Robidoux v. CokerRobidoux v. Coker
By petition for writ of prohibition the petitioner, Benjamin Robidoux, a juvenile, seeks to prohibit the adult criminal division of the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction with regard to two counts of an indictment which also charged petitioner with an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment in a separate count.
Chapter 39 sets forth a comprehensive procedure for the treatment of offenders below the age of eighteen (18) years. Exclusive original jurisdiction of such offenders is vested in the juvenile division of the circuit court. However, four exceptions allowing for treatment of juveniles as adults are contained in Chapter 39. Under the first exception, a child 14 years of age or older may be certified for trial as an adult by a juvenile judge following a waiver hearing.
Under
In E.H.N. v. Willis, supra, a minor was charged by a single information with two
A similar result was reached in A.D.T. v. State, supra. In that case, the juvenile defendant was charged by indictment with one count of disorderly intoxication and three counts of resisting arrest with violence. The First District held that the indictment could not substitute for a petition alleging delinquency. Noting that substitution was permitted only when the child is charged by grand jury indictment with a violation of Florida law punishable by death or life imprisonment, the First District reasoned that if the legislature had intended for an indictment to be used in the place of a delinquency petition in any other situations, it would have so provided. Similar conclusions have been reached in the Third and Fifth Districts. See State ex rel. Lugo v. Sepe, 296 So.2d 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Johnson v. State, supra; Collins v. State, supra. We believe these decisions are correct in strictly limiting adult treatment of juveniles to the four exceptions contained in Chapter 39.
While it might be more convenient to dispose of all three counts involved herein in one judicial proceeding in the adult division, we do not believe the fact that the attempted murder and aggravated assault charges arose out of the same incident as the life felony charge of armed robbery is sufficient to allow adult jurisdiction. E.H.N. v. Willis, supra. Nor are the two charges simply lesser included offenses of the life felony charge. Quite simply, as in A.D.T. v. State, supra, transfer of jurisdiction on these two charges cannot be accomplished by the simply including the charges in an indictment on the life felony charge. Only the offense punishable by death or life imprisonment is properly before the adult court. What could not have been done separately; i.e., by the filing of separate indictments for the three offenses, cannot be done by the simple expedient of a single indictment. The state is not precluded from seeking a waiver hearing on the attempted murder and aggravated assault charges under the other exceptions of Chapter 39, assuming the proper filing of a delinquency petition. However, the fact that such a course of action may, in practice, appear to be superfluous or inefficient, as perhaps was the case in E.H.N. v. Willis, supra, and A.D.T. v. State, supra, is a problem for the legislature to address. This court is not authorized to create a fifth exception.
For these reasons, we conclude that the petition should be granted; and, accordingly, the trial court is hereby directed to enter an order dismissing Counts II and III of the subject indictment in accordance with the terms of this opinion.
LETTS, C.J., and DOWNEY, J., concur.