Rоbert S. Meyers appeals from the decision of the district court 1 granting summary judgment for Ford Motor Company. Meyers sought declaratory and injunctive relief and monеy damages against Ford for alleged discrimination on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. We affirm.
Meyers, a white male, contracted with Ford in September, 1974 to оperate the Ford automobile dealership in Marina del Rey, California. The agreement was a standard dealer development contract whereby Ford helps finance the purchase of the dealership. Ford and the dealer form a corporation in which Ford owns preferred stock and the deаler owns common stock. Dealership profits are used to retire the preferred stock. The contract provides that either party may terminate at will. Upon termination, the dealer receives payment for his common stock based on its value. If the stock has no value, the dealer is paid $1.00.
After two months оf operating the business at a loss, Meyers concluded that the dealership could not be profitable and he exercised his right to terminate the agreemеnt. He requested return of his original capital investment in the business. Ford denied this request and paid Meyers $1.00. Meyers concedes that this was in accord with the terms of the standard dealer development contract which he signed. He contends, however, that Ford’s strict adherence to the contract terms amounted to raсial discrimination in light of an allegedly more favorable settlement given the prior black owner of the Marina del Rey dealership. 2
Meyers’ immediate predеcessor was A. Gordon Wright, a black man. In January, 1968 Wright signed a standard dealer development contract to operate a Ford dealership at Venice, California. In 1972 the dealership was moved from Venice to Marina del Rey. Wright was unable to operate the Marina del Rey dealership at a profit. He did not wish to leave the business, however. In July, 1974 he agreed to give up his interest in the dealership’s sales operation if
Both partiеs conceded that there were no disputed material issues of fact and moved for summary judgment. On appeal Meyers contends that the district court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment for Ford.
42 U.S.C. § 1981
3
prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts,
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
The principles on the order and alloсation of proof under Title VII outlined in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
In the instant case the district court granted summary judgment for defendant at the close of discovery. The court con-eluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Meyers and giving him thе benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence, Ford was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Robert v. Browning,
Wright and Meyers were Ford dealers whose dealer dеvelopment agreements were terminated. Both operated the Marina del Rey dealership “point” at a loss; their stock was valueless. Each was рaid one dollar for his stock; Wright received an additional payment of $20,000.00. Meyers argues that intent to discriminate on the basis of race should be inferred from the diffеrences between the settlement terms.
The district court found, however, that Wright and Meyers were not similarly situated in all relevant respects. Wright had operated thе dealership for six years, the last two at Marina del Rey. He had been successful as a Ford dealer at the Venice location and believed that with the support of Ford the Marina del Rey point could be profitable. Although Ford and Wright made several attempts to shore up the business, that site was never profitablе. Nevertheless, Wright did not wish to give up the sales business and agreed to do so only at the insistence of Ford. Wright negotiated with Ford to obtain a favorable termination sеttlement but he also maintained his relationship with Ford and the dealership through his interest in the leasing operation. Meyers, on the other hand, voluntarily terminated his dealership contract after only two months. There is no evidence that he made serious effort to right the business.
Assuming, arguendo, that Meyers had established a primа facie case of race discrimination, the district court found that Ford had successfully rebutted it. In so doing, the court gave appellant the benefit of all rеasonable inferences from the evidence. The court noted that Ford was aware of Wright’s influence with other black dealers and in the black community. Therе was also some evidence that the $20,000.00 may have been paid to Wright mindful of possible legal claims against Ford for violation of antitrust, dealer protectiоn, and civil rights laws.
We believe the district court properly held that Ford had articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.
See Kenyatta v. Bookey Packing Co.,
Finally, Meyers failed to cаrry his burden of proving that Ford’s articulated reasons were mere pretext. There were economic and other factual differences which distinguished Meyers’ termination from that of Wright. The evidence clearly indicated that the differences in the terms of the settlements were not motivated by racial animus.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
. We note that although this suit was filed as a class action, the request for class certification was denied when appellant could not articulate a possible plaintiff class. Appellant has not shown that the settlement with Wright is part of any pattern or prаctice of favorable treatment of Ford dealers who are black.
. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Tеrritory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the sеcurity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.