Robert J. Marshall v. United StatesRobert J. Marshall v. United States
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Hufstedler
Lead Opinion
The appellee to this proceeding, Robert Marshall, is a federal prisoner incarcerated at the McNeil Federal Penitentiary in Steilacoom, Washington. He has challenged his sentencing, pursuant to the Dangerous Special Offenders Sentencing Statute,
On January 14, 1974, Marshall was convicted on four counts of unregistered possession and illegal transfer of two fragmentation hand grenades, in violation of
On direct appeal to this court, United States v. Marshall, No. 74-2120 (9th Cir. June 12, 1975), it was argued that the district court erred by not giving reasons, in the record, for withholding the pre-sentence report. We held there that since an objection was not lodged below, the omission could not be challenged for the first time on appeal. Marshall also contended that his sixth amendment right of confrontation had been violated by the admission of hearsay testimony at the trial court hearing on the issue of whether the sentencing should be pursuant to the Dangerous Special Offenders Statute. While we noted that this issue was a substantial one, we specifically held that: “[Sjince appellant also failed to raise this issue in the district court, he may not now do so on this direct appeal. His remedy is under
Apparently, as a result of our language, Marshall filed a
It is upon that basis that we now must reverse. Our earlier opinion in this matter was clear that a constitutional challenge to the Dangerous Special Offenders Statute would have been proper pursuant to a
While Marshall has framed his notice arguments in constitutional terms, it seems clear that a statutory requirement is involved. Our suggestion on direct appeal that Marshall could collaterally raise his constitutional challenge to the admission of hearsay evidence, pursuant to
It is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. It does not present “exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.” Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27, 59 S.Ct. 442, 446, 83 L.Ed. 455.
368 U.S. at 428, 82 S.Ct. at 471.
Thus, it has developed that non-constitutional claims are not proper for collateral review unless a “fundamental defect” is asserted which would lead to a “complete miscarriage of justice”. The Supreme Court has re-enunciated this rule on several occasions. Most recently, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, at 477 n.10, 96 S.Ct. 3037, at 3043, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), the Court observed that, “Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been no change in the established rule with respect to non-constitutional claims.” See also Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, at 345, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, at 178, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 91 L.Ed. 1982 (1947).
Here, the statutory issue of notice does not present the “exceptional circumstances” constituting the type of fundamental defect contemplated in Hill. While Marshall’s
Whether§ 2255 relief would be available if a violation ofRule 32(a) occurred in the context of other aggravating circumstances is a question we therefore do not consider. We decide only that such collateral relief is not available when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements of the Rule.
368 U.S. at 429, 82 S.Ct. at 472. See also Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 91 L.Ed. 1982 (1947). Accordingly, under the circumstances, we do not feel review pursuant to
The point is also made that possibly this motion for relief pursuant to
We, therefore, reverse the District Court judgment for the reason that the issue of adequate statutory notice was not raised on direct appeal.
REVERSED.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
The majority opinion holds that Marshall’s attack upon the validity of his sentence, based upon the Government’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements of
The district court vacated Marshall’s sentence on the sole ground that the Government’s failure to comply with the procedural requisites of
I first address the question whether a
The reasoning in Hill, however, directly supports the conclusion that Marshall could obtain
The remedies under
We should not be quibbling about whether Marshall, appearing pro se, put the right label on his document, “[I]n this area of the law, . . . ‘adjudication upon the underlying merits of claims is not hampered by reliance upon the titles petitioners put upon their documents.’ . . . See Helfin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407.
Insistence upon procedural precision means that the already overburdened district court will be required to entertain the identical motion under a different name. Moreover, it is an imposition upon Marshall himself.
Under
We have not heretofore specifically addressed the question whether the failure of the Government to give a notice complying with the statutory requirements of
I would affirm the district court.
Notes
. Stone v. Powell (1976) 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 and Sunal v. Large (1947) 332 U.S. 174, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 91 L.Ed. 1982, are not in point. Neither case involves an attack on sentencing. Stone is limited to federal habeas attacks upon state court judgments based upon claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment. In Simal, the defendant attempted to attack a conviction, from which he took no appeal, complaining about the erroneous exclusion of evidence.