DANIEL E. ROBERTS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. PLEASANT LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
CASE NO. 9-11-04
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY
September 12, 2011
2011-Ohio-4560
ROGERS, P.J.; PRESTON and WILLIAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court, Trial Court No. 2010-CV-0695. Judgment Affirmed.
Susan Hayest Kozlowski, William J. Steele and Lora A. Molnar for Appellant
Karrie M. Kalail, David S. Hirt and Peter Zawadski for Appellee
ROGERS, P.J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Daniel E. Roberts (“Roberts“), appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Marion County dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal Roberts argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the action as he properly perfected his appeal. Based on the following, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶2} The facts are not in dispute. Roberts was employed by Defendant-Appellee Pleasant Local School District, Board of Education (“Pleasant” or “Board of Education“), as a special education teacher under a series of limited teaching contracts from the 1998-1999 school year through the 2009-2010 school year.
{¶3} In April, 2010 the Board of Education sent Roberts a letter notifying him that it intended not to employ him at the expiration of his current limited teaching contract. In that same month, the Board of Education received a written request from Roberts requesting a written statement describing the circumstances that led to its decision not to renew his contract. The Board of Education sent him a letter describing the circumstances that led to its decision.
{¶4} In May, 2010, Roberts sent Pleasant a written request for a non-renewal hearing before the Board of Education, which was held July 19, 2010. The Board of Education subsequently affirmed its intention to non-renew Roberts’
{¶5} On October 7, 2010, Pleasant filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
Assignment of Error
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DECISION BY DISMISSING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DANIEL E. ROBERT‘S (sic) APPEAL ON THE BASIS OF A LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT PROPERLY PERFECTED HIS APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT PURSUANT TO OHIO REVISED OHIO (sic) SECTION 3319.11(G)(7).
{¶6} In his sole assignment of error Roberts argues that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. His argument is three-pronged. First, Roberts argues that
{¶7} Pleasant contends that the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Pleasant argues that Revised Code Chapters 2505 and 2506 in conjunction with
{¶8}
{¶9} The general provisions regulating appellate procedure and administrative appeals are located in Revised Code Chapters 2505 and 2506, respectively, of the Ohio Revised Code.
Every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other division of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is located as provided in Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.
{¶10} This section of the code provides a general right to appeal the final decision of a political subdivision. A school board of education falls within the
{¶11} The general right to appeal an administrative decision is narrowed by Revised Code Chapter 2505, which governs appellate procedure.
A teacher may appeal an order affirming the intention of the board not to reemploy the teacher to the court of common pleas of the county in which the largest portion of the territory of the school district or service center is located, within thirty days of the date on which the teacher receives the written decision, on the grounds that the board has not complied with this section or with section 3319.111 of the Revised Code.
{¶12} This section, however, is notably silent as to the manner in which the appeal is perfected. Therefore, we must look to Chapter 2505, specifically,
An appeal is perfected when a written notice of appeal is filed, . . . in the case of an administrative-related appeal, with the administrative officer, agency, [or] board . . . After being perfected, an appeal shall not be dismissed without notice to the appellant, and no step required to be taken subsequent to the perfection of the appeal is jurisdictional.
After the entry of a final order of an administrative officer, agency, board, department, tribunal, commission, or other instrumentality, the period of time within which the appeal shall be perfected, unless otherwise provided by law, is thirty days.
{¶13}
{¶14} Roberts argues that the trial court erroneously determined the source of Roberts’ right to appeal was
{¶15} The analysis in Hansford is largely ineffective in the present case as
{¶16} Next, Roberts argues that Chapters 2505 and 2506 govern the appellate process once the appeal has been filed and perfected pursuant to
{¶17} The holding in Kiel, supra, was that since
{¶19} The final case Roberts cites is Manholt v. Maplewood Joint Vocational School District Board of Education (Aug. 21, 1992), 11th Dist. No. 91-P-2410, which he urges this Court to distinguish. Manholt is a strikingly similar case from the Eleventh District, which we find to be persuasive. In that case,
In the case at bar, the right to appeal the decision of appellee affirming its previous intention not to re-employ appellant as a school teacher is conferred by both
R.C. 2506.01 and3319.11(G)(7) . Neither of these statutory provisions explicitly state how the notice of appeal is to be perfected. Accordingly, we must apply relevant sections ofR.C. Chapter 2505 , i.e.R.C. 2505.03 ,2505.04 , and2505.07 .
Id. at *4.
{¶20} Lastly, Roberts argues that
{¶21} Moreover, if we were to hold that
{¶22} Accordingly, we overrule Roberts’ assignment of error.
{¶23} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON and WILLIAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr