ROBERT S. UNPINGCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTOLIN DERRY, Defendant-Appellee.
Supreme Court Case No.: CVA19-016
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM
2021 Guam 1
2021 Guam 1
TORRES, J.
Superior Court Case No.: CV1189-18; Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam; Argued and submitted on March 9, 2020; Hagåtña, Guam
OPINION
Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellant: James M. Maher, Esq., Law Office of James M. Maher, DNA Bldg., 238 Archbishop Flores St., Ste. 300, Hagåtña, GU 96910
Appearing for Defendant-Appellee: Louie J. Yanza, Esq., Law Office of Louie J. Yanza, P.C., One Agana Bay, 446 E. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 202, Hagåtña, GU 96910
TORRES, J.:
[1] This appeal arises from a trespass action between neighbors over an encroaching fence and wall built by Defendant-Appellee Antolin Derry on Plaintiff-Appellant Robert S. Unpingco‘s Torrens registered property. As established in the proceedings below, Derry completed construction of the encroaching structures in 1994. Unpingco learned of the encroachment in 2017. In 2018, the Department of Public Works issued a notice of violation to Derry regarding the encroachment. Unpingco sued for an injunction and damages. Unpingco moved for partial summary judgment as no material facts were in dispute; Derry then cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations for trespass. The trial court denied Unpingco‘s motion for partial summary judgment and granted Derry‘s cross-motion for summary judgment, finding the trespass to be time-barred. Unpingco appeals, arguing the trial court misinterpreted the nature of the trespass and the applicability of the statute of limitations in
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[2] Unpingco came into possession of his property, identified as Lot 1072-2-A-2 in Barrigada, Guam, as a properly registered landowner in 1978 under Guam‘s Land Title Registration System. He moved away from the property in 1980. He received the property via a Deed of Gift from his parents and holds a certificate of title from the Guam Department of Land Management that does not list any estates, liens, charges, or encumbrances on the land described in the certificate of title. The land was first registered on February 1, 1929, and the certificate of title identifies Robert S. Unpingco as the certified owner of the property.
[4] A neighbor informed Unpingco of the encroachment in 2017, over 22 years after the erection of the wall. Unpingco then sent a letter to Derry informing him of the encroachment and asking Derry to take down the portions of the wall encroaching onto the property. Subsequently, in 2018, the Department of Public Works issued a “Notice of Violation” to Derry regarding the encroachment.
[5] On December 5, 2018, Unpingco filed suit against Derry before the Superior Court, alleging trespass and seeking injunctive relief—specifically, removal of the encroachment and damages. This action was commenced on December 5, 2018, over 24 years after the completion of the wall.
[6] Unpingco moved for partial summary judgment, alleging there were no material facts in dispute regarding the encroachment on his property as neither Unpingco nor Derry contested the encroachment‘s existence on Unpingco‘s property. Derry, however, cross-moved for summary judgment, asserting the suit was time-barred under
[7] The trial court denied Unpingco‘s motion and granted Derry‘s cross-motion for summary judgement, finding that no genuine issues of material fact remained regarding the statute of limitations. In doing so, the trial court held that Unpingco failed to bring a timely action under
II. JURISDICTION
[8] This court has jurisdiction over appeals from a final judgment of the Superior Court.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[9] “We review a trial court‘s decision granting a motion for summary judgment de novo.” Hawaiian Rock Prods. Corp. v. Ocean Hous., Inc., 2016 Guam 4 ¶ 13 (citing Zahnen v. Limtiaco, 2008 Guam 5 ¶ 8). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Guam R. Civ. P. 56(c).
IV. ANALYSIS
[10] Though multiple issues are raised on appeal, we limit our review to whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to Derry on the basis that Unpingco‘s complaint is barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in
[11] Guam‘s Land Title Registration Act uses a form of registration known as the Torrens system, a system for registering real property titles by “the use of certificates which conclusively show the state of the title at all times.” Pelowski v. Taitano, 2000 Guam 34 ¶ 30 (quoting Pioneer Abstract & Title Guar. Co. v. Feraud, 267 P. 134, 137 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928)); see also
[12] To initially register land under Guam‘s Torrens system, one must petition the Superior Court of Guam.
[13] Generally, “[e]very registered owner of land which is brought under the Torrens system holds the land free from any and all adverse claims, rights and encumbrances not noted on the certificate of title[.]” 14 Michael Allen Wolf, Powell on Real Property § 83.03[8] (2020) (LexisNexis Matthew Bender). This indefeasibility and simplicity is fundamental to the Torrens system. Id.; see also Lujan v. Quinata, 2016 Guam 39 ¶ 11 (explaining Guam‘s Land Registration System is intended to ensure titles are safe and indefeasible). Once the initial registering landowner completes the first registration process, one cannot “assert any interest or right in or lien or demand upon the same, or make entry thereon adversely to the title of interest” after one year,
[14] The Torrens land registration system “ensure[s] [the real property‘s] marketability, to protect the transferee of a registered title, and to simplify conveyancing by allowing prospective purchasers to rely on the certificate of title as reflecting all interests in the land.” 66 Am. Jur. 2d Registration of Land Titles § 1 (2020) (footnotes omitted); see also Pelowski, 2000 Guam 34 ¶ 30; Calvo Fin. Corp., 2008 Guam 12 ¶ 60. The system is intended to create “an absolute presumption that the register of titles speaks the last word about the title to land, eliminating all ‘secret liens and hidden equities,’ and making the language in the register of titles absolute proof of indefeasible title excepting only those encumbrances and claims noted therein.” Kincaid v. Yount, 459 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); see also
[15] As a result of this indefeasibility, a landowner may bring an ejectment action on Torrens-registered property regardless of a statute of limitations. See, e.g., Burkhart, 2013 Guam 2 ¶ 18 (holding that landowner may bring ejectment action in part because
[16] Some jurisdictions have held Torrens-registered land may be defeasible in a very narrow, limited number of circumstances. For example, Massachusetts provides restitution for claims against registration decrees made in bad faith or procured by fraud. See, e.g., Tetrault v. Bruscoe, 497 N.E.2d 275, 278 n.6 (Mass. 1986); Keller v. O‘Brien, 683 N.E.2d 1026, 1030 (Mass. 1997); State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Beale, 227 N.E.2d 924, 927 (Mass. 1967). Minnesota courts allow the doctrine of laches as an equitable defense to an ejection action. See Hebert, 2014 WL 103327, at *4; cf. Burkhalter v. Mays, 877 N.W.2d 788, 793-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (holding a party must prove actual, not merely constructive, knowledge to prevail on claim of interest not memorialized on certificate of title).
[17] Minnesota has established an exception for “boundary by practical location” through which adjoining landowners may change their boundary line, even for Torrens-registered land, through acquiescence, agreement, or estoppel. See In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. A15-1557, 2016 WL 3582593 (Minn. Ct. App. July 5, 2016); see also Romanchuk v. Plotkin, 9 N.W.2d 421, 427 (Minn. 1943). To achieve a change in boundary lines by acquiescence or agreement, the owner of the property being claimed must do something beyond mere passive conduct. Britney v. Swan Lake Cabin Corp., 795 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
[18] These circumstances are not present here—and Derry‘s encroachment would not defease Unpingco of title, were these tests to apply.
[19] Derry argues the protections against title defeasance in Guam‘s Land Title Registration Act is irrelevant to assessing this claim as there is no attempt by Derry to claim or defease Unpingco‘s land title. Appellee‘s Br. at 15-16 (Jan. 13, 2020). Even if Derry, however, is not claiming title to a portion of Unpingco‘s property, his encroachment is an unauthorized intrusion and encumbrance upon the property. As we have held, no one may claim “any estate, interest, claim, lien, or demand of any kind or nature whatsoever, against the land so ordered registered or any part thereof.” Pelowski, 2000 Guam 34 ¶ 30 (quoting
[20] Since lands registered under the Land Title Registration Act are indefeasible, absent potential aforementioned exceptions, the three-year statute of limitations for trespass actions set forth in
V. CONCLUSION
[22] We REVERSE the grant of summary judgment and REMAND to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
/s/
ROBERT J. TORRES
Associate Justice
/s/
KATHERINE A. MARAMAN
Associate Justice
/s/
F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO
Chief Justice