws of the state of North Carolina provide a sufficient system of corrective justice in respect to taxes illegally imposed in appeals to the executive department of the government, and, if satisfaction is not thus obtained, Ihe party aggrieved has a remedy provided for the recovery of the tax paid by suit. For obvious reasons, courts of equity are reluctant to interfere with the taxing power of the states in the course of its orderly administration. They were not intended to furnish the corrective for every injury or abuse of power w'hich may be committed by the officers of a state government, and so long- as the laws prescribing tbe methods of assessment and subjects of taxation do not entrench upon the legitimate authority of the United States, or violate any rights recognized or secured by its coustitutiou and laws, courts of equity of the United States will not interpose between the state and its citizens, unless a case of equitable cognizance is presented. The record in this case does not disclose the grounds upon which the court below' acted in refusing the injunction and dismissing the bill. They ivill probably be found in those general