692 F. App'x 937
9th Cir.
2017

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darcy PASCHALL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50502

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Filed July 3, 2017

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

691 Fed. Appx. 937

Benjamin Holley, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Michael Emerson Lasater, Esquire, U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Sandra Hourani, Doug Keller, Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM **

Darcy Paschall appeals from the district court‘s judgment and challenges the six-month custodial sentence and 51-month term of supervision imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Paschall contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to respond to her nonfrivolous argument in favor of leniency. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there was none. The record reflects that the district court considered Paschall‘s argument and adequately explained its reasons for imposing the sentence selected. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358-59, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007).

Paschall also contends that the 51-month term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable in light of the district court‘s willingness to terminate supervision in two years if Paschall remains violation-free. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The term of supervised release is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Paschall‘s history of drug and alcohol abuse. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

AFFIRMED.

Robert Steven MAWHINNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-55006

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Filed July 3, 2017

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

691 Fed. Appx. 937

Robert Steven Mawhinney, Pro Se

John David Hayashi, Esquire, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Irvine, CA, Robert Jon Hendricks, Esquire, Attorney, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM **

Robert Steven Mawhinney appeals pro se from the district court‘s judgment denying his petition to vacate an arbitration award entered against him and granting American Airlines, Inc.‘s petition to confirm the award. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly denied Mawhinney‘s petition to vacate the arbitration award because Mawhinney‘s allegations of arbitrator misconduct, and his disagreements with the arbitration process and result, failed to demonstrate any of the statutory grounds for vacating the award under 9 U.S.C. § 10. See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“Neither erroneous legal conclusions nor unsubstantiated factual findings justify federal court review of an arbitral award under the statute, which is unambiguous in this regard.“); see also U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat‘l Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Arbitrators enjoy wide discretion to require the exchange of evidence, and to admit or exclude evidence, how and when they see fit.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mawhinney‘s motion to alter or amend the judgment because Mawhinney failed to establish any basis for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Mawhinney‘s requests to supplement the record, set forth in his reply brief, are denied.

AFFIRMED.

Notes

*
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.