Robinson v. AderholdRobinson v. Aderhold
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Bell
Lead Opinion
In the instant habeas corpus case, brought by one person for the release of another convicted of rape, it was alleged in the petition that the conviction was void for the reason that the accused was deprived of due process of law under the
- The questions as to the voluntary character of the alleged confession and its admissibility in evidence, having been adjudicated adversely to the accused by courts of competent jurisdiction in the original case, could not be again litigated, by or in behalf of the prisoner, in a habeas corpus proceeding. Daniels v. Towers, 79 Ga. 785 (2) (7 S.E. 120); Walker v. Clarke, 150 Ga. 98 (102 S.E. 822); Wells v. Pridgen, 154 Ga. 397 (144 S.E. 355); Andrews v. Aderhold, 201 Ga. 132 (39 S.E.2d 61); Hall v. Scoggins, 202 Ga. 198 (42 S.E.2d 763); Wood v. Brush, 140 U.S. 278 (11 Sup. Ct. 738, 35 L. ed. 505 (5)); in Re Swan, 150 U.S. 637 (1, 2) (14 Sup. Ct. 225, 37 L. ed. 1207); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (35 Sup. Ct. 582, 59 L. ed. 969); Ex parte Ulrich, 43 Fed. 661.
- Moreover, even if it might be assumed that the questions as to the validity and admissibility of the alleged confession were open for a new adjudication in the habeas corpus case, still, under the evidence that was introduced, the judge, sitting as a trior of the facts in such case, was authorized to find, as he did, that the confession had been freely and voluntarily made. See, in this connection, Claybourn v. State, 190 Ga. 861 (1) (11 S.E.2d 23); Lewis v. Patterson, 191 Ga. 348 (4), 357 (12 S.E.2d 593); Williams v. State, 192 Ga. 247, 253 (15 S.E.2d 219); Mathis v. Scott, 199 Ga. 743 (2) (35 S.E.2d 285); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (66 Sup. Ct. 116, 90 L. ed. 61). See also Mangum v. State, 201 Ga. 519 (40 S.E.2d 423).
- The facts of the instant case differ materially from those in each of the following cases, cited for the plaintiff in error: Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L.ed. 220); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (43 Sup. Ct. 265, 67 L. ed. 543); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (55 Sup. Ct. 340, 79 L. ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. ed. 682);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (60 Sup. Ct. 472, 84 L. ed. 716); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 546 (62 Sup. Ct. 1139, 86 L. ed. 1663). None of these decisions would require or authorize a reversal of the judgment in the present case.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. This is a habeas corpus case. James Mangum, a negro, was convicted of rape, the alleged victim being a white woman. The verdict of conviction containing no recommendation, he was sentenced to death by electrocution. His motion for a new trial, containing the usuаl general grounds and one special ground added by amendment, was overruled, and he excepted. The judgment refusing a new trial was affirmed by this court on November 13, 1946. Mangum v. State, 201 Ga. 519.
Thereafter, on December 19, 1946, S. S. Robinson presented to Honorable Melville Price, Judge of the Superior Courts of the Atlantic Circuit, an application for the writ of habeas corpus against A. C. Aderhold, warden, alleging that the conviction of Mangum was void, and рraying that the warden, who then held Mangum in custody, be required to bring him before the judge for the purpose of examining into the cause of his detention.
The applicant alleged that the conviction of James Mangum is void because it was based upon an alleged rape, and the only corroborating testimony relied on was an alleged confession by Mangum, which was repugnant to the
It was further alleged that the conviction was contrary to the
The warden filed a response and produced the body of the prisoner, as required by the judge. No demurrer was filed, and at the hearing evidence was introduced by both sides, as hereinafter more fully stated. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge passed the following order: “After hearing evidence and argument in this case, the court finds from the evidence that the confession used in the evidence in the trial was freely and voluntarily made, and that constitutional rights of the prisoner were not violated, and the prisoner is hereby remanded to the respondent warden for such disposition as the law may direct.”
To this judgment the applicant for habeas corpus excepted, thus bringing the case to this court for review. No other ruling or order was assigned as error.
The applicant introduced in evidence a certified copy of the entire record of the trial of James Mangum on the charge of rape, together with a copy of his motion for new trial and the amеndment thereto; but the present statement, unless otherwise indicated, will deal first with the evidence that was introduced on the trial of the habeas corpus case.
It appeared from the evidence that Mangum was arrested on February 3, 1946, and there was evidence regarding four separate statements, each purporting upon its face to have been signed by him. One of these statements was dated February 9, 1946, and three were dated February 20, 1946.
Mangum, testifying in the habeas corpus case, admitted signing one of the statements dated February 20, but testified that it was blank when he signed it. He denied signing any of the other statements mentioned. It appears from the record of the former trial that only one of the above-mentioned statements was introduced in evidence, to wit, the one that Mangum admitted signing in blank.
However, the respondent introduced evidence for the purpose of showing that all of the statements were signed by Mangum, and were genuine, also that they were freely and voluntarily made by him. The statement which he admitted signing, and which was the only one introduced upon his trial for rape, may be referred to as the main statement. In that statement, if it was genuine, he admitted the commission of several crimes during a period of four or five months, including the rape of a white woman on Bass Street, for which offense he was tried and convicted as above stated. In other words, it is the conviction for that alleged offense which is now assailed as being void, in the application for habeas corpus.
In support of the application, James Mangum, the applicant, testified as follows: “I didn‘t do anything to the lady. The officers beat me up in the police station and knocked these placеs on my head. The officers who did it were Officers Cox and Moss of the City of Atlanta Detective Squad. The detective officers offered me a blank sheet of paper to sign, stating it was to secure a bond for me to get out. That is the same piece of paper which you showed me and which now has some writing on it supposed to be my confession. Then I was kept on the third floor of the jail. I was not taken to the hospitаl. Another man was arrested along with me. I was not taken out with the other boys to see where the rapes are supposed to have taken place. At that time I was at the city jail and I did not have a lawyer and they would not let me see any of my relatives.”
On cross-examination, he was asked about the four written “statements” to which reference has been made. His testimony with respect to signing them has already been givеn in substance, and need not be repeated. His further testimony on cross-examination was as follows:
Question: “During that first week after you were arrested February 3, 1946, didn‘t the detectives let you talk to your sister, Dorothy Rogers?” Answer: “No, sir. I was never taken out of the station house until they taken me to the Big Rock, the city jail. I never told any one that I raped any woman. The little officer gave me the sheet of paper to sign. He is Mr. Cox.”
Hоmer Strickland testified for the applicant: Direct examination: “My name is Homer Strickland. I am the uncle of James Mangum. I saw James the Saturday before he was arrested. He
Dorothy Rogers testified for the applicant: Direct examination: “My name is Dorothy Rogers. I am the sister of James Mangum. I don‘t know the day on which he was arrested. James was brought out to my house. That was Tuesday following his arrest. I just don‘t remember the day he was arrested. At the time he was arrested he was all right. He looked all right. Yes, I mean he looked all right on Tuesday. When I saw him he was just sitting in the detectives’ car handcuffed. I was not left alone with him. The officers just stаyed right there. One was in the car and one was standing right beside it. No, there was no privacy, we were all just right there together, the officers and all. I could not talk to him freely. They made him stay in the car.” Question: “When did you see James after Tuesday?” Answer: “The next time I saw James was in the county jail.” Question: “Did you talk with him?” Answer: “Yes, sir. I talked with him. He was in a small room.” Question: “Did you see his face? If so, describe it.” Answer: “Yes, sir, I saw his face, it was all bruised and swollen up. At the time I saw him his right eye was reddened and bruised and swollen. His right cheek, his mouth, and his lips were bruised and swollen. He didn‘t look the same as he looked
W. M. Cox testified for the respondent: Direct examination: “I am a member of the city police forсe of the City of Atlanta. I am the W. M. Cox who signed as a witness on this two-page confession signed by James Mangum on Feb. 20, 1946. [Identifying the document referred to above as the “main statement,” identified in the record as Exhibit C.] He signed that in my presence on that date, February 20, 1946. It was not blank. It was completely filled out then, as now, in two pages. He also signed this one. [Identifying carbon copy of the same document.] That also was completеly written when he signed it. He also signed this short one-page statement, dated February 20, 1946, on that same occasion, which bears my signature as witness also. [Identifying one-page statement previously exhibited to James Mangum during his cross-examination, Exhibit B.] Before he made the above statement on February 20, he had already made one typewritten statement on February 9, 1946. This is the statement that James Mangum signed on February 9. . . This was signed by all three prisoners, James Mangum, Lee James Allen, and Luther Henderson. . . I recall that Mangum was informed that the statement could be used against him in court, and the statement says the same thing . . . These statements of February 9 and 20th were made by James Mangum freely and voluntarily. There were no threats or coercion against him. No promises were held out to him. We did not promise him that he could make a bond if he signed it. My partner, Officer Moss, was also present. . . Officer Moss and I arrested James Mangum, known also as James Strickland, on Sunday, February 3, 1946, about 8:30 a. m. I was not investigating the charge of rape when
On cross-examination, Cox testified: “My duties begin at 8 o‘clock a. m. to 4 o‘clock p. m. I was in and out with the defendant all during the day. It took me several days to question him. We took him out so he could show us the spots of the alleged rapes. Part of the time he was handcuffed. Just two officers was a reason for the handcuffing of James Mangum. We waited until February 20 because these boys kept changing their statements and adding other information. . . I did not say anything to Mangum about letting him out on bond if he signed a sheet of paper. I told these boys that they did not have to sign the confessions if they did not want to. Mr. Cole was present when I told them that. I do not know what a flap jack is. I suppose it is a piece
Calvin Cole, sworn as a witness for the respondent, testified: Direct examination: “I am an investigator for the Solicitor-General of the Atlanta Circuit. This is my signature as a witness on this two-page confession signed by James Mangum and dated February 20, 1946. [Identifying the document Exhibit C, referred to above as the “main statement.“] I typed that statement for him, putting down the statements which he made to me, and then he signed it in my presence. That was on February 20, 1946. It was not blank when he signed it. No one struck or threatened or promised to give him anything in my presence. There were no swollen parts on his face or head that I could see. . . James Mangum had made a statement before that, on February 9, 1946. I happened to come into the room on February 9 where the Constitution reporter, Keeler McCartley, was typing the statement for James Mangum and two other prisoners, Lee James Allen and Luther Henderson. I waited only a few minutes and did not wait to see them sign the statement of February 9, but I heard them orally admit their guilt of some rapes while I was there on February 9. Between the 9th and 20th of February I was with Officers Cox and Moss and with Mangum, and Mangum pointed out to us the place where he said he grabbed this woman on Bass Street, who testified against him at the trial at which he was given this death sentence. After we got back to the police station Mangum mentioned a Boy Scout hut, saying there was a Boy Scout hut close to where they dragged this lady and raped her. I went back to the place that Mangum had pointed out to us and saw that there was a Boy Scout hut in fact there. I made no threats and heard no one else threaten Mangum. His face and feаtures seemed regular.”
On cross-examination, Cole testified: “I didn‘t type the statement of February 9th. I do not remember advising the boys of their right to have counsel. I cannot remember now, but whatever I said at the original trial, that was correct. I was out only once or twice with the defendants in the car. I swore at the trial in Fulton Superior Court, ‘You asked me when this boy is
Referring now to the record of the original trial under the indictment for rape and the motion for a new trial as filed and later amended — it appears that in the one special ground of the motion for a new trial, the movant, James Mangum, contended that the court erred in admitting, over objection, the alleged statement or confession which is referred to above as the main statement.
The movant objected to the introduction of this statement on the grounds: (1) it required the defendant to produce evidence against himself, in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions; and (2) it was in violation of the
The record shows further that the motion for a new trial, as above referred to, was overruled by the trial court, and that the judgment was affirmed by this court.
It appears that Mangum‘s sister, Dorothy Rogers, and his uncle, Homer Strickland, who testified as witnesses for the applicant in the habeas corpus case, did not testify upon the original trial. However, the defendant in his statement to the court and jury upon the original trial made substantially the same contentions regarding the alleged statement to the officers that he made later by testimony in the habeas corpus case.
As to the second division, I think it is inconsistent with the first division. After ruling in the first division that the voluntary character of the alleged confession had been adjudicated in the original case and could not subsequently be again litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding, for the court then in the second division to go into the merits of the evidence adduced in the habeas corpus proceeding and make a ruling thereon, seems to me to be highly inconsistent with established legal precedents cited in the first division.