PATRICIA ROBINSON v. VINCENT CIANFARANI, JR., ET AL.
SC 19220
Supreme Court of Connecticut
November 25, 2014
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.*
Argued September 18—officially released November 25, 2014
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Mark J. Migliaccio, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Stephen G. Murphy, Jr., for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion
ROGERS, C. J. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether private landowners are liable fоr injuries sustained by a third party as the result of the failure to remove snow and ice from a public sidewalk abutting their property. The plaintiff, Patricia Robinson, brought an action alleging that she was injured as a result of the negligence of the defendants, Vincent Cianfarani, Jr., and Sharon Bahler, in failing to clear snow and ice frоm a public sidewalk next to their property. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the town of Enfield (town) ordinances requiring landowners whose property abuts public sidewalks to clear those sidewalks of ice and snow did not impose civil liability on the defendants for injuries to third parties. Rather than defending against summary judgment on the ground that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether town ordinances shift civil liability to landowners, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants were liable on several alternative negligence theories. The trial court rendered summary judgment on the ground that the town ordinances did not shift civil liability tо the defendants, and the plaintiff thereafter filed this appeal.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this case. The plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on a patch of snow and ice on a sidewalk abutting the defendants’ property. The sidewalk was owned by the town, and, pursuant to §§ 9-10 through 9-12 of the Enfield Code of Ordinances,2 the defendants, as abutting landowners, were
On appeal the plaintiff claims that, notwithstanding the fact that this court concluded in Willoughby v. New Haven, supra, 123 Conn. 453–54, that an ordinance imposing penalties for failing to clear ice and snow from a public sidewalk does not shift liability for injuries to an abutting landowner, the defendants may be held liable under alternative negligence theories. While not specifically pleaded, the plaintiff argues that the defendants can be held liable under common-law principles governing the duty of care for property in their possession or over which they exercise control and the defendants’ affirmative acts, and under the theоry of negligence per se. We disagree.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. ‘‘The standards governing our review of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 312–13, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). ‘‘When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotatiоn marks omitted.) Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. Partnership, 311 Conn. 301, 313, 87 A.3d 546 (2014).
This court also recognized in Willoughby that an ordinance merely imposing a penalty for failure to clear a sidewalk does not shift civil liability for injuries to abutting landowners. Id., 454. This rule is grounded in the public policy that, while a municipality may impose penalties on abutting landowners in order to alleviate its own labor and expenses, it still has the primary duty to maintain public sidewalks in a safe condition. See, e.g., Stevens v. Neligon, 116 Conn. 307, 312, 164 A. 661 (1933) (‘‘The [property owner’s] duty to remove the snow and ice is one owed to the city. . . . [T]he city ordinance cannot cast upon the property owner liability to a traveler upon the highway for failure to perform that duty. . . . The duty of the municipality is to use reasonable care to keep its streets and sidewalks reasonably safe for public travel.’’). Moreover, shifting ‘‘liability upon an individual may not be accomplished by inference or unless expressly provided’’; Willoughby v. New Haven, supra, 123 Conn. 456; because ‘‘[l]iability for damages for sidewalk accidents is potentially formidable—a fall on an icy sidewalk is often serious in its consequences and the damages heavy.’’3 Id., 455–56.
Long after this court’s 1937 decision in Willoughby, the legislaturе enacted just such a statutory vehicle whereby it permitted municipalities to elect to transfer civil liability to landowners with property abutting public sidewalks.
Turning to the present cаse, the relevant town ordinances, enacted long before the legislature adopted
The plaintiff concedes that the town’s ordinances do not shift liability in the manner prescribed by Willoughby or
We further note that, although there is support for the proposition that landowners can be held liable for a defective condition that they have created on a sidewalk; see Perkins v. Weibel, 132 Conn. 50, 52–53, 42 A.2d 360 (1945); Calway v. William Schaal & Son, Inc., 113 Conn. 586, 590–91, 155 A. 813 (1931); Hanlon v. Waterbury, 108 Conn. 197, 200, 142 A. 681 (1928); Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 525, 532 (1881); there are no allegations or proof that such is the case here.7
Therefore, the plaintiff’s alternative theories of common-law liability based on negligence are governed by the settled common-law rule.8 ‘‘An abutting landowner, in the absence of statute or ordinance, ordinarily is under no duty to keep the public sidewalk in front of his property in a reasonably safe condition for travel.’’ Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 280, 567 A.2d 829 (1989); see also Willoughby v. New Haven, supra, 123 Conn. 451. In order for a landowner’s duty to the public to exist, this common-law rule would have to have been abrogated by statute or duly authorized ordinance. See Caciopoli v. Lebowitz, 309 Conn. 62, 70–71, 68 A.3d 1150 (2013). As we have discussed previously herein, however, neither
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
ROGERS, C. J.
Notes
Article III, § 9-12 (a), of the Enfield Code of Ordinances (1967) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[w]henever any owner or occupant of premises . . . whose duty it is to remove snow and ice . . . shall fail, refuse or neglect to comply with the same or shall otherwise violate any рrovision of this article shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and fined as provided in section 1-8.’’
We note that the Enfield Code of Ordinances was recodified in 2006 and these relevant provisions were renumbered as §§ 74-102 and 74-103, respectively. Additional changes were made in 2009. For purposes of clarity and convenience, we refer, as did the parties to this appeal, to the orginal codification of the relevant ordinances.
‘‘(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13a-149 or any other general statute or special act, such town . . . shall not be liable to any person injured in person or property caused by the presence of ice or snow on a public sidewalk unless such municipality is the owner or person in possession and control of land abutting such sidewalk . . . provided such municipality shall be liable for its affirmative acts with respect to such sidewаlk.
‘‘(c) (1) The owner or person in possession and control of land abutting a public sidewalk shall have the same duty of care with respect to the presence of ice or snow on such sidewalk toward the portion of the sidewalk abutting his property as the municipality had prior to the effective date оf any ordinance adopted pursuant to the provisions of this section and shall be liable to persons injured in person or property where a breach of said duty is the proximate cause of said injury. (2) No action to recover damages for injury to the person or property caused by the presеnce of ice or snow on a public sidewalk against a person who owns or is in possession and control of land abutting a public sidewalk shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained.’’