66 Conn. 1 | Conn. | 1895
The amended complaint states, as the ground of the plaintiff’s action, that in April, 1891, he received a certain stallion “ Harkaway ” from one Hayden, under a written agreement of conditional sale, to remain the property of said Hayden until the sum of $2,000 with iuterest, was fully paid ; then the title to vest in the plaintiff ; that in pursuance of this agreement he paid Hayden $1,500 ; that afterwards one Lilley purchased of said Hayden his interest in said stallion, and on February 10th, 1893, surrendered to the plaintiff said agreement of conditional sale, the plaintiff still being in possession of said stallion, and the balance due from the plain
The plaintiff states a case which is indeed one of hardship; the proof of which would entitle him to relief from a court of equitable jurisdiction. His misfortune is that he has entirely failed to establish such a case as he alleges, to the satisfaction of the trial court. If the court below, upon the' facts found, had rendered judgment in his favor, such judgment would not have corresponded with, or been supported by, the allegations of the complaint. The transaction relied upon was a mortgage or pledge, and the claim for a judgment permitting redemption on payment of the indebtedness secured. The court found there was never any mortgage or pledge, and no indebtedness; hence there could be no such judgment as demanded. This finding we cannot disturb. " Indeed, the further fact found, that the plaintiff never owned the stallion, having failed to acquire title under the original sale, precludes the possibility of a mortgage or pledge.
The case of Phipps v. Munson, 50 Conn., 267, seems, on all questions involved, directly in point, and decisive of the present case. The statement there made (p. 270), that the very purpose of the agreement to reconvey was to give to the plaintiff, instead of an equity of redemption, a right to purchase for a given price within a limited time, is equally applicable here. Such being the object of the parties, it was not in the power of the court below, and surely it is not our province, to place an artificial or technical construction upon their act, for the purpose of defeating their intent.
Regarding the transaction as a purchase by the defendant with an option to the plaintiff to purchase from him “for a given price within a limited time,” it is clear that, independently of the difficulty of granting a decree for specific per
There is no error in the judgment complained of.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.