Roberts v. SamardvichRoberts v. Samardvich
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Sharp
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.
The complaint in this case was filed by this
pro se
plaintiff, George Charles Roberts, an inmate at the Maximum Control Complex, in Westville, Indiana, purporting to state a claim under
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
See Kashani v. Purdue University, 813 F.2d 843 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 846, 108 S.Ct. 141, 98 L.Ed.2d 97 (1987); Owen v. Lash, 682 F.2d 648 (7th Cir.1982); Sheets v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 656 F.Supp. 733 (S.D.Ind.1986). For recent authority consistent with Kashani, 813 F.2d at 843, see Shelton v. Trustees of Indiana University, 891 F.2d 165 (7th Cir.1989). See also Kroll v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 934 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.1991); Cosby v. Jackson, 741 F.Supp. 740 (N.D.Ill.1990), and Rodenbeck v. Indiana, Leaking Underground Storage Tank Div. etc., 742 F.Supp. 1442 (N.D.Ind.1990). Any and all damage claims against the defendants in their official capacities are now DISMISSED under the mandates of the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. Thus, the defendants are immune from damages claims in their official capacities, but that does not end the story here. Given the seminal case of Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), this plaintiff is going to be hard pressed to make any kind of viable claim against the defendant Wright. To that extent, Magistrate Judge Pierce is again correct that that complaint should be dismissed by summary judgment in favor of the defendant Charles Wright and against the plaintiff. Each party will bear its own costs.
Certainly one of the beginning points for any case under
The excessive force claim against defendant Frank Egolf appears to present issues of fact that under the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States must be resolved by a jury as a trier of fact. This court will seriously consider attempting to secure appointed counsel for any such trial and will likely schedule the same in Lafayette, Indiana as soon as the court’s calendar permits. IT IS SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PIERCE, United States Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, George Charles Roberts, Jr., brings this action under
This cause is presently before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Charles Wright, Ronald Samard-vich, Frank Egolf, Mark Smith, Gary Ware, Matthew Hamilton, Gregory Goodman, Steven Gallegos, Charles Stang, and Nell Hayes (collectively “the defendants”), and the plaintiff’s motion to reschedule the jury trial. For the reasons which follow, the court will recommend that the defendants’ motion be denied with respect to the excessive use of force claim against defendant Egolf, and granted in all other respects. The court will also recommend that the plaintiffs motion to reschedule the jury trial be granted.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the party that
“[T]he plain language of
“Supporting materials designed to establish issues of fact in a summary judgment proceeding ‘must be established through one of the vehicles designed to ensure reliability and veracity — depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits.’ ”
Friedel v. City of Madison,
832 F.2d 965, 970 (7th Cir.1987) (quoting
Martz v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co.,
757 F.2d 135, 139 (7th Cir.1985)). Supporting materials, in other words, must be “of evidentiary quality — either admissible documents or attested testimony, such as that found in depositions or in affidavits — demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Winskunas v. Birnbaum,
23 F.3d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.1994). While “[t]he evidence need not be in admissible
form,
. . . it must be admissible in
content,
in the sense that a change in form but not in content, for example a substitution of oral testimony for a summary of that testimony in an affidavit, would make the evidence admissible at trial.”
Id.
at 1267-68 (Emphasis in original);
Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draw all inferences in favor of that party.
NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc.,
45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir.1995), ce
rt. denied,
— U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2249, 132 L.Ed.2d 257 (1995);
Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp.,
956 F.2d 1436, 1440 (7th Cir.1992). It must be noted, however, that not every factual dispute creates a barrier to summary judgment. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”
Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510;
Tolle,
23 F.3d at 178;
Derrico v. Bungee Int’l Mfg. Co.,
989 F.2d 247, 250 (7th Cir.1993);
First Indiana Bank v. Baker,
957 F.2d 506, 508 (7th Cir.1992). Moreover, “[a] genuine issue for trial only exists where there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmovant for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511;
Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of America,
8
Affidavits presented in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be based upon personal knowledge; a statement merely indicating that a purported affidavit is based upon “information and belief’ is insufficient.
Price v. Rockford,
947 F.2d 829, 832-33 (7th Cir.1991);
Visser,
924 F.2d at 659-60;
Schertz v. Waupaca County,
875 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir.1989).
The Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff, George Charles Roberts, Jr., is and was during the relevant time period, an inmate at the MCC in Westville, Indiana. Defendants were employees of the MCC during the relevant time period.
On October 10, 1993, defendant Goodman was securing Roberts for transport from the recreation area to his cell (Goodman Decl. ¶ 1-2), at which time Roberts became belligerent and complained that his recreation time had been cut short (Goodman Decl. ¶ 2; Gallegos Decl. ¶ 2). He began to turn to face defendant Goodman when Goodman ordered him to turn around and face the opposite direction (Goodman Decl. ¶ 2). Nevertheless, Roberts persisted in his behavior and shouted at Goodman (Goodman Decl. ¶ 3). Goodman grabbed Roberts’ arms and pushed him up the stairs toward his cell (Goodman Deck ¶4; Gallegos Decl. ¶3). Defendants Goodman and Samardvich then moved Roberts into his cell and left him there cuffed, shackled at the feet, and secured to the cell door by a lead (Goodman Decl. ¶ 7; Gallegos Decl. ¶ 7). Roberts continued to act in a belligerent manner (Stang Decl. ¶2). Defendant Gallegos observed Goodman and Samardvich moving Roberts and did not see them apply any unnecessary force (Gallegos Decl. If 8).
When advised of the incident, Lt. Newsom ordered a cell extraction (Stang Decl. ¶2). Defendant Stang led the five-man cell extraction team to Roberts’ cell. When he looked into the cell, defendant Stang saw that Roberts appeared to be cuffed, but had broken away from the lead that had secured him to the door. Defendant Stang could not determine whether he was still secured in his leg irons (Stang Decl. ¶ 3). The extraction team entered the cell, removed Roberts, moved him to another cell, and placed him in four-way leather restraints (Stang Decl. ¶ 4; Gallegos Decl. ¶7). At some point during the extraction, Roberts apparently received a cut on the right side of his head (Henrick
Roberts is approximately 6 feet tall and weighs approximately 230 pounds (Roberts Decl. ¶ 5). 2
Roberts requested medical attention, and Nurse Vicky Johnson was called to the cell (Stang Decl. ¶ 5; Henrick Decl. ¶ 4). She observed a small laceration, approximately one inch in length on the right side of the temporal area of Roberts’ head. She cleaned the laceration with hydrogen peroxide and stopped the bleeding. Roberts complained of pain in his right heel and Nurse Johnson noticed blood on his sock. She removed his sock and observed a small puncture wound to his right heel that she then cleaned with hydrogen peroxide. Nurse Johnson observed that Roberts was conscious and did not complain of any other symptoms. Nurse Johnson returned to examine him later that day and applied a bandage to his right heel. She observed that the laceration to Roberts’ head was not bleeding. Medical staff saw and treated Roberts two days later for both his head and heel (Henrick Decl. ¶ 4).
Disputed Facts
The parties dispute whether Roberts pulled away from defendant Goodman when he was being secured for transport from the recreation area (Goodman Decl. ¶ 3; Gallegos Decl. ¶ 4; Roberts Decl. ¶ 6).
Roberts contends that a material issue of fact exists as to whether defendants Goodman, Stang, and Gallegos were aware of any injuries he sustained during the cell extraction, arguing that all three defendants were present when Nurse Johnson treated him. No genuine issue of material fact exists, however. None of those defendants denied that Roberts received medical treatment for his injuries. Neither defendant Stang nor defendant Gallegos denied an awareness that Roberts received any injuries during the cell extraction; rather, they stated that they were “unaware of any significant injuries” sustained by Roberts (Stang Decl. ¶ 8; Gallegos Decl. ¶ 10) (emphasis added). Only defendant Goodman denied an awareness of any injuries received by Roberts during the cell extraction (Goodman Decl. ¶ 10), and whether Goodman was aware that he sustained any injuries is not a material fact.
Discussion
Official Capacity Claims
The defendants contend that the Eleventh Amendment bars Roberts’ action for damages against them in their official capacities. The court agrees. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages against state officials in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Moore v. Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1128-29 (7th Cir.1993); Meadows v. Indiana, 854 F.2d 1068, 1069 (7th Cir.1988); Ridlen v. Four County Counseling Center, 809 F.Supp. 1343, 1358 (N.D.Ind.1992).
Indiana has not waived its immunity,
Meadows,
854 F.2d at 1069, and Congress has not abrogated the states’ immunity in
Personal Involvement
The defendants contend that Roberts cannot prove liability as to defen
To prevail under
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment” and applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. When evaluating claims for cruel and unusual punishment, the court makes a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component), and (2) whether, in light of “contemporary standards of decency,” the alleged deprivation was sufficiently serious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation (objective component). Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2323-24, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991); Thomas v. Stalter, 20 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir.1994); Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1579 (7th Cir.1994).
Excessive Use of Force
In the excessive force context, the two components collapse into a single inquiry because “ ‘[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency . . . are always violated.’ ” Thomas, 20 F.3d at 301 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 1000 (1992)). The ultimate test, as set forth in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-85, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986), is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Thomas v. Stalter, 20 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir.1994); (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. at 999); see also Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1031 (7th Cir.1994); Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1581 (7th Cir.1994). The standard is strict and sets a fairly high threshold. Lunsford, 17 F.3d at 1581. When determining whether the force used was excessive, the court should consider the need for force, the threat to the safety of the staff and inmates, and the nature and extent of any injury inflicted on the prisoner. Lunsford, 17 F.3d at 1581. (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. at 999; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 1085).
The defendants maintain that Goodman and Samardvieh did not use excessive force. The court agrees. The evidence demonstrates that when Roberts was removed from the recreation area he became belligerent, turned toward defendant Goodman, and refused to follow Goodman’s orders to turn around. Roberts’ arms were grabbed, he was pushed up the stairs toward his cell, and placed in his cell cuffed, shackled, and secured to the door. Throughout the incident, Roberts continued to act belligerently. Roberts states that he did not pull away from Goodman at that time, but he does not dispute that he became belligerent, refused to obey Goodman’s orders to turn around, and continued to act belligerently. Although Goodman and Samardvieh used force against Roberts when moving him from the recreation area to his cell, given Roberts’ physical size, his belligerence, and his refusal to comply with Goodman’s orders, the amount of force used was not excessive.
Even assuming that Roberts sustained the cut to his right heel during his removal, there is no evidence that either Goodman or Sa-mardvich acted maliciously or sadistically to inflict the cut or to otherwise harm Roberts. Their actions in removing and moving Roberts involved only de minimis force, as in Lunsford. The evidence even when viewed in the light most favorable to Roberts does not demonstrate that Goodman or Samard-vich applied force maliciously or sadistically to cause harm to Roberts. Therefore, the court will recommend that summary judgment be granted defendants Goodman and Samardvieh on Roberts’ claim of excessive force against them.
The defendants contend that the extraction team did not use excessive force. The court agrees. The evidence demonstrates that a cell extraction was ordered because of the incident between Roberts and Goodman and Samardvieh, including Roberts’ continued belligerence. Defendant Stang led the five-man cell extraction team to Roberts’ cell, looked into the cell and saw that although Roberts appeared to be cuffed, he had broken away from the lead that had secured him to the door. Defendant Stang could not determine whether he was still secured in the leg irons. The extraction team entered the cell, removed Roberts from the cell, moved him to another cell, and placed him in four-way leather restraints.
The cell extraction, the removal to the second cell, and the restraining of Roberts were recorded on a videotape. The court has reviewed that videotape. Although it is not possible to see everything that took place inside the cell during the extraction,
3
the videotape shows no beating or hitting inflicted upon Roberts and shows no excessive force directed toward him. However, Roberts states that defendant Egolf hit him on the head causing a laceration approximately one inch in length. Although the
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Roberts, the court must assume that defendant Egolf hit him in the head. Although the nature and extent of injury to Roberts, as in Lunsford, was not significant — he received a laceration of approximately one inch in length that stopped bleeding within less than 20 minutes, 4 but as in Thomas, Roberts was struck in the head. The court cannot conclusively find that defendant Egolfs use of force in hitting Roberts in the head was de minimis. Although there is no direct evidence that Egolf maliciously and sadistically hit Roberts in the head to cause him harm, viewing the evidence in the fight most favorable to Roberts, the evidence could support such a reasonable inference.
Defendant Egolfs use of force falls somewhere between the de minimis use of force in Lunsford and the use of force in Thomas. The court cannot conclusively determine that in hitting Roberts in the head, Egolfs use of force was a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Therefore, the court will recommend that summary judgment be denied defendant Egolf.
Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
The defendants maintain that none of them were deliberately indifferent to Roberts’ injuries and that he was not denied appropriate medical care for a serious medical need. The court agrees. A plaintiff alleging inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment must demonstrate that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs serious medical needs. Farmer v. Brennan, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1977; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999-1000, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Wilson, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2323-24 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). “Deliberate indifference” is “recklessness” in the criminal sense, Farmer, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1980, and exists only when a prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1979; Williams v. O’Leary, 55 F.3d 320, 324 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 23, 1995) (No. 95-6090); Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir.1994); see also Hughes v. Joliet Correctional Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir.1991). Deliberate indifference may be manifested by officials “in intentionally denying or delaying access ’ to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. at 291.
Deliberate indifference to medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment only if the medical needs are serious. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. at 1000 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04, 97 S.Ct. at 290-91); Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1291 (7th Cir.1991); see also Hughes, 931 F.2d at 428. When determining whether a medical need is “serious,” the court should consider factors such as the severity of the medical condition, the potential harm that could result from a lack of medical care, and the actual harm caused by the lack of medical care. See Burns v. Head Jailor of LaSalle County Jail, 576 F.Supp. 618, 620 (N.D.Ill.1984); see also Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879, 95 S.Ct. 143, 42 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974). A medical condition is “serious” if it may be “life threatening or pose[s] a risk of needless pain or fingering disability if not treated at once.” Davis v. Jones, 936 F.2d 971, 972 (7th Cir.1991).
It is undisputed that Roberts received medical treatment subsequent to receiving the laceration to his head and sustaining a puncture to his right heel. Upon Roberts’ request for medical attention, Nurse
Moreover, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Roberts, does not support a finding or a reasonable inference that the head or heel injury constituted a serious medical need. Neither the laceration to the head nor the puncture to the heel was severe. Nurse Johnson described the one-inch laceration to the head as “small,” and described the injury to the heel as a “small puncture wound.” In treating both injuries, Nurse Johnson merely cleaned both wounds with hydrogen peroxide and gave Roberts a bandage for the heel puncture. The laceration bled for only a short time. Nor is there any evidence that either the laceration or puncture was either life threatening or posed a risk of needless pain or fingering disability. Indeed, the extent of treatment given by Nurse Johnson seems to suggest otherwise. The evidence would not support a finding or reasonable inference that Roberts’ head or heel injuries were fife threatening or posed a risk of needless pain or fingering disability if not treated at once.
The evidence, when viewed in the fight most favorable to Roberts, would not support a finding or reasonable inference that any of the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Roberts’ serious medical needs. Therefore, the court will recommend that summary judgment be granted the defendants as to Roberts’ claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
Rescheduling the Jury Trial
Because resolution of the summary judgment motion has not resolved all claims against all defendants, the court will recommend that Roberts’ motion to reschedule the jury trial be granted.
Conclusion
For foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Charles Wright, Ronald Samardvich, Frank Egolf, Mark Smith, Gary Ware, Matthew Hamilton, Gregory Goodman, Steven Gallegos, Charles Stang, and Nell Hayes be DENIED IN PART with respect to the excessive use of force claim against Frank Egolf, but GRANTED in all other respects; and
(2) the plaintiffs motion to reschedule the jury trial be GRANTED.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of courts within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir.1988); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21 Ltd., 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir.1986).
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 26th day of October, 1995.
Notes
. Roberts stated that defendant Egolf hit him on the head near the temporal area giving him the laceration (Roberts Decl. ¶ 9).
. Defendant Goodman estimated that Roberts is approximately 5 feet 10 inches tall and weighs 250 pounds (Goodman Decl. ¶ 6). Any minor discrepancy in Roberts’ size does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
. The cameraman was not the first person inside the cell and the camera making the videotape was partially blocked for a period of time.
. The videotape of the entire cell extraction, including treatment by Nurse Johnson, was approximately 20 minutes in length, and Nurse Johnson observed at the time she first treated Roberts that the laceration had stopped bleeding.