Robertson v. RobertsonRobertson v. Robertson
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Farris
Laurence Robertson, a noncustodial father, appeals a trial court order (1) prohibiting him from taking his two sons to any meetings of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses and from teaching’ or expressing to them certain religious doctrines, and (2) requiring him to enable his oldest son to deliver newspapers on Sunday mornings during visitation periods. He also seeks review of an award of attorney‘s fees and costs on appeal to the custodial parent, Martha Robertson, now Martha Caul (his former wife). Mrs. Caul requests an award of additional attorney‘s fees expended in opposing the motion for reconsideration and in defending this appeal.
*427 The father contends that the part of the trial court order restraining him from participating in the religious training of his children constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion, violates the Washington statute governing visitation rights, and infringes on the free exercise of his religion in violation of the first amendment to the United States Constitution.
In Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wn.2d 810, 813, 489 P.2d 1133 (1971), the Supreme Court held that
the courts should maintain an attitude of strict impartiality between religions and should not disqualify any applicant for custody or restrain any person having custody or visitation rights from taking the children to a particular church, except where there is a clear and affirmative showing that the conflicting religious beliefs affect the general welfare of the child.
In 1973, the legislature enacted
The court may modify an order granting or denying visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child but the court shall not restrict a parent‘s visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger the child‘s physical, mental, or emotional health.
Thus, there must be a showing in the record and a finding by the court that the requirements of
Munoz
and
With respect to the requirement that the father exercise his rights of visitation so as not to interfere with his oldest son‘s paper route, the order provides that if the father plans an activity during a visitation period that makes it impossible for him to return his son on Sunday morning, he may avoid doing so by giving Mrs. Caul 72 hours’ notice so that a substitute paper boy may be found. This restriction on visitation is reasonable; it is not an abuse of the trial court‘s discretion.
Finally, the father contends that he should not be required to pay Mrs. Caul $750 for attorney‘s fees and $250 for costs on appeal. Such an award rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, which must balance the needs of the requesting party against the other party‘s ability to pay. In re Marriage of Young, 18 Wn. App. 462, 569 P.2d 70 (1977). Our review of the record discloses no abuse of discretion in the award.
Mrs. Caul requests that additional attorney‘s fees be awarded pursuant to
Upon any appeal, the appellate court may, in its discretion, order a party to pay for the cost to the other party of maintaining the appeal and attorney‘s fees in addition to statutory costs.
We deny the request.
The cause is remanded for the taking of evidence on the effect upon the children, if any, of exposure to conflicting religious doctrines. The trial court will enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing.
*429 Reversed and remanded.
Williams and Callow, JJ., concur.
Notes
We reject Mrs. Caul‘s argument that
Munoz
was “overruled” by