Case Information
Before: *1 BOGGS and WHITE, Circuit Judges; and McCALLA, District Judge. [*]
BOGGS, Circuit Judge. On February 12, 2008, officers from the Dearborn Heights police department executed a search warrant at the home of Robert Wells. Upon entering the house, officer Patrick Mueller, accompanied by officers Timothy Ciochon and Christopher Pellerito, took Wells to the ground, handcuffed him, and tased him. Wells and the officers have offered differing accounts of the manner in which Mueller brought Wells to the ground and the point in time at which Mueller used his taser. A subsequent search of the house revealed marijuana, various drug paraphernalia, and methadone pills. Wells later pled guilty to possession of marijuana.
In February 2010, Wells brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging claims against sixteen Dearborn Heights police officers and the City of Dearborn Heights (the City). Wells later abandoned his claims against thirteen of the sixteen police officers, and the district court dismissed these claims with prejudice, leaving only the three officers who were most directly involved in his handcuffing and tasing Mueller, Ciochon, and Pellerito and the City as defendants. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Wells now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Mueller to the extent that the claims against him are based on the tasing of Wells and affirm all other decisions of the district court regarding Mueller. We also affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Ciochon and Pellerito on all counts. Finally, since the district court dismissed Wells’s claim against the City purely on the ground that he had failed to state a constitutional claim against the defendant officers, we remand Wells’s claim against the City in light of our decision regarding Mueller.
I
A The incidents from which this suit arises occurred during the February 12, 2008, execution of a search warrant authorizing the search of Wells’s home and seizure of, inter alia , all controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, “and any person(s) present at the residence.” The officers conducting the search were provided with an incident-risk assessment, which rated the execution of the search warrant as “Risk Level 3 (High)” on a three-level risk scale. Specifically, it disclosed that Wells had a criminal history, including convictions for both assault with a deadly weapon and resisting and obstructing a police officer, and that his father, Randall Wells, who lived at the same residence, was on probation and had a suspected gang affiliation. In addition, the officers knew that there were two fairly large dogs inside the home. The officers approached the door, which was fortified with bars, announced their presence, and then made a forced entry using a battering ram. [1]
The events after this point are controverted. The various depositions of defendants-appellees indicate that officer Patrick Mueller entered the residence first, followed by officers Timothy Ciochon and Christopher Pellerito, and that one of the two dogs, a bulldog weighing approximately 80 pounds, came growling towards Mueller, teeth bared. According to defendants-appellees, Mueller shot the dog, only once, when it lunged at and tried to bite his leg. Mueller then claims that Wells became enraged at the shooting of the dog and approached Mueller. When Wells allegedly ignored Mueller’s instructions to “drop to the ground” and pushed aside Mueller’s outstretched hand, Mueller kicked him, but Wells continued to advance. Mueller recounts that he then kicked Wells a second time, knocking him to the ground. According to Mueller, once Wells was on the ground, Wells began to kick Mueller and tried to stand back up, prompting Mueller to tase Wells in the abdomen. Mueller claims that he handcuffed Wells only after Wells had been tased.
Wells tells a somewhat different story. According to him, upon entering the house Mueller ordered Wells and his father to drop to the ground, and both of them immediately complied. Wells claims that he had difficulty lying down because of his cerebral palsy and that he first knelt on the floor and then placed his hand on a nearby love seat to help him get to the ground. In response, Mueller allegedly kneed Wells in the back, which put Wells completely on the ground, and proceeded to handcuff him. Next, while Wells and Randall claim they were lying compliant on the ground, Mueller shot the Wellses’ 80-pound American bulldog when it started barking at the officers. The dog allegedly made no physical contact with any officers, though the officers were kicking the dog to try to move it out of the way. Upon hearing Mueller shoot the bulldog, Wells turned his head, thinking his father had been shot. He also shouted, “you fucking pigs, you shot my dad,” and then, upon seeing that it was the dog that had been shot, called the officers “fucking pigs” several more times. While he was shouting at the officers, Wells also recounts that he was “turning my body around, all the way around[,] trying to get on my back and my butt just to see what was going on.” Wells claims that as he was turning, Mueller tased him “right in my hip, right where my butt cheeks are.” Though at one point in his deposition Wells stated that he “jumped to turn around,” he later clarified that, at the time he was tased, he had merely rolled onto his side and lifted his head off the ground to look around. He further asserts that he was not flailing around or kicking at the officers and that at no point did he attempt to stand.
After these events, Wells was taken outside and placed in a police car. A search of the house revealed marijuana, various drug paraphernalia, and methadone pills. Wells and his brother, Thomas, who was present in another room and also lived at the house, later pled guilty to possession of marijuana, and Randall pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance.
B
On February 9, 2010, Wells brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging claims against sixteen Dearborn Heights police officers for: (1) use of excessive force, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) assault and battery, in violation of Michigan tort law; and (3) gross negligence, in violation of Michigan tort law. In addition, Wells sued the City of Dearborn Heights for what he characterizes as “failure to train / supervise officers,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wells later abandoned his claims against thirteen of the sixteen police officers, and the district court dismissed these claims with prejudice, leaving only officers Mueller, Ciochon, and Pellerito and the City as defendants.
The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court, viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Wells, found that all defendants were entitled to summary
judgment. Beginning with the § 1983 claim against Mueller, Wells challenged two discrete
actions Mueller’s kneeing him to the ground and Mueller’s tasing him while handcuffed. The
district court dealt with the tasing first, holding that, even accepting Wells’s version of the events
as true, Mueller did not use excessive force and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. The district
court distinguished
Roberts v. Manigold
,
Moving to Ciochon and Pellerito, the district court held that they could not be held liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene. The court noted that while the Sixth Circuit has allowed § 1983 claims against officers who fail to stop the ongoing use of excessive force, even under Wells’s version of the facts, Muller’s application of force occurred so quickly that Ciochon and Pellerito could not have done anything to prevent it. Thus, the district court held that Ciochon and Pellerito could not be held liable for their failure to intervene and were entitled to qualified immunity.
With respect to the state-law claims, the district court held that Mueller could not be held liable for assault and battery because, as it found earlier, his actions during his encounter with Wells were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and thus were permissible under Michigan tort law. In addition, the district court held that Mueller, Ciochon, and Pellerito could not be held liable for gross negligence, again because their actions were objectively reasonable given the circumstances.
Finally, the district court dismissed Wells’s § 1983 claim against the City for failure to train / supervise its officers, noting that because Wells had not shown that any of the individual defendants violated his constitutional rights, he could not maintain a claim of municipal liability against the City.
Wells now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for all defendants.
II
“We review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo.”
Vance v. Wade
,
546 F.3d 774, 781 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is
warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, this court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party.”
McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd
.,
III
A
Section 1983 creates a private right of action against a state official who deprives an
individual of his constitutional rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil liability,
however, does not attach simply because a court determines that an official’s actions were
unconstitutional. “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless
a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and
(2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”
Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd
,
Because “[q]ualified immunity is an affirmative defense . . . [t]he defendant bears the burden
of pleading” it in the first instance.
Sheets v. Mullins
,
B
Wells first alleges that Mueller used excessive force when he kneed him to the ground and when he tased him while handcuffed. Operating with Wells’s version of the facts, the district court found that officer Mueller did not use excessive force, either in kneeing Wells to the ground or tasing him while handcuffed, and thus that Mueller was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not commit a constitutional violation.
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force by arresting and investigating
officers.”
Smoak v. Hall
,
Furthermore, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
Graham
,
With these standards in mind, we agree that Mueller’s first challenged action, kneeing Wells
to the ground, was objectively reasonable. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “the
execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden
violence,”
Michigan v. Summer
,
Although Wells has proffered a reason for his slow response his cerebral palsy we must
judge Mueller’s actions “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight,”
Graham
,
Moving to Mueller’s tasing of Wells, we find that, taking Wells’s story as true, Mueller did indeed employ excessive force. According to Wells, Mueller tased him after he was handcuffed and lying on the ground. Wells recounts that once he was on the ground, he shouted profanities at Mueller and attempted to “turn[] my body around, all the way around[,]trying to get on my back and my butt just to see what was going on.” Although Mueller claims that Wells also was kicking at him and trying to stand back up, Wells specifically denies kicking Mueller or attempting to regain his footing. Thus, because there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning the circumstances surrounding Mueller’s tasing of Wells, we must resolve this dispute in favor of Wells at this stage of the litigation and assume that it was only Wells’s attempt to roll over, while handcuffed and still lying on the ground, that prompted Mueller to tase him. Based on this version of the facts, it was [2]
unreasonable for Mueller to tase Wells.
The district court, relying heavily on the fact that Wells was shouting profanities at the
officers and “attempting to turn around onto his back,” concluded that Wells “was not complying
with the officers’ orders to stop struggling and remain on the ground” and thus that the tasing was
reasonable. But this circuit’s “prior opinions clearly establish that it is unreasonable to use
significant force on a restrained subject
even if some level of passive resistance is presented
.”
Meirthew v. Amore
,
Here, Wells’s version of the events is that he was handcuffed and on the ground, that he only
tried to turn over to see what was going on, and that he never lifted anything more than his head off
the ground. True, Wells did curse at the officers, but viewing these actions from the perspective of
a reasonable officer, it does not appear that Wells posed a safety threat or a flight risk. And to the
extent one might think he was continuing to resist arrest, Wells’s actions could not reasonably be
viewed as anything more than passive resistance.
See Bultema v. Benzie Cnty.
,
In fact, in a similar situation, this circuit held that kicking a handcuffed arrestee’s legs out
from underneath him when he jumped up from the ground was a use of excessive force.
See Smoak
,
In sum, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Wells, Mueller’s use of a taser was
not objectively reasonable and constituted excessive force. In addition, given the abundance of Sixth
Circuit precedent addressing the use of force on handcuffed individuals, much of which was
established prior to February 2008,
see e.g.
,
Smoak
,
C
Wells also alleges that Ciochon and Pellerito violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force when they failed to stop Mueller from using excessive force on Wells. The district court found that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Wells, the events in this case “occurred rapidly” and did not involve “ongoing excessive force, like repeated tasering or beating.” Thus, it held that even if Mueller’s actions constituted excessive force, “Ciochon and Pellerito could not have done anything to prevent the commission of the acts.”
“This court has held . . . that a police officer who
fails
to act to prevent the use of excessive
force may still be held liable where (1) the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive
force would be or was being used, and (2) the officer had both the opportunity and the means to
prevent the harm from occurring.”
Floyd v. City of Detroit
,
In the instant case, the force to which Wells was subjected occurred at two discrete, fleeting points in time the kneeing and the tasing denying Ciochon and Pellerito the opportunity to intervene and prevent any harm. By Wells’s own admission, the encounter with Mueller was rapid. In his deposition, he indicated that he was lying on the ground within two seconds of the door being broken down. Thus, even assuming that Mueller used unreasonable force in bringing Wells to the ground and cuffing him, there was no way Ciochon or Pellerito could have intervened. Similarly, when Mueller later tased Wells, he did so only once, engaging in no extended string of abuses. In the absence of ongoing, repeated tasing, there was no way for Ciochon or Pellerito to intervene and prevent harm.
Accordingly, we find that Wells has failed to make out one of the key elements of a § 1983 “failure to intervene” claim, i.e., the opportunity for Ciochon and Pellerito to prevent harm from befalling Wells. Thus, the district court appropriately granted Ciochon and Pellerito’s motion for summary judgment as to that claim.
IV
Wells next alleges a state-law claim of assault and battery against Mueller and a state-law claim of gross negligence against all three officers. The district court granted the defendant officers’ motion for summary judgment on both of these claims, relying on its earlier finding regarding Wells’s §1983 claims that all three officers’ actions were objectively reasonable to dispense with Wells’s state-law claims as well.
A
Under Michigan law, “a police officer may use reasonable force when making an arrest.”
Brewer v. Perrin
,
In granting Mueller’s motion for summary judgment on Wells’s assault-and-battery claim, the district court relied on its holding, made with respect to Wells’s § 1983 claim, that Mueller had not engaged in excessive force. Because the district court held that Mueller’s actions were objectively reasonable and thus did not constitute excessive force in violation of § 1983, it similarly held that Mueller’s actions could not constitute assault and battery under Michigan law. [3]
We have reversed the district court’s decision as to Mueller’s tasing of Wells, however, and held that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Wells, the tasing was an excessive use of force that was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See supra Section III.B. Accordingly, we also reverse the district court’s related holding that Mueller’s tasing of Wells could not constitute assault and battery under Michigan law, as it was premised on the same incorrect finding of objective reasonableness. We leave in place, however, the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to the portion of Wells’s state-law assault-and-battery claim based on Mueller’s kneeing Wells to the ground, as we, like the district court, have found that that action was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See supra Section III.B.
B
Government employees can also be held liable for gross negligence under Michigan tort law. Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2)(c). Gross negligence is defined by statute as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” Mich. Comp. Laws. § 691.1407(7)(a). In granting all three officers’ motion for summary judgment on Wells’s gross- negligence claim, the district court again relied on its holding, made with respect to Wells’s § 1983 claims, that all of the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable and thus could not constitute gross negligence.
As with Wells’s state-law assault-and-battery claim against Mueller, the district court
appropriately held that Mueller’s kneeing Wells to the ground was objectively reasonable and thus
could not constitute gross negligence. As mentioned earlier, however, the district court erred in
holding that Mueller’s tasing of Wells was objectively reasonable conduct. That said, under
Michigan law, Wells cannot bring a gross-negligence claim that is premised on Mueller’s alleged
assault and battery of Wells. Michigan courts have repeatedly “rejected attempts to transform claims
involving elements of intentional torts into claims of gross negligence.”
VanVorous
, 687 N.W.2d
at 143;
see also Smith v. Stolberg
,
With regard to the gross-negligence claim against Ciochon and Pellerito, Wells’s only
argument is that Ciochon and Pellerito were grossly negligent when they failed to intervene. It is
true that a federal district court in Michigan has recognized a cause of action for gross negligence
under Michigan law where an officer fails to intervene on behalf of an arrestee being subjected to
excessive force.
See Philpott v. City of Portage
, No. 4:05-CV-70,
V
Finally, Wells alleges a § 1983 claim against the City for failure to train / supervise its officers. The district court found that because “none of the individual Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff cannot maintain his municipal liability claims.” As we have now determined that Mueller was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity with respect to his tasing of Wells, see supra Section III.B, the premise on which the district court relied when granting summary judgment for the City is no longer valid. We therefore must remand Wells’s claim against the City to the district court for further consideration in light of our other holdings.
VI
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Mueller on Wells’s § 1983 claim and state-law assault-and-battery claim, but only to the extent that those claims are based on the tasing of Wells. Because the district court dismissed Wells’s § 1983 failure-to-train / supervise claim against the City purely on the ground that he had failed to state a constitutional claim against the defendant officers, we REMAND Wells’s claim against the City in light of our decision regarding Mueller. We AFFIRM all other decisions of the district court.
McCALLA, Chief District Judge. I agree with the majority’s opinion except as to its discussion of officer Patrick Mueller’s tasing of Robert Wells. The opinion adopts Wells’s version of the facts as true when analyzing Mueller’s tasing of Wells.
Adopting a plaintiff’s version of the facts as true is appropriate when reviewing a denial of
qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal. Allowing an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified
immunity on summary judgment protects an official’s qualified immunity from suit.
See Moldowan
v. City of Warren
,
In the instant case, however, the district court granted summary judgment to Mueller on the
ground of qualified immunity. In such a situation, an appeal is not interlocutory and need not be
limited to questions of law. Accordingly, when reviewing the district court’s decision on appeal,
viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff may still result in the court finding
a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
See King v. Taylor
,
Regarding Mueller’s tasing of Wells, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether
Mueller employed excessive force when he tased Wells. The district court’s opinion indicates that
Mueller and Wells gave deposition testimony that is contradictory. (R. 60 at PageID 856-61.) If
Mueller’s deposition testimony is believed, Mueller did not employ excessive force by tasing Wells.
See Abdul-Khaliq v. City of Newark
,
These genuine issues of material fact require resolution by the factfinder.
See Alspaugh v.
McConnell
,
Notes
[*] The Honorable Jon P. McCalla, Chief United States District Judge for the Western District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
[1] There is some inconsistency in the record as to whether the officers knocked and announced their presence, simply announced their presence, or did not provide any notice before breaking down the door. Since Wells does not challenge the legality of the officers’ entry, however, this dispute is not relevant to the instant appeal.
[2] Defendants-appellees also cite to the deposition of Wells’s brother, in which he claims that Wells was having a seizure during the arrest, for support that Wells was struggling with the officers. It is clear, however, that Wells did not have a seizure during this encounter. Furthermore, to the extent that the deposition at issue otherwise contradicts Wells’s own deposition testimony, this is merely another genuine dispute of material fact that we resolve in favor of Wells at this point in the litigation.
[3] The district court appears to have equated the objective-reasonableness standard used to
assess officer liability for a § 1983 excessive-force claim with the objective-reasonableness standard
used to determine whether an officer has committed assault and battery under Michigan tort law.
While the district court did not provide any support for this course of action, it appears that Michigan
courts do indeed view the two standards as equivalent.
See VanVorous
,