OPINION
1 Alexander Earl Baggett (Husband) appeals the trial court's denial of his motion under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure following the entry of an Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce and the related findings of fact and conclusions of law (Amended Decree) in his divorce from Randy L. Robinson (Wife). 1 We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
T2 Husband and Wife were married in Utah on December 31, 1995. The couple has one child together, who is still a minor. Wife filed for divorcee on March 26, 2008. The parties stipulated, and the trial court ordered, that Husband would pay temporary support to Wife beginning on June 1, 2008, including child support, mortgage payments on the marital home, and temporary alimony of $2,909 per month (the Temporary Order). A trial was held before Judge Stephen L. Roth in June 2005, at which time the proceedings were bifurcated. Judge Roth granted the divorcee on June 29, 2005, but provided that "[alll other matters associated with this divorce, including child support, alimony, property distribution, allocation of debts, attorney[ ] fees and any other matter argued before this court at trial ... shall be reserved for final ruling by this court." The parties' marriage lasted for a total of 114 months.
T3 On January 4, 2006, Judge Roth issued a Memorandum Decision explaining his decisions regarding custody of the parties' child, child support, division of property and debt, and alimony. Judge Roth awarded Wife alimony in the net amount of $1,882 per month, stating, "That Sum is payable for a period equal to the length of the marriage," i.e., 114 months. He instructed the parties to caleu-late the amount of alimony Husband would need to pay so that, after taxes, Wife would receive $1,882 and to include that gross amount in their proposed findings. In addition, because Husband had only paid approxi
14 For the next eight months, the parties attempted unsuccessfully to agree upon the terms of the proposed order and the supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties submitted their respective positions on a number of disputed issues to the court on September 1, 2006, and argued the issues at a hearing before Judge Roth on July 11, 2007 (2007 Hearing). At the 2007 Hearing, the parties first discussed the date on which the parties' retirement accounts would be divided. Wife's attorney urged Judge Roth to take into account Husband's failure to meet his support obligations under the Temporary Order in determining the effective date for the division of marital property. Judge Roth considered Wife's concerns and stated generally that "my decision will take effect as of the date the supplemental decree was signed," 3 except that the retirement accounts would be divided as of the date of his January 4, 2006 Memorandum Decision.
15 Later in the proceedings, the parties specifically addressed the issue of alimony. The parties stipulated at the 2007 Hearing that alimony would last for 102 months, which is the length of the 114-month marriage less the year credit Husband received for making partial payments under the Temporary Order. The parties then addressed the effective date of the permanent alimony award. Specifically, Wife questioned whether there should be an order addressing the temporary alimony arrearages accumulated during the interim between the June 2005 trial and the 2007 Hearing and if so, whether they should be calculated based on the higher award in the Temporary Order or based upon the permanent support award in Judge Roth's January 4, 2006 Memorandum Decision. Wife argued that Husband should not get the benefit of the lower alimony payments awarded under the Memorandum Decision because he had not been paying his share of marital debt as ordered by that decision. Therefore, Wife suggested that the lower permanent alimony amount not begin until Husband began paying toward the marital debt. Although Judge Roth acknowledged Wife's concern, he rejected Wife's suggestions regarding the commencement of the remaining 102 months of alimony. Instead, referring to his January 4, 2006 Memorandum Decision, Judge Roth stated, "It seems to me that my ruling-that my order ought to take place as of the date of the ruling, that the-it will be the gross amount of that [$11,882 as of January." He further clarified,
And that would take-that would satisfy, it seems to me, my concerns about what's happened here, while still making implementation of my ruling, which was thought out in some length in terms of what was appropriate in terms of child support and-and alimony and put that into place. The concern I have is just continuing the temporary order because it also continues amounts of child support-and alimony, which I calculated on a much more detailed basis than is under the temporary orders....
Judge Roth's reference to the precise dollar figure of the net alimony award, $1,882, as well as the reference to his January ruling, leave little doubt that he ordered permanent alimony to run for 102 additional months,
T6 After several more months of negotiations in an attempt to memorialize Judge Roth's rulings and to resolve other issues left open at the 2007 Hearing, Wife served Husband with a copy of the proposed Amended Decree on March 5, 2008. Husband notified Wife of his intention to object but failed to do so within the time provided by the parties' correspondence. Because she had not received any formal objections to the Amended Decree, Wife submitted it to the court on April 3, 2008. By this time, Judge Robert P. Faust was assigned to serve as the trial judge on the case as the successor to Judge Roth. Seeing that no objections had been filed within the five days provided by rule 7(P(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Faust entered the Amended Decree on April 11, 2008. One of the provisions of the Amended Decree provided that Husband was to pay $2,499 4 per month as alimony to Wife for a period of 102 months to begin on the date that the Amended Decree was entered, April 11, 2008. Because Judge Roth's ruling at the 2007 Hearing ordered the 102 months of permanent alimony to begin as of the date of the January 4, 2006 Memorandum Decision, the Amended Decree provided Wife with twenty-eight extra months of permanent alimony.
T7 On April 28, 2008, Husband filed a motion for rule 59(e) or rule 60) relief (First Rule 60(b) Motion). As an addendum to the First Rule 60(b) Motion, Husband's attorney submitted an affidavit stating that on April 4, 2008, his office received a copy of the Amended Decree and notice that it had been submitted to the court but that he had not seen it until April 28, 2008. Husband's attorney indicated that he is not certain why he did not see the letter, but also noted that he was moving offices during that time. Husband argued that he was entitled to relief under rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure based on irregularity in the proceedings, see Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)-(a)(1) (providing that a court may grant a new trial, amend or make new findings of fact and conclusions of law, or direct the entry of a new judgment based on "[iJrregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial"), or because of accident or surprise, see id. R. 59(@)8) (granting relief under rule 59 for "[alecident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against"). Specifically, he asserted that the entry of the Amended Decree was irregular because it did not accurately represent the stipulations of the parties and Judge Roth's rulings and because "the process by which the [Amended Decree] was presented to the Court was irregular." Husband further argued that he was entitled to rule 59(e) relief because of the accident or surprise that resulted from the misplacement of the letter during the move of his attorney's office. In the alternative, Husband argued that he was entitled to relief under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure based on "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" for essentially the same reasons. See id. R. 60(b) (providing that "[oJn motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for several enumerated reasons, including "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect").
{8 In a minute entry dated June 27, 2008, Judge Faust denied the First Rule 60) Motion, ruling that Husband's motion was untimely under rule 59(e), see id. R. 59(e) ("A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of judgment."), and that his "failure to timely object to the proposed Amended Decree [wals inexcusable." Judge Faust further reasoned that Husband could not "rely on surprise or mistake because by April 4, 2008, by the latest, [Husband's attorney] was clearly informed that the proposed Amended Decree had been submitted to the Court." He then determined that there was "no rea
T9 Instead, on July 10, 2008, Husband filed a second motion asking for relief under rule 60(b) (Second Rule 60(b) Motion). In the Second Rule 60(b) Motion, Husband asserted that he was entitled to relief based upon either "fraud ..., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party," satisfaction of the judgment, or "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(8), (5)-(6). He asserted that Wife misrepresented Judge Roth's rulings as stated both in his January 4, 2006 Memorandum Decision and at the 2007 Hearing, including, among other things, the date the permanent alimony award would take effect.
110 Judge Faust held a hearing on the Second Rule 60(b) Motion on October 23, 2008 (2008 Hearing). At the beginning of the hearing, Judge Faust stated, "I have given some thought, assuming we got over the hurdle and granted the motion-assuming that, I'm not saying we will-but assuming that, of whether or not I would be required to keep and handle it or whether I could approach Judge Roth and have him take a look at it." He then stated, "[What I thought we would do is just simply handle the threshold issue of whether or not to grant the motion for [rule 60(b) or] not." He suggested that he "was tinkering with the idea of asking both of [the parties] to go back one last time and get the order completely consistent with what Judge Roth had asked" and that if he "needed to step in and handle each issue one at a time, [he] would sanction somebody for whoever was wrong." However, Judge Faust never explicitly granted Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion. Instead, the parties agreed to meet and attempt to resolve their disagreements concerning the Amended Decree. In doing so, however, Wife's attorney indicated that Wife was not waiving her legal arguments. Judge Faust responded, "So noted."
11 The parties were again unable to resolve their differences. Approximately fifteen months later, on January 25, 2010, Husband filed a request to submit for a decision on his Second Rule 60(b) Motion. The notice alerted the trial judge that a prior hearing had resulted in the court "re-quir[ing] the parties to meet and attempt to resolve their differences," and requested another hearing. By this point, Judge Paul G. Maughan had been assigned to the case. Without further hearing, Judge Maughan denied Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion on two grounds in a minute entry dated February 4, 2010. He first determined that the Second Rule 60(b) Motion was "effectively a renewal" by Husband of his First Rule 60(b) Motion and that "there [was] nothing in [Husband's] present motion which could not have been raised in his initial motion for [rJule 60(b) relief." Judge Maughan then stated that even if he considered the matter on the merits, he was "not persuaded by [Husband's] argument that the Amended [DJeeree [did] not accurately reflect Judge Roth's extensive rulings." In addition, Judge Maughan determined that Husband was "essentially mounting a challenge to the legal merits of certain of Judge Roth's opinions," something not permitted by rule 60(b). Husband now appeals from Judge Maughan's denial of his Second Rule 60(b) Motion.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
112 Husband first argues that we lack subject matter jurisdiction. He asserts that there is no final order in this case because at the 2008 Hearing Judge Faust either granted his Second Rule 60(b) Motion or reopened the judgment, or because the
Y18 In the alternative, Husband argues that if we do have subject matter jurisdiction over his appeal, Judge Maughan exceeded his discretion in denying Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion. "We review a district court's denial of a rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion." Jones v. Layton/Okland,
ANALYSIS
I. Judge Maughan's Denial of Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion Is a Final, Appealable Order.
¶14 An appeal may be taken only “from ... final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law.” Utah R.App. P. 3(a). “For an order or judgment to be final, it must ... dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the case. In other words, a judgment is final when it ends the controversy between the parties.” Bradbury v. Valencia,
115 We first address Husband's assertions in his reply brief and at oral argument that the Amended Decree was not a final, appealable order; that his own rule 60(b) motions were procedurally improper because there was no final order from which to seek relief; that Judge Maughan did not properly have Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion before him; that Judge Maughan's
116 Nor are we persuaded by Husband's argument that Judge Faust's comments at the 2008 hearing that some issues may need clarification-specifically the alimony commencement date and life insurance protection for Husband's alimony obligation 6 -indicate that Judge Faust determined that the Amended Decree was not a final order. Although Judge Faust stated that if he granted the Second Rule 60(b) Motion further discussion of these issues may be appropriate, he did not suggest that the decree did not purport to resolve these issues. Moreover, a review of the Amended Decree reveals that it is final.
¶17 "[A]n order is final where the effect of the order ... was to determine substantial rights ... and to terminate fully the litigation." Foster v. Montgomery,
¶19 In response to Husband's Notice To Submit, Judge Maughan entered a signed Minute Order denying the Second Rule 60(b) Motion and directing that the minute entry "will stand as the Order of the Court."
7
This minute entry is the final judgment for purposes of this appeal, and we have subject matter jurisdiction to review that final order. See Swenson Assocs. Architects, PC v. State,
¶20 Having concluded that we have subject matter jurisdiction, we now proceed with our substantive review, which is limited to Judge Maughan's denial of Husband's See-ond Rule 60(b) Motion. See Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin,
II The Trial Court Exceeded Its Discretion in Denying Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion.
¶21 Judge Maughan denied Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion on several grounds. Judge Maughan first determined that Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion had the effect of renewing his First Rule 60(b) Motion and that the grounds for which he sought relief in his Second Rule 60(b) Motion could have been raised in the first. Although Husband argued in his First Rule
¶22 In his Second Rule 60(b) Motion, however, Husband again argued that the Amended Decree was inconsistent with Judge Roth's rulings, this time arguing for relief under subsections (3) and (6) of the rule. 8 See id. R. 60(b)(8), (6) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (8) fraud ..., misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."). It is apparent from the record that Husband had the information from which to challenge the alleged inconsistency of the rulings at the time he filed his First Rule 60(b) Motion. By then, Husband had a copy of the Amended Decree and had been present at the 2007 Hearing during which Judge Roth modified his January 4, 2006 Memorandum Decision with respect to the commencement of alimony. Nothing further occurred between Husband's rule 60(b) motions to provide additional support for his claim that the Amended Decree was inconsistent with Judge Roth's ruling.
¶23 As a general rule, parties should allege all known grounds for relief in one motion for relief from judgment under rule 60(b). As this court explained in Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler,
[there must be finality, a time when the case in the trial court is really over and the loser must appeal or give up. Successive post-judgment motions interfere with that policy. And justice is not served by permitting the losing party to string out his attack on the judgment over a period of months, one argument at a time, or to make the first motion a rehearsal for the real thing the next month.
Id. at 969 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Amica Mutual court concluded that the defendant's second rule 60(b) motion was barred by "'law of the case'" because the "newly discovered evidence" he asserted as the ground for relief under his second motion "was available ... at the time he filed his first 60(b) motion and with due diligence could have been included in the original motion," which was also based on newly discovered evidence. See id. We agree that generally, "[al party may not file repeated [rule 60(b) ] motions until he either offers a meritorious ground for relief or exhausts himself and the trial court in an effort to do so." See Carvey v. Indiana Nat'l Bank,
¶25 In his denial of Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion, Judge Maughan stated that he was not persuaded that the Amended Decree was an inaccurate reflection of Judge Roth's "extensive rulings." Judge Maughan, however, did not have the benefit of the written transcript of either the 2007 or 2008 Hearings. Our review of the record, including these transcripts, indicates that the Amended Decree submitted by Wife and signed by Judge Faust directly conflicts with Judge Roth's ruling at the 2007 Hearing that the permanent alimony award would begin on January 4, 2006. Judge Roth's Memorandum Decision explicitly contemplated that permanent alimony would last for the length of the marriage, 114 months. He further ordered that Husband would be entitled to one year of credit for payment of temporary alimony. This had the effect of reducing the duration of permanent alimony to 102 months, a number the parties stipulated to at the 2007 Hearing. However, due to the length of time that had passed since his January 2006 Memorandum Decision and Husband's failure to comply completely with the terms of that decision, Judge Roth modified the date upon which permanent alimony would begin. At the 2007 Hearing, Judge Roth explicitly referred to his January 4, 2006 Memorandum Decision, stating that the $1,882 net alimony award would begin "as of the date of the ruling[;] ... it will be the gross amount of that [$]1,882 as of January." Although this was a departure from the alimony commencement date of June 2004 in his Memorandum Decision, Judge Roth contemplated that the later start date would account for arrearages that had acerued during the nearly eighteen months between the end of trial and the 2007 Hearing, stating, "And that would ... satisfy, it seems to me, my concerns about what's happened here, while still making implementation of my ruling, which was thought out in some length in terms of what was appropriate in terms of ... alimony and put that into place." 9
¶26 In urging us to affirm, Wife asserts that Judge Roth ordered the permanent alimony award to begin at the time the Amended Decree was entered. In support of this assertion, Wife points to language earlier in the proceedings where the parties discussed the division of retirement accounts. After the parties discussed the date for the division of the parties' retirement accounts and concerns about Husband's failure to assume responsibilities under the Memorandum Decision, Judge Roth stated generally that the "provisions" of his decision would take effect when the final decree was signed. He then identified the date of the Memorandum Decision as the effective date for the division of the parties' retirement accounts. Reflecting their understanding that Judge Roth had not yet ruled on the issues relating to alimony,
¶27 The permanent alimony commencement date of April 11, 2008, that Wife inserted into the Amended Decree awards Wife twenty-eight extra months of permanent alimony, resulting in a windfall to Wife of approximately $70,000 and an award of 130 months of permanent alimony, despite Judge Roth's award of such alimony only for the length of the 114-month marriage.
12
Furthermore, while Husband bears much of the responsibility for not filing timely objections to the proposed decree and not appealing either the Amended Decree or the denial of his First Rule 60(b) Motion, there are other factors that contributed to this result. Due to the inordinate amount of time this divorce action has lingered-eight years and counting-at least four different trial judges have been assigned to the case.
13
Once Judge Roth, the trial judge who heard the evidence and issued the ruling to be memorialized by the parties, was reassigned, his successors were left in the difficult position of trying to sort out the post-entry objections to the Amended Decree without the benefit of having participated in those proceedings. While the rotation of judicial assignments in the district courts is not per se a basis for relief from judgment, the task of the successor judges was complicated by Wife's inclusion of terms in the Amended Decree that counsel conceded at oral argument before this court were intended merely as a starting point for further discussion. Because Husband failed to file the objections to the Amended Decree that Wife had anticipated, Judge Faust had no reason to suspect that the Amended Decree did not accurately reflect Judge Roth's ruling and, instead, included Wife's best case scenario on the commencement of alimony. Under the unique facts and cireumstances present here, we conclude that Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion should be considered on the merits so as to prevent Wife from enjoying a windfall that is, at least in
¶28 Having decided that Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion may be considered on the merits, we now address whether Husband is entitled to relief from that decree under rule 60(b). In particular, we address Husband's argument under rule 60(b)(6), which allows a court to set aside a final order or judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). "Relief under [rule 60(b)(6) ] embodies three requirements: First[,] that the reason be one other than those listed in subdivisions (1) through [ (5) ]; second, that the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion be made within a reasonable time."
15
Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.,
¶29 First, the grounds listed in subsections (1) through (5) of rule 60(b) do not apply here. See Kunzler v. O'Dell,
¶30 Second, we conclude that the unusual circumstances present here justify relief. The commencement date in the Amended Decree directly and substantively conflicts with Judge Roth's oral ruling at the 2007 Hearing. By virtue of the inclusion of a commencement date that is difficult to support from a review of the record, Wife is the beneficiary of twenty-eight months of permanent alimony in excess of Judge Roth's ruling, totaling nearly $70,000. Additionally, the duration of permanent alimony as provided in the Amended Decree exceeds the length of the marriage in contradiction of Judge Roth's unambiguous ruling to the contrary. While we do not condone Husband's lack of diligence in challenging the terms of the Amended Decree, both before and after it was entered, the principles of equity that are embodied in rule 60(b) convince us that a decree so far removed from the ruling of the court should not stand.
¶32 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Husband is entitled to relief from the Amended Decree and we therefore vacate it. In doing so, we are sensitive to the difficulties faced by the trial judges who suceessively assumed the responsibilities for this matter during the four years between Judge Roth's initial Memorandum Decision and Husband's notice to submit the Second Rule 60(b) Motion for decision. Neither of these judges were privy to the trial evidence or the thought processes of Judge Roth, which were elucidated by the transcript containing his exact language included in the record on appeal, but not available to Judge Maughan. However, we are left with a firm conviction that the strident positions of the parties inordinately delayed resolution of these issues, thereby adding to the loss of continuity caused by successive trial judges, and that the parties' practice of staking out aggressive negotiation positions resulted in a final order that does not reflect the ruling of the trial court. Therefore, we hold that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion.
CONCLUSION
¶33 Because the Amended Decree was a final, appealable order from which Husband properly sought rule 60(b) relief and because Judge Faust did not grant Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion or otherwise reopen the judgment at the 2008 Hearing, Judge Mau-ghan's denial of Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion is a final, appealable order for purposes of this appeal. Because Husband appeals from this final judgment, we have subject matter jurisdiction. Although Husband should have identified all known grounds for relief in his First Rule 60(b) Motion, the unique cireumstances of this case warranted consideration of the merits of that second motion. Because the Amended Decree directly and substantively conflicts with Judge Roth's ruling at the 2007 Hearing regarding the permanent alimony commencement date and would result in a nearly $70,000 windfall to Wife due to her inclusion of a negotiation position in the proposed order, we conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying relief from that decree under rule 60(b)(6). Therefore, we reverse the denial of Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion, vacate the Amended Decree, and remand to the trial court for proceedings to enter a final decree of divorce that accurately reflects Judge Roth's ruling so that this eight-year saga can be concluded.
¶ 34 Reversed and remanded.
¶ 35 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Presiding Judge, and J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., Judge.
Notes
. The Decree was called an "amended" decree simply because the proceedings were bifurcated and the trial court had previously entered a divorce decree.
. However, Judge Roth also ordered that if Husband paid "the full amount of arrears within forty-five (45) days after the date of this Decision, the period of alimony payment [would] begin June 2003," essentially allowing for two years credit on Husband's permanent alimony obligation if the condition was satisfied. -It is undisputed that Husband failed to pay the arrearages within forty-five days after the Memorandum Decision.
. As further explained below, the supplemental decree Judge Roth referred to was memorialized as the Amended Decree that Judge Robert P. Faust entered on April 11, 2008. See infra 16.
. In the Amended Decree, Wife asserted that this is the gross amount she required so that she would net $1,882 per month after taxes.
. Because the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we may look to the federal rules for guidance. See Drew v. Lee,
. It appears that Judge Roth did not make a substantive ruling with regard to the amount of life insurance coverage Husband would need to carry to cover his alimony obligation and instead left it to the parties to reach an agreement. Although Husband identifies the life insurance issue as a basis for his argument that the Amended Decree is not final, he does not rely on the life insurance provision on appeal as support for his claim that Judge Maughan erred in denying his Second Rule 60(b) Motion. Instead, he focuses on Judge Roth's ruling on the commencement date of the permanent alimony award. Therefore, we do not substantively consider the life insurance issue and only address it as it relates to Husband's arguments about the finality of the Amended Decree.
. Although Husband complains that Judge Mau-ghan denied the Second Rule 60(b) Motion without a hearing, there was no requirement that he grant Husband's request for oral argument. See Utah R. Civ P. 7(e) (providing that "[the court may hold a hearing on any motion," but "shall grant a request for a hearing" on motions for summary judgment and other motions that "would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action").
. Although Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion also alleged that he was entitled to relief under subsection (5), see Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (providing for relief from judgment on the ground that "the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged"), he has not argued this ground on appeal. Therefore, we do not consider it. In addition, although Husband alleges on appeal that he is entitled to relief under rule 60(a), see id. R. 60(a) (providing that "[cllerical mistakes in judgments ... may be corrected by the court at any time"), our review of the record indicates that Husband did not raise this as a basis for relief in his Second Rule 60(b) Motion. Consequently, we do not address it further. See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc.,
, While Wife acknowledged this language in her response to Husband's Second Rule 60(b) Motion, she did so only to assert that arrearages would be calculated based on the permanent alimony beginning in January 2006, but inexplicably insisted that the 102-month permanent alimony period would not begin until the Amended Decree was entered, i.e., in April 2008.
. After Judge Roth's ruling on the effective date of the permanent alimony award, Husband's attorney clarified, "If Your Honor is actually saying that it's from the date of the [January 2006] order, then I think our calculation application [of post-trial arrearages] is closer to what's correct. But I believe that [Wife's attorney] and I can go through and we can identify those numbers. That's a matter of the numbers." Judge Roth affirmed his intent to modify the effective date of the permanent alimony award by responding, "Right."
. The practice of adopting aggressive interpretations of Judge Roth's ruling was not limited to Wife. Even on appeal, Husband insists that the commencement date for permanent alimony should be controlled by the Memorandum Decision, arguing that Judge Roth "made no rulings [at the 2007 Hearing] altering [his] earlier decision that alimony should begin in June 2004." Our review of the record convinces us that Judge Roth expressly adopted a January 2006 date for the commencement of permanent alimony, thereby abandoning the June 2004 date in his prior Memorandum Decision.
. As an experienced trial judge, Judge Roth was likely well aware of Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(h), which mandates specific findings in order to award alimony for a duration longer than the length of the marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(h) (Supp.2010) ("Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time."). Yet Judge Roth entered no findings that would justify an award of alimony for longer than 114 months. Given this lack of findings, the fact that the commencement date in the Amended Decree would have violated section 30-3-5(8)(h) supports our conclusion that the Amended Decree was contrary to Judge Roth's ruling.
. The original divorce petition was filed before Judge Stephen Henriod.
. Permission to prepare an order reflecting a ruling from the bench should not be treated by either party as an opportunity to negotiate for a "wish list" of preferred terms. Instead, both parties should attempt to agree on an accurate recitation of the trial court's actual ruling. See Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility 14-301(8) ("'When permitted or required by court rule or otherwise, lawyers shall draft orders that accurately and completely reflect the court's ruling."). If the parties cannot agree on the substance of the ruling after a reasonable effort, further clarification should be sought from the trial court.
. Rule 60(b)(6) was previously numbered rule 60(b)(7). "[Hlowever, there is now no rule 60(b)(7).. .. Current subsection (6) was previously numbered as subsection (7) until a 1998 amendment to the rule eliminated former subsection (4), at which time the former subsection (7) became the current subsection (6)." Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,