Robinson v. BonetaRobinson v. Boneta
Micaela C. Deming for Appellant
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Intervener-appellant Hellen Douglas (“Douglas“) brings this appeal from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County, Juvenile Division overruling her objections to a magistrate‘s decisions and naming plaintiff-appellant Darr Robinson (“Robinson“) as the residential parent of the minor child (“L.D.“) that was the subject of the case. Douglas claims that the trial court erred by denying her request to present new evidence as is permitted by
{¶2} In September of 2012, L.D. was born to defendant-appellee Brittany Boneta (“Boneta“). Doc. 1. On December 3, 2012, Robinson, along with the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services through the Allen County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“ACCSEA“), filed a complaint to determine the parentage of L.D. Doc. 1. The trial court entered a judgment on October 21, 2013 naming Robinson as the father of L.D. Doc. 15, 18. No order of parenting time was made at that time, but Robinson was ordered to pay child support. Id.
{¶3} On February 18, 2014, the ACCSA filed a motion for contempt alleging that Robinson had failed to comply with the seek work order. Doc. 21. A hearing was held on the motion on September 25, 2014, at which Robinson admitted being in contempt of the court order. Doc. 29. The parties agreed that if Robinson subsequently complied with the court order, they would not oppose a suspended jail
{¶4} On March 25, 2016, Robinson filed a complaint for allocation of parental rights and responsibilities under the same case number as the paternity case. Doc. 48. Robinson then filed an ex parte motion for temporary custody of L.D. on April 5, 2016. Doc. 60. The basis for this was that Boneta had left L.D. with Douglas, the maternal grandmother, while Boneta entered a drug rehabilitation program. Id. On April 13, 2016, Douglas filed a motion to intervene and to be granted legal custody of L.D. Doc. 62 and 63. Douglas alleged in the motion for legal custody that Robinson was prohibited from contact with L.D. by a domestic violence civil protection order issued by the Auglaize County Court of Common Pleas. Doc. 63. On June 13, 2016, a copy of a judgment entry modifying that protection order to allow Robinson contact with L.D. was filed. Doc. 70. This modification occurred after a hearing on June 3, 2016, and the Court of Common Pleas of Auglaize Country removed L.D. from the protection order “as a Court of competent jurisdiction is considering parental rights and responsibilities and will issue orders accordingly.” Id. On July 8, 2016, the magistrate granted Douglas’ motion to be added as a party. Doc. 71. On July 19, 2016, a hearing was held on Robinson‘s motion for temporary custody of L.D. Doc. 77. After reviewing the facts of the case, the magistrate denied Robinson‘s motion due to him having no
{¶5} On November 30, 2016, all of the parties submitted a joint motion for a Guardian ad Litem (“GAL“). Doc. 83. The trial court granted the motion and appointed a GAL. Doc. 86. The GAL filed his report on April 3, 2017. Doc. 110. On June 2, 2017, Robinson filed a second ex parte motion for temporary custody of L.D. on the grounds that Boneta had been indicted on four felony drug offenses. Doc. 142. Douglas filed a response to the motion on June 7, 2017. Doc. 144. Boneta filed her response to the motion on June 12, 2017. Doc. 146. The trial court denied the motion on June 12, 2017. Doc. 147.
{¶6} Hearings were held to determine the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities on August 1, August 22, and September 5, 2017. Doc. 171. On March 22, 2018, the magistrate filed her decision. Id. In the decision, the magistrate specifically found that there was no evidence presented at the hearings that any party had a conviction for domestic violence or had committed an act which might form the basis for the minor child to be found a dependent, neglected, or abused child. Id. at 34. The magistrate then named Robinson as the residential parent. Id. at 41. Douglas filed objections to the decision on April 4, 2018. Doc. 173. As part of the objections, Douglas requested that the trial court accept additional evidence in the matter that was unavailable to Douglas at the time of the hearings as is permitted pursuant to
The trial court erred by finding that [Robinson] was a suitable parent and that a grant of custody was in the best interests of the minor child without affording [Douglas] the opportunity to present additional evidence, under
Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) /Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d) when the evidence demonstrated continuing detriment to the child while in [Robinson‘s] care.
{¶7} The assignment of error challenges whether the trial court should have held a hearing for the presentation of additional evidence. Originally Douglas claimed the right to present additional evidence under
If one or more objections to a magistrate‘s decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law. Before so ruling, the court may hear additional evidence but may refuse to do so unless the objecting party demonstrates that the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced that evidence for consideration by the magistrate.
{¶8} Generally, the trial court has discretion to determine whether it will hear additional evidence following an objection, but “a court does not have discretion to refuse to consider new evidence if the objecting party demonstrates that it could not, with reasonable diligence, have presented the evidence to the magistrate.” Welch v. Welch, 4th Dist. Athens No. 12CA12, 2012-Ohio-6297, ¶ 12. While this court is “sympathetic to a burdensome caseload and the struggle to produce timely decisions,” the passage of time between the hearing and the decision of the trial court can allow for changes in circumstances that may be properly raised by a party pursuant to the appropriate rule, i.e. either
{¶9} In this case, Douglas is pointing to events that occurred after the final hearing date as additional evidence. This court makes no finding on the weight of the evidence as far as whether it would be sufficient to justify a new hearing. However, the trial court specifically found that “[a]ll of the unavailable evidence to which [Douglas] refers relates to occurrences subsequent to the completion of the hearing. It was evidence which the Magistrate could not have heard and considered at the time of the trial because it did not exist at the time of trial“. Doc. 194.
{¶10} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County, Juvenile Division is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
Judgment Reversed And Remanded
SHAW and PRESTON, J.J., concur.
/hls