51 N.Y.S. 691 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1898
It is proper, in the first instance, to consider the effect of the pardon granted to the plaintiff by Gov. Robinson, on the 21st day of October, 1878, and his subsequent restoration to the rights of citizenship by Gov. Morton, on the 15th day of April, 1895.
•In the opinion rendered in U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150-159, Marshall, J., uses the following language:
“A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.”
The same doctrine is stated in 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 317, and the authorities there cited.
In Eighmy v. People, 78 N. Y. 330, it was said that the pardon therein referred to was issued to the plaintiff in error because he was “a fit object of mercy”; and the pardon issued to the plaintiff on the 21st day of October, 1878, contained this recital: “And, he being represented to us as a fit subject of our mercy, therefore know ye, that we have, pardoned,” etc. The effect of a pardon of a convict is not to annul a judgment of conviction obtained against him, nor to determine that such judgment was erroneous or unjust. The pardon is an act of grace—of mercy—on the part of the executive, that in no way interferes with the validity or force of the judgment as far as it has been executed.
It was said in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., at page 380, referring to a pardon:
“If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.”
But this language must be understood to apply to a time subsequent to the granting of the pardon. As to acts done under a judgment of conviction before pardon, the adjudication remains in full force. The plaintiff could not have maintained an action for' malicious prosecution against the party at whose complaint he was arrested, nor against the authorities of the state prison by whom he was confined for false imprisonment. They were protected by the judgment.
The following doctrine has been declared by the court of appeals:
“Notwithstanding the extensive language used in Ex parte Garland, supra, and In re Deming, 10 Johns. 232, and that which we used, there are limits to the effect of sutih a pardon. The word ‘pardon’ includes a remission of the offense, or of the penalties, forfeitures, or sentences growing out of it.” Per Edmunds, J., People v. Potter, 1 Park. Cr. R. 51.
In Knote v. U. S., 95 U. S. 153, the following language was used by Mr. Justice Field in his opinion:
“A pardon is an act of grace, by which an offender is released from the consequences of his offense, so far as such release is practicable and within control" of the pardoning power or of officers under its direction. It releases the offender from all disabilities imposed by the offense, and restores to him all his civil rights. In contemplation of law, it so far blots out the offense that after-wards it cannot be imputed to him to prevent the assertion of his legal rights. It gives to him a new credit and capacity, and rehabilitates him to that extent in his former position. But it does not make amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender in his person by imprisonment, forced labor, or otherwise. It does not give compensation for what has been done or suffered, nor does it impose upon the government any obligation to give it. The offense being established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”
We might refer to many other authorities to the same effect, but deem it unnecessary to do so. The pardon granted to the plaintiff did not have the retroactive effect of determining that the judgment of conviction was erroneous or unjust, or that his imprisonment thereunder was unlawful. It did not give to him a claim against the state for damages on account of his past imprisonment, or against the prosecutor who caused his arrest, or the public official who detained him in custody. In the language of Justice Field, above quoted:
“The offense being established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”
The pardon, while relieving the plaintiff from future punishment and penalty in consequence of his conviction, did not affect the force or effect of the judgment as far as it had been executed. It is apparent, therefore, that, prior to the enactment of chapter 342 of the Laws of 1895, the plaintiff had no claim against the state. When the case came before the board of claims, on the 17th day of December, 1895, if a valid demand existed, it was one which was created by the act in question. If it should be held that the stat
In a criminal action brought by the people of the state, 18 years before, after a fair trial in the court of oyer and terminer, the plaintiff had been dulyoconvicted of the crime of burglary. No appeal had been taken from the judgment, and it had remained 18 years unreversed and unassailed. If a claim in favor of the plaintiff was not created by the act of 1895, the court below would have been compelled to find that he had no demand against the state; that the judgment in the court below was final, and could not be disturbed; that the adjudication in that court that the plaintiff was guilty of the crime of burglary was conclusive as to his guilt; that the judgment'was binding on the board of claims, and upon all other courts; that no claim could arise against the state in -consequence of a judgment of conviction and an imprisonment thereunder, such judgment never having been reversed or assailed. Any other finding would have been clearly erroneous. The plaintiff, therefore, to sustain his contention, must rely on the act of 1895. That statute created his claim, if any existed, when the matter was presented to the board of claims. If it did not have the effect of validating the demand, it was ineffectual for any purpose. The conclusion of the court below cannot be sustained unless it can be held that the act of 1895 was a determination by the legislature that the conviction of the plaintiff in 1877 was improper, and that a claim existed in his favor against the state in consequence of the judgment of conviction and his imprisonment thereunder, which the legislature authorized the board of claims to audit and allow, or‘unless the act empowered the said board to determine whether or not the plaintiff was improperly convicted, and, if it found in his favor in that regard, to allow his claim of damages therefor.
But why was the conviction of the plaintiff improper? He was found guilty by the court of oyer and terminer of the crime of burglary. The conviction was not improper if he was in fact guilty. It could only have been held improper if, although found guilty, he was in fact innocent. If the act in question shall be deemed a legislative determination that his conviction was improper, the legislature, in its enactment, was compelled to practically annul a judgment duly rendered in the oyer and terminer in 1877. That judgment determined that the plaintiff was guilty. The legislature, by the act in question, in enacting that his conviction was improper, necessarily found that he was innocent. In doing so, it was compelled to pass upon a question of fact, to invalidate an
In Black’s Constitutional Law (page 78) it is said:
“Any act of the legislature which would undertake to determine questions of fact or law affecting the rights of persons or property would be judicial in its ■character, and therefore invalid. The legislature cannot lawfully, by statute, reverse or annul a judgment of a court, or grant a new trial, or otherwise reopen private controversies which have been finally settled by the courts or by lapse of time under the statute of limitations. Nor, as is generally held, can the legislature grant an appeal from a judgment in cases where the right to appeal has been lost. Declaratory statutes, the office of which is to declare what shall be taken to be the true meaning and intent of a law already in force, are valid 'if they are to apply only to controversies thereafter arising; but, in so far as they are intended to have a retrospective operation, that is an unlawful assumption of judicial power, and invalid. * * * Neither can the legislature direct the collection of a tax which has already been declared invalid by the courts, or direct that a criminal or class of criminals shall be discharged by the courts, or interfere with the sentence imposed by a court in a criminal case, by providing for a reduction of the term of imprisonment for good conduct.”
To the same effect, see Cooley, Const. Lim. 104-106; Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700-761; 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 1032, and notes; Parmelee v. Thompson, 7 Hill, 77-80.
We conclude that, if the statute in question did not have the effect of validating or creating the claim of the plaintiff presented to the court below, it was ineffectual; and a finding of that court •cannot be sustained, as in that case no legal demand existed in
The plaintiff was also tried in 1877, before a court of oyer and terminer,—a court created by the constitution of the state, to determine the question of his guilt or innocence. No power is conferred upon the legislature to pass upon the question determined by the oyer and terminer, or to authorize a court of its own selection to do so. The determination of the court designated by the constitution to try the plaintiff for the crime with which he was charged must be deemed final as to his guilt.
For the reasons above stated, and without considering other questions raised in the points submitted to us, we are of the opinion that the judgment rendered in this case cannot be sustained. It would, be a matter of regret if we were compelled to hold that the enactment of chapter 342 of the Laws of 1895 was a proper exercise of legislative power. The doctrine has ever been maintained by our courts that a judgment obtained without fraud or duress, either in a civil or criminal court, is a final determination of the rights of the parties, and of the questions necessarily passed upon in its rendition. That that doctrine should be maintained is of the utmost importance. If the act under consideration can be . sustained, we see no reason to doubt that, in any case where a criminal has been convicted of a crime and imprisoned, the legislature, on his being pardoned, or on the expiration of his term of im
The judgment should be reversed, and the plaintiff’s claim dismissed, with costs to the defendant. All concur.
I concur, except that I express no opinion as to the power of the legislature to vacate a judgment of conviction of a crime obtained by the people against the accused. I do not think this act assumed to vacate the judgment.