770 N.E.2d 1085 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2001
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *406
In 1986, the Ohio General Assembly enacted former R.C.
On June 30, 1992, the Ohio General Assembly enacted Section 5, S.B. No. 192, effective September 29, 1992. Section 5 provided that the monies held in the custody of the treasurer in the ITF under former R.C.
With regard to the specific appellants in the present case, Roberts was injured on September 3, 1986, when a portion of his left hand was amputated by a *408
saw while at his place of employment, Rhodes Industries, Inc. ("Rhodes"), in Avon Lake, Ohio. The safety guard for the saw had allegedly been removed by Rhodes. In 1987, Roberts filed a complaint in the Lorain County Common Pleas Court against Rhodes for an intentional tort pursuant to former R.C.
On September 27, 1991, Roberts filed an action in the Lorain County Common Pleas Court against Rhodes seeking a determination of damages as a result of the earlier determination of liability. This action was placed on the inactive docket, and the liability determination was never reduced to damages. On August 28, 1992, Roberts filed a complaint in the Court of Claims against the treasurer, commission, and the bureau seeking a judgment declaring he had a valid, vested right to a portion of the ITF and requesting a determination and payment of damages as a result of the intentional tort of Rhodes. In November 1992, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court ordered a stay due to the proceedings in Rossborough, in which Roberts had intervened. On August 31, 2000, the trial court lifted the stay and denied the motions for summary judgment. In March 2001, both parties again filed motions for summary judgment, and on April 13, 2001, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the treasurer, commission, and the bureau. Roberts appeals from this judgment.
Larry Moyer was an employee of Butcher Son, which is owned by appellant Butcher. On March 29, 1989, Moyer was killed by an explosion while working on the premises of Butcher Son. In March 1990, Moyer's estate filed a complaint against Butcher Son claiming Moyer's death was the result of an intentional tort. After Brady was determined on August 27, 1991, the state refused to process intentional tort claims, leaving Butcher exposed to a judgment against his company. Butcher then entered into a settlement with Moyer's family in August 1992. On August 9, 1993, Butcher filed a complaint against the state, commission, and the bureau in the Court of Claims seeking reimbursement of funds expended in the settlement and attorney fees incurred in defending the intentional tort claim filed by Moyer's estate. On September 13, 1993, the action was stayed pending the outcome of Rossborough. The Court of Claims lifted the stay on December 29, 2000, and in March 2001, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On April 13, 2001, the Court of Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the state, commission, and the bureau. Butcher appeals this judgment. *409
On April 29, 1988, Stump was injured while performing work pursuant to his employment with Industrial Steeplejack Co. ("ISJ"). On April 12, 1989, Stump filed an intentional tort lawsuit in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court against ISJ. On May 21, 1991, he received a liability judgment against ISJ. The case was appealed, but while pending on appeal, Brady was decided. The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the trial court, finding that because R.C.
On December 16, 1991, during the pendency of the first appeal in the Cuyahoga County case, Stump filed an action in the Court of Claims against the treasurer, commission, and the bureau, alleging he had an interest in the ITF. On January 2, 1992, a stay was ordered during the pendency of Rossborough, in which Stump had intervened. The stay was vacated on September 26, 2000, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in March 2001. On April 13, 2001, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the treasurer, commission, and the bureau. Stump appeals this judgment.
Roberts asserts the following assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #1: The trial court erred in granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #2: The trial court erred in denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Stump asserts the following assignment of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: The trial court erred in granting the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in denying the Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
Butcher asserts the following assignments of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT WERE IN EXISTENCE AS TO THE STATE OF OHIO'S BREACH OF ITS AGREEMENT WITH APPELLANT AND ITS INEQUITABLE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS' CLAIM FOR INSURANCE BENEFITS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RETROACTIVELY APPLYING SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW AS SUCH RETROACTIVE APPLICATION IS NOT MANDATED UNDER OHIO LAW AND THE RESULT HAS BEEN A MANIFEST INJUSTICE.
Roberts', Butcher's, and Stump's assignments of error assert the trial court erred granting summary judgment. Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc. (1998),
Roberts' first and second assignments of error and Stump's assignment of error are related and will be addressed together. Roberts and Stump argue the decision in Brady should not be applied retrospectively. A decision overruling a former statute as being unconstitutional is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former was bad law, but that it never was the law. Peerless Electric Co. v. Bowers (1955),
However, the Ohio Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to this rule: in those instances in which a court expressly indicates that its decision is only to apply prospectively, see Lakeside Ave. L.P. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999),
In the present case, Roberts and Stump contend they have acquired vested rights under R.C.
Roberts' and Stump's claimed right to recover damages from the ITF could not be said to have vested until, at the earliest, a damages hearing was held by the commission and an award was issued by the commission, as required by former R.C.
Thus, the only judgments Roberts and Stump obtained were mere liability judgments against their employers. Although Stump also obtained a damages judgment, such judgment was rendered against only ISJ, not any state agency, and was issued by a trial court, not by the commission, as specifically required by R.C.
Both Roberts and Stump also argue that they have been denied the opportunity to pursue independent recovery from their employers. However, this is clearly not the case. Both did, indeed, obtain liability judgments against their respective employers. In Roberts' case, a trial court found his employer, Rhodes, liable for an intentional tort. After Brady, Roberts filed an action seeking a damages determination based upon the liability finding, but this action was placed on the inactive docket, and the damages have never been determined. Unfortunately, Roberts believes that Rhodes is no longer in business. Stump also has a liability and damages judgment against his employer, ISJ; however, ISJ is also apparently unable to satisfy the judgment awarded by the trial court due to ISJ's insolvency. Thus, it is clear that neither Roberts nor Stump has lost any right to pursue a remedy as a result of Brady, they retain their common-law rights and remedies, and, in fact, they both have liability judgments against their employers. Though unfortunate that their employers are unable to satisfy a judgment, this does not strengthen their legal position in the present case. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Court of Claims properly granted summary judgment against Stump and Roberts on this issue.
Roberts and Stump next argue, alternatively, that even if they are not entitled to recover from the ITF, they are entitled to recovery under S.B. No. 192. Section 5, the portion of S.B. No. 192 under which they claim entitlement to recovery, provides that the bureau can only distribute: (1) attorney fees not to exceed $1,000,000 for services provided to employers under former R.C.
From the funds remaining in the Workers' Compensation Intentional Tort Disbursement Fund, the Bureau shall prorate a credit for the rating year beginning July 1, 1993, to the administrative assessment of each employer that has made payments to the Intentional Tort Fund by the amount of all such payments made by each such employer, provided that in computing the amount of the prorated credit due to each employer, the Bureau shall reduce the credit to the individual employer by the amount paid or to be paid by the Industrial Commission or Bureau either in employer attorney's fees or as an award on behalf of such an employer brought under former section
4121.80 of the Revised Code. (Emphasis added.)
Roberts and Stump contend that the allowance of monies "to be paid" (connoting the future), when read in conjunction with "an award on behalf of such an employer brought under former section
Appellees set forth their own interpretation of this passage. Though somewhat difficult to articulate, generally, appellees argue that "paid" refers to both of the subsequent phrases "attorney fees" (i.e., fees that were paid before Brady) as well as "an award on behalf of such an employer brought under former section
For employees and clients who travel on business past 5:00 p.m. to meetings, the company will pay parking costs and salary at the overtime rate of time and a half.
Appellees explain that in their illustration it is clear by context that both employees and clients will be paid by the company for parking costs while only employees will obviously receive salary at time-and-a-half. Likewise, appellees argue that when read in context, Section 5 utilizes this same informal composition tactic to convey that "to be paid" refers to only one of the subsequent items (attorney fees) and "paid" refers to both subsequent items (attorney fees and awards brought under former R.C.
This passage in Section 5 is not a model of clarity, particularly given its unfortunate compound structure and ambiguous use of "either" and *414
"or." The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that a court's primary concern when interpreting statutes must be to determine the legislative intent behind the statute, which is done by focusing on the language in the statute and the legislative purpose. Morgan v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1994),
What the General Assembly meant to communicate with this sentence is difficult to glean and can only be surmised by this court. As a court of law put in the position of having to unravel this semantic mystery, we believe that neither Roberts' and Stump's nor appellees' interpretations are compelling. With regard to appellees' belief that "paid" refers to both previously paid damages awards and attorney fees, while "to be paid" refers only to attorney fees, this is simply too far a stretch. If the General Assembly had meant to effectuate the interpretation that appellees argue to this court, it could have very easily stated such without the complicated twist and necessary blind leap-of-faith that appellees urge. We find appellees' interpretation unpersuasive.
With regard to Roberts' and Stump's interpretation of Section 5, it is simply not logical and fraught with several problems. Their reading would again put in place the precise scheme that the Ohio Supreme Court in Brady already stated was unconstitutional and the same scheme for which S.B. No. 192 was effectuated to fix and wind down. Roberts and Stump counter that statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and S.B. No. 192 should be interpreted as being constitutional, citing Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist. (1995),
In addition, the specific procedure in R.C.
Therefore, we are left to furnish our own interpretation. We believe that the simplest and plainest reading of Section 5 contemplates "to be paid" to refer to both attorney fees and damages awards under R.C.
Admittedly, our interpretation has at least two major weaknesses itself. We can assume that either: (1) the commission, in fact, already paid the awards in any such cases, or (2) there existed no type of case as described above when Brady was released. We make such presumptions based upon Butcher's representation that only five related cases have been filed in the Court of Claims, and this court is itself aware of four of them, none of which fall under this peculiar category. Our interpretation not only appears to be the intention of the *416 legislature by the words used, but would also appear to be the more reasonable way to reconcile several problems that arise when following the interpretations propounded by appellees and Roberts and Stump. We do not believe this interpretation reaches an absurd result. Accordingly, we find that Roberts and Stump can raise no genuine issue of material fact that they are entitled to payment pursuant to S.B. No. 192.
Stump makes additional arguments claiming that equity requires he be paid his damages award from the ITF. Stump's arguments assume that he has a vested right in the fund, which we have already determined above he does not. Notwithstanding, he first claims that the sums he and Roberts are owed from the ITF can easily be paid from the interest alone that has accrued since Brady. When Brady was decided in 1991, the ITF held approximately thirty million dollars and now holds over double that amount as a result of accrued interest. Stump claims that only the principal thirty million dollars will have to be distributed under S.B. No. 192 and not the accrued interest of approximately thirty million dollars, and even the thirty million dollar principal will not have to be disbursed in whole because it is likely that hundreds of employers that contributed to the ITF originally have gone out of business since 1991. Thus, Stump's equity argument apparently is that because his claim is so small and so much interest has accrued that will not have to be disbursed, equity should allow him to claim a relatively small portion of that interest.
However, the additional thirty million dollars in interest that has accrued since 1991 is presumably being compounded as part of the original principal and will also be available for disbursement whenever S.B. No. 192 is enforced, minus, of course, one million dollars for attorney fee disbursements and $50,000 for administrative expenses. Stump cites nothing in S.B. No. 192 to support his belief that the interest will be held separately and not be disbursed along with the original principal. To the contrary, S.B. No. 192 prohibits the use of the ITF monies for anything other than as provided in Section 5 and provides for a pro-rata distribution of all remaining funds to those employers who paid into the fund. Because the distribution is pro-rata, it appears as though each qualifying employer will receive a proportionate amount of the total remaining funds and will not merely be refunded the actual premiums previously paid into the fund. Thus, no matter how much of the fund is remaining after attorney fees and administrative expenses, that whole amount will be distributed pro-rata. Stump's argument in this respect fails.
Stump's other equitable argument is that the result of leaving vested injured employees without a source of recovery when they followed the mandates of the law in effect at the time is unjust and inequitable. However, we have already found that neither Stump nor Roberts had a vested interest in the ITF. *417 We also explained above that Roberts and Stump did have a source of recovery, but, unfortunately, both of their employers are no longer able to satisfy any judgment rendered by a court of common pleas. Thus, we find no merit to this argument.
Given our determinations above, Roberts' and Stump's argument against the application of res judicata is moot. Therefore, Roberts' first and second assignments of error and Stump's assignment of error are overruled.
We will address Butcher's first and second assignments of error together. Butcher argues in his first assignment of error that equity should interpose to provide indemnification from the ITF because he complied entirely with the terms of R.C.
We find a number of cases helpful in resolving the issues raised by Butcher. In Taylor v. Triple A in the U.S.A. (1995),
In addition, numerous cases have found that the effect of Brady was to treat R.C.
We also note that while not factually or procedurally on all fours with the present case, the Ohio Supreme Court's determination in State ex rel. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Mayfield (1992),
In the present case, we find the holding in Taylor and the other cited cases persuasive. As in Taylor, we find that Butcher cannot seek to invoke the intentional tort immunity provided under R.C.
Having found such, we make one further comment regarding Butcher's plea for recovery based upon equity. He requests that this court indemnify him for the settlement because Brady pulled the proverbial rug out from under him during the pendency of his intentional tort trial. Indeed, only a corpse would be unable to see the inequity brought by Brady under the specific circumstances as occurred in the present case. We view Butcher's equitable position, as an employer, different from the position of Stump and Roberts, as employees. After Brady, Stump and Roberts could still potentially obtain damages for an intentional tort, albeit directly from their employers instead of the ITF. However, Butcher was prohibited from retaining liability insurance, and then, with no opportunity to protect himself or his company, Brady opened him up to liability while in the middle of a pending intentional tort action. Butcher was left with no cover and no subsequent remedy.
However, while we agree that the result of Brady upon cases pending at the time of its rendering was unfair, we are constrained by the bulk of cases finding that Brady applies retrospectively to extinguish employer immunity for intentional tort claims brought by employees. Butcher does retain his right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, and that court may desire to address this situation. Thus, it is with some reluctance that we find Butcher failed to demonstrate any genuine issues of material fact. Butcher's first and second assignments of error are overruled.
Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in granting the motions for summary judgment. Roberts', Butcher's, and Stump's assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the Ohio Court of Claims is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
TYACK and DESHLER, JJ., concur. *420