Robert E. Gonzales v. Ann McGill Gorsuch, Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
688 F.2d 1263
9th Cir.
1982
Check Treatment

*2 KENNEDY, Cir Before WALLACE BURNS,** Judges, Judge. cuit District

KENNEDY, Judge: Circuit challenges propriety

This suit of ex- approved penditures by the Environmental Agency Protection and made [EPA] Bay Area Governments Association ABAG made the expenditures [ABAG].1 workplan section 208 pursuant Water Act Pollution Control the Federal Act), (herein Water the Clean U.S.C. EPA plan funded the § million authorized un- through a $4.3 ** Burns, entity comprised public Judge, of 92 local James M. ABAG is a Honorable Chief Unit- Judge governments. for the District of Ore- formed under California’s District It is ed States sitting by designation. gon, Act. of Powers Cal. Gov’t Code Exercise Joint Supp. (West 1980 & §§ 208(f), 1288(f) develop implement U.S.C. der section 208 work- plan. before planning began, After the but its to the responsibility addition for devel- completion, brought Gonzales2 this suit. a clean oping plan, ABAG was also the suit was theory of that some of the designated by the state as the local entity used ABAG funds were for con- *3 charge Bay in Area Air Quality Main- pollution. not related water tracts and, [AQMP]3 tenance Plan eventually, a contended, These, was were improper it ex- Waste Management Plan Solid [SWMP].4 section and' hence penditures Appropriate funding for development and legally funded. finding not After could implementation plans of these soon fol- reaching merits, the standing and the court lowed.5 ABAG consolidated the pro- three requested the injunctive denied below and plan, into one grams the ABAG Environ- and declaratory relief entered summary Management mental Plan. The ap- EPA for the EPA. judgment Costle, Gonzales v. it in proved 1976. ABAG then began the (N.D. F.Supp. 1978). Cal. Gonzales period required planning by section 208.6 we now and affirm. appeals, Gonzales filed suit in September of 1976. discovery, his claim was After reduced to I. assertion that approximately the 5 percent 1972, Congress In amended the FWPCA. by contracts funded the the section 208 (1972). L. 86 Stat. 839 Pub. regional AQMP were for the and the provided comprehensive for a amendments SWMP, instead of for improvement of program improve federal state and the He quality.7 asked the water court to de- quality. part water As pro- nation’s illegal the contracts clare as in excess of 208 208 of the section amended Act au- gram, authority funding injunction and for an areawide waste manage- treatment thorizes against their execution or payment. by administered plans, govern- local ment by the and funded EPA. ment temporary restraining No order or other Indeed, relief was pursuant sought. May preliminary In section 208(a)(2) Act, year of the Clean waited almost one Water before U.S.C. Gonzales (1976), 1288(a)(2) commencing discovery. When ABAG was selected as the court be- § responsible entity parties’ developing cross-summary local for ruled on the the low motions, for the plan Bay year water San Francisco the two judgment planning clean applied for, over, then Area. ABAG and re- and most of period original was the ceived, an EPA spent. EPA, $4.3 million to been funds had 1978 the complaint originally filed, 208(f)(2), 6. Under 2. As the was U.S.C. Gon- joined 1288(f)(2), Congress provided six other funding individuals and an zales was full for competed agency “developing operating continuing had with ABAG for area- grant. progressed, management As the suit plan- EPA waste treatment and wide withdrew, agency years. completed and four of the individuals ning process” for two ABAG leaving and two others. Because all two-year process Gonzales on June 1978. EPA alleged plaintiffs have identical interests January three here, gave approval its final in of 1979. environment, injury to that of we will only. refer Gonzales hereinafter contracts, points paid 7. to four for Gonzales funds, section 208 which he claims are with designation pursuant was made to the 3. This pollution planning. unrelated to These Act, 7401 -7642 §§ 42 U.S.C. Air Clean Bay let to: the Area Air Pollu- contracts were (for $119,000); District the Metro- tion Control designation pursuant was This made (for $86,- 4. politan Transportation Commission - Act, Disposal 42 U.S.C. §§ Solid Waste Comsis, (for $5,000); 000); Systems Inc. (for $7,000). Applications, Inc. $211,000, The total amount involved is al- brief, 5. In its the EPA has informed us that misappropria- though claims further Gonzales $4,000,000 at least for has received ABAG allegedly accounting masked ABAG’s tions $689,000 for the SWMP from AQMP procedures. grants. than section 208 other sources granted ‘citizen’ reflects had an additional ABAG decision of the U.S. $180,000 for part workplan. Supreme final in Court the case of Club Sierra plaintiffs court found The district v. Morton U.S. 727 [405 [92 standing, moot, the case (1972)].” had was It ... is clear 636] expend- language agreed that section 208 authorized that under Costle, conference, F.Supp. itures. Gonzales a noneconomic interest in the environment, (N.D. water, agree Cal. We clean is a the suit suffi- but for a citizen suit be dismissed reason other cient base under section should adopted by the district than court. We

find has no main- Further, every citizen the suit. tain legitimate has a and established States use and quality in the

interest navigable II. waters of the United States. Thus, presume I would that a citizen of seeks jurisdiction Gonzales to invoke the *4 States, regardless United of resi- court of the federal under the citizen’s suit dence, have would an interest as defined provision of Clean Water Act. The reg'ardless in this bill of the location of provision of the citizen-suit Clean Water waterway and regardless of the issue Act, 1365(a)(2) (1976), 33 U.S.C. provides: involved. (a) Except provided (b) in subsection Bayh. I my good Mr. thank friend from [dealing with of this section notice to the I believe pro- Maine. that the conference any citizen may commence a civil EPA] prevent any will not person vision or his own (2) action on behalf —... against legitimate with a group concern about where there is the Administrator an al- quality from bringing against suit of the leged per- failure Administrator to who violate the permit, those act or a or or any duty act chapter form against the Administrator if he fails to 26 of title §§ which is [ch. 1251-1376] perform nondiscretionary act. These discretionary with the Administrator. of citizen suits —in which a sorts citizen courts shall jurisdiction, The district have injunction can obtain an but ob- cannot regard to the without amount in contro- damages money tain himself —are a citizenship parties, of versy or the very useful additional tool in enforcing perform . . . order the Administrator protection environmental laws. I am duty, may act or as the case be ... . such glad authority to see that for such suits is legislative history import The reinforces the in this bill. included statutory language 1365(a)(2) of the that § Works, Committee on Public A Legislative intended was standing to nation- History of the Water Pollution Control Act class, comprised wide of citizens who al- of Amendments interest in clean leged an water. Senators Muskie, 1365(a)(2) latter, thus Bayh and one of the every citizen granted litigable principal draftsmen, interest in Act’s discussed the enforcement all Report: nondiscretionary acts Conference and duties EPA. Bayh. Mr. in a Would an interest clean environment —which would be invaded personal A stake in the outcome is of the Federal Water Pollu- violation question central to the standing. Baker Act or a tion Control thereunder— Carr, 691, 703, v. 369 U.S. 82 S.Ct. the purposes “interest” for be an of this (1962) (“a personal 7 L.Ed.2d stake in section? gist outcome —is question Mr. Muskie. That standing”). is the intent of the Plaintiff’s one who interest as .. The report enjoys conference. conference uses and Bay is sufficient understanding “It is the states: personal the liberal stake requirement meet conferees conference substitute applicable plaintiffs. environmental See relating to definition of the term Power Co. v. Duke Carolina Environmental 59, 72-74, Group, Housing 438 U.S. Study Urban Development, 627 F.2d 2620, 2629-2631, (1978); 942 at but the inference is broken if v. Challenging Students Reg- States injury alleged and the redress sought ulatory Agency (SCRAP), Procedures so no are remote that connection at all may 669, 678, 2405, 2411, 2416, Boating Indus. discerned. Ass’ns v. Mar be (1973); L.Ed.2d Club v. Mor- Sierra shall, 1376, 1379-80(9th 1979); 601 F.2d Cir. 727, 734, ton, 405 U.S. Bowker, 541 F.2d at 1349. 31 L.Ed.2d inability The court’s to redress the fails, Plaintiff’s neverthe injury may be manifest in claimed various sought less, as the relief will not redress the ways. may Circumstances indicate that the It is a alleged. inquiries prerequisite of will requested relief actually worsen the prevent relief will justiciability See, position. NAACP, plaintiff’s eg., Bos the claimed injury, redress or that there Harris, Chapter (1st ton 607 F.2d significant likelihood such redress. is a 1979) (challenge to block recipi Kentucky v. Eastern Rights Welfare Simon eligibility, successful, if would ent’s entail 26, 38-39, Org., 1917, 1924, grant program’s purposes would never 450 (1976); Legal Pacific Foun implemented plaintiff’s city). be Energy dation State Resources Conserva relief requested insufficient because Development Comm’n, 659 F.2d tion inability of the court’s any formulate (9th 15, 1981); Cir. October 903 at 910 See, decree. meaningful eg., Greater Tam Morton, Bowker pa Goldschmidt, Chamber Commerce v. 1976). Redressability in this sense is an *5 (D.C. 1980) (invali standing. of aspect agreement dation of international executive is a close relation between the There injury not redress will because act of for of requirement power to redress a claimed eign sovereign necessary relief); for Boat requirement the injury and of a causal link Marshall, ing Indus. Ass’ns 601 F.2d 1376 injury the asserted and the relief between (rescission 1979) (9th Cir. of administrative See, eg., Duke Co., claimed. Power 438 interpretive notice would injury not redress The S.Ct. two re U.S. guarantee no existed that because rescission however, diverge. do On the quirements, court). focus, would later bind The how hand, the causal require connection one ever, always upon ability is the of the court upon the focuses relation between ment the injury redress the suffered the plain or the defendant’s conduct and defendant tiff; wrong parties if the are before the injury. plaintiff’s Redressability the re court, requested relief or if the would wors analysis of whether an the court has quires position, plaintiff’s the or if the en court is right or to power prevent the the claimed the grant relief that unable relates to the respect, the potential In this injury. for harm, plaintiff the lacks standing. Glad plaintiff’s the assures stake in redress stone, Village Bellwood, Realtors of outcome lawsuit’s high

the remains 91 at S.Ct. 1601 at litigation. the throughout Co., Duke Power 2633; Bowker, the tie between causation re The F.2d power the court’s to afford quirement is usually relief strong enough

appropriate standing conferred the stat an that correction of “infer[ence] comprehensive, nothing before us is but ute improper defendant’s conduct will re legislative history caused in the indicates that injury thereby,” Legal Con Aid lieve County Brennan, intended to gress ignore of Alameda or to test the con Soc’y denied, 1979), requisites justiciability. F.2d cert. ventional of We 921, 100 congressional find no intent to confer see also (1980); Davis v. Dept. standing actually to seek relief that will not cial review at the insistence of a member of injuries parties have in- redress the statutory purpose class. Here the curred.8 insure that an interest in the is to statute case, redress for the instant In the water, clean whether or environment alleged by beyond wrong based, economically is a sufficient basis not properly decree issued limits standing This a citizen suit. for allegations of the complaint. on the based to a review of appropria- extend not does restraining pre order other temporary A any judicial review and tions where sought. was wait liminary relief Gonzales ineffective to en- would be vindicate decree before year commencing one dis almost ed Accordingly, appel- concerns. vironmental and, consequence, by as a the time covery standing to maintain the action. lacks lant on ruled court below cross-motions court Although the district dismissed judgment, year the two summary planning other than reasons those we have action for over, and most the original was period addressed, judgment the ultimate of dis- spent. The court been below had sums missal, correct. was assumption proceeded on it could AFFIRMED. any illegally spent ABAG refund order funds, if this were even so it would not but WALLACE, concurring: Judge, Circuit injury, and the claimed court redress bring about the the result reached pollution I concur in would not agree sought. injunction majority. I that Gonzales lacks planning Any Gonzales action, moreover, this action. There pro standing future would to maintain against an necessarily are, parts- opinion on with unsubstantiated as ceed Therefore, grants agree. more would I write be forth which I do sumption significant The district court to address this issue: coming. separately found that one power had been to alter or amend the congressional made since com additional suit, standing but its in the purpose governing was federal mencement rules planned. work Section 208 complete courts. life, plaintiffs have limited workplans many years For it has been clear that the allege that would re did not defendants both consti embodies doctrine grants. further “Plaintiffs or receive quire juris on limitations federal-court tutional *6 ‘the remote rely possibility, on may not diction, from the or contro derived “case fact, by allegations of that unsubstantiated III, versy” prudential of Article and clause might have been better had situations their judicial of gov self-restraint considerations otherwise, might acted im respondents See, e.g., v. erning its exercise. Warth Sel ” court afford relief.’ were the prove 490, 498-501, 2197, 95 din, S.Ct. 422 U.S. Morton, 1347, (9th 1349 v. Bowker (1975); 45 L.Ed.2d 343 Construc 1976), Seldin, Warth v. quoting 422 U.S. Petaluma, Industry City Ass’n v. of 522 tion 2197, 490, 507, 2209, 95 S.Ct. 45 L.Ed.2d 343 897, 1975), de cert. F.2d speculation contrary to the Such (1975). 934, 1148, nied, 96 S.Ct. 47 L.Ed.2d 424 U.S. it be “substantially likely” that requirement (1976); Ferdon, F.Supp. Nevin 413 Co., occur. Duke Power will redress 1043, 1046 (N.D. 1976) curiam) (per n. 5 Cal. 79, at 2633. court). Although the district (three-judge spending always clearly of unauthorized are has not artic Supreme Court Allegations necessarily justiciabil- particular aspects inconsistent with of the whether ulated not are standing pru do not address the case where doctrine constitutional or ity. We sought dential, subject Valley Forge College Congress misappropri- has see Christian wayward judi- Separation United for of bureaucracy to ations v. Americans Coleman, generally Realty Corp. See Havens not reach the do issue ad- We therefore 1114, concurring by Judge in his Wallace 455 U.S. 71 L.Ed.2d 214 dressed opinion, of limits on the extent constitutional standing by ability Congress’ statute. to confer defines the essential State, assigned role Church and S.Ct. 752, 758, (1982) (Valley 70 L.Ed.2d among judiciary coequal the three branches emphasized has Forge), it the difference Id.; republic. Simon, constitutional of our Congress may two: the discard the between supra, 426 U.S. 96 S.Ct. at standing statute, rules thus prudential Cohen, 83, 97, Flast v. 392 U.S. standing to per- the full expanding extent 1942, 1951, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 III, but may abrogate by Article mitted controversy” or requirement, The “case requirements of III minimum Article the course, not obviate duty does of the of Gladstone, Realtors v. of Village itself. to vindicate federal courts constitutionally- 91, 100, Bellwood, individual protected rights, protect 66 (1979) (Gladstone); 60 L.Ed.2d Si- power between the state and allocation Kentucky Rights Welfare v. Eastern mon governments which national serves as the 41 n. Org., 426 U.S. delicate for our balance of federal- bedrock (1976) (Simon); n. ism, interpret and to and enforce acts of Seldin, supra, 422 Warth they insofar as are consistent with III, Article the Constitution. “is analyze fails to majority Because important in its every circumscription bit as case, this basic distinction in this import power judicial of the United States provisions of the “citizen suit” its discussion ” granting of power. in its . . . Val- (Act) is in important several the FWPCA supra, S.Ct. at 760. ley Forge, Where a overbroad. I respects agree somewhat litigant lacks Article III standing to chal- not met the pre- has constitutional Gonzales lenge sought adjudicated, action it requisites standing. Having thus failed obligation is the constitutional of the feder- justiciable case controversy or to establish to dismiss the al court lawsuit. Where III, Gonzales rely Article cannot on his litigant establishes under Arti- Act, 505(a)(2) of the 33 U.S.C. III, squarely and properly cle raises the 1365(a)(2), right to establish his to chal- legality of governmental issue of the con- conduct. the EPA’s Insofar as the lenge duct, obligation it is correlative congressional implies intent majority address his judiciary to claims on the mer- conclusion, however, I must alter way, blinking there can be no Either its. disagree. respectfully consequences. Article is the fundamental limitation III requirements minimum The irreducible judicial power of the United States. on the represent policies mere III do not restricting power federal courts’ By expand federal courts can sua resolution of review “cases” to treat hospitably an effort more sponte in “controversies,” Article III ensures that litigant’s claims, merits of reach legal questions are decided courts legality challenged affirm the presenting that “concrete only in situations *7 authority under Article III conduct. Our sharpens which the issues and adverseness” or only pro- to redress otherwise to “exists realistic, informed decisionmak- promotes some threatened or actual in- against” tect Carr, 186, 204, 369 Baker U.S. 82 ing, see complaining party may which to the jury 703, 691, (1962), 7 L.Ed.2d 663 and S.Ct. allegedly to the unlawful fairly be traced from overreaching the courts their prevents Seldin, the defendant. Warth v. conduct role in our limited democratic socie- proper, 499, at 95 at 2205. 422 U.S. S.Ct. supra, Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee see ty, litigant does not meet these consti- aWhere War, 208, 221-27, 418 U.S. 94 Stop the prerequisites, he invoke not tutional 2932-35, 2925, (1974). 41 L.Ed.2d 706 S.Ct. States, power of the United nor judicial the the judicial exercise of au- By prohibiting courts him to do so. may the federal “the merely public ventilation of thority 760; Forge, supra, 102 at Valley S.Ct. Si- or the jurispru- refinement of grievances 38, mon, 426 U.S. at 96 understanding,” supra, S.Ct. Valley Forge, su- dential 759, that, only than not go at further we 102 S.Ct. III thus we pra, If 1270 zales

overstep designated our role in the has failed to meet this require- constitu last scheme, but public erode the confi this holding, agree. tional ment. With I respect on which and authori dence date, evolved they As have to this the ultimately rests in a ty society. democratic aspects doctrine, of the standing prudential 166, v. Richardson, United States 418 U.S. aspects, the constitutional are also like 2940, 2 188, 2952, 94 S.Ct. 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1) plaintiff the must assert his three-fold: J., (Powell, (1974) concurring). rights, and “cannot rest his own claim legal rights or III, relief on interests of of Article aspect party As an Seldin, Warth parties,” supra, 422 invoking authority the court’s third must demon 499, 2205; 95 at (2) at S.Ct. “even personal U.S. “such stake in the strate outcome alleged has where redressable controversy as to assure that con injury sufficient to meet requirements which sharpens adverseness pre crete III,” Valley Forge, of Article supra, 102 upon of issues sentation which the court so 760, injury at if that is “shared in depends.” S.Ct. largely Carr, Baker v. supra, 369 substantially equal measure 204, all or 82 S.Ct. at This, turn, U.S. at in large represents class of citizens” it “gen separate three but involves interrelated grievance” not normally appropri eralized First, a components:1 “distinct palpa judicial resolution, for a ate Warth v. Sel injury plaintiff, Seldin, ble” Warth v. 499, din, supra, 2205; at 422 U.S. 95 S.Ct. at 501, at supra, 2206, 422 U.S. 95 S.Ct. at be it (3) plaintiff’s interest must be threatened,” or “actual Linda v. Rich R.S. the zone of interests to protected “within 614, D., 617, 1146, 410 U.S. 93 ard S.Ct. by the regulated” statute or constitution 1148, (1973); second, 536 35 a “fair guarantee question. Gladstone, al supra, causal ly traceable connection” between 6, 6; 100 n. 99 441 U.S. at S.Ct. at 1608 n. injury and the challenged conduct of Data Processing Association Service defendant, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Camp, 150, 397 Orgs., 153, Inc. U.S. 90 Study Group, 59, Environmental 438 U.S. 827, 829, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 S.Ct. 72, 2620, 2630, 98 S.Ct. 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (Duke Power); Simon, (1978) supra, 426 relation between the constitutional 41, 1925; at third, at prudential aspects standing, as well likelihood” “substantial the relief re inclusion of both as the causation and re- prevent redress or quested will injury. dressability in the portion constitutional Power, supra, 430 20, U.S. at Duke 75 n. doctrine, case, is crucial to this 2631 n. 20. Village at S.Ct. of Arlington congressional arises under a grant- statute Metropolitan Heights v. Housing Develop standing any ing interested “citizen.” Corp., 252, 264, 555, ment 429 U.S. Congress Clearly, cannot statute vest the 50 L.Ed.2d The third ele jurisdiction with federal courts to hear law- ment, redressability, is clearly a constitu present that do a case suits or contro- aspect standing See, tional doctrine. Article III or versy under that are other- Gladstone, e.g., supra, at jurisdiction not within limited wise 1608; Simon, supra, grants S.Ct. III which Article federal courts. 1925, 1926-1927; id. at may, “grant express an at 1936 (Brennan, J., concur persons right of action who otherwise majority ring). The concludes by prudential that Gon- be barred would Valley Forge, 1979), denied, supra, generally 1. See cert. S.Ct. Valente, ----U.S.----, (1980); Boating Industry Larson v. 65 L.Ed.2d 1112 Marshall, & n. Ass’ns v. *8 J., (1982) (Rehnquist, dissenting); Legal Morton, 1347, Pacific 1979); Bowker v. 541 F.2d Cir. Energy State (9th 1976). Foundation v. Resources & Devel Cir. 1349 Commit, 903, (9th opment 659 F.2d 910-11 Cir. INS, 408, 1981); (9th 634 F.2d Chadha v. 418 generally Valley Forge, supra, 2. See 102 S.Ct. 812, granted, 1980), 102 454 U.S. cert. Brennan, 759-60; Legal Society Aid v. su- at 87, (1981); Legal S.Ct. Aid Socie pra, 1336 & n. 31. 608 F.2d at Brennan, 1319, ty v. 1333

1271 6. When, however, Congress purportedly Seldin, at supra, v. 422 U.S. Warth rules.” may by grant standing, there are two clear 501, Congress at 2206. acts to 95 S.Ct. new interests the invasion of separate inquiries: whether create statute injury in to a litigant. dispense pru- result to with the Congress will intended 22, Simon, supra, 426 at 41 n. See, U.S. e.g., expand standing and thus standards dential 22; n. v. Re- Schlesinger 1925 at permitted by 96 S.Ct. extent Arti- the maximum to War, to Stop supra, Committee servists III, particular litigants whether the cle 14; 14, n. 94 S.Ct. at 2933 n. 224 at U.S. 418 sufficiently alleged have the court before D., at supra, Richard 410 U.S. R.S. Linda Article III. standing their established Nonetheless, at 1148 n. 3. 3,n. 617 109, 31, 1612, & at 115 n. 99 at id. S.Ct. See acted, Congress has so “[wjhen even & n. 31. 1615 ” Art. Ill remain. . . . Si- requirements Act, 33 505(a)(2) of the U.S.C. Section 22, at 41 n. 96 at mon, U.S. S.Ct. supra, 426 1365(a)(2), permits “any bring citizen” to § recently ex- As the Court has n. 22. 1925 the Administrator of the EPA against suit plained: perform any to failure nondiscre- his expand Congress may, by legislation, duty. majority The con- tionary act or full standing permitted extent was to this section intended that cludes by one Ill, permitting litigation thus Art. standing to a “nationwide class” of grant by pru- would be barred “who otherwise allege[] who an interest in clean “citizens event, rules.” In no standing ... dential however, majority, to neglects The water.” Congress abrogate the Art. may 505(g), 33 in section U.S.C. that add always must A minima: Ill Congress limited the definition 1365(g), palpable distinct and “a suffered have persons “having to those an “citizen” . . . that is likely be himself” injury to or may adversely which is af- interest requested grant- relief is if redressed import removed from Far fected.” ed. majority’s is the conclusion language Gladstone, 99 at S.Ct. supra, 441 U.S. “every litigable citizen interest [has] (citations omitted). generally See 1608 at nondiscretionary of all enforcement in Standing Power to Confer Bice, Congress’ nearly the EPA.” The duties of acts Courts, in Constitutional the Federal in language of the Administrative identical (R. America in 291-303 Collins Government grant Act has been construed to Procedure 1979). ed. persons satisfy who standing only to sufficient at- give majority does III. requirement “injury in fact” important distinc- basic and to this tention Processing of Data Service Association prudential constitutional between tion Camp, supra, 397 at 152- U.S. Orgs., Inc. Congressional legisla- limitations. standing 829-30; v. Mor- at Sierra Club expand more than no can do tion 727, 732-33, ton, 405 U.S. permitted by extent Article III. the full 636 L.Ed.2d As 31 Congress may, in a particular example, For recently, observed “it Court Supreme action, right of a statutory provisions the citizen-suit clear [of to sue enforce the interests of litigants apply only persons who can FWPCA] “private attorneys or to act as parties third ” injury. . . . sort of Middlesex some claim public vindicate interest general” Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea County would otherwise be considered disputes Ass’n, Clammers “generalized grievances.” nonjusticiable (1981) (Middlesex Gladstone, supra, County). Seldin, supra, Warth therefore, intend in sec- did not addition, Congress, standing to non-in- 505(a)(2) tion the Administrative amend by statute id.; J.E. public. See members of the jured prudential eliminate the Act to Procedure Schramm, F.Supp. Co. v. test. su- Brenneman See Gladstone, of interest” “zone Rather, (E.D. Pa. n. S.Ct. at 1608 n. pra, *9 1272 clear, grievances alized legislative history inapplicable. makes Con- is long So as to expand intended gress standing to the they suffer a distinct palpable injury to by permitted the Court’s inter- themselves, full extent “persons Congress to whom has of the Constitution. pretation Under Sierra right action, of granted a either expressly Morton, supra, 734, 738, at U.S. Club by implication, may clear .. . or invoke the 1366, 1368, and at United States v. interest public in general support of their SCRAP, 689 n. Seldin, supra, claim.” Warth at (1973), 2416 n. L.Ed.2d 254 a environment, interest in noneconomic importance constitutional/pru- admittedly slight, although may amount to distinction in this case now dential becomes injury sufficient under an Article III if that clear. The provisions more citizen-suit of “adversely is gov- interest affected” dispense prudential with the Act limita- challenged. Therefore, conduct ernmental by expanding standing tions to the full injury sufficient under 505(a)(2) section an permitted by extent Article III. Such of environmental damage consist cannot be dismissed on the ground suit that adversely plaintiff’s affects a use and is plaintiff asserting rights of third the clean enjoyment of waters of the Unit- attempting or is parties adjudicate Any contrary ed States. construction of grievance. I would generalized not read 505(a)(2) unconstitutional, would be section colloquy quoted major- the senatorial in the Congress would allow to “abrogate” as it an ity opinion attempt as to codify citizen Article requirement minimum III that a standing under terms of Sierra Club. suffer “distinct palpable in- legislative read this history would I as Nor Gladstone,

jury himself.” supra, attempt confer standing every on an 1608; at Warth v. citizen, whether not such a citizen can Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at direct injury within the demonstrate rather, requirement; congres- because III Gonzales, along with the identical com- enjoy a presumption enactments sional plaintiffs, all other asserts that plaints constitutionality, I would legisla- read the enjoyment of Bay use and has been his history as conferring standing any- tive diversion water-plan- diminished test, the Court’s who meets Article III one purposes, to other ning funds since the developed before or whether after Sierra Bay are not as clean they waters as Club. had have been the EPA would been I therefore would hold that a citizen has spent only for water properly planning. to sue such under section to establish is sufficient an This interest 505(a)(2) fact, injury if he demonstrates in “adversely 505(a)(2) affected” under section causation, and a substantial likelihood of injury in fact under Article III because redressability. words, In other I would asserts that Gonzales he is “among the in- any conflict between 505(a)(2) avoid section SCRAP, States v. jured.” supra, by holding Article III Congress that S.Ct. at Montgom- any citizen who could Costle, intended ery Environmental Coalition v. or controversy” a “case (D.C. establish to sue in Normally, F.2d on public federal court behalf of the inter- injury sort of might be con- water, but that Congress in clean did nonjusticiable generalized est griev- sidered abrogate the ance, intend to second and third equal as it is shared substantially tripartite residents doctrine of Arti- Bay all Area. elements measure standing. prevail is clear cle III order to in this since it enacted Yet 505(a)(2) therefore, appeal, in order permit any in- Gonzales must establish to enforce injury fairly the Act jured private citizen as a his traceable to the attorney general, supra, challenged misappropriation plan- Middlesex County, prudential limitation there ning funds and that is a substantial standing to those denying presenting gener- relief could redress likelihood *10 It is injury. the latter of these upon despite impli- he stumbles. And contrary in the majority opin- cations

ion, stumbling this is a block imposed by itself, and III as such is beyond remove or modify

power clearly Congress had if intended to even do enacting 505(a)(2). so America, UNITED STATES Plaintiff-Appellee, HAIGES, III, Harold Norman Defendant-Appellant.

No. 82-1124. of Appeals, Court States Ninth Circuit. Sept. Argued and Submitted 28, 1982. Sept. Decided Campbell, Colin F. Federal Public De-

fender, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant-appel- lant. Dokken,

Roger Atty., Asst. U. S. W. Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellee. HUG, CANBY, Before FERGUSON and Judges. Circuit HUG, Judge: Circuit Haiges, III Norman Harold claims that bring failure to him to Government’s seventy days of within the date of his trial Speedy violated the Act indictment Trial “Act”), 18 U.S.C. 3161-3174. (the §§ Haiges’s pretrial court denied mo- district indictment, concluding to dismiss the tion complied had with the Government imposed by limitations the Act. We time affirm.