The petitioner, Martin Roberts, is a native of Grenada. He seeks judicial review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming a denial of his motion to reopen removal procеedings. Concluding, as we do, that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in deeming the petitioner’s motion untimely, we deny the petition.
The facts are uncomplicated. The petitioner lawfully entered the United States on Jаnuary 20, 1994. His B-2 visa furnished him with authorization to remain for a period not to exceed six months. He overstayed the expiration date and accepted employment without authorization from the Immigration and Nаturalization Service (INS). The INS subsequently apprehended him and initiated removal proceedings.
The Immigration Judge (IJ), in an order dated February 26, 1997, adjudged the petitioner removable. The IJ’s order granted him a onе-year period within which to depart voluntarily and decreed that, should he fail to do so, he would be deported.
The petitioner ignored the voluntary departure deadline. He remained in the United Statеs and, in 2000, married a United States citizen. A year later, his bride filed an 1-130 application on his be *35 half for a relative visa. The INS approved the application.
The petitioner waited two more years and, in July of 2003, moved to reopen the removal proceedings to аllow pursuit of an adjustment of status based on his marriage and the impending birth of twins (who, when born, would be United States citizens). The IJ denied the motion on timeliness grounds, concluding that the petitioner’s marriage was not an exceptional circumstance that warranted a relaxation of the usual time line governing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b) (establishing time frame for filing motions to reopen). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. This petition fоr judicial review followed.
In this venue, the petitioner asserts that because he demonstrated prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residency through his bona fide marriage to a United States citizen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e), the BIA erred in adhering slavishly to its temporal guideposts. He adds that the BIA’s failure to weigh certain factors in his favor, including his good character and the hardship that would befall his family (including his two children) as a consequence of his deportation, constituted an abuse of discretion.
Although the contours of the petitioner’s arguments are somewhat blurred, it seems that he is contending not only that the BIA abused its discretion in finding untimeliness but also that it erred in not disregarding timeliness concerns and invoking its sua sponte authority to reopen the case. We address these two facets of the petitioner’s claim sepаrately.
We begin with bedrock: “motions to reopen are disfavored in immigration practice because of the compelling public interests in finality and the expeditious processing of proceedings.”
Falae v. Gonzáles,
The regulations applicable to immigration cases, which have the force of law, stiрulate that motions to reopen removal proceedings must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). The petitioner’s motion was filed well outside this ninety-day window and the BIA denied the motiоn because it had not been timely filed. The petitioner counters that it was impossible for him to file a timely motion to reopen because his request for reopening stemmed from nuptials that did not ocсur until after the ninety-day window had closed. To this, he adds that he was forced to postpone the filing of his motion further because of (i) the bureaucratic delay in the approval of his 1-130 immediate relativе application and (ii) the statutory limitation applicable to persons who flout voluntary departure orders.
We digress for a moment because the second half of that argument requires an explanation. Once the petitioner did not depart voluntarily by the imposed deadline — February 27, 1998 — he became ineligible for certain immigration benefits, including adjustment of status, for a period of five years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d). 1 *36 Sincе he waited for the passage of that five-year period before moving to reopen the removal proceedings, the petitioner’s motion was four years and 275 days late. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).
Moving to the substancе of the petitioner’s arguments, we disagree that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. Although the time limits for filing motions to reopen may be relaxed upon a showing of exceptional сircumstances,
see
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4), the mere fact that a petitioner makes out a prima facie case for relief does not ensure the favorable exercise of that discretion by the BIA.
See id.
§ 1003.2(a);
Falae,
In this instance the equities are mixed. On the one hand, the petitioner’s marriage is bona fide, his character is unblemished, and his removal apparently will result in hardship for his wife and children. On the other hand, the petitioner’s case does not fall within the categorical exceptions to the temporal deadline prescribed by the applicable regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4) (providing that exceptions may be granted if a motion to reopen is, for example, based on an application for asylum or withholding of removal in light of changed country circumstances, or addresses an order that was entered in ab-sentia, or was jointly filed by the alien and the government). Moreover, the petitioner thrice flouted the immigration laws — by overstaying his original visa, by working without a “green card,” and by disregarding his courflordered voluntary departure deadline. His current eligibility for an adjustment of status is a direct result of those misdeeds.
Within broad limits, reconciling such competing centrifugal and centripetal forces is for the BIA, not for the court of appeals.
See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(a);
see also Falae,
We add only that we fully understand the BIA’s reluctance to reward the petitioner’s intransigence by granting his motion to reopen. Taking a different tack would have servеd to encourage, rather than deter, disobedience of the federal immigration laws. We conclude, therefore, that the BIA acted within the realm of its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as untimеly.
We now turn to the petitioner’s challenge to the BIA’s refusal to use its sua sponte power as a vehicle for granting his motion to reopen. Federal regulations state that the BIA “may at any time reoрen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. This provision is inapplicable here because the BIA had never rendered a decision in the petitioner’s cаse (he did not appeal from the IJ’s original order). Its first and only involvement was when it denied the petitioner’s motion to reopen. The plain meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is to the effect that the BIA
*37
cannot invoke its sua sponte authority in a matter if it had not rendered any decisions in the matter prior to the time when it rejected the petitioner’s appeal from a denial of a motion to reopen.
See Prado v. Reno,
There is a possible loophole. Like the BIA, the IJ enjoys authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte,
see
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), and unlike the BIA, the IJ did issue a decision in the original removal proceedings. Theoretically, then, the рetitioner might have contended that the BIA should have compelled the IJ to reopen based on the IJ’s sua sponte authority.
See, e.g., Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft,
With the facts of this case as they are, however, any such effort would have been procedurally barred. By statute, a court may review a final order of removal only if “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to [him] as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Courts must take that exhaustion requirement very seriously.
See Sousa v. INS,
This line of authority is dispositive here. The petitioner did not ask the BIA to compel the IJ to reopen the proceedings based on the latter’s sua sponte authority to do so. We thus would lack jurisdiction to review any such claim even if we were to impute one to the petitioner. 2
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, the petition for judicial review is denied.
So Ordered.
Notes
. Although this statute, read literally, provides for a ten-year period of ineligibility, a shorter *36 five-year period applies to the petitioner because removal proceedings were instituted in his case prior to the repeal of former 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(е)(2)(A), which limited ineligibility for benefits to five years from and after the flouted departure deadline.
. We note that, apart from the petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it is at least arguable that our review of this challenge would in all events be barred because we lack authority to review issues committed to the agency's unfettered discretion.
See Prado,