Roberts v. Progressive Independence, Inc.Roberts v. Progressive Independence, Inc.
Charles Roberts brought two claims against Progressive Independence, Inc., and its director and board members (collectively, “PI”), under the Rehabilitation Act (“Act”): (1) wrongful termination; and (2) failure to provide reasonable accommodation for a trip to a business conference in Miami, Florida. The district court granted PI summary judgment on the wrongful termination claim, and a jury awarded Roberts $85,000 under the reasonable accommodation claim. PI appeals, and Roberts cross-appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
BACKGROUND
Roberts is a thirty-three year old man with cerebral palsy. Because of his disability, Roberts must use a motorized wheelchair and requires assistance in meeting his daily needs. Such assistance includes lifting Roberts in and out of his wheelchair, feeding and dressing him, and aiding him in using the bathroom and maintaining personal hygiene. To meet these needs, Roberts uses the services of personal care attendants (“PCAs”) for approximately six hours per day.
PI qualifies as an independent living center under the Rehabilitation Aсt. It offers services to, and'advocates training for, the disabled. It is funded through federal and state programs, and at the relevant time employed five persons, all of whom were disabled. Sharon Johnson is the executive director of PI; the remaining defendants are members of Pi’s board of directors.
Roberts began working for PI in January of 1995 as an assistive technology assistant. On the morning of April 24, 1996, Johnson informed Roberts that he would be required to attend a conference sponsored by the National Industries for the Severely Handicapped Conference, which was to be held in Miami, Florida, from April 27 through May 1, 1996. Johnson asked Roberts to prepare a memorandum detailing his needs for the trip. 1
Later in the day, Roberts submitted to Johnson a memorandum detailing the following needs:
Personal Care
1. External catheter applied daily
This is my main concern. If it is not applied appropriately accidents toill occur. The attendant should be highly used to applying this assistive technology. Sterility and proper cleaning procedures should be implemented for cross infection control.
2. Dressing/undressing.
3. Total shower assistance/shower chair
4. Apply pacemaker antenna/change batteries
5. Assistance with cleaning after bowel movements
6. Get out proper medication (I can take it myself)
7. Feeding at meals
8. Transportation
9. Charging chair
10. Shaving/teeth brushing Wheelchair Information:
I have contacted Veazey, my vendor. Airlines do not allow chairs on board that they are aware. They usually disassemble chairs and crate them. Damage usually occurs so insurance should be considered.
After reviewing this memo, Johnson suggested two hours of attendant care each morning and two hours each evening, which Roberts agreed was satisfactory. While Roberts was in Johnson’s office, she spoke with the Visiting Nurses Association (VNA) in Florida. 2 Johnson indicated to the VNA that she would finalize plans the next day while on the рlane (via telephone) or once she was in Miami.
Later in the day, Roberts tried to find out more about the details of his care, but was advised by Johnson that she did not have any time for questions or comments. Lacking additional information about his care, Roberts grew anxious that evening, and decided that the best way to ensure adequate care was to take his own PCA with him on the trip. To that end, Roberts arranged for Pat Collins, his PCA, to accompany him, making airline reservations for her on his flight to Miami.
The next morning, April 25, Roberts presented Johnson an additional memo regarding his trip. The memo stated, in pertinent part:
From all formal information in this 24 hours it is obvious from any person with a disability I have not received personal peace of mind that this will meet my standards. I cannot feel comfortably safe with a strange attendant performing the necessary tasks. I have arranged for my personal care attendant, who is familiar with my own needs, to attend to me during these conference days. Time did not permit you to allow me the opportunity to discuss this with you after my memo dated April 24th regarding my requirements for the trip. I attempted to do so but you indicated that you do not have time for questions. Although we did discuss the Miami attendant to be with me two hours in the morning and two hours in the evening to ensure that my safety and personal needs will be met satisfactorily throughout the day I feel more attendant care is needed. My independent skills have proven that several experiences with me are necessary before an attendant gives adequate minimum care.
I am respectfully requesting that funds allocated towards the Home Health Agency in Miami be reallocated to Patricia Collins. This can be done after May 1, 1996.
After reading the memo, Johnson either told Roberts that it was unacceptable, or that PI would not be paying for Roberts’ attendant to fly. In any event, Roberts testified that Johnson told him that “you can go on my terms or be terminated,” and he responded, “I guess I am terminated.”
Roberts then went to a nearby business. Johnson found him and Roberts testified that she told him, “[Yjou need to give me the keys to the office or come back.” Roberts gave Jоhnson the keys. Later that day, Roberts returned to Pi’s offices with
Roberts filed a formal grievance with PI that was heard by a committee composed of certain PI board members. The committee found that the accommodations Johnson offered were sufficient, denied Roberts’ grievance, and found that he was not terminated or constructively discharged, but rather resigned. Roberts appealed to the full board, which upheld the decision and declined to reinstate him.
Roberts then filed a complaint in federаl district court. He alleged two causes of action under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
Subsequently, PI moved for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment on the termination claim, because Roberts could not establish that his termination “was based solely on his disability,” as required under the Act. However, the court denied summary judgment on the reasonable accommodation claim, finding there were “genuine issues of material fact with respect to the reasonableness of the accommodations offered by Johnson.”
Roberts then filed an application for reconsideration or rehearing of the court’s order on summary judgment, which the court considered along with Pi’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court denied both motions. With respect to Pi’s motion, the court rejected Pi’s contention that the granting of summary judgment on the wrongful termination claim rendered the reasonable accommodation claim moot.
The reasonable accommodation claim was tried to a jury. Before the verdict, both sides moved for judgment as a matter of law under
PI appeals from the jury verdict rendered in favor of Roberts, and from the district court’s denial of Pi’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or remittitur. Roberts cross-appeals from the court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of PI on the wrongful termination claim. Both sides also appeal the district court’s denial of various requested jury instructions.
DISCUSSION
The district court had jurisdiction under
I. Reasonable Accommodation
PI argues that the district court’s grant of summary judgment in its favor on Roberts’ wrongful termination claim rendered his reasonable accommodation claim moot, and hence entitled him to judgment as a matter of law on the reasonable accommodation claim. PI raised this argument in a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed after summary judgment, and renewed it in motions for judgment as a matter of law before and after the verdict. The district court denied the motions.
“We review the district court’s denial of a renewal motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. We must affirm if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to [the non-movant], there is evidence upon which the jury could properly return a verdict for [the non-movant].”
Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard
PI argues that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because: “1) PI had no obligation to provide reasonable accommodations for a job to be performed on April 27, 1996, when Roberts was no longer employed [as of April 27]; and, 2) PI is not required to provide reasonable accommodations to Roberts on or before April 25, 1996 [the date Roberts was terminated], becаuse the accommodations were not yet needed to perform the job functions on April 27,1996.”
We disagree with Pi’s logic and conclusion. Pi’s former employee argument (argument 1) and future accommodations argument (argument 2) are flawed because both rest on the premise that an employer need provide reasonable accommodation under the Act only
at the moment
such accommodation is needed, and that employment relations can be broken down into discrete and isolated time rеferences without considering the reality that events are interconnected.
3
This premise runs contrary to logic and our precedent, which refers to the term “reasonable accommodation” as “those accommodations which presently, or in the
near future,
enable the employee to perform the essential functions of his job.”
Hudson v. MCI Telecoms. Corp.,
Therefore, the district court did not err in denying judgment as a matter of law on the reasonable accommodation claim even
PI additionally claims entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because “the jury must speculate about the reasonableness of the accommodations,” as the accommodations were still being developed at the time Roberts was terminated on April 25, and would not be finalized until Johnson was on the plane later that day or in Miami — two days before Roberts was to arrive.
We believe there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could properly return a verdict for Roberts. While Johnson had not planned or finalized all the accommodations for Roberts’ trip, she had determined that he would receive four hours of attendant care per day — -two in the morning and two in the evening. In fact, Johnson locked in that aspect of accommodation without any flexibility, demanding that Roberts “go on [Johnson’s] terms or. be terminated.” The evidence also revealed that Roberts told Johnson in his follow-up memo that he needed more than those four hours of care, and from someone experienced with assisting him, in order to ensure his safety and personal needs. Roberts was also being forced to commit to an arduous and potentially dangerous trip with inadequate planning and substantial uncertainties. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Roberts, we conclude that the jury properly could find PI did not make reasonable accommodation for the trip.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Pi’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
II. Wrongful Termination
In his cross-appeal, Roberts contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for PI on the wrongful termination claim on the ground that he failed to establish his termination was based solely on his disability. We agree with Roberts.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard applied by the district court. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no gеnuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) . When applying this standard, we examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Universal Money Ctrs. v. AT & T,
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall,
solely
by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or аctivity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
in cases arising under § 504 of. the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) he is a disabled person; (2) he was otherwise qualified apart from his handicap, i.e., with or without reasonable accommodation, he could perform the job’s essential functions; and (3) he was terminated under circumstances which give rise to an inference that his rejection was based solely on his disability.
Relying on Williams, the district court concluded at summary judgment that Robеrts “cannot establish that his termination “was based solely on his disability’” because Roberts was discharged for his misconduct of refusing to go to Miami rather than his disability. We disagree with that conclusion.
Roberts’ wrongful termination claim depends entirely on whether PI offered him reasonable accommodation for the Florida trip. If PI failed to offer reasonable accommodation for the trip, Roberts cannot be faulted under the circumstances for refusing to attend. On the other hand, if PI offered Roberts reasonable accommodation, then Roberts’ refusal to go on the trip was not protected under the Act, and consequently PI did not wrongfully terminate Roberts for his refusal. Viewed most favorably to Roberts, the evidence at summary judgment — including the amount of attendant care Roberts was to receive in Florida, and the uncertainty in plans he was required to accept — could support the conclusion that Roberts’ refusal to go on the trip was solely because PI failed to offer reasonable accommodation to him in сonnection with the trip. Under that interpretation, Roberts’ termination was solely because of his disability and, therefore, wrongful under the Act.
Given the evidence at summary judgment, the district court properly found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the accommodations PI offered Roberts were reasonable. Given the disputes of material fact regarding reasonable accommodation, the district court also should have found genuine issues of material fact regarding the wrongful termination claim. Thus, we reverse its grant of summary judgment for PI on Roberts’ wrongful termination claim.
III. Requested Jury Instructions
“The admission or exclusion of a particular jury instruction is within the sound discretion of the trial court. We review the trial court’s conclusions on legal issues de novo, however, and need not defer to its decisions on questions of law.”
Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco, Inc.,
A. Good Faith Efforts Instruction
PI appeals the district court’s denial of its proposed good faith efforts instruction pursuant to
In cases where a discriminatory practice involves the provision of a reasonable accommodation pursuant to section 102(b)(5) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. ] or regulations implementing§ 12112(b)(5) section 791 of Title 29, damages may not be awarded under this section where the covered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with the disability who has informed thе covered entity that accommodation is needed, to identify and make a reasonable accommodation that would provide such individual with an equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on the operation of the business.
Id. (emphasis added).
The district court properly denied Pi’s request for a good faith efforts instruction. By its express terms,
B. Punitive Damages Instruction
Roberts asserts that the district court erred in denying his request fоr a punitive damages instruction, claiming that PI “acted with malice or reckless indifference to Roberts’ protected rights.” However, the district court ruled against giving the instruction, concluding “that there’s not sufficient evidence in this case to allow the punitive damages issue to go to the jury.” Without deciding whether punitive damages are available under § 504,
compare Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
IV. Remittitur
PI additionally contends that the district court erred as a matter of law in failing to reduce the jury’s award on the reasonable accommodation claim from $85,000 to $50,-000 pursuant to a damages cap in
With regard to the first argument, we do not believe the district court erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the damages cap.
We also uphold the district court’s denial of remittitur despite Pi’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury award of $85,000 for Pi’s failure to reasonably accommodate Roberts. “The trial court’s denial of a motion for remitti-tur is entitled to considerable deference on appeal. We will not disturb this determination absent a gross abuse of discretion.”
Sheets v. Salt Lake County,
We believe there was sufficient evidence to support the jury award. Although PI “fails to understand Roberts’ claim for damages from a failure to accommodate that never materialized,” we have concluded that PI had a duty reasonably to accommodate Roberts on the trip while he was still an employee, and that there was sufficient evidence to enable a jury to find that PI failed reasonably to accommodate Roberts in connection with the planned trip to Florida. As for evidence of damages, Roberts testified that the events of April 24th and 25th — which would encompass both the failure to reasonably accommodate and the termination — led to subsequent pain and suffering on his part. Additionally, Roberts’ doctor testified that, when he examined Roberts on October 23 of the same year, Roberts had developed abdominal problems and stress for many months as a result of “being affected with his work relatiоnship” — in particular both the inadequate accommodations and the termination. Given this evidence that Pi’s failure to reasonably accommodate contributed in part to Roberts’ subsequent physical and emotional troubles, the jury’s award does not shock our conscience, and we affirm the district court’s denial of remittitur.
However, we hold that Roberts will not be entitled to any additional damages for pain and suffering on his wrongful termination claim. As Roberts’ doctor testified, and as Roberts’ counsel acknowledged at oral argument, Roberts’ physical and emotional damages from both the failure to accommodate and the termination were inextricably linked. Thus, with respect to pain and suffering damages, we believe the jury award for the reasonable accommodation claim is coextensive with any award Roberts might receive for his wrongful termination claim. On remand, therefore, if Roberts were to prevail on the wrongful termination claim, he will not be entitled to recover additional damages for physical and emotional harm, as such damages would duplicate the jury award for the reasonable accommodation claim. Of course, Roberts would be entitled to damages arising solely from the termination, such as front pay and back pay. We are confident those damages would not be duplicative because the district court specifically instructed the jury not to consider “any damages that you find arise solely as a result of [plaintiffs] termination,” such as “wages and benefits.”
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Pi’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Roberts’ reasonable accommodation claim. We REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment for PI on Roberts’ wrongful termination claim. We AFFIRM the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the good faith efforts
Notes
. Anita Hensley, another PI employee, would be traveling with Roberts;. however, she would not be responsible for any of his аttendant care.
. There is conflicting testimony on this point. According to Roberts, he only came into Johnson's office because he was advised that "someone wanted my birthday and social security number.” Roberts gave that information over a speaker phone without knowing to whom he was talking, and then immediately left Johnson's office. However, Johnson testified that the VNA also queried Roberts about his disability, and that Johnson reviewed Robert's memo with the VNA before the conversation terminated and Roberts left.
. The duty tо make reasonable accommodation under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is explicitly stated in the Justice Department regulation implementing § 504 of the Act:
A recipient [of federal financial assistance] shall malte reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.
Additionally, § 504(d) provides that "[t]he standards used to determine whether this section has been violated ... shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act_” Tile I of the ADA defines discrimination to include:
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.
. Although all these cases except
McDonald
interpret the duty to reasonably accommodate under the ADA rather than the Rehabilitation Act, "[cjases decided under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are ... applicable to cases brought under the ADA and vice versa.”
Woodman v. Runyon,
. As discussed infra Part II, we believe that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the termination was lawful, and that it was error to grant summary judgment tо PI on that issue.
. In fact, there is no explicit Congressional provision for a private right of action for a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Although