Robins v. Ritchie

for the rea- to reimburse counsel awards ROBINS; Clark; Heather Jill Eleanor Id.; legal online research. costs of

sonable Wersal, Gregory Plaintiffs- Neighbor- Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Appellants, Albany, 369 F.3d County Ass’n v. hood (2d Cir.2004); 91, In re Continental F.2d Litig., Sec. Illinois RITCHIE, capacity Mark in his official Cir.1992). did not abuse The district court as Minnesota of State by doing so here. its discretion (and/or successor); Timothy his Paw- Further, contrary to concerns raised lenty, capacity in his official as Gover- in unfair Scheeringa, this will not result (and/or nor of the of Minnesota State billing. Electronic research ser double successor); 1-300, his John Does De- money by making “presumably vices save fendants-Appellees. legal research more efficient.” Role Mod No. 10-2397. Am., Brownlee, Inc. v. els (D.C.Cir.2004). The cost of online re Appeals, United States Court of normally matched with a reduc search Eighth Circuit. attorney in the amount of time an tion Sept. 2010. Submitted: Haroco, researches. Inc. American Chicago, F.3d Nat. Bank & Trust Co. Filed: Jan. 2011. (7th Cir.1994). reim 1440-41 “[I]f disallowed, at market rates is bursement lawyers to induce

the effect will be own, expensive them more time

substitute computer.”

for that of ... In re Con Litig., Illinois 962 F.2d at

tinental Sec.

570. not Standley

Because do Leftwich

control, it is and because reasonable counsel for online-

reimburse derivative services, the district court did not

research by reimbursing its discretion deriva-

abuse expenses. counsel for online-research

tive

III. CONCLUSION reasons, foregoing

For the we dismiss

Scheeringa’s appeal. brought suit the United States for the District

District Court of Minneso- Timothy ta against Governor Pawlenty, appoints who a new Chief Jus- Clark, argued, Golden Val- Jill Eleanor of a vacancy, tice the event and Minne- MN, ley, appellant. Ritchie, sota of State Mark who AAG, Gilbert, E. argued, Kenneth Alan posts vacant seats for which candidates brief, Paul, MN, Raschke, Jr., on the St. may prepares sample file to run and bal- appellee. for eligible lots. Robins is a resident and voter of Minnesota. Wersal and Clark are BYE, BEAM, SMITH, and Before of Minnesota who each residents intended Judges. Circuit candidacy to file for for the seat of Chief BYE, Judge. Circuit of the Justice Minnesota the November 2010 election. Robins, Clark, Gregory Heather Jill and (hereinafter “Robins”) filed a com- Wersal Robins, In complaint, their Heather Jill plaint challenging federal district Clark, Gregory alleged and Wersal a mis- constitutionality of Minnesota Consti- resignations appointments use of and tution Article and Minnesota delay prevent and elections in violation of (incum- 204B.36, §§ Statutes subdivision 5 preference the Minnesota Constitution’s bency designation judges), for and 490.125 for elections and the United States Consti- (mandatory age judges). retirement for right public tution’s to vote and run for injunction sought preliminary office. The claims are on the recent based enjoin Secretary Minnesota’s of State from resignation Mag- of Chief Justice Eric J. relying challenged state laws and the subsequent appointment nuson and requiring him to hold an election for the Skjerven Associate Justice Lorie Gildea as seat of Chief Justice of the Minnesota justice. According the new chief to the Supreme Court in November of 2010. The complaint, there has not been election district court1 denied the motion and Rob- justice years. for the seat of chief for ten appealed. reaching ins the dis- Without Chief Justice Kathleen A. Blatz was elect- preliminary trict court’s denial of the in- six-year ed in 2000 to a term and towas junction, we remand to the district court to However, run for re-election in 2006. challenges dismiss Robins’s to Article 2005, Chief Justice Blatz announced her Section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution resignation from the statute, incumbency and to the designation Court, January effective in 2006. Gover- Minnesota Statutes subdivision Pawlenty appointed nor Associate Justice jurisdiction. lack for justice Russell A. Anderson to the chief also challenge We remand Robins’s to the seat. Justice run Chief Anderson was to statutorily mandated retirement age for dismissed, resigned re-election but before judges Judge to be with Beam’s separate opinion announcing judgment Pawlenty ap- the election. Governor then of the court on that issue. Eric pointed Magnuson J. as the new chief Davis, 1. The Honorable Michael J. Chief District of Minnesota. Judge, United States District Court for the Magnuson filling judicial Justice was to cess for justice. Chief vacancies and run for election in November but claimed the Minnesota Constitution re- Magnuson an- March 2010 Chief Justice quired justice an election for chief in 2010. resignation his effective at the nounced petitioners Id. at 146. The further assert- Pawlenty end of June 2010. Governor ed of State Ritchie’s failure to Lorie appointed then Associate Justice accept filings candidate or hold an election Skjerven justice. as chief Gildea for the seat of chief violated their rights resignations under the First Amendment of the alleges this series appointments is “more than coinci- United States Constitution to run for office dence, that the engaged Governor has and to vote. Id. at 151. systemic appointment

in a overuse of the May On the Minnesota Su ... process appoint his Mends and preme opinion Court issued an denying the colleagues expense pub- ... at the petition. The court declared Minnesota lic’s to vote for Chief Justice.” preference law has no requirement challenges resigna Two relevant “‘[njeither elected, judges noting to be process previ appointment tion and were appointment election nor of judges pre ously brought Supreme to the Minnesota ferred over the other —under the constitu First, brought Court. Robins and Clark tion process place each has its under dif challenging in petition the incumben ” ferent circumstances.’ Id. at 146^7 cy designation provided for in Minnesota Ventura, (quoting Zettler v. 649 N.W.2d 204B.36, § subdivision 5. In Statutes (Minn.2002)). 846, 850 The court ex (“Clark ”), Pawlenty the Clark Minne plained “the obligated Governor is to fill Supreme petition sota Court denied the by judicial all appointment vacancies” un entirety, holding part, “petitioners its VI, plain language der the of Article Sec any have not established violation of their tion 8 of the Minnesota Constitution and rights” First Amendment as to the incum resignation therefore held the of Chief bency designation. 755 N.W.2d Magnuson Justice a vacancy created that (Minn.2008). petitioned Robins and Clark Pawlenty obligated Governor was to fill certiorari, for a writ of which was denied appointment until the “election of a succes Supreme the United States Court. — general sor at the next election more than -, Pawlenty, Clark v. U.S. (2009). 2056, 173 year appointment, one after his or her L.Ed.2d 1134 II, is, in November 2012.” Clark Then, 16, 2010, Robins, Clark, on March added). 147, 151 at (emphasis N.W.2d The and filed a petition Wersal the Minneso Secretary court concluded “the of State is Supreme naming ta Court Governor Paw not under post authorized state law to lenty Secretary and of State Ritchie as justice chief seat for the November 2010 (“Clark respondents. In Clark v. Ritchie election,” general Secretary and the ”), petitioners sought II to bar Gover State’s refusal to hold an election for chief Pawlenty appointing anyone nor from to justice in 2010 not violate the First “does fill vacancy resulting from Chief Jus Amendment, respect peti either with to Magnuson’s resignation require tice and to rights rights tioners’ to vote or the open of State Ritchie to run petitioners Clark and Wersal justice chief seat for election in November (Minn. public office” because state law “does not of 2010. 787 N.W.2d 144-45 2010). permit an election for chief in No petitioners The asserted there was appointment pro- excessive use of the vember 2010.” Id. at 151. 17, 2010, court the motion for following the Minneso- The district denied May

On injunction concluding the II, preliminary decision ta Court’s likely prevail claims would not on the mer- complaint a one-count fed- Robins filed they likely are most barred its because complaint The asserted eral district court. judicata they hinge res and because on an § arguing a violation of 42 U.S.C. law, being required election under state Article Section Minnesota Constitution ex- which subdivi- Minnesota Statutes rejected pressly in Clark II. The district (incumbency designation), Minneso- sion recognized may jurisdic- lack also (mandatory ta 490.125 retire- Statutes tion in this case under the Rooker-Feld- judicial overcreation of age), ment and the man declined reach that doctrine but ap- the overuse of coupled vacancies with hearing issue until it held a on the State’s pointments violate the First Amendment appeals. motion to dismiss.2 now office, run right public to vote and to voting, right equal protection II the Fourteenth Amendment to vote. jurisdiction, As a court of limited May sought a pre- On case, any before we reach the merits we liminary injunction based two issues jurisdic must determine whether we have (1) complaint: from the the constitutionali- “[E]very tion. federal court has ty of Article of the Minneso- special obligation to consider its own (2) Constitution, ta the constitutionali- Gierer, jurisdiction.” Family Schatz statute, Cir.2003) (internal ty incumbency designation 1157, 1160 omitted). quotation marks and citation A Statutes subdivision jurisdic federal court can raise 5. asked the district court to issue tion sponte issues sua when there is an preliminary injunction restraining a Secre- jurisdiction lacking. indication Thomas tary enforcing of State Ritchie from (8th Basham, 521, v. 931 F.2d 522-23 Cir. Minnesota Constitution Article 1991). jurisdiction subject “Lack of 8, by interpreted as the Minnesota Su- litigation by matter of cannot be waived thereby him preme requiring Court and parties ignored by the court.” Rock justice open candidacy the chief seat for Hedges-Gough Island Millwork Co. v. or, alternative, filing voting, Co., 24, Cir.1964). Lumber 337 F.2d 27 requiring asked for a writ of mandamus “The appellate satisfy court must itself not Secretary open filing of State to only jurisdiction of its own but also of that And, injunc- the chief seat. if the of the district court.” Id. The case issue, granted tion was on that first subject juris if should be dismissed matter enjoin sought of State Ritchie Underwood, lacking. diction is v. Hunter using incumbency designation. from (8th Cir.2004). 468, 362 F.3d 476-77 Robins also asked the district court enjoin Pawlenty making Governor from question The State raised the of any appointments future under Article jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman Section 8. doctrine to the district court as well as to juris- pending hearing 2. The district court declined to address there was a on the matter of court, By ruling jurisdiction. diction under Rooker-Feldman when order of this dis- preliminary injunction jurisdiction on the for a trict court's consideration of un- motion stayed doctrine was because it found the other two bases were der the Rooker-Feldman pending appeal. sufficient to resolve the motion and because resolution of this

925 theory judgments, “The basic of the Rook- we conclude the district court this court. only the Unit jurisdiction doctrine is lacks er-Feldman over those given been Supreme Court has ed States claims and thus those claims should be to review a state-court deci dismissed. sion, generally district courts so federal A subject-matter jurisdiction over at

lack tempted appeals judg from state-court First, essentially this case is an Ark. ment.” Dodson v. Univ. Med. appeal judgment by from state-court (8th Cir.2010) (in Scis., 750, 601 F.3d 754 way aggrieved party. One to determine quotation marks and citation omit ternal whether federal claim is based on a 1257(a); ted); see also 28 U.S.C. Rooker complaint injury caused a state-court Co., Trust 263 U.S. v. Fid. judgment, appeal judg and thus an of such 149, (1923); 68 L.Ed. 362 Dist. S.Ct. of ment, if is to determine the state and Feldman, Appeals Columbia Ct. of “inextricably federal claims are inter 1303, 462, 486, 103 S.Ct. 75 L.Ed.2d U.S. Feldman, twined.” 460 U.S. at n. (1983). The United States 1303; Charchenko, 103 S.Ct. 47 F.3d at confined the Rooker-Feldman doc inextricably 983. Federal claims are inter only brought trine to “cases state-court twined with state-court claims if the feder injuries complaining losers caused al claims can succeed to the extent judgments rendered before the state-court wrongly the state court decided the issues commenced proceedings [federal] Charchenko, it. before 47 F.3d at 983 inviting district court review and re Cass, (citing Corp. Keene jection judgments.” of those Exxon Mobil (8th Cir.1990)). explained As in Feld Indus., Corp. v. Saudi Basic 544 U.S. man, jurisdic district courts “do not have 161 L.Ed.2d challenges tion ... over to state court (2005). specifically has This court cau particular arising decisions in cases out of against seeking tioned state-court losers judicial proceedings even if those chal victory over their adversaries subse lenges allege the state court’s action was § quent 1983 actions in federal court. We unconstitutional. Review of those deci noted, “[l]itigants can whether choose to may only sions be had in Supreme] [the ... in pursue claims state federal 486, Court.” 460 U.S. at 103 S.Ct. 1303. court,” Dodson, (citing 601 F.3d at 754 chal We find Robins’s current Stillwater, City 47 F.3d Charchenko of lenges to both the Minnesota Constitution (8th 981, Cir.1995)), a par 984 and “[o]nce incumbency designation and the to statute court, however, ty litigated in state he has inextricably be intertwined with claims ‘cannot circumvent Rooker-Feldman in I II. raised Clark and Clark Robins’s a recasting his or her lawsuit as [section] ” VI, challenge to Article Section 8 of the action,’ (quoting at Bech 1983 id. 754-55 alleged Minnesota Constitution and the Rosemount, 1062, City 104 told F.3d of (8th Cir.1997) (second systematic ap overuse of vacancies and in 1065 alteration pointments hinge to avoid elections on challenges Because to original)). Robins’s state law mandates the election of whether the Article Section 8 of Minnesota and, judges particular, in the of election incumbency designa and the Constitution judge in essentially gen the chief the November 2010 appeals tion statute are from See, e.g., election. v. Town judgments as a eral Bonas state-court masked 1983 (1st losers, 69, action, Smithfield, N. 265 F.3d Cir. brought by state-court 2001) (concluding widespread filed after the state court rendered its disenfran- fore, here, claims even if only if the town refused the involved occurs chisement constitutionality the required by challenge was hold an election decision, attempt whether one are an rules because state-court’s state and local Supreme to vote in a state Court’s de- appeal of the the deprived is ques II to a ends—with cisions in Clark and Clark federal “starts—-and election law”); Poythress, Duncan v. district court. tion of state Cir.1981) (5th (holding F.2d B Fourteenth Amendment violation of the to hold an if officials refuse exists state Second, this case was initiated after supreme justice court for a vacant election in the state-court judgment was rendered required is state seat when the election timing the re- proceeding and thus meets law) by Nolles v. State Comm. Mobil, cited in quirement as described Exxon Dist., Reorg. Sch. at 1517. In that 544 U.S. Cir.2008). But, Supreme the Minnesota Supreme case the Court confined the already no such election is has ruled Court Rooker-Feldman doctrine to federal cases II, at Clark 787 N.W.2d required. See brought by challenging state-court losers challenging Article 151. Robins’s claims judgments “state-court rendered the before can, therefore, only succeed proceedings district court commenced.” if the district court concludes an election added). (emphasis dispute There is no Id. required Minne for chief under parties judgment that the between law, require sota a conclusion which would present I was rendered before the Clark court to overturn the Minneso the district But, case was filed district court. II. ta Court’s decision Clark parties disagree judgment on the date the II. was rendered Clark so, Equally challenge Robins’s incumbency designation provided for May II opinion The Clark was filed on subdivision 13, 2010, Minnesota Statutes and the clerk of the rejected in expressly 5 was raised and judgment courts entered on June 2010. I. cannot succeed on the complaint May Robins filed federal overruling claim without district complaint and served the on the that decision. May parties defendants on 2010. The May is the dispute whether 13 or June 8 alleges the claims are not inex- judgment date the court “rendered” state tricably merely intertwined because she is purposes of Rooker-Feldman. challenging constitutionality interpreted by as Neither the nor this cir Minnesota Constitution when, Court, Supreme the Minnesota and not cuit has clarified for Rooker-Feld asking necessarily purposes, judg the district court to re- man a state court renders ject Supreme ruling issuing opinion the Minnesota ment —the of the or the Court’s regarding requirement judicial entry judgment. the of elec- formal of Other circuits particular briefly tions and in an election for chief have addressed this issue and held in for the argument proceedings 2010. We find this the state-court end when the unpersuasive. According Supreme purposes of Rooker-Feldman Feldman, the “finally in district courts have no state court claims resolve[s]” Court decisions, the authority to review state court at issue. Mothershed Justices of (9th Ct., 602, 604 n. 1 challenges allege Sup. “even if those that the Cir. 2005) unconstitutional,” (concluding proceed state-court state court’s action was the 486, ings purposes at for Rooker-Feldman 460 U.S. 103 S.Ct. 1303. There- ended of Minnesota. The Rooker-Feld- court denied the writ District supreme state when the preserves man doctrine United States the “finally resolved” of mandamus jurisdiction Court’s exclusive Supreme sought relitigate feder- plaintiff issue modify judgments state-court reverse court); de Maestros de Federación al Dodson, under 28 U.S.C. 1257. See de Relaciones del Rico v. Junta Puerto F.3d at 754. Both Rooker and Feldman 17, Rico, 410 F.3d Trabajo de Puerto court, party, involved a who lost state Cir.2005) (1st “if the state court (holding filing complain suit in federal court to of finally resolved all the have proceedings injury judg- an caused the state-court litigation, ... then questions the federal seeking rejection of ment and review have ‘ended’ within proceedings state the 415-16, at judgment. that 263 U.S. on the meaning the of Rooker-Feldman 476, 149, at 103 S.Ct. 1303. U.S. issue”). at A district questions federal Supreme decided Exxon When the Court Minnesota, from the District of court case Mobil, recognized holdings it Rook- Ramsey Household Faith v. Christ’s applied broadly. er and Feldman were too (“CHOF”), also addressed this County, at 544 U.S. 125 S.Ct. 1517. The low- came to a similar conclu- timing issue and er court in Exxon Mobil dismissed a fed- the First and Ninth Circuits: sion as which eral case had been filed while the fi- refers to court’s “judgment” “[a] [A] proceeding pending, state court was still rights nal of the and obli- determination judg- because the state court rendered its parties of the a case.” gations before federal ment case was re- 2004). Dictionary ed. Black’s Law solved. Id. at 125 S.Ct. 1517. On law, judgment at In the context of appeal, Supreme Court clarified Rook- requiring any “final” “not further means pro- er-Feldman does not bar concurrent judicial action the court ren- court, ceedings in both state and federal judgment dered to determine the matter if judgment even the state court renders litigated.” Id. The state district court resolved, long before the federal suit is so its final determination of the issued not an appeal as the federal case is September rights parties state case. Id. at 125 S.Ct. 1517. To words, judg- 2008. In other it rendered distinguish falling cases within between Furthermore, ment on that date. Court’s exclusive argument that the state court CHOF’s involving and cases this con- judgment did not “render” its because it jurisdiction, current request thirty for a granted CHOF’s prescribed timing requirement; con- day stay would create an incentive for application fined the of Rooker-Feldman repeat court losers to this tactic. state those federal cases commenced they As soon as learn of unfavorable judgment after a state-court was ren- court, result state state court losers dered. request stay could and then rush to timing Given the intent behind the re- court. file federal judgment the date a is “ren- quirement, (D.Minn.2009) F.Supp.2d purposes dered” for Rooker-Feldman (alterations in original). “finally should be the date the state court purpose The behind the tim the claims. To use the formal resolved” ing requirement of Rooker-Feldman as create a window of judgment date would final supports refined in Exxon Mobil the con time between the state court’s deci- entry judg- of by clusion reached the First and Ninth sion and the administrative aggrieved party ment in which an could and the District Court for the Circuits Therefore, ju- we hold that for the exclusive Supreme Court’s thwart the of Rooker-Feldman a state court purposes in federal district by filing suit risdiction the date the state judgment In renders on decision. appealing state-court court court, “finally resolves” the claims before highest court of Minnesota’s the context it, May for this case is judgment is which solely on the date rely Supreme when the Minnesota Court filed appel- the clerk of the formally entered the federal claim was opinion. its Because create an automatic 30- late courts would date, present ease satis losing party could filed after day in which a window timing require fies the Rooker-Feldman appeal in federal court and complaint file a Mobil. guise of ment as set forth Exxon under the state-court decisions R. jurisdiction. See Minn. Civ. concurrent of Rooker-Feldman requirements The (“the appel- Proc. clerk of App. 136.02 plaintiffs met this case are because judgment pursuant late courts shall enter “losing party in state court [who] are a not less than 30 to the decision or order filed suit in federal court after the state days filing after the of the decision or ended, inju- of an proceedings complaining order”). pur- This undermine the would ry judgment caused the state-court and doctrine. of the Rooker-Feldman pose rejection judg- of that seeking review Mobil, ment.” Exxon 544 U.S. at current demon- The facts of the case Therefore, the district court S.Ct. 1517. purpose how the of Rooker-Feld- strate subject jurisdiction matter over Rob- lacks of preservation man —the the United challenges ins’s to the Minnesota Constitu- Supreme exclusive States Court’s including chal- tion Article Section 8— modify state- jurisdiction to reverse lenges systematic overuse of the judgments be undermined if —would vacancy appointment process —and judgment the state-court was “rendered” statute, incumbency designation Minn. purposes for Rooker-Feldman when § 5. therefore Stat. subd. We entered instead judgment the formal was remand this case to the district court to of the date the state court’s final decision chal- dismiss the claims based on those Supreme was issued. The Minnesota jurisdic- lenges for lack of final II Court issued its decision Clark tion. May 2010. opinion when filed its on until judgment Formal was not entered Ill 8, 2010, in June accordance with Minnesota challenges Procedure Robins also the constitution- Appellate Rule Civil 136.02. 490.125, appeal ality initiated the federal suit to of Minnesota Statutes mandatory age retirement opinion the Minnesota Court’s which creates May judges. II I concur in the result reached on which was after Judge the court as announced in opinion judgment was released but before entry opinion, disagree but with separate was entered. To use the date of the Beam’s judgment dismissing of formal would allow state-court the case based on a lack of standing. Because I do not losers to learn of the outcome of the state- believe challenge challenges court matter and such outcome Minnesota Statute 490.125 or under the guise equal protection a lower federal court under the the basis Act, jurisdiction. Employment Age concurrent This would un- Discrimination challenge I instead believe the dermine the Court’s and because alleged on the statute’s inter- holdings premised and the of both Rooker and Feld- ference with the voters’ to elect its man. I judiciary, would conclude Robins does to this statute being is based on it However, standing. Robins’s chal- impetus judicial which, have for appointments, on the lenge constitutionality Robins, is focused according to infringes on the right judicial appointments resulting from to vote and run public for office. midterm vacancies created the manda- I would conclude this claim is essentially tory judges. though retirement of Even the same as challenge Robins’s to Article form, appears different in the substance of VI, Section of8 the Minnesota Constitu challenge is the same as the claims it, tion. challenge, Robins’s as I read is in raised Clark II —whether the Gover- not to whether the mandatory retirement ability appoint judge to in the nor’s event age judge’s violates a rights, constitutional IV, vacancy, provided of a as for in Article but rather whether the vacancies created Constitution, Section 8 of the Minnesota by the mandatory age retirement thwarts infringes rights on the constitutional to constitutionally protected judicial elections public vote and run for office. I Because through a subsequent appointment under substantively find this claim to be VI, Article Section 8. This claim can II, claim I same raised Clark would if ability succeed the Governor’s appoint conclude the district court is without sub- the event of a vacancy under Article ject jurisdiction matter to consider this And, Section 8 were unconstitutional. as challenge under Rooker-Feldman. H.A., discussed in Part for Article I recognize expressly Robins did not unconstitutional, Section 8 to be declared challenge statutorily mandated retire- the district court would first have to find age judges ment either Clark I or requires judicial state law elections and However, II. Clark I would conclude the appointments. disfavors the use of Such a underlying premise of Robins’s challenge finding, though, require would a reversal rejected was raised and in both I Clark II, including of Clark the Minnesota Su II, inextricably Clark and therefore is preme express rejection Court’s of “the intertwined with the state-court claims. argument that the constitution establishes challenge mandatory Robins’s to the re- preference” such for elections and hold age scope; tirement is limited it is a “ ing that election nor appoint ‘[N]either challenge only to the effect the statute has ment of judges preferred is over the oth creating possible midterm vacancy, II, er.’” 787 N.W.2d at 146-47 resulting in an appointment possible Zettler, 850) (alter (quoting at N.W.2d delay judicial of the next election for that Thus, ation in original). I would hold Rob According complaint, seat. to the challenge mandatory ins’s retire claims: age, claims, ment like Robins’s other vote, constitutional [the] and/or inextricably intertwined with the state office, to run for and other First Amend- court’s decisions and should be dismissed rights ment are violated ... the man- for lack of un datory retirement statute at Minn.Stat. der Rooker-Feldman. 490.125, which is unconstitutional on face, applied, its but also as because the therefore concur with the result (not statute creates numerous mid-term reached the court as announced vacancies, years) at the end of 6 which Judge separate opinion, Beam’s but for appoint. then the Governor to allow[s] reasons, different and would remand this claim, claims, Complaint Declaratory Judgment along & In- with Robins’s other ¶ short, junction 17. In challenge Robins’s the district court to be dismissed. 930 fact, defendants, in their mem In Judge whom

BEAM, Judge, with Circuit their motion support orandum of law concurring part, joins, SMITH result, dismiss, § “is concede that the 490.125 concurring in the dissenting part, II.” I or Clark sue was not raised Clark judgment of the court announcing the and Thus, limiting gloss placed now under the in part. by the upon Rooker-Feldman that court’s conclusion I concur in the Court, Corp. v. Saudi see Exxon Mobil jurisdic- subject no matter this court has Industries, 280, 284, 125 544 U.S. Basic the Rooker-Feldman doctrine tion under (2005), it is 161 L.Ed.2d 454 S.Ct. constitutionality challenging the for claims difficult, impossible, any if not to see con Article Sec- of Minnesota Constitution Rooker-Feld nection whatever between § tion 8 and Minnesota Statute man, judicial I and Clark II and the (incumbency designation). 5 subdivision by plaintiffs. statute advanced retirement application of the Rooker- dissent from the doctrine cannot be used Accordingly, doctrine to the Minnesota Stat- Feldman subject the separate this claim from (mandating age § retirement ute 490.125 matter of either the district But, under es- judges) claim. because court this court. retirement-age precedent tablished unreviewable or without claim is otherwise being directly by addressed Upon merit, sponte using I would dismiss sua however, court, the retirement claim is Rules of reasoning inherent within Federal easily disposed of. A federal court has 12(b)(6). 12(b)(1)or Civil Procedure jurisdiction to consider its own INS, jurisdiction. 302 Moussa complaint, filing After the district court Cir.2002). Thus, prop F.3d injunc- plaintiffs’ sought preliminary context, erly analyzed in this one can see Rule of Procedure tion under Federal Civil directly of a interested the absence 65(a) upon its Article Section 8 based standing necessary to party eliminates the allegations. The district and 204B.36 dispute given age advance the retirement ruling limited to these two de- was case-or-controversy requirement of Ar And, interlocutory appeal, this see mands. III, ticle of the United States only the dis- 28 U.S.C. advances standing determina Constitution. Such preliminary trict court’s refusal to issue a is, however, wholly unrelated to the tion injunction exclusively upon these based Likewise, Rooker-Feldman doctrine. two averments. The district court refused assuming jurisdiction, the ADEA and even juris- subject matter to rule on defendants’ equal protection allegations fail to diction defense which asserted Rooker- Ashcroft, Gregory state a claim under principles. Feldman 501 U.S. L.Ed.2d There is no indication that the mandato- (1991); retiree-appointment issue, with at- ry judges retirement of its Quie, dispute is defeated Nelson v. (equal tendant Fourteenth Amendment (Minn.1980). N.W.2d in Em- protection) Age Discrimination Accordingly, I concur the result (ADEA) allegations, Act was ployment subject to the limita- reached the court II or ever raised in Clark I or Clark tions set forth above. discussed the district court. Neither judge, judi- any any there indication that

cial or voter involved in this candidate any way directly af-

dispute was ever in § 490.125.

fected Minnesota Statute

Case Details

Case Name: Robins v. Ritchie

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Date Published: Jan 26, 2011

Citation: 631 F.3d 919

Docket Number: 10-2397

Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.