390 F.3d 262 | 3rd Cir. | 2004
Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 11-16-2004 Robert Perry Dehart v. Martin Horn Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential Docket No. 03-4250P Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004 Recommended Citation "Robert Perry Dehart v. Martin Horn" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 106. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/106 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
PRECEDENTIAL (Filed: November 16, 2004)
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Edward A. Olds, Esq. (Argued) __________ 1007 M ount Royal Boulevard Pittsburgh, PA 15223 No. 03-4250 Counsel for Appellant ___________
Gerald J. Pappert, Attorney General ROBERT PERRY DEHART, J. Bart DeLone, Esq. (Argued) Calvin R. Koons, Esq. Appellant John G. Knorr, III, Esq. Office of the Attorney General v. Appellate Litigation Section 15 th Floor, Strawberry Square MARTIN HORN, Commissioner of Harrisburg, PA 17120 Corrections; JAMES S. PRICE, Superintendent SCI Greene; UNITED Rodney M. Torbic, Esq. STATES OF AMERICA Office of the Attorney General (Intervenor in D.C.) 564 Forbes Avenue 5 th Floor ___________ Manor Complex Pittsburgh, PA 15219 On Appeal From the United States District Court for the Western District of Counsel for Appellees Martin Horn Pennsylvania and James S. Price (D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-01238) District Judge: The Honorable Bonnie R. Schlueter, Esq. William L. Standish Office of United States Attorney 700 Grant Street Argued October 1, 2004 Suite 400 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 BEFORE: ROTH and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges and Catherine Y. Hancock, Esq. IRENAS,* Senior District Judge. United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Staff * Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, 601 D. Street, N.W. Senior District Judge for the United Suite 9547 States District Court for the District of Washington, D.C. 20530 New Jersey, sitting by designation. Michael S. Raab, Esq. summary judgment for the Appellees on United States Department of Justice DeH art’s constitutional claims, and Civil Division, Appellate Staff dismissed his RLUIPA claim for failure to 601 D Street, N.W. comply with the exhaustion requirement of Room 9136 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We affirm the Washington, D.C. 20530 District Court’s grant of summary
judgment as to the constitutional claims Counsel for Appellee USA and reverse the dismissal of DeHart’s RLUIPA claim.
I.
OPINION OF THE COURT DeHart is a practitioner of Mahayana Buddhism, a religion to which he was introduced while a prisoner. He has practiced his religion daily since early 1990, although his interest in and study of
IRENAS, Senior District Judge. Buddhism dates back to the early 1980s. Robert Perry DeHart (“DeHart”) is He meditates and recites mantras for up to an inmate at SCI-Greene (“the Prison”), a five hours a day and corresponds with the Pennsylvania state correctional facility. City of Ten Thousand Buddhas, a religious He is serving a life sentence for murder, as organization located in Talmadge, well as shorter consecutive sentences for California. According to DeHart’s self- robbery, burglary and escape, and has been taught understanding of Buddhist religious incarcerated in the state correctional texts, he is not permitted to eat any meat or system since 1980. He brings this action dairy products, nor can he have foods pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against containing “pungent vegetables” such as M a r t i n H o r n , P e n n s y l v a n i a ’ s onions, garlic, leeks, shallots and chives. Commissioner of Corrections, and James As a result, DeHart became a vegetarian in S. Price, the Superintendent of the Prison 1989, and began declining food trays (“Appellees”), alleging that his Free containing meat in 1993. When he does Exercise and Equal Protection rights under accept food trays, he eats only fruit, certain the First and Fourteenth Amendments cereals, salads when served without were violated by the Prison’s refusal to dressing, and vegetables served with provide him with a diet comporting with margarine. DeHart supplements his meals his Buddhist beliefs. DeHart also brought with items purc hase d fro m th e a claim pursuant to the Religious Land Use commissary, including peanut butter, and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, peanuts, pretzels, potato chips, caramel 42 U.S.C. § § 2000cc et seq . (2000) popcorn, and trail mix. He requests that (“RLUIPA”). The District Court of the the Prison provide him with a diet free of Western District of Pennsylvania granted meat, dairy products and pungent vegetables. Sahoora Bag contains some items not served on that day’s master menu. Special The legal issues related to DeHart’s items for the therapeutic and religious request are best understood against the diets are purchased through the medical background of the system employed to department and prison commissary. feed prisoners in Pennsyl vania’s DeHart submitted a written grievance to correctional facilities. Inmates receive the Prison on June 17, 1995, requesting a standardized meals prepared pursuant to a diet free of “animal products and by- master menu, which is designed to provide products”consistent with his religious all of an inmate’s daily nutritional beliefs. [1] After his request for a vegan [2] requirements. Food for the inmates is diet was denied, DeHart unsuccessfully purchased and prepared in bulk. Inmates appealed his request to Superintendent are given limited choice in what appears Price and the Department of Corrections on their food trays; they are able to decline Central Office Review Committee. He also pork products and elect to receive an sent a letter to Commissioner Horn alternative protein source, such as tofu or outlining his religious dietary restrictions, a bean burger, when available. The only dated July 1, 1995. After completing the deviations from the mass production of appeals process within the Department of meals are for inmates with health Corrections, DeHart filed this suit, conditions necessitating therapeutic dietary pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the modifications and inmates with particular religious dietary restrictions. Doctors prescribe a variety of therapeutic diets, and [1] DeHart also filed an official the master menu includes seven different
grievance objecting to the use of butter in menus for diabetic inmates, sodium and fat the preparation of vegetables a month restricted menus, and a menu for inmates before, although he did not mention the with renal problems. Jewish inmates who religious basis for his complaint. DeHart adhere to a kosher diet receive special first raised the issue of his religious meals in the form of a “cold kosher bag,” beliefs in a written letter to which contain raw fruits and vegetables, Superintendent James Price dated May Ensure® dietary supplements, pretzels, 22, 1995, in which he specifically crackers, coffee and granola. Muslim mentioned that his Buddhist beliefs inmates receive special meals in their cells prohibited the consumption of meat, during Ramadan, when they observe a dairy and pungent vegetables. daylight fast. The Prison provides a post- [2] DeHart’s proposed diet is referred to sunset evening meal after the normal in the briefs and court documents supper hour and a breakfast bag, called a “Sahoora Bag,” to be eaten before sunrise. alternately as a vegetarian and a vegan As a result of concerns about food diet. Because he refuses to eat meat, fish and dairy products, we will use the term spoilage and serving temperature, the
vegan to describe his dietary preferences. Western District of Pennsylvania. decision in Johnson v. Horn , 150 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998), between religious This appeal marks DeHart’s third commandments and positive expressions appearance before this Court. In his first of belief. 227 F.3d at 54. Specifically, we appeal, we affirmed the District Court’s ordered the lower court to reconsider denial of preliminary injunctive relief. whether DeHart retained other means of DeHart v. Horn , 127 F.3d 1094 (3d Cir. exercising his religious beliefs in light of 1997) (mem.) (“ DeHart I”). The District our overruling Johnson . Id. We also Court held that DeHart’s request for a asked the District Court to assess the preliminary injunction should be denied on impact of granting DeHart’s request for a the ground that keeping a vegan diet was meat and dairy-free diet on the prison not a command of Buddhism. Despite community in light of the accommodations upholding the r esu lt, this Court made to Jewish inmates adhering to the emphasized that the District Court should kosher dietary rules. Id. at 58-59. With not determine “whether [DeHart’s] beliefs respect to DeHart’s Equal Protection are doctrinally correct or central to a claim, we emphasized that our overruling particular school of Buddhist teaching.” Id . of Johnson required Appellees to offer a at 2. legitimate penological reason for treating We next heard DeHart’s appeal of the DeHart differently than Jewish inmates District Court’s first grant of summary other than simply drawing a line between judgment for the Appellees. The District inmates with orthodox and non-orthodox Court held that the Prison’s policy of religious beliefs. Id. at 61. denying individual dietary requests of
On remand after DeHart II, the District inmates was reasonably related to a Court adopted the Magistrate’s Report and legitimate penological interest under the Recommendation to grant summary standard set out in Turner v. Safely , 482 judgment for Appellees. DeHart v. Horn , U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 No. 95-1238 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2003). (1987). [3] After the decision of a panel to The District Court rejected Appellees’ reverse the District Court’s judgment, argument that DeHart’s beliefs were not DeHart’s appeal was reheard en banc . sincere and religious in nature. See Magis. DeHart v. Horn , 227 F.3d 47 (2000) (en Rep. & Rec. on Mot. for Summ. J., at R.R. banc) (“ DeHart II”). This Court reversed 19a-24a. [4] The lower court concluded that the lower court’s judgment and remanded the second Turner factor weighed in favor for reconsideration of the second, third and of the Prison because DeHart had more fourth Turner factors. Id. In doing so, we than adequate alternative means of overruled the distinction drawn by our [4] We use the notation “R.R.” to expressing his religious beliefs: he was (W.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2001). However, in a permitted to meditate, recite the Sutras separate order, the District Court adopted (Buddhist religious texts), correspond with t h e M a g i s t r a t e ’ s R e p o r t a n d the City of Ten Thousand Buddhas, Recommendation that DeHart’s RLUIPA purchase canvas sneakers instead of claim be dismissed for failure to exhaust leather, have Buddhist materials sent to all administrative remedies as required by him from outside the prison and have a 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. DeHart v. Horn , No. Buddhist religious advisor visit him in 95-1238 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2003). The prison. See id. at R.R. 25a-26a. With District Court concluded that RLUIPA regard to the third Turner factor, the adopted a different substantive standard of District Court found that the dietary review for prisoner religious freedom accommodation proposed by DeHart was claims than RFRA. See Magis. Rep. & much more burdensome than what was Rec. on M ot. to Dismiss, at R.R. 44a. provided to Jewish and Muslim inmates Therefore, because DeHart presented his because his d iet w ou ld req uire claim to the prison grievance process individualized preparation of meals and while RFRA provided the applicable special ordering of food items not on the standard, his claim was no longer master menu. See id. at R.R. 26a-34a. exhausted now that it was based on The lower court concluded that DeHart’s RLUIPA. See id. at R.R. 46a. d i e t a r y r e q u e s ts c o u l d n o t b e
DeHart appeals both the grant of accommodated without imposing more summary judgment on his First and than a de minimis cost on the Prison. See Fourteenth Amendment claims and the id. at R.R. 34a-36a. dismissal of his RLUIPA claim. DeHart’s complaint, as initially filed,
II.
also claimed that his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs had been We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal impaired in violation of the Religious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a district court’s grant of summary Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 2000bb et seq . (1993) (“RFRA”). In City judgment is plenary and we employ the of Boerne v. Flores , 521 U.S. 507, 117 same standard as applied below. United States ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare , 382 F.3d S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed. 624 (1997), the S u p re m e C o u r t d e c la r e d R F RA 432, 436 (3d Cir. 2004). A district court unconstitutional as applied to the States, may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact to be and DeHart’s claim was extinguished . After DeHart II and before the lower resolved at trial and the moving party is court’s decision on remand, RLUIPA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. enacted as a replacement for RFRA. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the DeHart was granted leave to amend his pleadings, depositions, answers to complaint to state a claim under the new interrogatories, and admissions on file, statute. DeHart v. Horn , No. 95-1238 together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any related to legitimate penological interests.” material fact and that the moving party is Id. at 89. We elaborated in DeHart II that: entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
[T]his standard of review requires a Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). The substantive law court to respect the security, governing the dispute will determine rehabilitation and administrative which facts are material, and only disputes concerns underlying a prison over those facts “that might affect the regulation, without requiring proof outcome of the suit under the governing that the regulation is the least law will properly preclude the entry of restrictive means of addressing those summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty concerns, it also requires a court to Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “In give weight, in assessing the overall reviewing the grant of summary judgment, reasonableness of regulations, to the we must affirm if the record evidence inmate’s interest in engaging in submitted by the non-movant ‘is merely constitutionally protected activity. colora ble or is no t signific antly probative.’” Port Auth. of New York & 227 F.3d at 51. Thus, DeHart’s appeal New Jersey v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. , 311 forces us to resolve the tension between a F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2002). court’s duty to redress constitutional
violations resulting from neutral prison
III.
regulations and its obligation not to A. unreasonably interfere with the complex issues involved in managing the day-to- In Turner v. Safely the Supreme Court day activities of a prison. identified the crucial balance in assessing inmates’ claims that their constitutional Turner articulated a four factor test for rights were violated by prison regulations. determining whether a prison regulation is While “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier reasonably related to a legitimate separating prison inmates from the penological interest. 482 U.S. at 79. As protections of the Constitution. . . . ‘the we explained in Waterman v. Farmer , 183 problems of prisons in America are F.3d 208, 213 n.6 (1999) (citation complex and intractable, and, more to the omitted): point, they are not readily susceptible of
[ Turner ] requires courts to consider resolution by decree.’” 482 U . S. at 84 (1) whether a rational connection (quoting Procunier v. Martinez , 416 U.S. exists between the regulation and a 396, 404-405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d neutral, legitimate government 224 (1974)). Recognizing this tension in interest; [5] (2) whether alternative principles, Turner established the standard of review for prisoner constitutional claims: “when a prison regulation [5] In DeHart II we upheld the District impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably Court’s finding that this factor favored
the Prison. We held that a prison’s means exist for inmates to exercise fourth Turner factors. 227 F.3d at 57-59. the constitutional right at issue; (3) Specifically, we asked the District Court to what impact the accommodation of assess the potential impact on the prison the right would have on inmates, community of granting DeHart’s request prison personnel, and allocation of for a special diet comporting with his prison resources; and (4) whether religious beliefs in light of the prison obvious, easy alternatives exist. system’s experience with providing other
religious diets. Id. at 58. We also asked We cautioned in DeHart II that this the lower court to reexamine whether approach “does not call for placing each DeHart’s religious dietary restrictions factor in one of two columns and tallying could be accommodated in such a way as a numerical result,” but that assessing the to impose only a de minimis cost on the reasonableness of a prison regulation Prison. Id. We noted that “the requires consideration of all the evidence defendants’ treatment of Jewish inmates, in the record. 227 F.3d at 59. [6] in the absence of some further explanation, When we reversed the District Court’s casts substantial doubt on their assertion grant of summary judgment in DeHart II, that accommodating DeHart’s request we directed the lower court to reevaluate would result in significant problems for its findings on the second, [7] third and the prison community.” Id . We are
satisfied that the District Court on remand properly considered the impact on other
interests in an efficient food system and inmates, guar ds an d th e prison in avoiding inmate jealousy were administration of providing of religious legitimate penological concerns. 227 diets for adherents of other faiths, and we F.3d at 53. Additionally, the Prison’s agree that the third Turner factor favors refusal to provide DeHart with a the Prison. While neither party separately religious diet bore some rational relation addressed the lower court’s findings on the to that interest. Id. fourth Turner factor in this appeal, we are also satisfied with the District Court’s [6] In DeHart II we explained that Turner was equally applicable to DeHart’s Free Exercise and Equal
Buddhist beliefs through meditation, Protection claims, and that the analysis correspondence with Buddhist religious significantly overlapped. 227 F.3d at 61. organizations, and through the purchase [7] We instructed the lower court to of canvas, rather than leather, sneakers, reconsider its analysis of the second amongst other accommodations. See Turner factor on remand in light of our Magis. Rep. & Rec. on Mot. for Summ. decision to overrule Johnson . 227 F.3d J., at R.R. 19a-24a. DeHart has not at 54. The District Court subsequently appealed this finding, so that only the held that this factor also favored the third and fourth factors are at issue in Prison, as DeHart was able to express his this appeal. analysis on that issue. DeHart has repeatedly affirmed the Avon
diet, he has also continued to insist that he
B.
be served no pungent vegetables. [10] The third Turner factor requires that we analyze the impact of accommodating DeHart’s dietary requests on inmates,
and onions: “garden burgers, the chili, prison personnel, and allocation of prison the bean chili, the tofu salad, the stewed resources. When DeHart II was decided, tomatoes, the vegetable soup, . . . , the DeHart proposed that he be served a diet bean and pasta casserole, the vegetable created by dietician Karen Avon which bean soup, . . . , the soy pasta sauce, the modified serving sizes of items on the pasta bean soup, . . . , the soy barbeque, master menu and added soy milk and the fried potatoes, the baked beans, . . . , whole grain bread as supplements. [8] The and the bean burger.” Dep. of Margaret Avon diet, however, includes items that Gordon, at R.R. 712a. Avon’s proposed contain pungent vegetables. [9] Although menu included stewed tomatoes, baked beans, and beet and onion salad. Aff. of Karen Avon, at R.R. 202a-210a. [8] Aff. of Karen Avon, at R.R. 195a- [10] DeHart’s affidavit submitted in 232a. Avon includes as an appendix to support of his Opposition to the her affidavit modifications based on one Appellees’ Motion for Summary week’s master menu. For example, on Judgment, which his counsel affirmed Monday inmates were served for supper during oral argument, included the egg salad made with one egg yolk, three following statements: egg whites, onion, celery and 4. I cannot eat dairy products, mayonnaise, one half cup noodles, one pungent vegetables, or meat half cup succotash, one half cup beet and products, in any form and follow onion salad, fresh fruit and eight ounces my religious beliefs. of skim milk. Avon proposed that 5. I would agree to eat extra DeHart be served one half cup of servings of vegetables, and extra noodles, one cup succotash, one cup beet servings of non-meat items such as and onion salad, two slices of whole tofu, beans, soy milk, and peanut grain bread, two teaspoons of margarine, butter, which are consistent with my fresh fruit, eight ounces of soy milk and religious beliefs . These items, with eight ounces of iced tea. Id. at R.R. the exception of soy milk, appear in 202a. the main menu offered to all [9] Margaret Gordon, a clinical dietitian inmates, nearly every day and are for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, readily available. They are also testified at her deposition that the regularly mixed with onions and following non-meat, non-dairy items garlic, which are prohibited from the master menu contained garlic pungent vegetables. DeHart’s proposed diet now appears to be whole grain bread and extra servings of the that he be served extra portions of few alternative protein sources DeHart vegetables and grains on the master menu, would eat, all at extra cost to the Prison. consistent with the Avon diet, but with the Id. Secured food storage would be portions individually prepared to his required in order to prevent theft of the dietary specifications . Alternatively, he specially ordered items. Id. The District proposes that he receive extra daily Court noted that DeHart’s proposed diet servings of the alternative protein sources was not nutritionally adequate, and would available at the Prison, but specially require regular nutritional audits by a prepared without pungent vegetables and contract dietician, also at extra cost to the Prison. [11] Id. In contrast, the District Court outside of their rotation on the master menu. Therefore, to the extent that found that the religious diets provided to DeHart II’s discussion of the third and Jewish and M uslim inmates did not require fourth Turner factors used the Avon diet as its comparison point, our prior ruling provides little guidance for our analysis. [11] In DeHart II we directed the District Court to determine how and if the
The District Court held that DeHart’s Pennsylvania Department of Corrections proposed diet would place a greater burden Food Services Administrative Directive on the Prison than the dietary requiring a registered dietician to verify accommodations granted to Jewish and that the master menu meets or exceeds Muslim inmates. See Magis. Rep. & Rec. the recommended daily nutritional on Mot. for Summ. J., at R.R. 30a-36a. allowances would apply to DeHart’s DeHart’s diet would require individualized proposed diet. 227 F.3d at 49 n.1. If the preparation of his meals, which is made District Court found that DeHart’s more burdensome by the fact that the proposed diet fell short of the nutritional Prison’s kitchen was set up only for bulk standards contained in the Administrative food preparation. Id. Additionally, it Directive, we indicated that the issue would require special ordering soy milk, would remain under Turner whether the directive was reasonably related to a . . . legitimate penological interest. Id. 7. Now that the Commonwealth Neither party nor the District Court serves alternate protein sources addressed this question on remand. such as tofu, peanut butter and However, we recognize the link between beans, if they were to give me good health and a nutritionally adequate servings of those items without diet, and note that the prison has a pungent vegetables , it would come significant interest in keeping prisoners far closer to satisfying my healthy, given the costs of medical nutritional needs than they do now. treatment and the difficulty in preventing
Aff. of Robert P. DeHart, at R.R. 256a- the spread of illness between prisoners in 260a (emphasis added). close quarters. special ordering of items not already involve supplementing or alternating available at the Prison or through the regular prison meals with additional foods Prison’s current vendors, nor did they already available at the prison. However, require individualized preparation of providing a diet free of pungent vegetables meals. Id. would mandate that the prison alter the
way it prepares meals. This problem is On appeal, DeHart argues that the cold only heightened by DeHart’s failure to put kosher meals served to Jewish inmates and forward, in specific terms, a diet that the Sahoora bags provided to Muslim would fit within his restrictions. While inmates during Ramadan also require some of the therapeutic diets include individualized preparation and the serving specially prepared items and foods not of items not appearing, or outside their included on the master menu, [13] the failure rotation, on the master menu. He contends to provide medically necessary therapeutic that there is no reason why granting his diets puts the health of inmates at risk and request would pose any greater burden on could result in significant medical the Prison than other special diets because expenses. individualized preparation is required for all the therapeutic meals and religious With respect to the dietary diets. Additionally, he argues that his accommodations provided to Jewish dietary request is no more likely to lead to inmates, the cold kosher meals do not an increase in requests for dietary require special ordering of items not accommodations than any of the other already available at the Prison. The kosher special diets served at the Prison. meals involve negligible preparation, as
they are uncooked, and in the case of some DeHart’s arguments overlook a crucial fruits and vegetables, uncut as well. In distinction. None of the other special diets fact, the diet DeHart requests bears a served at the Prison require individualized greater resemblance to the hot kosher preparation and reorganization of the way meals we declined to require in Johnson . prison kitchens prepare food and are The Sahoora bags provided to Muslim provided to accommodate an inmate’s inmates require some special preparation religious beliefs. [12] Other religious diets in order to prevent foods in the breakfast bags from spoiling overnight, and add the complication of being served outside of [12] There are no inmates receiving the cold kosher diet at SCI-Greene, so we normal mealtimes. However, these today. Although analysis under Turner is Sahoora bags do not require major changes not a mere tabulation of factors, it is clear to how the prison purchases, stores or from the foregoing analysis that the prepares food, in contrast to the special Prison’s denial of DeHart’s request for a preparation of single servings sought by diet consistent with his Buddhist beliefs is DeHart. reasonably related to the Prison’s
legitimate interest in efficient food With regard to th e provision. fourth Turner factor, the District Court found that there was no alternative that IV. could fully accommodate DeHart’s
As we noted in DeHart II, the analysis religious dietary restrictions while of DeHart’s Equal Protection claim imposing only a minimal burden on the incorporates much of the discussion of the Prison. See Magis. Rep. & Rec. on Mot. third and fourth Turner factors. 227 F.3d For Summ. J., at R.R. 34a-36a. Simply at 61. In our earlier opinion, we directed providing double servings of vegetables the District Court to reconsider its grant of and grains on the master menu, or daily summary judgment for Appellees in light servings of the available alternative protein of our invalidation of the distinction drawn sources, would not meet DeHart’s needs between religious commandments and because they include pungent vegetables, positive expressions of belief. Id. We which he has repeatedly affirmed that he held that “the distinction drawn between would not eat. Id. at R.R. 35a. Special orthodox and non-orthodox believers ordering of soy milk, whole grain bread cannot justify the refusal of DeHart’s and extra servings of alternative protein request” in the absence of some nexus sources is costly and burdensome, as is the between this distinction and a legitimate individualized preparation of master menu penological concern. Id. On remand and items without pungent vegetables. Id. in this appeal, the Appellees argue instead DeHart denies that his proposed diet poses that DeHart is not similarly situated to any any special burden, but we agree that the group for equal protection purposes record supports the conclusion that his because his request poses a greater burden religious dietary restrictions cannot be met, than the dietary accommodations given to by the menu he suggests or any obvious Jewish and Muslim inmates. DeHart and easy alternative, with only a de argues that he is similarly situated to minimis cost to the Prison. Jewish and Muslim inmates, and again In DeHart II we affirmed the District contests the District Court’s conclusion that his proposed diet is more burdensome. Court’s conclusion that first Turner factor favored the Prison, and reversed its However, because we find that the burden findings as to the second, third and fourth imposed by DeHart’s proposed diet exceeds the burden imposed by factors. On remand, the lower court determined that those factors also favored accommodating Muslim and Jewish inmates, we affirm the District Court’s the Prison, a conclusion that we affirm grant of summary judgment for Appellees review over a district court’s decision to on DeHart’s Equal Protection claim. [14] grant a motion to dismiss, and to the extent
that our review turns on the statutory
V.
construction of the exhaustion requirement Subsequent to our decision in DeHart in Section 1997e(a), our review is also II, DeHart amended his complaint to state plenary. Spruill v. Gillis , 372 F.3d 218, a claim under the newly enacted Religious 226 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Section 1997(e)(a) provides that “[n]o Act. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss action shall be brought with respect to the amended complaint on the ground that prison conditions under Section 1983 . . . DeHart had not exhausted the prison or any other Federal law, by a prisoner administrative grievance process for his confined in any jail, prison, or other RLUIPA claim. The District Court c o r r e c t io n a l f a c i l it y u n t i l s u c h accepted the Magistrate’s Report and administrative remedies as are available Recommendation to dismiss and DeHart are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) now appeals. [15] We exercise plenary (1996). This stringent exhaustion requirement was established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), [14] As a result of our conclusion that replacing language that required prisoners DeHart is not similarly situated to any to exhaust only those “plain, speedy, and other group of inmates, there is no need effective remedies as are available.” Civil to consider the Turner factors in Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, addressing his Equal Protection claim. Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349, § 7(a)
(1980), amended by Prison Litigation [15] Although the District Court’s order Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, does not so specify, we conclude that the 110 Stat. 1321 at 66 (1996). The PLRA dismissal for failure to exhaust was enacted with a two-fold purpose: to administrative remedies was with limit the number of prison condition prejudice, and therefore final and lawsuits then flooding the courts and to appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. return control over prison policies and Plaintiff has never argued that the decision-making to local prison officials. dismissal should be without prejudice, See Porter v. Nussle , 534 U.S. 516, 524- but instead contends that exhaustion is 25, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). not required. In essence, the lower court’s ruling was an adjudication on the merits of his contention because it complaint, rather than attempt to exhaust addressed the question of whether his RLUIPA claim. As a result, the order RLUIPA so altered the standard of is appealable. See Deutsch v. United review as to require re-exhaustion of States , 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. claims grieved under RFRA. Plaintiff 1995); Borelli v City of Reading , 532 has elected to stand on his dismissed F.3d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976).
This Court has repeatedly held that Appellees argue that DeHart has not Section 1997e(a) makes exhaustion of given the Prison an opportunity to address prison administrative remedies mandatory, his claim under what they assert is a new regardless of the efficacy of the grievance substantive standard contained in process. See, e.g., Nyhuis v. Reno , 204 RLUIPA, and as a result, the District F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that Court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust “the PLRA amended § 1997e(a) in such a administrative remedies is proper. way as to make exhaustion of all Appellees have never contended that a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s DeHart did not exhaust all the available mandatory–whether or not they provide the administrative remedies when the claim inmate-plaintiff with the relief he says he was brought under RLUIPA’s predecessor, desires”); Booth v. Churner , 206 F.3d 289 RFRA. In fact, DeHart’s suit predates the (3d Cir. 2000) (finding exhaustion PLRA, and therefore he is not required to mandatory in Eighth Amendment claim exhaust all remedies under the PLRA’s brought by prisoner under § 1983 even stringent standard. It is clear from the though plaintiff s o ug h t m onetary record that prior to filing suit, DeHart damages), aff’d 532 U.S. 731 (2001). We exhausted all the administrative remedies held that an across-the-board, mandatory available to him in seeking a diet that exhaustion requirement serves the comported with his religious beliefs. The underlying policies of the PLRA, issue is then whether RLUIPA and RFRA including: are sufficiently different as to justify
requiring DeHart to present his claim for a (1) avoiding premature interruption second time to the prison grievance of the administrative process and process. Because we disagree with giving the agency a chance to Appellees’ contention that RLUIPA discover and correct its own errors; enacted a new substantive standard of (2) conserving scarce judicial review for prisoner religious claims, we resources, since the complaining hold that DeHart has satisfied the party may be successful in exhaustion requirement of Section vindicating his rights in the 1997e(a) and may proceed with his administrative process and the courts RLUIPA claim. may never have to intervene; and (3) improving the efficacy of the RFRA provided that “[g]overnment administrative process. shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden Nyhuis , 204 F.3d at 75. Although we results from a ru le of gene ral rejected a judicially-created futility applicability.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) exception to the exhaustion requirement in (1993). RFRA included an exception to its Nyhuis , 204 F.3d at 71, we have never held blanket rule: “Government may that a prisoner must exhaust his claims substantially burden a person’s exercise of more than once. religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the change substantive constitutional law person—(1) is in furtherance of a rather than re med y constitu tional compelling governmental interest, and (2) violations, given the broad scope of the is the least restrictive means of furthering Act, its applicability to the States, and the that compelling governmental interest.” lack of evidence of First Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). violations on par with the type of
widespread abuse as demonstrated in RFRA had been passed in response to support of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. the Sup reme Court’s decision in City of Boerne , 521 U.S. at 530, 532. Employment Division v. Smith , in which the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny Following the decision in City of to a facially neutral, generally applicable Boerne , Congress attempted to preserve law that incidentally burdened members of RFR A’s com pelling gov ernm enta l a particular religious group. 494 U.S. 872, interest/least restrictive means test by 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). recasting it in a form that could avoid the In doing so, the Court held that application fatal constitutional problems of that of the compelling government interest test statute. The result of this effort, RLUIPA, it set forth in Sherbert v. Verner , 374 U.S. essentially reiterates the language of 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 RFRA as it applies to institutionalized (1963), would have created the “anomaly” persons: of a “constitutional right to ignore neutral
No government shall impose a laws of general applicability.” City of substantial burden on the religious Boerne , 521 U.S. at 513 (citing Smith , 494 exercise of a person residing in or U.S. at 885). The Congressional findings confined to an institution, as defined accomp an y ing R F R A spec ificall y in section 1997 of this title, even if repudiated the Court’s decision in Smith , the burden results from a rule of see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4), with general applicability, unless the Congress stating that the purpose of RFRA government demonstrates that was “to restore the compelling interest test imposition of the burden on that as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and person– Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise (1) is in furtherance of a compelling of religion is substantially burdened.” 42 governmental interest; and U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (citations omitted).
(2) is the least restrictive means of In City of Boerne , the Supreme Court f u r t h e ri n g t h a t c o m p e l l i n g overturned RFRA as it applied to the governmental interest. States. It held that Congress had exceeded
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000). Congress the scope of its enforcement powers under was explicit in its intent to replicate in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in RLUIPA the substantive portions of enacting RFRA. The Court concluded that RFRA. 146 Cong. Rec. E1563-01 (daily RFRA was an impermissible attempt to ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. First, it pares the scope of the legislation Canady) (“[Section 2000cc-1(a)] applies from RFRA’s broad applicability down to the RFRA standard to protect the religious only land use issues and claims by exercise of persons residing in or confined institutionalized persons. Compare 42 to institutions”); 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01 U.S.C § 2000bb-1 (“Government shall not (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of substantially burden a person’s exercise of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (“[RLUIPA] religion even if the burden results from a applies the standard of the Religious rule of general applicability . . .”), with 42 Freedom Restoration Act”). U.S.C. § 2000cc (“No government shall
impose or implement a land use regulation Contrary to the position of Appellees in a manner that imposes a substantial and the District Court, it cannot be argued burden on the religious exercise of a that RLUIPA does not apply the same person . . .”), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 standard to prisoner free exercise claims as (“No government shall impose a did RFRA. The statutory language is substantial burden on the religious exercise nearly identical, and statements by of a person residing in or confined to an RLUIPA’s sponsors in the Congressional institution, . . . , even if the burden results Record indicate that the legislative intent from a rule of general applicability. . .”). was to reenact RFRA in constitutional Second, it shifts the source of Congress’ form. [16] See 146 Cong. Rec. E1563-01; power to pass the Act. While RFRA was 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01. RLUIPA styled as an expression of congressional makes two fundamental changes to RFRA. authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, RLUIPA w as enacted pursuant to Congress’ powers under the [16] Appellees raised the question of Spending Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. RLUIPA’s constitutionality before the 1, and the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. District Court, but the issue was mooted art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc- by the District Court’s holding that 1(b) (“This section applies in any case in DeHart had not exhausted his RLUIPA which – (1) the substantial burden is claim. The United States of America imposed in a program or activity that joined this case as an intervenor to receives Federal financial assistance; or (2) defend the constitutionality of RLUIPA the substantial burden affects, or removal before the District Court. The Supreme of that substantial burden would affect, Court recently granted certiorari in a case commerce with foreign nations, among the raising this issue. See Cutter v. several States, or with Indian tribes.”). Wilkinson , 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003) RLUIPA makes no change to the standard (holding that RLUIPA violates the by which prisoners’ free exercise claims Establishment Clause), cert. granted , 73 are reviewed. U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2004) (No. 03-9877). The constitutionality of
The District Court’s reliance on Wilson RLUIPA may be an issue on remand to v. Moore , No. 4:01CV158-RV, 2002 WL the District Court. 950062 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2002), is in errors under the compelling interest/least error. In Wilson , the Northern District of restrictive alternative test of RFRA and Florida dismissed several claims made by RLUIPA. Forcing DeHart to present the the plaintiff, an inmate in a Florida state same claim under the same standard as a correctional facility, on the ground that the prerequisite to judicial review of his plaintiff had not exhausted his claims RLUIPA claim is unnecessary and serves under the new RLUIPA standard, even none of the purposes of the PLRA’s though the claims were filed before exhaustion requirement. RLUIPA was enacted. The crucial
VI.
difference between Wilson and the instant case is that DeHart exhausted his free For the foregoing reasons, the judgment exercise claim under RFRA, which applied of the District Court with respect to the same standard as contained in DeHart’s First and Fourteenth Amendment RLUIPA, whereas in Wilson , the claims will be affirmed. The judgment of plaintiff’s grievances were filed well after the District Court with respect to DeHart’s RFRA was declared unconstitutional . See claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act will be Wilson , 2002 WL 950062, at *3-4 (noting that plaintiff filed grievances on July 10, reversed and remanded for further Aug. 21, Aug. 22, Dec. 18, and Dec. 25, proceedings consistent with this opinion. 2000). As a result, the prison reviewed the Wilson plaintiff’s claim under the pre- RFRA standard employed in Smith and O’Lone v. Shabazz , 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), which applied the Turner reasonableness test to prisoner free exercise claims. Wilson , 2002 WL 950062, at *5. The actual holding of Wilson is that RLUIPA substantively changed the standard of review from what it was before RFRA was passed and after RFRA was declared unconstitutional, and not, as the lower court and Appellees suggest, from the standard contained in RFRA itself.
DeHart is not required to re-exhaust his RLUIPA claim. He appropriately presented his grievance to the Prison under the identical standard before commencing the instant lawsuit in 1995. The Prison has had its opportunity to correct its own
NOTES
[3] The Turner factors are outlined and designate page numbers in the discussed infra Part III. Reproduced Record.
[13] For example, the therapeutic diets compare DeHart’s request to the diet served to Jewish inmates at SCI- include items that do not appear on the Pittsburgh. The record does not specify master menu, such as pineapple and exactly how many Muslim inmates there grapefruit juice, apricots, sugar free are at SCI-Greene or in the Pennsylvania beverages, cold cuts, chicken pieces in correctional system, but the record broth, pineapple chunks, and applesauce. indicates that the number is considerable. Aff. of Karen Avon, at R.R. 219a-232a.
