Robert SATERDALEN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. James SPENCER; David Rikhus, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-2953.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: May 16, 2013. Filed: Aug. 5, 2013.
725 F.3d 838
John M. Baker, Jenny Gassman-Pines, Greene & Espel, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
In February 2010, Saterdalen was a registered level III predatory offender subject to the reporting requirements of
Rikhus sought a warrant for Saterdalen’s arrest, alleging that Saterdalen had knowingly violated the state registration requirements or intentionally provided false information, in violation of
At no time has Saterdalen disclosed that he owns any property there and that this is his residence while he is in South America. By not providing this address in Belize, Saterdalen is in violation of his registration requirements in that the BCA cannot mail a verification form to Saterdalen.
Rikhus signed the arrest warrant complaint under oath and before a notary public. Spencer also signed the complaint, stating “[b]eing authorized to prosecute the offense charged, I approve this complaint.” An Olmsted County district judge issued the arrest warrant on February 25, 2010, finding that “the above sworn facts” established probable cause for Saterdalen’s arrest. Saterdalen was then arrested in Belize City and thereafter transported to Texas, where he was handcuffed, shackled, and transported by van to Olmsted County jail in Minnesota. Saterdalen’s bail was set at $1 million.
On August 31, 2010, the chief deputy county attorney dismissed the complaint against Saterdalen for lack of probable cause, stating, “There is insufficient evidence for the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. [Saterdalen] was not obligated by Minnesota law to register a secondary address located outside the State of Minnesota.”
Saterdalen’s complaint alleged “that the Defendants did a malicious prosecution, resulting in an unreasonable seizure and unlawful detention of [Saterdalen], violating his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” Compl. ¶ 2. After Rikhus and Spencer answered the complaint, the district court ordered Saterdalen to file a reply, which he did. See
II. Discussion
We review de novo the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings, applying the same standard of review as we apply to a dismissal under
A. Qualified Immunity
Saterdalen argues that Rikhus is not entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability and the burdens of litigation in a § 1983 suit unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir.2009). The question of qualified immunity thus “generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the [official’s] action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-819).
“The Fourth Amendment right of citizens not to be arrested without probable cause is indeed clearly established.” Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 649 (8th Cir.1999). Where the alleged constitutional violation involves an arrest pursuant to a warrant, “the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner[.]” Messerschmidt v. Millender, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012). That a warrant has issued, however, is not dispositive because “it is possible that a magistrate, working under docket pressures, will fail to perform as a magistrate should.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986). Accordingly, a civil rights suit against an officer who applied for a warrant may be maintained if “on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue[.]” Id. at 341.
As set forth above, Minnesota law requires that a level III predatory offender report his primary address and any “secondary addresses in Minnesota, including all addresses used for residential or recreational purposes.”
Minnesota’s reporting statute defines “primary address” as “the mailing address of the person’s dwelling.”
Saterdalen argues that minimal further investigation by Rikhus would have revealed that Saterdalen had met his reporting requirements. See Kuehl, 173 F.3d at 650-51 (holding that an officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from suit when a “minimal further investigation” would have exonerated the suspect). According to his appellate brief, Saterdalen regularly reported his primary address in Minnesota by returning verification forms and likewise reported where he traveled by sending postcards to Rikhus. Had those facts been known, the argument goes, no reasonably competent officer would have applied for a warrant. Saterdalen thus does not dispute the factual allegations in the arrest warrant complaint—including the fact that he had not reported the Belize address—but instead contends that the additional information would have indicated that he had complied with the statute. While arguably “[t]he most reasonable interpretation of the statute is that the Belize Address was not a primary address because Saterdalen still had a Minnesota address to which he planned to return each year,” D. Ct. Order of July 13, 2012, at 20, further investigation into Saterdalen’s reporting practices would not have undermined the objectively reasonable interpretation of law that the Belize address constituted Saterdalen’s primary address.
B. Absolute Immunity
Saterdalen also argues that the district court erred in granting Spencer absolute immunity from suit. “Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suits for damages arising out of their official duties in initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions.” Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1987) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)). The defense may be unavailable when a prosecutor performs functions outside his role as an advocate. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (explaining that when a prosecutor acts as an administrator or “performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer,” the prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity). Absolute immunity, however, covers actions taken to initiate a prosecution, “even if those actions are patently improper.” Williams, 827 F.2d at 1208.
Saterdalen contends that Spencer is not immune from suit because no probable cause existed to support the warrant for his arrest. Even if that were true, Spencer is nonetheless entitled to absolute immunity because his acts in reviewing
III. Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.