Lead Opinion
This case is before the Court on appeal from a circuit court judgment validating a proposed bond issue.
We write further, however, because we conclude it is necessary to recede from our decision in Meyers v. City of St. Cloud,
Under the plain terms of the statute, any person wishing to participate in bond validation proceedings must appear in the circuit court. In connection with the filing of a bond validation complaint, section 75.05(1), Florida Statutes, requires that “[t]he court shall issue an order directed against the state and the several property owners, taxpayers, citizens and others having or claiming any right, title or interest in property to be affected by the issuance of bonds or certificates, or to be affected thereby, requiring all persons, in general terms and without naming them and the state through its state attorney or attorneys of the circuits where the county, municipality or district lies, to appear at a designated time and place within the circuit where the complaint is filed and show why the complaint should not be granted and the proceedings and bonds or certificates validated.” Section 75.07, Florida Statutes, goes on to provide that “[a]ny property owner, taxpayer, citizen or person interested may become a party to the action by moving against or pleading to the complaint at or before the time set for hearing.”
Therefore, we recede from Meyers. Since Meyers, we have stated on three other occasions that citizens and taxpayers who failed to appear in the circuit court bond validation proceeding nevertheless had standing to appeal the final judgment. See Rowe v. St. Johns Cnty.,
It is so ordered.
Notes
. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting,
I do not disagree with the reasoning of the majority opinion either on the merits or regarding the conclusion that the reasoning of Meyers is seriously flawed. But I am constrained to dissent because I conclude that this case should be dismissed. For reasons the majority opinion makes plain, the appellant lacks standing to bring this appeal. The proper disposition of such a ease is dismissal. I thus would give effect in this case to the abrogation of Meyers and its progeny.
