Lead Opinion
Robinson & Reynolds, at Donalsonville, in Seminole county (formerly Decatur county), Georgia, delivered to tbe Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company forty head of cattle for transportation to Montgomery, Alabama, and they were there delivered at the stock-yards to Tatum, Embry & Company. Robinson & Reynolds were not authorities on tick eradication or quarantine regulations which were in force in the said county at the time of this shipment, the same being carried on co-operatively by county, State, and Federal authorities. At Donalsonville the Federal government had an officer, a veterinarian, in charge of such work, in whom, under the Federal act, was duly vested all the administrative and quasi-judicial duties incident to the enforcement of the' statute on quarantine and tick eradication, and the enforcement of the rules and regulations passed by the Department of Agriculture under and by virtue of the authority vested in it by the statute. The plaintiffs presented the said cattle to this officer, who, after due inspection of the same, issued therefor what is known as a “free certificate,” which was attached to the waybill, and the material portions of which were as follows: “ This certifies that 40 cattle, originating in the county of Decatur, have been inspected by me and found free from any symptoms of scabies (mange), Texas fever, and have been dipped once in arsenical solution on May 1st, 1920, and may be shipped for slaughter. (Signed) A. P. Abbott, Inspector.” This certificate is a part of the brief of the evidence in the case. The cattle, after having been duly inspected, were delivered to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, as above stated, for the purpose of delivery to the consignees at their stock-pens in Montgomery,. Alabama. Decatur county (or Seminole county), from which these cattle were shipped, was a quarantined area, under the regulations, as stated above, of the government and its official in charge. The cattle, after having been delivered to the defendant company, and, according to the evidence, without exposure to infection, were transported to Montgomery, and were there held for seven days by the company, and the company, without consulting the official in charge of the quarantine regulations at Montgomery, instead of delivering the cattle, upon their arrival at Montgomery, into the free or non-quarantined pens to which
There is no dispute in the record or.the brief of the evidence as to the correctness of the items of expense incurred in feeding and dipping the cattle at Montgomery, provided the railroad company was authorized to hold the cattle for the seven days without delivery and have them dipped a second time. In other words, the holding of these cattle for the second dipping, if required by law and the regulations of the Bureau of Animal Industry, would give the plaintiffs no claim against the railroad company for this work. The controlling question in the case is whether the holding of the cattle by the railroad company at Montgomery, Alabama, .and giving to them a second dipping before the delivery of them into the non-quarantined pens at Montgomery, to which they were duly consigned, was proper under the law and the regulations of the Bureau of Animal Industry. The learned judge who tried the case entertained the view that the second dipping was necessary and proper and was in accordance with the regulations of the department, and, on motion of counsel for the defendant, at the conclusion of the evidence he directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for $20.50, which was the value of one of the cows killed in the pens at Montgomery, and for costs. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that the damages amounted to $523.12, and insisting that the second dipping was wholly unwarranted by law and the regulations of the department, and that the expense connected therewith was an unjust imposition upon the plaintiffs as the
The learned counsel for both the plaintiff in error and' the defendant in error argued the case at great length. After giving the questions involved a very careful consideration, this court is of the opinion that the trial judge erred in directing the verdict as rendered. We think, under the law and regulations of the department, that the railroad company at Montgomery was not authorized to make the second dipping of the cattle, and (without following the learned counsel fully into the arguments which they have submitted) we are of the opinion that the case is controlled by certain regulations of the Department of Animal Industry on the subject of tick eradication.
When the cattle reached Montgomery, instead of being placed in non-infectious pens, to which they had been assigned, they were held up by the railroad for seven days, and then, by the railroad authorities, dipped a second time; and this was done without any inspection by the government inspector who was in charge of the stock-yards or quarantine regulations at Montgomery. There was no evidence offered by the railroad company that the cattle were infected when they reached Montgomery. No charge was ever made to that effect. This being so, the act of the railroad authorities at Montgomery in subjecting the cattle to a second dipping was unnecessary, and the expense therein incurred was an unjust charge against the owners of the cattle. While we are of the opinion that, under the laws and regulations of the Department' of Animal Industry, in view of the certificate of the inspector at Donalsonville, the second dipping was unnecessary, and while we think that the statute quoted above is controlling on the question, and that it would be clearly contrary to the whole scheme of government regulation for any dipping or tick eradication to be carried on except under the direction of the government, and that the action of the railroad authorities at Montgomery, in undertaking the second dipping without consulting the government, was without authority, we are impressed with the fact that the railroad authorities at Montgomery acted in perfect good faith and under the impression that the second dipping was authorized and was necessary under the law.
Judgment reversed.
Rehearing
ON MOTION ROE REHEARING.
The opinion of the court in this case is based upon the explicit terms of the act of 1903 in connection with the rules and regulations of the Department of Agriculture, promulgated in pursuance of the terms of said act. 32 Stat. 791. The rules
To carry out the provisions of this act the Secretary of Agriculture, on July 1, 1919, published certain rules and regulations. Among these rules and regulations are the following’ which are applicable to the interstate movement of cattle for purposes other than immediate slaughter: Section 3, paragraph 1, of regulation 2, applies to cattle of the quarantined area, or other cattle exposed to or infested with tides, and it permits the movement of such cattle which have been properly dipped twice with an interval of from 7 to 12 days in a permitted arsenical solution or otherwise treated in a manner approved by the Secretary of Agriculture, under
Paragraph 1 of section 3 of regulation 3, found on page 17 of the pamphlet issued by the Secretary of Agriculture, is as follows: “ Cattle affected with scabies may be shipped interstate for purpose other than slaughter if dipped twice in a permitted dip, 10 to 14 days apart, under the supervision of a bureau inspector, and so
These regulations in pursuance of the act of 1903 make it perfectly clear that the provisions of the Act of Congress were not intended to prohibit interstate transportation of what is known as “ free cattle ” or cattle which had been inspected and dipped by a bureau inspector before shipment and pronounced free from infec-. tion. The act of 1903 expressly provides that animals inspected by the Bureau of Animal Industry and certified to be free from disease might be shipped from one State to another without further inspection, and the court explicitly holds, under the terms of said act, that it did not prohibit the shipment of animals free from disease, and that the Secretary of Agriculture had power thereunder to make rules and regulations in reference to such animals, the violation of which alone would not constitute a crime. “ The act of Congress, then, being limited to cases where the animal was affected with an infectious or communicable disease, it was not within the power or authority of the Secretary of Agriculture
Learned counsel for the' movant insists, in his motion for a rehearing, that the act of 1903 had been repealed by the act of 1905, and that the provisions of the act of 1903 could not be applied to the shipment involved in this case, and thus evince the fact that this court “ has not grasped what was the issue in the case at bar, and hence has failed to decide that issue, while the issue was clearly understood by the trial judge, and was actually decided by him, and thus the opinion does a grave injustice to the trial judge, as well as an injustice to the defendants in error.” This court may have been so unfortunate as to fail to grasp the issue involved in the case. Our excuse is that we decided the issue involved under the explicit terms of the act of 1903, which, according to our limited apprehension, controlled the only question of fact and law in the case, to wit, whether there should have been a second dipping of the cattle in-question, which had been inspected and dipped and certified as free from disease by an inspector of the Bureau of Animal Industry when delivered for shipment. This court is unable to agree with the statement of the learned counsel that the act of 1905 repealed the act of 1903, upon the construction of which the opinion was made. It is conceded that there is no express repeal of the terms of this law or of the regulations made in pursuance thereof. A very close examination of the terms of the act of 1905 and of the rules and regulations which apparently were made in pursuance thereof fails to disclose any conflict that would tend to establish a repeal by implication. The Secretary of Agriculture, in the compilation of the laws and the rules and regulations of the department, seems not to have discovered any conflict between the act of 1903 and the act of 1905. In the publication of the pamphlet showing the laws and the rules and regulations made in pursuance thereof, both the act of 1903 and the act of 1905 are given, and not a hint or intimation made of any conflict between any of their terms or provisions. On the contrary, a- close examination of the two acts discloses the fact that as to tick eradication the rules and regulations published by the Secretary of Agriculture, as made'by the department in 1919, are based entirely upon the act of 1903. ’ It
The second authority on which the opinion of this court was
This court is therefore of the opinion that the motion for a rehearing is without merit; that no rule of law or regulation of the Department of Agriculture or fact in evidence was overlooked; and that the decision of the court is in strict conformity to the provisions of the act of 1903 and the rules made in pursuance thereof. The motion is denied.
Rehearing denied.