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Robert Thomas Edmunds v. Delta Partners, L.L.C.
403 S.W.3d 812
Tenn. Ct. App.
2012
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*1 were “su items AVA’sstatements Thomas EDMUNDS Robert puffing. anything other than

perior” against preponderate record does findings. of these either L.L.C., PARTNERS, et al. DELTA argues that Tanzer there Finally, Mr. invoicing disputes. Mr. Tan- certain were Tennessee, Appeals Court of alleged disputes con- that these zer asserts Section, Middle at Nashville. billing part on the deceptive stitute record, simply there is From the AVA. 14, 2012 Nov. Session. any alleged invoic- proof lack of Dec. 2012. deceptive unfair or as errors were ing TCPA, see terms are defined those Rehearing Denied Petition words, proof In other does not supra. Jan. invoicing any errors constituted show Application Appeal for Permission to or tended to cause practice that caused by Supreme Denied Court false, something believe or Mr. Tanzer to 9,May 2013. misled tended to mislead that the errors matter. While we him as a factual that the trial court did find some

concede the court discrepancies invoicing, find that these mistakes caused did not injury. Mr. Tanzer substantial Ac- discrep- court cordingly, the resolved $1,930 by awarding ancies Tanzer totality From setoffs and credits. circumstances, we cannot conclude the tri- preponderates against the evidence al court’s conclusion that setoffs and cred- favor Mr. Tanzer its in cured mis- billing, in the nor the evidence takes does against the trial court’s con- preponderate rise clusion that these mistakes failed to so as deception implicate the level TCPA. reasons, foregoing

For the we affirm the The case judgment court. proceedings remanded for all further necessary and are may be consistent are opinion. appeal this Costs this as- against Appellant, Stephen sessed Tanzer, surety. and his *5 Holt, Tennessee,

John Springfield, B. for Partners, the appellants, Delta L.L.C. and Michael Richard Garrison. L.

Richard Colbert Courtney L.' Wilbert, Franklin, Tennessee, for the ap- pellee, Robert Thomas Edmunds.

OPINION STAFFORD, J.,

J. STEVEN delivered Court, opinion in which DAVID FARMER, J., R. joined, and HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., opinion. filed a concurring Appellant corporation appeals trial rulings finding court’s liable breach damages, interest, of contract prejudgment pursuant Fair damages to the Labor Standards Act. Additionally, corpora- president appeals tion’s court’s *6 piercing action in veil to hold personally him liable for the contract dam- ages. reverse finding We the trial court’s with to veil regard piercing, but affirm the in all respects. court other Background I. Plaintiff/Appellee Robert Edmunds was employment by Defendant/Appel- offered (“Delta”) Partners, lant Delta L.L.C. purpose perform 2004. Delta’s was to manufacturing compa- “turnarounds” for nies, to cut helping companies costs profitability. Upon and increase accepting employment, the offer of Mr. Edmunds regarding received several his documents Delta, employment including with a non- agreement, disclosure non-compete and a covenant, which he agreed. docu- provided ments further that: In consideration of the performance [], required by all services Delta confidentiality provisions and covenant herein, not-to-compete set forth Em- Company agrees [i.e. Delta] (40) week. salary forty per a total of hours out- for Mr. [i.e. Edmunds] ployee work, that, while at Employee Offer Letter. Mr. Edmunds testified in the lined tasks, clerical worked salary performed and other benefits initial This program- and Employee pursuant computer issues software provided time clients may, telephone from time to as and calls from ming, Letter took Offer Company, be Per Edmunds’ by Employee employees. and other Mr. agreed and testimony, phone modified. calls occurred these in- throughout time with Delta and his provided “[e]m- further The document Tennessee, employees in volved and clients cause, for be terminable ployment shall Indiana, Alabama, Kentucky, well as as in the sole discretion being cause such addition, In in order and other states. Defen- Mr. Edmunds and Delta....” Both month, paid each employees to be Garrison, as Presi- Michael dant/Appellant Delta, computer program Edmunds would use signed docu- and dent CEO time and input regarding Offer the data their Employee ment. Mr. Edmunds’ month; program starting salary wages computer his each Letter stated that $65,000.00. signed also then checks would be The document would create to be employer. an at-will that Delta was the em- stated Mr. Garrison and distributed to From 2004 until sometime Mr. Garrison ployees. salary biweekly Edmunds was his company that the informed Mr. Edmunds $2,500.00, totaling installments experiencing financial difficulties and $65,000.00per year. dramatically.” Mr. Ed- work had “slowed company munds to remain with the accepting chose

Subsequent to Mr. Edmunds Delta, and, according despite these difficulties the offer of stock, 95% of Delta clerical testimony, performed Garrison came to own the same before, 5%. owning with his wife other tasks includ- and administrative difficulties, experienced financial ing inputting payroll information *7 employees. to pay could no afford longer and answering calls from clients phone However, with the stayed Mr. Edmunds states. Delta was un- employees in other to company personal loyalty” Mr. “out salary full in pay able to Mr. Edmunds his 2008, 2006, 2007 Mr. Garrison. In and 2007, 2006, 2008. From the evidence and payments sporadic Edmunds received trial, paid Mr. Edmunds was presented at Ultimately, Mr. Edmunds left from Delta. $3,800.00 2006, $21,250.00 total of in in due to the company in October 2008 $42,500.00in much 2007 and 2008. For payment of payments, sought lack of and 2008, receiving Mr. was his usu- Edmunds alleged to him under the the funds owed $2,500.00 biweekly payment. al prior three employment contract difficulties, payments due to more these years. in the summer of 2008. again stopped ever When asked whether Mr. Garrison January refused to pay,

When Delta failure Mr. Ed- explained pay Delta’s 22, 2009, this lawsuit in Mr. Edmunds filed ad- salary, munds his Mr. Edmunds prior County Circuit Court. A the Robertson have later may mitted that Mr. Garrison 19, September held on bench trial was did that, company informed him that not from 2011. Mr. Edmunds testified enough payroll. funds to cover 2006, have paid according was 2004 until he testified, however, at no Edmunds Employment. the terms of the Offer of Mr. Ed- Edmunds, time did Mr. Garrison terminate According Mr. from the time Ed- or inform Mr. employment Delta in munds’ he was in 2004 until he left hired contin- paid would be days he to work five a week munds that he reported work, $14,000.00 getting percent, nor did and in an in- on Delta more gent According seek unem- terest rate of 2.75 suggest percent. that Mr. Edmunds he Instead, Edmunds, early Mr. Ed- Mr. all drawn money 2006. ployment that Mr. “told me equity pay munds testified from the home line was used to addition, living expenses. when he could. He told me basic both pay he’d me every penny delayed he me their retirements were to Mr. going pay due addition, me, receiving owed to trust him.” In not pay he Edmunds his full testified that he and Mr. 2006 to 2008. Mr. Edmunds even the tax Garrison had discussed conse- Through testimony Mrs. Edmunds’ sev- receiving a con- quences of Mr. Edmunds eral letters and emails were introduced pay lump amount back siderable requested which Mrs. Edmunds some, after stating sometime money Garrison and Delta pay he be reassuring Mr. Edmunds that would allegedly owed to Mr. Edmunds. allegedly amount he was paid full letters, early May which date as as owed, asked, you Mr. Garrison want “[D]o expressed frustration with Mr. part got of it at You have all once it? Garrison’s continued failure to pay think about taxes situation.” How- Edmunds, as well Mr. Garrison’s assur- ever, Mr. Edmunds never received “something ances that happen- should be allegedly for the amounts he was back letter, ing however, soon.” One stated and, payments again stopped when owed that Mr. Edmunds would not look for an- employment Mr. Edmunds left his job other because believed that he sought unemployment

with Delta and ben- would be unable to secure efits, did oppose. which Delta not age1 due to his that Mr. and Edmunds wife, Edmunds, angry Mr. Edmund’s Amy also became and refused to discuss Del- problems testified that Mr. Garrison reassured both ta’s and outlook with Mrs. Ed- herself her that Mr. Ed- in the and husband munds. Included emails were also responses munds would be in full for his em- to Mrs. emails from Edmunds’ emails, 2006, 2007, Delta in Mr. Garrison. In one of the dated ployment with Edmunds, 7, 2007, According September to Mrs. she Mr. Garrison assured up and her went Mrs. work pick husband into considerable Edmunds that would being “things get as a of Mr. on a debt result should back *8 despite regular quickly begin her income as a teacher. basis and then paid, approximately up first couple catching pay.” used some of back $7,000.00 $8,000.00 response, August another they or had earmarked dated put money to be a 401K. Mr. Mrs. into Once Garrison assured Edmunds exhausted, salary profit was turned to a he had no or from the couple taken equity According compa- home loan. to Mrs. Ed- instead all income to the company, munds, gone expenses, couple approximately ny operating drew had to pay $38,000.00 equity payroll company’s from the home line in and taxes on the two employees. as- eight at an interest rate of to nine field Mr. Garrison also $25,000.00 at an “al- percent, interest sured Mrs. Edmunds Delta was $4,000.00 eight percent, rate of seven in most sure to another client in get to 100%” However, coming at an interest rate four to seven weeks. due to the age specifically Mr. Edmunds’ is not stated adult children. in the He record. and his wife have two stop to money, of- he ever tell Mr. Edmunds Mr. Garrison did lack of current However, en- “lay coming Ed- into he did [Mr. work. alternative” —to fered “[one] unemploy- can unemploy- he draw to courage off and Mr. Edmunds seek munds] him pay is income to ment until there compensation and to what was ment “do job.” Mr. Garri- he another with or finds family.” Mr. Garri- best for him and had with Mr. spoken he son stated that they entered also never son testified in the week and offered Edmunds earlier agreement wherein Mr. Edmunds into an that he: back home and go to let him Instead, would work free. Mr. Garri- for even him to never asked insisted Mr. that he made it clear to son testified and never getting paid work without be Mr. was to Edmunds that Edmunds deepest grati- I possible will. have the and, Delta had paid projects, when staying for the course and do tude him therefore, pay him with. De- money, to day without go through single not [one] “understanding,” Mr. Garrison spite this thinking the debt and debt about testified that Mr. Edmunds continued for him.... gratitude I have resigned usual until he report work as fall Mr. Gar- According

in the of 2008. rison, Mr. was all bi- Edmunds for fully everything right make I intend to did weekly periods If has in which Mr. Edmunds [Mr. Edmunds] whenever I can. I will job, to leave find another do weeks he projects. and work for Delta on On way I help any I him in can merely all can to paid, was not he came into way. discourage him in call, and will not phone office the occasional answer every never I have intention of I have. but, pro- were ongoing because there no meeting my obligation to Ed- [Mr. to Mr. jects, According work was scarce. I can regardless. whenever munds] Garrison, there no contract of because was no employment, Delta owed Mr. Edmunds that she Thus Mrs. Edmunds testified and always he pay were led to believe back for the weeks had worked her husband paid. pay that Mr. would Mr. not been Mr. Garrison Edmunds that, wages to Mrs. back for his lost from 2006 2008. admitted in an email he wrote record, Edmunds, which is included Mr. that Mr. Garrison denied Edmunds, pay he stated he could In- employed pursuant to a contract. despite fact that he had funds to stead, signed he document stated payroll employ- salaries and taxes on other Mr. Edmunds was an em- himself and email, in the Additionally, ees. Mr. Garri- ployee that Mr. Edmunds application extremely busy that he was son admitted merely employee. an at-will Accord- every company, working with work for Garrison, ing Mr. informed weeks, until night midnight seventeen Edmunds, all the employees, including running a as well as ten to eleven hours payroll. could not make *9 manufacturing plant day. client’s all How- that, time, Garrison testified at that he ever, portion when about asked the “debt” new encouraged Mr. Edmunds to seek em- that he saying of his statement in an email ployment unemployment or his benefits. owed Mr. Edmunds a “debt and a debt Mr. Because of Mr. Garrison’s and Ed- he gratitude,” Mr. Garrison stated that however, friendship, munds’ long-standing “part money.” referring was to When to stay Mr. Edmunds chose on the he prior statement asked about his company. Mr. Garrison testified he pay,” would catch on “back Mr. Garri- specifically up stated that Mr. never Ed- terminated, referring he was to responded munds’ son employment nor sum,” merely stating Act, “a total but was under the Fair Labor Standards § provide would Mr. Edmunds with seq. he U.S.C. 201 et. The trial court could.” “possibly much as Mr. awarded damages for breach of in contract the amount of Mr. that Mr. Ed- Garrison also denied $116,034.52together with in- prejudgment relating any pro- work to munds did annum, terest a per at rate of 7% those in Alabama jects other than from $10,660.00in unpaid minimum as a wages, to Mr. According 2006 until 2008. Garri- set off to the breach of damages, contract son, gain attempted while Delta clients $10,000 together with in attorney fees for state, their were out efforts fruitless. work on the federal claim. Delta and Mr. that, example, For Garrison stated appeal. in 2007 or attempted sometime Delta Alabama, “sell a in package” a client II. Presented Issues company buy but that the chose not to package. Mr. Garrison also admitted that 1. the trial Whether court erred in at a employee company one Delta worked finding a valid and enforceable contract for Garrison, According in Alabama. to Mr. January after 2006? clients, in order gain Delta would either 2. the trial Whether court erred times,”

visit or “call a number of but that pre-judgment decision award interest they did a penny of business” with “[n]ever (7%) a rate seven percent interest? they most of the clients solicited. In addi- 8. Whether trial court erred tion, Mr. Garrison stated that Delta had decision to consider Mr. Garrison the al- employees full-time or contract who lived Delta, ter-ego of and therefore to find him Georgia and worked and Ala- outside personally for responsible judgment? that, bama. Garrison admitted ad- 4. Whether the trial court erred answering any phone dition to calls to the decision to find Edmunds was office, Delta input Mr. Edmunds the data engaged under Fair La- commerce regarding employees’ these out-of-state bor Standards Act as defined in 29 U.S.C. generate time sheets in order to for checks 203, thereby § allowing judgment employees. attorney fees? that, Mr. Garrison further testified al- though officially registered still III. Standard of Review State, Secretary as an L.L.C. with action trial This was tried was not there operating because was no such, court As review jury. without we more work. Mr. Garrison con- findings the trial court’s novo fact de required reports tinued to file annual correctness, with a unless presumption of until corporation the time of trial. the evidence preponderates otherwise. addition, that, Mr. Garrison testified 13(d). R.App. Tenn. P. No presumption [him],” on, essentially “Delta was [] correctness, however, attaches the trial operated and that it out of his home. court’s conclusions of law and our review is The trial court entered a Memorandum Brownson, de Blair v. novo. Opinion and Order November (Tenn.2006) (citing Bowden v. order, In the court ruled that Mr. Ward, (Tenn.2000)). ego Garrison was Delta’s alter and that *10 both were liable to Mr. Edmunds for For the to preponderate evidence fact, contract, employment against finding breach of the a trial it and court’s of unpaid wages minimum attorney finding and fees must another of fact with support

822 Harding The Court finds that Delta breached convincing effect. 7. greater 4215 Harris, Edmunds employment v. 354 contract with Road Ass’n Homeowners 296, (Tenn.Ct.App.2011); failing pay Edmunds by 305 S.W.3d Assocs., $65,000.00 salary Ed- Sidney & 40 annual owed to Gilreath Walker v. 66, employ- of (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). 71 Where munds under the terms findings does not make ment contract. the trial court fact, presumption correct there is no Decem- January through From 8. “must our own inde ness and we conduct 2006, only received ber Edmunds record determine pendent review the $3,800.00 compensation despite as evidence preponderance where the existence the Contract. 403, Brooks, 992 S.W.2d lies.” v. Brooks January through Decem- 9. From (Tenn.1999). 2007, only received ber Edmunds $21,250.00 compensation despite Analysis

IV. of the existence Contract. A. Breach of Contract January through De- 10. From argues first that the trial Delta 2006, only received cember Edmunds that Mr. finding court erred in Edmunds $43,081.48 as compensation despite by pursuant was to a con employed existence Contract.2 $65,000.00 and year tract a that Delta day rarely 11. missed a Edmunds interpreta that contract. breached work, reporting every day for work and question of law. tion of a contract is a a full hour working eight day. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d Guiliano v. consis- Beginning 12. Garrison (Tenn.1999). Therefore, the trial court’s tently promised that he would Edmunds interpretation a document is of contractual him. money Edmunds the owed to pay presumption not to a of correct entitled wife, Amy and Ed- Edmunds’ ness on v. Western Heri appeal. Angus munds, via email in 2007 communicated (Tenn.Ct. Co., tage 48 S.W.3d Ins. repeatedly prom- and 2008.... Garrison App.2000). the determination of the monies owed to Ed- ised is ques occurred a whether breach has repeated munds. reliance these Krueger, tion of fact. Carter assurances, promises and Mr. Edmunds (“This is a (Tenn.Ct.App.1995) 934-35 to report provide continued to work and matter which properly of fact is addressed benefit to Delta and Garrison. direct fact.”). regard to the this trier of With and that Gar- Edmunds trusted believed issue, the trial court found: Delta, rison, the President and CEO of was a 6.The there Court finds him. up would make the debt owed to contract of between Ed- July From August through 13. Although munds and the con- Delta. timely, Edmunds received consis- will, tract was the Court terminable tent, full payments upon based finds terminated until not $65,000.00 year. salary per left the of Delta in employ October 2008.... record, ever, appears From our review of the Mr. Edmunds does take issue testamentary documentary evi- damages pursuant awarded to him dence in case that Mr. Edmunds Therefore, this shows we to address contract. decline $42,500.00 rather than the this error. $43,081.48 How- as found court. *11 through Further, January From Octo- provides

15. the contract that Delta 2008, $65,000.00 reported pay ber Edmunds work as will Mr. Edmunds annually in performed his duties a rea- required, agreement as consideration for his to the manner, all sonable and executed tasked terms the non-disclosure and non-com- him Garrison. assignments by Ed- pete clauses. As consideration is an es- was not or written disciplined up munds sential element to the formation of a con- anyone by during at Delta the course of tract, we “agreement” conclude that the employment. his is speaking issue in terms of contract for- Matlock, discharged Campbell 16. Edmunds was never or mation. v. 749 S.W.2d by addition, terminated Garrison or Delta. (Tenn.Ct.App.1987).

the document states that the terms of the “agreement” can be by modified mu- Despite requests 19. for numerous assent parties. Again, tual of the the doc- payment compensation owed to law, ument speaks terms of contract as Contract, pursuant to the Ed- it is well-settled that contract may only $116,034.52 is still through munds owed modified by be mutual assent. Thompson resignation on his October Inc., v. Creswell Supply, Industrial thoroughly We have reviewed the record (Tenn.Ct.App.1996). Ad- case this and conclude that the evidence ditionally, Delta now admits its appel- preponderate against does not the trial late brief that employment Mr. Edmunds’ finding employment court’s that a valid governed by was a contract. Accordingly, existed, contract that the contract was not supports the evidence the trial court’s find- resignation terminated until Mr. Edmunds’ ing that Mr. employment Edmunds’ was in October and that the contract was governed by a contract. by breached Delta when it failed to promised. Mr. Edmunds as court, in the trial First, that, argued because the evidence the record the contract for an support’s the indefinite term fully provided trial court’s conclusion that Mr. that Mr. be employment gov Edmunds’ Edmunds could terminated “at employment Delta,” an erned contract. In this the sole discretion of Mr. Edmunds case, Garrison, right both Edmunds and Mr. has no enforceable recover the Delta, representative as the signed compensation promised pursuant he was employment outlining document the non the contract. It true that Tennessee and non-compete requirements employment disclosure follows “at-will” doctrine. as well as the of Mr. employment duties Edmunds as At-will employ means that employee. This document refers to ment contracts of duration indefinite are an “agreement.” itself as Tennessee law terminable at the will of the employer or agreement a contract employee defines be Guy or no cause. “[a]n v. Co., tween two or parties creating more obli Mut. Omaha Ins. (Tenn.2002). gations Thus, that are enforceable otherwise 534-35 Mr. Edmunds Jones, recognizable at law.” expectation Green No. had an under contract to E2011-02587-COA-R3CV, $65,000.00 year WL be so per long as he 2012) July duties, (Tenn.Ct.App. unless performed and until his (9th Indeed, (quoting Dictionary Black’s Law was terminated. ed.2009)). By brief, very terms of the docu his now admits that the ment, then, Mr. Edmunds and Delta were signed by parties documents in 2004 entering employment. contract, into contract of constitute an but enforceable ar- *12 Delta, in representative repeatedly was terminated for the contract that gues them that Mr. Edmunds would in- assured allegedly Mr. Garrison when his that pay receive full back for work and that there was no Edmunds Mr. formed an em- Mr. was still considered Ed- Edmunds compensate to Mr. money which from in resignation Delta his however, ployee of until court, specifi- trial munds. The Edmunds stated October 2008. Mr. even Mr. never cally that Edmunds was found that Mr. Garrison was concerned about From employment. from his terminated receiving large a consequences tax such record, again we con- our review Mr. pay of back in one sum. lump amount not prepon- the evidence does clude that Garrison, however, disputes that he ever finding. this against derate promised to “a total to Mr. pay sum” that, at Mr. admitted trial Instead, Edmunds. Mr. Garrison contends Edmunds that there while he informed Mr. specifically that while he not inform did pay salary money beginning was no to his employment was Mr. Edmunds that his specifically told Mr. Ed- he never terminated, termination was “obvious” employment his was terminat- munds that circumstances, despite based on allegations are no ed. There Mr. Mr. Ed- fact that Garrison allowed employee authority had the to other Delta day to come into work munds each Mr. Edmunds’ terminate perform company tasks that benefitted the addition, so. In Mr. Garri- they did pay Mr. Ed- and that continued son admitted that he continued to allow munds, Accordingly, albeit sporadically. days Mr. to come into work five Edmunds conflicting we faced are accounts on perform tasks behalf week Thus, the events this case. the issues Delta, telling once Mr. never Edmunds turn in on the trial court’s part this case Further, not. from our he should credibility relative determination email responses review of Mr. Garrison’s the witnesses. When resolution Edmunds, Mr. Garrison assured Mrs. depends upon issues in a case the truthful- and his wife business Edmunds witnesses, judge ness of the trial who has pick and that Ed- likely up opportunity to observe the manner and In again paid. promising munds be would testifying demeanor of witnesses while up catch that Delta would soon on “back position in a far better than this Court pay,” clearly Mr. Garrison stated his inten- H., In re decide those issues. Arteria tion that Mr. Edmunds receive back (Tenn.Ct.App.2010) 326 S.W.3d paid. for which he was for work never (citing Corp., McCaleb v. Saturn pre- this does not Accordingly, evidence (Tenn.1995)). 412, 415 “If the ponderate against finding that Ed-Mr. factual on court’s determinations are based entirety munds was to be for the its credibility, assessment of witness this just his work with Delta and not on weeks Court will reevaluate that assessment per- where there were to be projects convincing clear absent evidence Thus, Mr. own testi- formed. Garrison’s contrary.” Bd. County Franklin Of mony support tends to the trial court’s Crabtree, Educ. 337 S.W.3d finding Mr. Edmunds was never ter- (Tenn.Ct.App.2010) (citing Jones v. Gar- promised full minated and (Tenn.2002)). rett, compensation retroactive work trial court this case did not make ex- Delta. press credibility findings. a tri- addition, may both Mr. al be finding credibility court’s Garrison, the trial and his wife testified that manner which implied *13 case, decided the Richards v. reviewing court case. Liber After the in this record it Co., (Tenn. appears that Delta Ins. 70 S.W.3d instead relied on ty Mut. the 2002). argument that the Clearly, finding signed by in that the documents employ Mr. Edmunds and Mr. Garrison in by contract was terminated Delta ment not were not a contract or Mr. prior time Edmund’s at to Edmunds’ Octo terminated, employment had been both of resignation, trial ber 2008 the court credit which been have discussed above. It is testimony the ed the of Mr. Edmunds over well-settled issues are considered testimony of the Nothing Mr. Garrison. in appeal by waived on present failure to leads question record us to Mr. Edmunds them at trial. See ABN Mortg. AMRO credibility give to greater leads us Group, Inc. v. Southern Sec. Federal Cred testimony to the of Mr. weight Garrison. Union, (Tenn. 126-27 S.W.3d Instead, weight the evidence in the Farr, Ct.App.2011) (citing Waters supports finding that Mr. record Garri (Tenn.2009)). addition, In Edmunds, not son did terminate Mr. but may “a not an party litigate issue on one continued to utilize his services for the ground, abandon that ground post-trial, Delta, repeatedly benefit assured ground and assert new basis or ap on Mr. Edmunds that Delta would compen Leach, peal.” State v. sate him for the work for which he not had (Tenn.2004). Having present never been we paid. Accordingly, been must conclude level, ed argument with this at the trial not preponderate the evidence does trial court was unable make a specific to the trial val against finding court’s that a finding toas whether a modification took id, enforceable contract existed that was place in this case. Even assuming, ar- prior not by terminated Delta to October guendo, properly that this issue is raised undisputed 2008. Because it Delta on we appeal, conclude that the evidence pursuant to Mr. failed Edmunds to in preponderates favor a finding contract, finding we affirm court’s the contract at issue not in modified that Delta employment breached the con argued Instead, by manner Delta. tract and is liable to Mr. Edmunds for evidence shows that Mr. Garrison re full amount of he compensation was owed peatedly assured Mr. Edmunds that he under contract from 2006 until his debt,” “a owed him that he would “catch[ ] resignation ... back up pay,” that Mr. Garri In at appellate its brief and “every son of meeting my had intention argument appeal, oral argues this Delta obligation to whenever I [Mr. Edmunds] that if the regardless.” added). contract was terminated can (emphasis In ad 2006, then the terms dition, contract were Mr. Garrison admitted that Mr. Ed in modified 2006 when never agreed munds had work for no formed Mr. there no Edmunds compensation, though even mutual assent money payroll. Specifically, make Delta required to a modification was that, argues by remaining compa with the terms of the contract. As ny such, after the downturn Mr. Ed we conclude that there was no modi agreed regard to work on a fication of the contract project-basis, munds to Mr. only being paid compensation. Edmunds’ rate of for those weeks in which specific projects he worked on for Delta. Pre-judgment B. Interest argument, At oral counsel Mr. Ed- objected argument argues munds this because Delta next that the trial in awarding pre- it had not been asserted the trial court erred court. timely payment damages implicitly agreed forego the contract interest on judgment remain year. money by choosing an per Re- percent a rate of seven Delta, interest, not be employee of should enti this Court pre-judgment garding addition, tled prejudgment interest. stated: has that Mr. Edmunds cannot argues de- wrongfully have been Parties who *14 rely by taken him and his on the loans out money damaged have been of prived wife, or Mr. Garrison’s assurances via First, they have dam- ways. been two Mr. would be com email that Edmunds they have not received the aged because pensated failed to because Edmunds money they are entitled. Sec- to which explain to Mrs. the true circum Edmunds ond, they damaged because have been the declining stances of business. use of they deprived have been money they the time should The trial award of dam court’s judg- until the date of have received it ages prejudgment and award of interest is interest pre-judgment ment. Awards of an reviewed under abuse of discretion type second are intended to address Bank, Inc. BancorpSouth v. standard. based on the rec- damage. They (Tenn.Ct. are Hatchel, 223, 223 S.W.3d 230 is ognition party damaged Assocs., that a App.2006); Franklin L.P. Capital forego the of its being forced to use Inc., 392, Family, v. 194 S.W.3d Almost General Motors money over time. (Tenn.Ct.App.2005). 405 A trial court 648, Corp., v. 461 U.S. 655- Corp. Devex applies abuses its discretion when it 2062-63, 56, 2058, 76 L.Ed.2d 103 S.Ct. legal an incorrect standard or reaches a (1983); Mitchell, 211 v. 876 Mitchell against is logic reasoning decision which 830, (Tenn.1994). Thus, our S.W.2d 832 injustice party an causes com recognized have repeatedly courts Eldridge v. 42 plaining. Eldridge, S.W.3d awarded, is not to prejudgment interest (Tenn.2001) v. (quoting State Shir but punish wrong-doer, compen- (Tenn.1999)). ley, 6 S.W.3d If a for wronged party sate the loss discretionary range decision is within money use of it have should alternatives, we will not acceptable substi Myint v. Ins. received Allstate earlier. judgment tute that of the our for Co., 970 S.W.2d at 927. may have simply court because we chosen

a different v. alternative. White Vander (Tenn.Ct. Univ., bilt International, Inc., Scholz v. S.B. App.1999). (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (string S.W.3d case, pre- In this the trial court awarded omitted). Thus, law in cite “the Tennessee judgment interest to Mr. Edmunds based awarding prejudgment favors interest upon finding that: more doing fully compen whenever will so for plaintiff sate a successful the loss The evidence showed that because Mr. money plaintiff receiving agreed- use of was not to which Edmunds 2006, 2007, legally upon salary Blal for and entitled.” Lockett Charles he Sons, Inc., take ock & No. E2001-01000-COA- was forced to out a second mort- R3-CV, (Tenn.Ct. gage at *3 on his home at a variable WL interest 82). Scholz, 40 rate. He incurred additional costs App.2002) (citing be- that an award of not the benefit of the Delta contends cause did have un he was to at the pre-judgment inappropriate money interest be time due, mere award Specifically, der the facts of this case. costs that a that, argues pay remedy. because Edmunds back will in the does not pre- The evidence record rison. When paying Delta ceased Ed- Indeed, findings. installments, against regular these munds ponderate Garrison his wife was uncontroverted at trial owned 100% of the evidence Delta. Gar- fully wife rison was that Mr. and his suffered aware that Edmunds Edmunds was working portions without financially pay large due to Delta’s failure to Mr. 2006,2007, addition, and 2008. Edmunds. the evidence were made that the shows assurances personal Garrison took responsibili- pick up business would Edmunds ty for the monies owed to Edmunds. certainly be which would have paid, would promise continued stay induced Mr. Edmunds to with the Amy and his wife that he repay would company despite its financial struggles. debt owed to Edmunds. Gar- When *15 Thus, we not an spoke conclude it was abuse rison made those promises, he of discretion for the trial court to obligations award to personal Edmunds as obli- pre-judgment gations, obligations interest to Mr. Edmunds not as alone, describing his debt but argues Delta also the trial court also his gratitude” “debt of to Edmunds. awarding erred in at a interest rate report Edmunds continued to to work percent seven because the last draw on the upon based personal relationship his line a equity home was at rate of 2.75 with Garrison and personal Garrison’s percent. the evidence shows assurances eventually seventy-five percent that the over of the would be for all his work. Garrison money from equity drawn the home line only person was the who knew Del- at a between per- rate seven to nine Edmunds; ta could not to afford percent cent. The awarded rate of seven however, terminating instead of Ed- on the spectrum. is low end of this Ac- munds, Garrison continued to make cordingly, discern we no abuse of discre- promises repaid that Edmunds would be tion the trial court’s decision to award to continued allow Edmunds re- interest at a percent. rate seven daily port to work on a basis. Alter-Ego C. Respectfully, and due with deference to issue, the findings trial court’s on this we argues Mr. Garrison next that the conclude the evidence was insufficient in finding trial court erred that Delta was justify piercing corporate veil and alter-ego person and that he should be holding personally responsi- Mr. Garrison ally responsible damages for the owed to ble Delta. for the liabilities of Accordingly, Mr. Edmunds Delta. this explained must This Court the doc Court determine whether there was corporate trine of piercing veil VP justify piercing sufficient evidence Del Group, Buildings, Polygon veil Inc. v. No. corporate impose personal ta’s lia M2001-00613-COA-R3-CV, bility case, 2002 WL on Mr. Garrison. In this 15634, 8, January *4-5 following (Tenn.Ct.App. trial court findings made regard this issue: 2002): 20. The corporate Court finds that Delta and Conditions under which the alter-egos. entity disregarded vary Garrison were Garrison ad- will be accord quite ing present mitted that some time he has to the circumstances case, been manager particularly the sole officer and and the matter is with province Delta. Garrison admitted that of the trial court. Mu essentially 2006 forward Delta was Gar- M.B.H. v. roll Tennessee Gesellschaft (Tenn. 211, filed); Consultants, Inc., Emergicare Inc. v. Tape, Woolbright, Bd. No. W1998-00659-COA- (citing Electric Power Ct.App.1995) (Tenn. 1897350, R3-CV, 2000 *2 Joseph Valley v. WL at Chattanooga St. 2000) (Perm. 29, Dec. de Ct.App. app. Corp., 691 S.W.2d Steel Structural 2001). 14, Andrews, (Tenn.1985)); May No. Piper v. nied. 01A01-9612-CV-00570, 1997 WL circumstances, may In those courts (Tenn.Ct.App. at *3 Dec. veil find the pierce corporate 1997) 1998). (Perm. app. June denied entity” liable, Mu “true owners of Thus, when an question individual Gesellschaft, 908 roll S.W.2d corporate obli held liable for should be impose Lability against controlling a “to one. gations largely a factual “Each is corporate used who has shareholder involving disregard case entity legal obligations.” to avoid his entity upon special rest its facts.” must Serv., Inc. Consolidation Manufacturers 213; Gesellschaft, 908 S.W.2d at Muroll Rodell, (Tenn.Ct. S.W.3d Haynie, 833 Schlater v. disregard courts will App.2000). Our (Tenn.Ct.App.1991). entity corporation separate as a

upon showing corporation *16 or or such neces dummy sham action is presumption There is a justice. to sary accomplish Muroll Ge legal entity, is a a distinct corporation 213; sellschaft, 908 at Tennessee S.W.2d apart its wholly separate and Bell, Investors, Ltd. 709 Racquetball v. directors, shareholders, officers, affili or 617, (Tenn.Ct.App.1986); S.W.2d 619 appropriate In an corporations. ated Ridge Repair City Auto v. Oak Serv. the case in furtherance of ends of and Co., 707, 711, 57 425 Tenn.App. Fin. separate identity of justice, corpo the a 620, (1967); Fidelity 622 Trust S.W.2d the may ration be discarded and individ Co., 61, 7-8; 22 at 160 Tenn. at S.W.2d owning all ual or individuals its stock Consultants, Inc., Emergicare 2000 WL and will be treated identical to assets 1897350, 772127, *2; Piper, at 1997 WL Gesellschaft, the Muroll corporation. *3. at 213; Schlater, 908 at 833 S.W.2d S.W.2d 15634, Buildings, VP at *4-5 2002 WL 925; Fidelity v. see also Trust Co. (footnote omitted); also v. Na- see Boles Co., 57, 61, Laundry 160 Service Tenn. Co., Inc., Development tional 175 S.W.3d 6, (1929); generally 22 7-8 S.W.2d see 226, (Tenn.Ct.App.2005) (citing 244-45 fa- & v. Bailey E.O. Co. Union Planters vorably analysis the and in VP discussion Co., 439, Tenn.App. Title 232 Guar. 33 of Buildings). piercing The doctrine (1950). Discarding the fic S.W.2d 309 corporate applies equally veil cases corporate entity, tion or piercing of the party pierce a of a which seeks to the veil veil, appropriate is when corporate liability company, as Delta: limited such for a corporation is liable debt but is debt, owners, rule, members, general a without funds and As employees agents lack funds is due to some misconduct or other a Tennes- liability company on the of the directors. see limited have no part officers 213; Gesellschaft, personal liability 908 S.W.2d at for the or obli- Muroll debts S.E.A., Co., et Leasing gations company. Inc. v. Southside See Tenn.Code al., 48-217-101(a)(l); E2000-00631-COA-R3-CV, § Ann. No. Tenn.Code 48-249-114(a)(l)(B). 1449852, § (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000 at *9 Ann. an WL Under 2000) (no Sept. remedy “piercing Tenn. P. 11 known as R.App. equitable

829 however, veil,” sepa “the in fact corporate indistinguish tities are identical or entity may rate of a be able legal corporation necessary accomplish and where showing Serv., that it a disregarded upon justice. Consol. Inc. Manufacturers Rodell, dummy necessary (Tenn.Ct. sham a or where or v. S.W.3d justice.” Haynie, v. accomplish Schlater In App.2000). Continental Bankers Life (Tenn.Ct.App.1991). Ins. v. Co. South The Bank Ala Despite inapplicability the reme mo, (Tenn.1979), 578 S.W.2d 625 Ten name, dy’s “corporate veil” of a Ten Supreme nessee set Court forth three ele company may liability nessee limited required ments pierce corporate veil also the same pierced, utilizing be stan parent corporation as between a and its Family Office, dards. See Starnes LLC subsidiary: McCullar,

v. 765 F.Supp.2d 1) parent corporation, at the time of (W.D.Tenn.2011). complained of, the transaction exercises (Bkrtcy. re 479 B.R. Steffner, over complete subsidiary, dominion its E.D.Tenn.2012). finances, policy but of practice respect business to the trans- courts Tennessee attack, under so corpo- action that the that the of piercing are cautioned doctrine transaction, entity, rate as to that had corporate applied only veil be should mind, separate no will or of its existence prevent “extreme circumstances to the use own. entity perform to defraud 2) illegal Pamperin control acts.” Streamline Such must have been used to (Tenn.Ct. Inc., Mfg., commit wrong, perpetuate fraud or *17 2008). 6, App.2008) app. Oct. (perm. statutory posi- denied the violation of a or other explained: legal duty, unjust As this Court tive or a dishonest and parties’ act in contravention of third principle piercing “The the fiction rights. veil corporate applied is to be 3) The aforesaid control and breach of great precipitately, caution and not since duty proximately injury must cause the corporate regularity.” there presumption is a ater, 925; unjust or loss of. complained 833 S.W.2d at Schl Inc., Consultants, Emergicare 2000 WL subsequent Id. at 632. this Court’s 1897350, *2; Lindsey, & Bradley at Racquetball decision Tennessee Inves Malloy Marketing Systems, v. Media Bell, tors, v. Ltd. 709 S.W.2d Inc., E2000-00678-COA-R3-CV, No 617(Tenn.Ct.App.1986), we recognized 1875882, 2000 at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. WL these are also in an required elements 2000) (no 15, R.App. Dec. Tenn. P. 11 action to hold the individual owner a filed). party wishing The to negate the the the corporation liable for debts of cor entity such separate existence of has the poration ego theory. under the alter Id. at burden proving jus facts sufficient to 622; see, e.g., Island Brook Homeowners tify the veil. piercing corporate Schla Ass’n, Inc. v. No. M2006- Aughenbaugh, ter, 833 at 925. S.W.2d 2917781, 02317-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL at 5, 2007); 15634, (Tenn.Ct.App. 2002 at *5. *6 Oct. Tennessee Buildings, VP WL Investors, Bell, veil, the Ltd. v. 709 piercing corporate Racquetball When a court 617, may entity (Tenn.Ct.App.1986); the 622 but disregard corporate or S.W.2d 919, liability Haynie, a see v. 833 impose against der related Schlater S.W.2d a a entity, parent corporation (Tenn.Ct.App.1991) (stating such as or 925 that Con shareholder, controlling parent/subsid the where two en tinental Bankers addressed 830 Inc., factors); NATS, No. inap Allen Altice v. relationships and was therefore

iary M2007-00212-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL a involving case before the plicable to 2008) 15, 1744571, (Tenn.Ct.App. *2 Apr. relationship). corporation/shareholder Fisher, (same); Dolle v. No. E2003-02356- used most common factors (Tenn. COA-R3-CV, *4 2005 WL to determine whether courts by Tennessee 2005) (same); Boles v. Ct.App. Aug. corporate originally veil were pierce Inc., Co., 175 Development National Corp. Ins. Deposit in Federal set forth (Tenn.Ct.App.2005); 245 S.W.3d (E.D.Tenn.1984), Allen, F.Supp. 386 584 Schools, Barbour, Inc. v. Oceanics follows: (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) S.W.3d determining be considered Factors to Consultants, (same); Emergicare Inc. v. disregard corporate veil whether Woolbright, No. W1998-00659-COA-R3- has entity whether include not CV, 1897350, *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000 WL injustice in work fraud or been used 2000) (same). no Generally, Dec. one public policy, but also: contravention determining whether factor is conclusive (1) failure collect there was a whether veil; rather, to pierce corporate courts (2) corpora- capital; whether rely factors in upon will a combination of (3) undercapitalized; grossly tion was Pamperin, 276 deciding the issue. S.W.3d (4) certificates; stock nonissuance Schools, (citing at Oceanics by indi- ownership of stock one sole 140). though corporate at formali “Even vidual; (5) same or the use of the office observed, may still ties have been one (6) location; employment of business challenge corporate entity by showing (7) employees attorneys; the same victim that he has been the of some basi corporation as an instru- the use of cally by corporate unfair device which the in- mentality or business conduit for an organization has been form of business (8) corporation; another dividual or inequitable result.” used to achieve an assets or to diversion Pamperin, (quoting S.W.3d entity or other detri- stockholder Haynie, Schlater v. creditors, manipulation of ment of or the (Tenn.Ct.App.1991)). *18 (9) another; the assets and liabilities Mr. two fac Edmunds relies on corporation subterfuge use of as a the tors, which he contends are sufficient to (10) transactions; the illegal formation corporate the veil. Mr. justify piercing corporation and to to use of the transfer that argues proof first the at Edmunds existing liability it the of another person Mr. trial showed that Garrison exercised (11) or and the failure main- entity; to and complete dominion control over Delta length relationships among tain re- arms during years at issue in this case. lated entities. Indeed, Mr. Garrison admitted that Delta (citing juris Id. at 397 cases from various “essentially” him from 2006 until the was Jackson, dictions); also v. Coker, see Marshall trial. v. 20 time of See Stark Cal.2d M2007-01764-COA-R3-CV, (1942) No. 2008 WL 839, (considering, P.2d 129 390 2008) Dec. (Tenn.Ct.App. case, *6 evidence the mar piercing veil that (citing that noting corporation the above factors couple ried who controlled the they commonly are referred to the Al they corporation). that were stated factors); AmPharm, len Inc. Eastland that the evidence in this case agree We Services, L.L.C., mind, separate No. M2006- that had “no Pharmacy shows 01334-COA-R3-CV, 4830803, *6 from Mr. Garrison apart 2008 WL will or existence” (Tenn. 2008) years Pamperin, at issue. Ct.App. (citing during Nov. (the (quoting at 438 Continental Bank- take care charges) personally, S.W.3d if the 632). ers, at fact 578 S.W.2d corporation failed to do so.” Id. at 689. do- complete that shareholder exercises president The of the corporation defendant over a corporation minion control deny did not that he made this statement. justify is insufficient piercing alone plaintiff company, who had entered veil; seeking corporate party pierce into a service contract with the defendant corporate prove veil must also that corporation, contended continued to control have must been used “[s]uch work corporation for the defendant in reli- wrong, commit fraud or perpetuate ance on this assurance. The Court of Ap- statutory of a positive violation other peals concluded that this assurance was a duty, or legal unjust a dishonest and act in strongly factor in favor of piercing the parties’ contravention of third rights.” veil: corporate at Pamperin, (quoting This given assurance was for the obvious Bankers, 632); Continental purpose promoting the individual ad Crypt Dy- see also National Precast Co. v. vantage president [the the defen Inc., Pennsylvania, F.Supp. Core corporation]. dant This follows because (W.D.Pa.1992) (holding that fact “the person the only profit who could closely one shareholder controlled a operation the continued corpora corporation enough sup- held one, tion president]. [the When veil”). port piercing corporate To beneficiary who is the sole corpora of a prong analysis, meet this Mr. Ed- it, operations tion’s and who dominates points munds out Garrison made president] case, as did in this [the in assurances to Mr. wife Edmunds and his creditor duces a to extend credit to the Edmunds would be his full corporation such an giv assurance as compensation, despite his knowledge here, en that fact has been considered Delta did not have the funds by many authorities sufficient basis for Edmunds. Mr. argues piercing corporate veil. Weisser v. personal these statements constitute as- (2d Mursam Shoe Corporation Cir. that impose liability surances on Mr. Gar- 1942), 467; 127 F.2d 145 A.L.R. personally. rison Quaid (1918), v. Ratkowsky 183 A.D. “A ... personally officer who 812, aff'd, 170 N.Y.S. N.Y. guarantees may an obligation personal- be 121 N.E. 887. ly performance liable for the of that partic- Id. Other cases have to similar come con obligation.” ular 18 Am.Jur.2d Corpora- See clusions. Weisser v. Mursam Shoe § Indeed, tions some have courts *19 (2d Cir.1942) (conclud Corp., 127 F.2d 344 pierced the veil corporate when the share- of ing that issue fact existed as to whether exercising holder control over the corpora- piercing corporate the veil appropriate was personal tion made assurances that a debt when one of two of a compa shareholders be paid. example would For in DeWitt ny paid payment the first Brokers, disputed the Ray Flemming Truck Inc. v. W. Co., (4th check); 681, personal lease a Cir.1976), Stark v. Fruit 540 689 F.2d Coker, (1942) 839, 20 Cal.2d the Fourth 129 P.2d 390 Appeals, ap- Circuit Court of plying (piecing corporate the the veil when the mar substantive law South Car- olina, held ried who the piercing appropri- couple corporation that veil was controlled president they corporation ate when the of the defendant stated that were the (i.e., corporation “he made presi- personal stated that assurances as their obli [the issue); dent of the corporation]) gation defendant would under notes at Clare 832 that, Barksdale, Publishing closing, There evidence at the Co. v. is

mont Press guaranteed perform- shareholder] 818, [the Cal.Rptr. 10 214 Cal.App.2d 187 agreement whereby ance a new ap (1960) piercing veil was that (holding conditioning system central air would be evidence, disput was there when propriate However, appellees’ installed home. defendant, agreed that he be by the ed alone, standing such an assurance no the debts of the insolvent responsible for way implies that [the shareholder] was Luke, Ga.App. v. 164 Saxton corporation); merely guaranteeing Corpo- not that (1982) 751, 170, (holding 752 296 S.E.2d ration, officer, he of which was an would at issue liable on contract shareholder agreement. perform “[T]here this new when, factors, “gave his among other no short of speculation is evidence guarantee project that the would personal acting was in an shareholder] indi- [the pay if he had to it completed, even be apposition, vidual whereas in capacity some pocket”). out of own [appellees the records show aware were] that personal have concluded assur courts by [all relevant] written documents that controlling part ances on the share acting only in a [the shareholder] corporate piercing the justify holder do not representative capacity. Earnest v. [ ]” per in order to hold shareholder veil Merck, 271, 273,] Ga.App. 358 [183 corpora sonally liable for the debts of the (Ga.Ct.App.1987) S.E.2d 661[ ]. Dailey, v. tion. See Anderson Colo. Hester, 335; 402 S.E.2d see also West (1913) 175, (holding P. 461 App. v. Broadcasting ern Co. Columbus Bar an officer and shareholder by assurances 320, Ga.App. rington, 167 306 S.E.2d corporation charge operations of its of a (1983) (holding piercing the corpo employees its that would be able to plain rate veil inappropriate when any personal them not create lia pay did failed tiff to show that the statements him); Corp. bility against Intelnet Intern. made of personal were assurances liabili A-6974-03T1, Corp., 2006 WL v. ITT No. Rymer, Ga.App. v. ty); Menchio 2006) (con (N.J.Super. Aug. (1986) (reversing judgment 348 S.E.2d 76 justified cluding piercing that veil was not allowing plaintiffs pierce corporate veil president despite assurances vice co-plaintiff when admitted that she had company company would honor the corporation dealt with rather than with its subsidiary). contracts of its president personally). Other courts have held that assurances thoroughly Wé reviewed the have record to justify will be deemed sufficient in this conclude case and evidence veil when there piercing against finding that preponderates no evidence the assurances were in personal assurances at issue were assur- assurances, than personal deed rather as ances on part Mr. Garrison rather agent corporation. surances as of the an corpo- than assurances on part Inc. example Enterprises, For in Hester Indeed, specif- ration. Mr. Garrison never Narvais, Ga.App. 402 S.E.2d ically obligation pay states that the back (1991), Georgia Appeals Court September is his In his personally. *20 piercing corporate concluded that the veil email, explains 2007 Mr. Garrison was in a in which it inappropriate case pay will Mr. Edmunds when one of the merely “speculation” that the sharehold to In his pays client’s its’ bill Delta. Au- personal, email, were rather than again er’s assurance gust 2011 Mr. Garrison merely on of the corporation. behalf to Mr. Edmunds payment conditions explained: money flowing to the stat- corporation, Court the in, will ing payments corporation that “when come I use of the subterfuge as a in can[,] transactions; (4) whatever I but I can pay illegal do little the formation payment some cycles.” clients^] affect corporation and use of the to transfer to it record, in Based on the evidence the we existing liability the person of another or cannot conclude that Mr. has Edmunds entity. Although it is true Delta is prove met his burden to the assur likely to pay unable its debt Mr. Ed- represent in ances this case an action on munds, simply there is no evidence in the part of Mr. personal the take record as to its capitalization. initial responsibility Instead, for the debt. the Moreover, corporate entity may “[a] not be record shows that Mr. Garrison qualified disregarded simply because stands as a his assurances that Mr. Edmunds would litigant’s bar to a recovery property.” receive when compensation Delta had the Corporations § Am.Jur.2d 47. In addi discussed, money pay previously it. As tion, it is corporation while clear that the Mr. Edmunds bears the burden to prove operated out of Mr. Garrison’s home which justify piercing the circumstances and Mr. Garrison held exclusive control corporate the veil in this case. See Schla corporation, over the previously dis (Tenn. v. Haynie, ter cussed, those facts alone are insufficient to Ct.App.1991). From our review of rec justify piercing corporate veil. ord, Mr. simply has not met Accordingly, the circumstances in this burden to show that assurances at case rise fail to to the of other level Ten personal Garrison, were to Mr. issue rath nessee cases which this has Court con than simply er assurances on behalf piercing cluded that corporate veil was corporate entity. appropriate. Many cases have found that Other argument than his personal about piercing corporate veil was warranted assurances and Mr. Garrison’s concession when the assets of the corporation were that he had control complete over the cor to the transferred shareholder for his or poration, Mr. Edmunds offers no other benefit, personal her own which transfer which show facts tend to con “[s]ueh defeated the claims of creditors. For ex trol must have used been to commit fraud ample, Pamperin v. Streamline Mfg., wrong, or to perpetuate the violation of a Inc., (Tenn.Ct.App.2008) 276 S.W.3d 428 statutory legal or other or a positive duty, 6, 2008), (perm. app. denied Oct. this Court dishonest and act in unjust contravention found pierce evidence sufficient to the cor parties’ of third rights.” Pamperin, 276 porate as to veil one shareholder when S.W.3d at 438 (quoting Continental Bank corporation assets of the improperly were ers, 632). Indeed, 578 S.W.2d at after to the distributed shareholder “for his own thoroughly reviewing the this record in benefit, personal to the detriment [the case we conclude that the Allen factors do corporation] and its Id. creditors.” at 439- weigh of piercing corpo favor case, Schools, In another Oceanics rate veil in Deposit this case. Federal Ins. Barbour, Allen, Inc. v. Corp. F.Supp.

(E.D.Tenn.1984). (Tenn.Ct.App.2003), the Court concluded Specifically, there is no (1) veil piercing corporate evidence in the was like record that there awas (2) appropriate wise when failure to collect the shareholder capital; corporation diversion of sold the principal assets asset of the entity proceeds stockholder or other to the from the detri transferred sale creditors, account, ment of manipulation personal or the to his which rendered (3) another; assets and corporation liabilities without *21 assets above, case, undisputed discussed the evi at In this howev as Id. 141-42. debts. er, re that Mr. Garrison dence trial was that Mr. Garrison is no evidence there corporate assets to corpora distributed little from the improperly ceived to no income Indeed, Finally, Mr. Garrison’s uncontro- during period himself. the at issue. tion was testimony at trial was he verted any record action nothing suggests the profits from receiving salary no and no intentionally part on the of Mr. Garrison during struggles. its financial Delta claim; instead, Mr. Edmunds’ from defeat record, appears our review of the cases, piercing corporate the In other Mr. Garrison disclosed Delta’s financial the fail justified by shareholder’s veil was lack struggles capital and its formalities. In corporate to observe ure well the Edmunds and wife before No. Buildings, Polygon Group, Inc. v. VP litigation this case commenced. M2001-00613-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 8, 2002), January this (Tenn.Ct.App. Instead, facts in most the this case corporate veil when the pierced Court the closely Money the & Tax resemble facts operated business in Ten sole shareholder Moody, Inc. v. 180 S.W.3d 561 Help, fact the despite corpora the nessee wherein the (Tenn.Ct.App.2005), Court the certificate required tion failed obtain the decision the trial Appeals reversed sole authority. Additionally, the share corporate piercing court the veil and find- file annual re required holder failed to ing personally the owner liable. In declin- ports, which resulted administrative dis veil, ing pierce corporate Moody the the fact, corporation. In the solution was little very Court noted that “there attempt have sole shareholder did not presented evidence to the trial court re- corporation reinstated until she was garding or the corporation] way [the [the in the Id. at In personally sued case. *6. Indeed, operated it.” Id. at 567. owner] addition, herself sole shareholder concluded Court evidence large money sums of and her husband presented regarding operation of the corporation experienc while the was even corporation was owner’s admission Id.; also ing financial difficulties. see that he was the sole offi- shareholder and Fisher, No. Dalle E2003-02356-COA- cer of the further corporation. Court (Tenn.Ct. R3-CV, *4 WL allegation was noted there “no 2005) App. Aug. (piercing corporate form, of the nor corporate fraud misuse corporation “simply func veil when the there regarding evidence [wa]s private shareholder’s] tioned as sole [the keeping practices corpora- record of [the which utilized he bank account he as addition, In the agreements under tion].” wished”). Finally, evidence showed which the were plaintiffs brought suit sued, the corporation that once the signed capacity the owner in his its only sole shareholder encumbered as president corporation, docu- all set, plaintiffs effectively preventing ments that the rather corporation, evinced satisfying their judgment. VP owner, contracting party. than the was the Buildings, at *7. this 2002 WL 15634 In case, Likewise there was evi- case, however, this little there no evidence that dence of the of Delta other than operation failed to Mr. Garrison observe fact, Garrison’s admission that was the formalities. In Garrison testified reports file and officer and that he continued to annual sole shareholder addition, corporation “essentially even after it was effective was In there [him].” ly specific allegations because was one are no that Mr. Garri- project dissolved there addition, fraud, remaining completed. to be misused the cor- perpetrated son

835 (1) form, kept except or that as porate improper provided otherwise in this section, Finally, records. Mr. Garrison likewise not less than— signed (A) contract in this hour, an beginning on the 60th $5.85 capacity case in his as President and 25, 2007; CEO day May after clearly Delta and contract states (B) hour, an beginning 12 months $6.55 in Mr. consideration for Edmunds’ day; after that 60th work, Company agrees “the [i.e. Delta] (C) hour, an beginning 24 months $7.25 pay Employee a Mr. [i.e. Edmunds] day; after that 60th ... salary outlined in the Employee Offer Let- 206(a). § 29 U.S.C. The FLSA further Although ter.” we are sympathetic with provides a cause of employee action for an situation, recognize Edmunds’ we for unpaid wages: minimum piercing corporate veil is an “extreme” Any employer provi- who violates the remedy. Pamperin, S.W.3d at 438. sions of section or section this tending Without more evidence to show title be shall liable or employee that Mr. Garrison used the enti- employees in affected the amount of ty wrong, to “commit fraud or perpetu- unpaid their minimum wages, their or statutory ate the violation of a or other unpaid compensation, overtime as the positive duty, legal or a dishonest and be, may case and in an equal additional unjust act in parties’ contravention third liquidated amount as An damages.... must, rights,” Moody, like Court in we liability action recover the prescribed apply decline to the doctrine in this case. may against any [above] be maintained Pamperin, 276 (quoting S.W.3d at 438 public a employer (including agency) in 632). Bankers, Continental S.W.2d at competent Federal or State court of

jurisdiction by any one or employ- more D. Fair Labor Act Standards in ees for and behalf of himself them- or similarly employees selves other sit- Finally, Delta and shall, .... in uated The court such action argue finding in that the court erred in any judgment addition to awarded them liable under the Labor Fair Stan plaintiff plaintiffs, allow a reason- (“the Act, § dards et. seq. U.S.C. attorney’s able fee to be paid FLSA”). The FLSA provides that work defendant, and costs action. ers engaged “commerce” defined un 216(b). § U.S.C. Edmunds was statute, der the are a required to be undisputedly employed pursu- with Delta minimum wage: ant contract which to a he was be commerce; Employees engaged in home paid salary, than compensated rather in Puerto and Virgin workers Rico Is- hourly. that fact alone does lands; Samoa; in American employees prevent bringing pursu- him from a claim vessels; agricultur- seamen on American ant to the FLSA. For in the example, al employees highly analogous Johnny’s case of Orton v. L.L.C., Every Franchise, employer shall to each pay Lunch 668 F.3d 843 (6th employees Cir.2012), in any who workweek plaintiff, is en- who gaged the production employee, brought pursu- commerce or in salaried a claim goods commerce, employed or is ant FLSA em- to the after defendant enterprise an engaged ployer compa- commerce reduced his due to the goods or in production ny’s for com- decreased cash flow. The district merce, following at the wages rates: court dismissed the case. The Sixth Cir-

836 the exemption employer, the decision on the Court reversed tiffs Appeals

cuit Court court, the plain- Appeals judgment the reversed dis holding that the district Orton, F.3d 668 at 848^19. The under the missal. proper a claim had out tiff made plaintiffs further held that the alle FLSA, employee. Court being a salaried despite salary that the reduction in his gation According the Court: to problems to the cash flow company’s due (2004) ... establish regulations new The FLSA, prevent application not of the did are agreements no employment that regulation makes no stating that “[t]he starting point for longer the relevant just exception deductions in be for is on a employee salary whether an they by cash flow cause were motivated [v. Baden-Winterwood basis. Life advising employer shortages,” and that the [618,] Inc.], Fitness, 566 F.3d Time mutually agreeable to negotiate was free Cir.2009) (6th question is there- The ]. [ salary with employee. reduction in Id. plaintiff] was owed fore not what [the at 849. rath- agreement; under his er, compensation is what the question case, In this Delta and Mr. Garri actually plaintiff] received. [the argued in the trial son court Orton, at 848. The Sixth Circuit 668 F.3d exempt employee pursu an Edmunds was despite plain- to

went on conclude 213(a)(1) § to 29 (regarding ant U.S.C. salary employer, agreement with the tiffs “executive, administrative, professional” or pursue an action for he was entitled to (2) “computer employees), (regarding wages pursuant minimum unpaid systems analyses], computer program FLSA, exempt from long so as he mer[s], engineer[s], other simi software or Thus, salary employee an the FLSA. worker[s]”). However, larly skilled only allegation there is an relevant when court specifically found these ex exempt at issue is employee apply emptions did not to Mr. Edmunds. FLSA. provisions Neither nor Mr. raised any authority employer may argument raise a or cited on this

An appellate or at oral plaintiffs exempt employee status as an issue their brief brought argument. Appellate to claims Tennessee Rule of an affirmative defense 13(b) provides appellate v. Procedure re Speedway under the FLSA. Thomas L.L.C., 496, only view will SuperAmerica, generally 506 F.3d extend those “ (6th however, Cir.2007). presented Although an Exemptions, ‘are issues review. trial, may presented the em issue have been “a narrowly against to be construed ” ordinarily to brief it ployers seeking party’s to assert them.’ Id. failure consti Inc., Kanowsky, v. Ben tutes waiver or abandonment of the issue.” (quoting Arnold Colson, 453, Mosby 80 S.Ct. No. W2006-00490-COA- 361 U.S. L.Ed.2d (I960)). (Tenn. R3-CV, employer bears the bur 2006 WL at *10 2006) (other Ct.App. establishing August den of the affirmative defense citations omitted); Co., evidence, also Newcomb v. Kohler by preponderance see (Tenn.Ct.App.2006) employer this burden satisfies (failure any authority providing and affirmative evidence “to cite “clear posi every require argument regarding construct an employee [a] meets Thomas, waiver of exemption.” appeal” ment of an 506 F.3d tion on constitutes a Bean, (internal omitted). issue); quotation marks Bean v. 55-56 at 501 (“Courts have routine (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) Because the district court Orton failed appropri plain ly held that the failure to make place the burden establish during the record and to cite all ate references to workweeks in which Ed- in the section munds authority argument paid, stating: relevant was not *24 27(a)(7) required by the brief as Rule of 27. Delta worked all across United issue.”). Thus, a constitutes waiver States. The evidence showed that Delta the issue of whether Mr. Edmunds was had in projects California, Kentucky, exempt from of the FLSA is provisions Alabama, and Arkansas. Delta made proceed waived and this Court can to con sales calls in Indiana Michigan. and of sider the merits Mr. Edmunds’ claim. Delta had employees that lived outside of the state of Tennessee. Delta re- above, As discussed the trial court found ceived and sent mail to individuals and Mr. employee that Edmunds was an of corporations that were based outside of Delta, commerce, engaged in and awarded Tennessee. Delta received and initiated damages him pursuant to the FLSA. On telephone calls to individuals and enti- however, Delta appeal, and Mr. Garrison ties located outside of the state of Ten- argue that an Mr. Edmunds was not “em- nessee. was engaged Delta in interstate for on ployee” purposes the Act weeks commerce. paid. he pro- when was not The FLSA 28. Edmunds was also in engaged in- that an “the term ‘employee’ vides means terstate commerce in his for work Delta any employed by employer.” individual an and Garrison. Edmunds communicated 203(e)(1). § argues 29 U.S.C. Delta that by telephone and electronic mail with “employed by Mr. Edmunds Del- subcontractors, Delta employees, and ta” because he was terminated in 2006 and clients that were based outside of the his on that efforts behalf of Delta were state of inputted Tennessee. Edmunds merely “an ongoing application job.” for data programs into Delta originated that However, the court specifically trial found from Delta employees and subcontrac- with that Edmunds’ Delta tors that were located outside was never terminated and we have found state of Tennessee. opened preponderate that evidence does not mail originated that outside of the state Thus, against finding. Mr. Edmunds of Tennessee and sent mail “employee” was an purposes going outside the state Tennessee. FLSA resignation until his in October We conclude that the evidence preponderate against does not the trial Next, argues Delta on findings Ed- court’s this issue. Mr. Ed- that, munds was for all which throughout weeks in he munds testified his time engaged Delta, functions, activities performed covered with several discussed, previously including answering FLSA. As the FLSA phones input only applies employees ting regarding to those that en the data state out of em commerce, gage activity or ployees. some related Even Mr. Garrison admitted 206(a). contact, § See to commerce. personally U.S.C. Delta had either or “trade, The FLSA phone, defines commerce as over various out state commerce, transmission, issue, transportation, throughout clients the time at period among communication Delta do several States but contends that did not a “a place or between any penny State and out of business” with those clients. Re 203(b). § side thereof.” 29 The spectfully, portion U.S.C.A. Delta’s business clients, court Delta specifically spent soliciting found that and was without which engaged Delta had Ac- Edmunds were commerce would have no business. testimony, be- with his Mr. Garrison ad fail see a distinction tion cordingly, we involving communications current had with out of dealings mitted tween involving po- companies throughout communications employees clients and state Indeed, of communica- types tential clients. of time at issue. period Both of Delta in email, made behalf tions were Mr. Garrison September purposes. its business furtherance of Tiffen employees working refers to Mo FLSA “commerce” under the definition of torhomes, located Alabama. another the communi- requirement no makes email, Troy Mr. Garrison admits that *25 type in of financial cations result some Locklin, Alabama, who in was still lived 29 party. one See U.S.C.A. benefit August with as as employed Delta late 203(b). § that undisputed throughout It is his 2008. Delta, Mr. tenure with Edmunds would of also much the fact Delta makes regarding the data the timesheets he input not with identify that Mr. Edmunds could from all Delta in employees, received of on any particularity any given his activities or cluding those that lived worked out of place week. case took The trial this Accordingly, state. the evidence does not 2011, nearly years three since Mr. Ed- court’s preponderate against trial find position from with Del resigned munds his was ing employee that Mr. an of Edmunds recognizes law that wit ta. Tennessee Garrison,3 engaged and Mr. and Delta may by the memories “be dimmed nesses’ commerce, for all the weeks he was not Elrod, passage time.” Waddle v. 367 of 2006, 2007, paid in and 2008.4 (Tenn.2012). 217, Despite gap between the events at issue and V. Conclusion case, review trial in this from our of the evidence, judgment The of the Circuit Court of clearly Mr. Edmunds testified every County part, Robertson is affirmed in re- engaging that he in commerce was part, and for all fur- week that he worked for Delta. While versed remanded may necessary that be attempted proceedings Garrison to rebut conten ther as and disregard jointly 3. The trial court found Mr. reckless for matter of whether severally damages pursuant and liable for by prohibited conduct the statute” its was "employer” the FLSA because was the of trigger prove three-year willfulness and Indeed, overwhelming Mr. Edmunds. limitation). "[t]he dispute There statute is no authority weight is officer pursuant Mr. Edmunds' claim to the FLSA operational corporation's with control of a timely filing this added to case enterprise employer along covered is an with original complaint. an amendment to the See corporation, severally jointly liable Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15. The trial court in this wages.” unpaid under the FLSA for Donovan case, however, conflicting findings made as to 1509, (1st Cir.1983). Agnew, F.2d v. Delta Mr. violation whether Garrison's appeal ruling. this Mr. Garrison does willful, allowing this case was Mr. Edmunds wages to recover lost minimum for the third pursu- 4. statute of limitation on claim January year, January 2006 to years from ant to the FLSA is two when the First, court the trial found Delta’s 255(a). § cause action accrued. 29 U.S.C. willful, later failure to was not then con- exception the statute an contains cluded the failure willful. Ultimate- arising "that a cause of action out of a willful though, damages ly, the trial court awarded may violation be within three commenced years unpaid Id.; wages two minimum years after the cause of action accrued.” Co., damages. as a set off the contract Neither McLaughlin also see Richland Shoe ruling by the party takes issue with this U.S. 108 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d court; therefore, (1988) will plaintiff we not disturb (requiring show employer appeal. "that either knew showed among are this opinion. consistent with Costs the issues we appeal. review on this taxed to appeal Appellant are why That is find we ourselves L.L.C., Partners, surety. and its anomaly of an opinion enforces a con- $65,000 salary tractual per year claim KIRBY, J., concurring HOLLY M. well as an FLSA claim. separately. agree fully majority’s analysis I with the ORDER in this concur separately only case. I Appellee Robert peti- Edmunds filed a portion add a comment as to the tion to rehear on December 2012. In opinion on the Fair Labor Standards Act. petition, argues Mr. Edmunds that this case, we affirming this are the trial Court failed to a proper afford deference court’s award to Mr. under the findings trial court’s and miscon- Fair Labor Standards Act and under his strued the facts and law as to whether unusual, contract. It *26 corporate veil should be pierced allow though possible, employee for an whose Appellant Michael Garrison to be liable for duties him within the place protec- would of Appellant debts tions of Fair Labor Standards Act to Partners, After L.L.C. due consideration salary also have an enforceable claim for petition, of Mr. respectfully Edmunds’ it is under an It is high- contract. DENIED. ly unusual an employee for such have a $65,000 salary

contractual of as much as Here, year. the trial found per court Mr. Edmunds was not an administrative

employee exempt who

FLSA. majority, As noted the is- appeal sues raised do not include this ruling; why reason is not

Case Details

Case Name: Robert Thomas Edmunds v. Delta Partners, L.L.C.
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Date Published: Dec 18, 2012
Citation: 403 S.W.3d 812
Docket Number: M2012-00047-COA-R3-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tenn. Ct. App.
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