Robert Allen appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to accept as timely a Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus.
1
Although the first document received by the district court — a motion to vacate which also asserted having delivered to the prison authorities a timely notice of appeal on March 28, 2004, thereby asserting a right to a belated appeal — was received by the
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district court approximately a year after it was due, Allen claimed he was entitled to benefit from the “prison mailbox rule,” articulated in
Houston v. Lack,
In requiring the extra due diligence, the district court relied on
Huizar v. Carey,
We conclude that the district court erred. As noted, the district court assumed that Allen did deliver a timely notice of appeal to the prison’s system for legal mail. Under that assumption — i.e., if that were an actual fact — then both
Houston
and Fed.R.App.P. 4(c)(1) mandate a holding that the NOA was filed as of the date of delivery to the prison authorities.
Houston
at 275,
However, it is clear from the district court’s order that it did not actually find as a fact that Allen had delivered a notice of appeal to the prison authorities on March 28, 2004; rather, the district court merely assumed that fact. Accordingly, on remand, the district court may inquire further as to the actual facts concerning whether or not, and when, a notice of appeal was delivered to the prison authorities. The district court may take into account any and all relevant circumstances, including any lack of diligence on the part of Allen in following up in a manner that would be expected of a reasonable person in his circumstances, in deciding whether the notice was delivered to the prison authorities. With respect to any such inquiry on remand, we construe both Houston and Fed.R.App.P. 4(c) to imply that the burden of proof should be placed upon the state if Allen has satisfied the requirement of Fed.R.App.P. 4(c)(1) (“timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or by a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of the depos *1199 it and state that first class postage has been prepaid.”). 2
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Notes
. Allen’s 1997 conviction in Alabama state court for first-degree robbery and attempted murder was affirmed by the Alabama court of Criminal Appeals. His petition for certiorari was denied by the Alabama Supreme Court. After two failed post-condition petitions in the state courts, Allen filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the federal district court for the Southern district of Alabama in June 2003. His federal habeas petition alleged six claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, one claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and a Brady violation. Adopting the magistrate's report and recommendations, the district court dis missed the petition in an order dated March 17, 2004. On May 4, 2005, Allen filed a motion to vacate and set aside the district court’s order. His motion contended that he should be permitted to proceed with his appeal because he had provided a properly addressed, postage-prepaid envelope containing his notice of appeal to the prison authorities at Holman correctional Facility on March 28, 2004. The district court rejected this argument, concluded the petition was untimely, and denied Allen's motion on July 20, 2005. We granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of "whether the district court properly denied appellant's request that the court accept his notice of appeal from the denial of his § 2254 petition!.]”
. Such placement of the burden of proof is also suggested by
Houston. See id.
at 275-76,
