Robert Strickler v. Harold Clarke

21-6530 | 4th Cir. | Aug 24, 2021

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, FLOYD, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert Dale Strickler, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.


Robert Dale Strickler, a former Virginia inmate, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying class certification, denying a preliminary injunction, dismissing as moot Strickler’s motions to expedite review and amend the complaint, and ordering Strickler to file an amended complaint in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541" date_filed="1949-06-20" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.">337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). With the exception of the denial of Strickler’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the order Strickler seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. [*] Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. To the extent Strickler’s notice of appeal can be construed as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) petition for permission to appeal the denial of the class certification, permission is denied.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.



[*] The denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction is immediately appealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). However, Strickler requested immediate release from custody in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the record indicates he has since been released from custody. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot this portion of his appeal. See Rendelman v. Rouse , 569 F.3d 182" date_filed="2009-06-25" court="4th Cir." case_name="Rendelman v. Rouse">569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[A]s a general rule, a prisoner’s transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive . . . relief with respect to his incarceration there.”). 2