Robin Carpenter v. Lewis AmosRobin Carpenter v. Lewis Amos
Case Information
*2 Before SHODEEN, DOW and SANBERG, Bankruptcy Judges.
SHODEEN, Bankruptcy Judge.
Lewis Amos appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s [1] entry of summary judgment in favor of Flesner Wentzel, LLC, and confirmation of his Sixth Amended Chapter 13 Plan. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The following facts are undisputed based upon the parties’ stipulation and exhibits.
In December 2011 Lewis and Robin Amos obtained a divorce. Based upon the evidence and applicable law the dissolution judgment entered by the state court ordered Lewis Amos to pay Robin Amos (hereinafter “Carpenter”) monthly child support of $529 for the couple’s five children. Less than a year later, Amos filed a Motion to Modify Judgement and Decree of Dissolution seeking a reduction in the amount of his child support due to a decrease in his income, and a change in the residential custody and visitation arrangements. Carpenter countered this motion by alleging that both of the parties’ incomes had changed, the children’s expenses had increased and Amos was not exercising his visitation rights. These filings triggered multiple disputes between the parties that resulted in litigation spanning five years. [2] Substantial evidence was supplied to the trial court in support of the parties’ respective allegations.
*3 The state court’s review of the evidence resulted in a Finding and Judgment of Modification that increased Amos’ monthly child support obligation and gave Carpenter sole custody of the children. The court also ordered him to pay one-half of Carpenter’s attorney fees amounting to $17,793.91. Amos appealed this outcome focusing on the trial court’s income calculation analysis. Finding no error, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order in its entirety. The state court also imposed fees in two other matters. Attorney fees in the amount of $4,547.00 were assessed related to a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion for Family Access filed by Carpenter due to Amos’ interference with custody of one of the couple’s minor children. In an action to Set Aside Transfer and Motion for Contempt, the state court concluded Amos had willfully refused to pay child support as ordered and required him to pay $9,000 in attorney fees.
Amos filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on October 12, 2017. In his filings, the attorney fees were identified as general unsecured claims. Flesner filed three proofs of claim totaling $31,740.90 for attorney fees the state court ordered Amos to pay, plus interest. Each of these claims was characterized as domestic support obligations, to which Amos objected. Flesner also filed an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of the attorney fees, which Amos contested.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the adversary proceeding that were supported by their joint stipulation of facts and respective exhibits. Based upon a detailed analysis of that record the bankruptcy court determined that the attorney fees owed to Flesner qualified as domestic support obligations and entered summary judgment in its favor for the full amount of its claims. As a result of this outcome, Amos was directed to file a plan that properly *4 treated payment of the attorney fee claims as domestic support obligations. A Sixth Amended Plan, was confirmed over Amos’ objection.
This appeal followed. Taken together, the issues raised by Amos in his Notice of Appeal result in a sole question: whether the undisputed facts establish that the attorney fees owed to Flesner constitute domestic support obligations under the bankruptcy code.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed
de novo
.
Mwesigwa v. DAP, Inc.
, 637 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing
Anderson v.
Durham D & M, L.L.C.
, 606 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2010)). We will affirm if
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Any basis found in the record
may support our conclusion.
Seaver v. New Buffalo Auto Sales, LLC (In re
Hecker)
, 459 B.R. 6, 11 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011);
Schoelch v. Mitchell
, 625 F.3d
1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2010). Here we review
de novo
whether the bankruptcy
court's conclusions interpreting the relevant statutes and applying them to the
undisputed facts is correct.
Fisette v. Keller (In re Fisette)
, 455 B.R. 177, 180
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011);
Checkett v. Sutton (In re Sutton)
,
DISCUSSION
The determination of whether a debt is a domestic support obligation, as that
term is defined in the bankruptcy code, is strictly a question of federal law.
In re
Williams,
703 F.2d 1055, 1056 (8th Cir. 1983). The bankruptcy code defines
domestic support obligations, in part, as alimony, maintenance or child support
ordered by a court of record to a former spouse, child or child’s parent. 11 U.S.C.
S101(14A). Such debts are excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5)
and are entitled to priority payment before most other creditor claims pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §507(a)(1). Labels assigned by the state court are not binding on a
bankruptcy court “[w]hen deciding whether a debt should be characterized as one
for support . . . the crucial question is the function the award was intended to serve.”
Phegley v. Phegley (In re Phegley)
, 443 B.R. 154, 157 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011)
(citing
Adams v. Zentz
,
Amos reasons that because the state court did not specifically identify the
Missouri statue it relied upon in ordering the attorney fees the award must be
*6
construed as punishment for his litigation conduct. This argument has been rejected
under facts nearly identical to those in this appeal.
In re Trentadue,
In re Trentadue,
In his brief, Amos states: “[t]he 8 th Circuit requires a bankruptcy court to consider the financial disposition of the parties in the context of the award.” He further contends the bankruptcy court “had an independent duty” to make a factual determination on the financial condition of the parties. And, finally, that the bankruptcy court incorrectly and exclusively relied upon the state court’s determinations. These arguments are not persuasive and lack legal merit for the following reasons.
First, this Circuit has actually rejected the concept that a “needs test” is
necessary to determine support obligations in bankruptcy.
Draper v. Draper
, 790
F.2d 52, 54 (8 th Cir. 1986) quoting
In re Harrell
,
Second, Amos seeks to impose a duty on the bankruptcy court to engage in an independent determination of the facts related to the state court’s award of attorney fees. Such action is not warranted under the procedure he selected. Cross-motions for summary judgment present peculiar problems. The court must consider each motion on the record provided and must take care not to confuse its limited role in passing on such a motion (that is, to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed material facts) with the role it would play were the parties to submit their case for decision on a stipulated record.
Cowell v. Hale (In re Hale),
289 B.R. 788, 792 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2003). A court’s
role in the context of summary judgment is not to weigh evidence to determine the
truth of an assertion, instead it is only to determine whether there is a genuine issue
of material fact requiring determination at trial.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
,
Third, family law cases are specifically reserved to state, not federal, courts
for determination.
Simms v. Simms
, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899);
In re Burrus
, 136
U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of
the United States.”). In
Amos v. Carpenter
, the state court concluded Amos
deliberately manipulated his income and assets to avoid payment of child support.
Amos’ own testimony confirms he would rather be incarcerated than meet his child
support obligations. It also did not find Amos’ income information credible or
*8
consistent. Amos clearly disagreed with these findings and now seeks a different
result under the bankruptcy court’s consideration of the same evidence. “[A]
federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to
state court decisions in judicial proceedings.”
Snider v. City of Excelsior Springs
,
Citing
Adams v. Zentz
for support, Amos maintains the bankruptcy court
incorrectly applied a per se rule that all attorney’s fees incurred by a party enforcing
or defending rights to child support payments or custody are domestic support
obligations.
A majority of courts agree that attorney fee awards related to enforce or defend issues involving child support, visitation or custody that effect the welfare of the children do qualify as domestic support obligations.
*9 In its ruling, the bankruptcy court engaged in a specific and detailed analysis of the undisputed facts and legal authority. Upon our de novo review we identify no error in the conclusion that the attorney fees imposed on Amos by the state court are domestic support obligations under the bankruptcy code and are therefore not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5). Based upon this conclusion confirmation of Amos’ Sixth Amended Plan that provided for priority treatment of Flesner’s attorney fee claims as domestic support obligations was appropriate. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s decisions. __________________
665 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999);
In re Hudson
,
Notes
[1] The Honorable Kathy Surratt-States, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
[2] The details of the multiple filings in the state court are set forth in the Joint Fact Stipulation.
[3] Carpenter was represented by the firm Flesner Wentzel, LLC (“Flesner”).
[4] To preserve his right to appeal confirmation of the plan Amos filed an objection
again alleging the amounts did not qualify for treatment as a domestic support
obligations.
See Zahn v. Fink (In re Zahn),
[5] See
Baillargeon v. Stacey (In re Stacey),