Roberto Beras v. Calvin Johnson, WardenRoberto Beras v. Calvin Johnson, Warden
Case Information
Unitеd States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED October 20, 2020 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Roberto Beras,
Petitioner—Appellant , versus
Calvin Johnson, Warden , Oakdale Federal Correctional Institution,
Respondent—Appellee . Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:17-CV-276 Before Wiener, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges .
Per Curiam:
Roberto Beras is a federal prisoner. He sought postconviction review
of his conviction for money laundering. But he did not do it the normal way—
through a motion under
I.
A.
Roberto Beras was the co-owner and vice president of Dinero Express,
Inc., which specialized in international money transfers.
United States v.
Dinero Exp., Inc.
, 313 F.3d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 2002) (“
Dinero I
”). The
Government filed an eighty-two-count indictment, alleging that Beras used
Dinero to facilitate “an extensive international money laundering scheme”
involving New York-area drug traffickers and “the proceeds of illegal
narcotics sales.”
Id.
As relevant here, the Gоvernment charged Beras in
Counts 3 through 35 with money
laundering under
One of Beras’s main laundering practices “involved the transfer of
drug proceeds to the Dominican Republic under the guise of phony money
remittances through a four-step process.”
Dinero I
,
The cash was not always clean. One time, Dinero received $500,000 in cash in Miami. But it “smell[ed] like gasoline.” Dinero employees then took the cash on a bus with them to New Jersey, where they literally laundered the money by “run[ning] it through the washing machine.” The cash still stunk, but a bank accepted the deposit nonetheless. So in both literal and figurative money laundering, [1] Beras proved quite successful.
Second, after depositing the cash, “Dinero remittance invoices were
generated for fictitious transactions to the Dominican Republic; the invoices
used false identities and addresses and were made out in amounts small
enough to avoid currency reporting requirements.”
Dinero I
,
“Third, arrangements were made for a Dominican ‘рeso supplier’ to
advance local currency. . . to Dinero’s Dominican office, which in turn
forwarded the cash to the drug traffickers’ Dominican personnel under the
pretense of fulfilling the fictitious remittances generated in New York.”
Dinero I
,
The fourth and last step involved “a wire transfer of funds from
Dinero’s New York operating account to the peso supplier’s bank accounts
in the United States.”
Dinero I
,
Beras was sentenced to 292 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised
release, and a $4,100 mandatory special assessment, and was additionally
subjected to an order of forfeiture in the amount of $10 million.”
Dinero I
,
B. Beras challenged his conviction. Because Beras’s previous challenges are relevant to his abuse of the writ in this proceeding, we recount the procedural history in some detail.
Beras appealed his conviction to the Second Circuit. It affirmed in two separate opinions, Dinero I and Dinero II , issued one day apart. The Supreme Court denied review on February 23, 2004. Beras v. United States , 540 U.S. 1184 (2004) (mem.).
While his direct appeal remained pending, Beras filed motions in the
trial court under
Meanwhile, Beras filed a timely 104-page
The Second Circuit denied Beras a certificate of appealability because,
as relevant to his
Cuellar
claim, he failed to show “jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.”
Beras v. United States
, No. 13-1800 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2014) (citing
Slack
v. McDaniel
,
Beras sought to raise his
Cuellar
claim again, this time in a successive
The Second Circuit denied a subsequent request to file a successive
This is where things get interesting.
Beras sued the warden of his federal prison in Lisbon, Ohio in the
Northern District of Ohio on March 27, 2012. He challenged his conviction
on the grounds that the judge presiding over his trial violated his First
Amendment, Sixth Amendment and
Yet even while his first
Later, Bеras was transferred to the Federal Correctional Institute in
Oakdale, Louisiana. Once in a new federal district, Beras filed two new
In Beras’s other
II.
We start with the procedural vehicle Beras chose for this proceeding:
Beras instead argues that he has statutory escape hatches in
Beras and the Government hotly dispute whether Beras and his
Cuellar
claim meet the
Reyes-Requena
prerequisites. But we need not decide
that question because Beras’s
Section 2244(a) allows us to dismiss a successive habeas application.
See McClesky v. Zant
, 499 U.S. 467, 483 (1991). The Supreme Court has
interpreted this statute to be consistent with the common-law “judicial
evolution” of the “abuse-of-writ” principle.
Id.
at 484 (citing
Sanders v.
United States
,
In general, there are two circumstances where a
Both apply to Beras’s
Yet Beras argues that this language
does
apply to him because his claim
is really a
Second, Beras argues that we should not dismiss because the Sixth
Circuit used an “incorrect” standard to assess his previous
Cuellar
claim.
But the Supreme Court has said that “the rule against repetitive litigation”
has “plenty of bite.”
Banister v. Davis
,
AFFIRMED .
Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge , concurring :
I jоin the majority opinion because it correctly applies the abuse-of- the-writ doctrine. I write separately about our decision in United States v. Reyes-Requena , 243 F.3d 893 (5th Cir. 2001). In that decision, our court created a contra-textual exception to the limitations Congress imposed on federal habeas corpus. That was wrong. In an appropriate case, our en banc court should overrule Reyes-Requena and follow the statute Congress wrote.
Lest my criticisms seem quixotic or unduly harsh, it bears emphasis
that
Reyes-Requena
is our canonical statement on the meaning of
I.
A. It’s oft-said that habeas corpus originated in Magna Carta. [1] Chapter 39 of the Great Charter declared: “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” Great Charter of Liberties , ch. 39 in Select Documents of English (1215), reprinted Constitutional History 42, 47 (George Burton Adams & H. Morse Stephens eds., 1929) (1901). When King John accepted the barons’ demands at Runnymede, the people of England got their first positive law—a statute of sorts—that protected them against arbitrary imprisonment.
When the Stuarts arbitrarily imprisoned English citizens, courts attempted to check the Crown’s abuses through habeas. Those efforts were often ineffective—which prompted Parliament to pass more habeas statutes. For example, a habeas case spurred the Petition of Right. See Darnel’s Case (“ Five Knights’ Case ”) 3 How. St. Tr. 1, 1–59 (K.B. 1627); Frances Relf, The Petition of Right 1–19 (1917) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (noting the Five Knights’ Case was an essential predicate of the Petition). Habeas cases spurred Parliament to abolish the King’s Court of High Commission. See, e.g. , Burrowes v. The High Commission Court 81 Eng. Rep. 42 (K.B. 1616); The Act for Abоlition of the Court of High Commission, 17 Car. I c. 11 (1641), in The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625–1660, at 186–89 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., 3d ed. 1906); Catherine Drinker Bowen, The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Coke 1552–1634, at 530 (1957). Habeas likewise spurred Parliament to abolish the Star Chamber. See Lilburne’s Case , 3 How. St. Tr. 1315, 1331–49 (1637); Habeas Corpus Act of 1641, 16 Car. I c. 10 (Eng.). And further habeas abuses prompted Parliament to pass the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. See, e.g. , Earl of Clarendon Case , 6 Cobbett’s St. Tr. 317, 330–31 (Eng. 1667); 4 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1679) cols. 1148–49 (recording evolution of the Act to final form). The lattermost statute was the “stable bulwark of our liberties.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *137. Indeed, Blackstone called the 1679 habeas statute the “second magna carta.” Id. at *133. This noble history is what made habeas the “Great Writ.” See 3 Blackstone, supra , at *129 (describing habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as “the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement”). [2]
B.
Just as statutes framed the writ of habeas corpus in England, so too
here. Our Nation’s foundational habeas case—which arose from the Burr
cоnspiracy—turned on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 14 in the first
Judiciary Act.
See Ex parte Bollman
,
Of course, only Congress can write law.
See id.
at 95 (noting the
“privilege” of habeas corpus “would be lost” if no statutory “means be . . .
in existence”). And since it’s Congress’s law to write, it’s also Congress’s
law to shape.
See id.
at 94;
Felker v. Turpin
,
Congress has exercised its habeas power ever since the Judiciary Act
of 1789.
See
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82;
Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Thuraissigiam
, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1974 n.20 (2020) (“[T]he scope of
habeas has been tightly regulated by statute, from the Judiciary Act of 1789
to the present day . . . .”). And Congress has made many changes over the
last two cеnturies. At first, the federal writ of habeas corpus could only test
the lawfulness of federal custody.
See
Judiciary Act of 1789,
Congress made further changes in the middle of the last century. “In 1948, as part of a general revision of the federal codes and in recognition of . . . judicially wrought changes in the scope of habeas corpus, habeas was split into three distinct statutes.” Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffman, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century 9–10 (2011). All three can be found in title 28 of the United States Code. Congress maintained a descendant of the original writ in § 2241. But Congress imposed limits on state prisoners in § 2254. And as most relevant to Beras, Congress imposed limits on federal prisoners in § 2255.
“The need for Section 2255 is best revealed by a review of the
practical problems that had arisen in the administration of the federal courts’
habeas corpus jurisdiction.”
United States v. Hayman
, 342 U.S. 205, 210
(1952). By 1948, five districts (including those which encompassed Alcatraz
and Leavenworth) accounted for most federal prisoners, and these districts
“were required to handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions.”
Id.
at 214;
see McNally v. Hill
,
The most recent overhaul of § 2255 came when Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. AEDPA “contained
a series of amendments to existing federal habeas corpus law.”
[4]
Felker
, 518
U.S. at 656. Among these amendments, Congress created “for the first time
a fixed time limit for collateral attacks in federal court on a judgment of
conviction.”
Mayle v. Felix
, 545 U.S. 644, 654 (2005);
see
That is where Congress left the “written law” of federal
postconviction review.
See Bollman
,
II.
Lower federal courts had other ideas, however. Around the same time
that Congress enacted AEDPA’s new limits on federal claims, the lower
federal courts faced a predicament: what to do about claims based on the
Suprеme Court’s two decisions in
Bailey v. United States
,
In
Bailey
, the Supreme Court confronted
In
Bousley
, the Supreme Court decided that its
Bailey
decision would
apply retroactively to federal prisoners collaterally attacking their
That did not stop us in
Reyes-Requena
. The United States convicted
Jose Evaristo Reyes-Requena under
But Reyes-Requena had a problem: he had already challenged his
conviction in a
We nevertheless opened the door that Congress closed. The key was
The court then created three prerequisitеs for future federal prisoners
to evade the strictures of
(1) the petition raise[d] a claim “that [wa]s based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision”; (2) the claim was previously “foreclosed by circuit law at the time when it should have been raised in petitioner’s trial, appeal or first§ 2255 motion”; and (3) that retroactively applicable decision establishe[d] that “the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense.”
Garland v. Roy
,
III.
Reyes-Requena
was wrong the day it was decided. And in the years
since, its reasoning has been rejected by jurists around the country.
See, e.g.
,
Wright v. Spaulding
, 939 F.3d 695, 706–07 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J.,
concurring);
McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc.
, 851 F.3d
1076, 1097 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc);
Samak v. Warden, FCC Coleman-
Medium
,
A.
Let’s start with the illusory constitutional problem. The Suspension
Clause оf the Constitution provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.”
That’s wrong. Since the Founding, the federal courts have
countenanced two types of Suspension Clause claims. The first might be
called
de jure
claims, where Congress or a federal official proclaims that the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Thus, during the Civil
War, the writ of habeas corpus was suspended by proclamation and
legislation by “President Lincoln and then by Congress, and later during
Reconstruction by President Grant.”
Thuraissigiam
,
The other type of suspension claim is a
de facto
one. In recent times,
the Supreme Court has evaluated “major legislative enactments” to
determine whether they effectively suspended the privilege of habeas corpus.
Boumediene v. Bush
,
Most relevant to the present discussion, the Supreme Court
emphatically rejected
Reyes-Requena
’s central premise almost 25 years ago.
In
Felker
, the Court considered whether Congress effectuated a
de facto
suspension of the writ by generally prohibiting second-or-successive habeas
petitions from state prisoners. These provisions are
in pari materia
with those
Congress imposed on federal prisoners in
The
Felker
Court held these restrictions easily survived Suspension
Clause scrutiny. For decades the federal courts had “restrain[ed]” multiple
filings by prisoners under the “abuse of the writ” doctrine.
Felker
, 518 U.S.
at 664. This doctrine represented the accumulation of a “complex and
evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical
usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions.”
Ibid
. (quotation
omitted). And it was Congress’s prerogative to “add[] restrictions” in
AEDPA on “second habeas petitions . . . within the compass of this
evolutionary process.”
Ibid.
Thus, the restrictions Congress enacted in
AEDPA presented no Susрension Clause problems. Indeed, it’s hard to
imagine how they could. A statute that allows prisoners to collaterally attack
their sentence once—and sometimes two, three, or more times—is more
than enough to “avoid[] any serious question about [its] constitutionality.”
Swain v. Pressley
,
And even if we could imagine a post-
Felker
Suspension Clause
problem, the Supreme Court retains “its power to grant an Original Writ.”
Samak
, 766 F.3d at 1291 (W. Pryor, J., concurring). Nothing in AEDPA
changes that.
See Felker
,
With a case so on-point from the highest court in the land, it’s quite
surprising that the
Reyes-Requena
court
did not even cite Felker
. It’s even more
surprising that our circuit would find
The Supreme Court has answered our Suspension Clause question.
Reyes-Requena was wrong not to listen.
B.
Without a Suspension Clause sword hanging over
The full text of
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention .
The textual key to understanding
The savings clause is triggered
only
where “
the remedy
by motion is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.”
For instance, we have held that
Beyond these limited lacunas, the
But most relevant here,
Bousley
itself proves that
C.
Reyes-Requena
held that the
assistance of counsel);
United States v. Stricklin
,
And although
First, the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of
Second, a contrary holding creates all sorts of anomalies. Take the
statute of limitations for example. AEDPA imposes a one-year limitations
period on federal prisoners.
See
Third, far from prohibiting statutory claims,
Fourth,
Fifth, the limits on second-or-successive
[AEDPA’s] new restrictions on successive petitions сonstitute a modified res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice ‘abuse of the writ.’ In McCleskey [], we said that the doctrine of abuse of the writ refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions. The added restrictions which the Act places on second habeas petitions are well within the compass of this evolutionary process . . . .
Felker , 518 U.S. at 664 (quotation omitted). How can Congress enact a provision that fits comfortably within the historical basis for testing the legality of a prisoner’s custody, yet also provide a remedy that’s inadequate for that purpose? Obviously, it cannot.
Sixth, we can’t hold
Seventh, finally, and most importantly,
Reyes-Requena
violates the
separation of powers. A panel of our court rewrote
Our Founders, who knew that “public Virtue is the only Foundation of Republics,” believed in the greatness of the American people. They trusted the people’s representatives to weigh competing interests and make difficult policy choices. That’s why they tasked Congress with making the laws and gave life-tenured judges the more modest job of applying them.
Wright
,
* * * Reyes-Requena deviated from these principles. And its mistakes cast long shadows over the work of this court because we continue to apply its ratio decidendi every day in deciding second-or-successive motions. In an appropriate case, we should overrule it.
Notes
[1] The practice of money laundering is ancient. Yet the term itself seems to have first come into use in the twentieth century. Some say the term stems from Al Capone and Prohibition. In addition to his more infamous illicit activities, Capone ran a number of laundromats. As the story goes, Capone would try to hide the source of his ill-gotten gains by mixing the cash from his illegal businesses with the cash he earned from those laundromats. By so laundering his dirty money, Capone sought to hide its source. Research Handbook on Money Laundering 3 (Brigitte Unger & Daan van der Linde eds., 2013); Brian O’Connell, What Is Money Laundering and What Is Its History? , The Street (Mar. 20, 2019). Others suggest the term stems from a morе prosaic, though now obscure, activity. In the early twentieth century, many more people than today used coins—for taxis, tips, and the like. At the time, many people also wore white gloves. To avoid dirty coins leaving stains on white gloves, some places, like casinos and fine hotels, offered a service to clean coins. Thus, dirty money was laundered clean. Research Handbook on Money Laundering , supra , at 3.
[2] The fraudulent remittances were not the only means by which Beras moved drug money between the United States and the Dominican Republic. He used “a number of different techniques.” United States v. Dinero Exp., Inc. , 57 F. App’x 456, 458 (2d Cir. 2002) (“ Dinero II ”) (per curiam). One technique involved aluminum cans and suitcases. Beras and others would fill aluminum cans with cash. The cans would be “seal[ed]”and a fake label put on. Then, Beras and others would take these cans of cash in suitcases “aboard airlines” to destinations abroad. Id. at 458.
[3] Since he filed his two § 2241 applications in this circuit, the Bureau of Prisons
moved Beras to Moshannon Valley Correctional Center in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania.
Under Fifth Circuit precedent, this subsequent relocation does not affect our power to hear
this case.
See Griffin v. Ebbert
,
[4] Congress slightly changed
[1] See, e.g. , Amanda L. Tyler, A “Second Magna Carta”: The English Habeas Corpus Act and the Statutory Origins of the Habeas Privilege , 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1949, 1957 (2016). The proposition is not without controversy. See, e.g. , W ILLIAM J. C UDDIHY , T HE F OURTH A MENDMENT : O RIGINS AND O RIGINAL M EANING 109–15 (2009) (arguing that Coke basically made this up).
[2] This of course is not to say that English courts did not play a powerful role in fashioning the writ as it existed at our Founding. See, e.g. , Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror , 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029, 2044 (2007) (arguing that judge-made habeas law was “not only historically dominant, but also, for the most part, historically successful”); Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications , 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 611 (2008) (“[T]he writ was fashioned by judges, not handed down by Parliament. A persistent misapprehension about the English history of habeas is that ‘the Great Writ’ was a parliamentary rather than a judicial gift.”). Jurists like Edward Coke are rightly celebrated for their use of common-law writs to check royal abuses in the seventeenth century. See, e.g. , Bowen, supra , at 291–92, 295–306. It is nonetheless also true that enduring reforms came from Parliament. As Coke himself argued, the whole reason England needed the Petition of Right was that common-law habeas alone was insufficient: “The [Five Knights] hath sued for remedy in King’s Bench by habeas corpus and hath found none. Therefore it is necessary to be cleared in Parliament.” Id. at 488.
[3] In exceptional circumstances not relevant here, the Court has noted “the absence of any express statutory guidance from Congress” and then “filled the gaps of the habeas corpus statute.” Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993); see, e.g. , id. at 633–38 (identifying a statutory gap and supplying a harmless-error rule); Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977) (identifying a statutory gap and supplying a procedural-default rule).
[4] Since the exception created by
Reyes-Requena
is limited to claims brought by
federal prisoners, this analysis is confined to the changes Congress made to
[5] This dichotomy is evident elsewhere in the habeas statutes too. For example,
§ 2254 requires stаte prisoners to “exhaust[ ] the remedies available in the courts of the
State.”
[6] Federal prisoners have raised a variety of statutory and constitutional challenges
in
[7] We know that’s true because the Supreme Court did not grant relief to Bousley.
See