*1 836 tаxpayers refusal to error trial court’s enumerate as 4. The requested charges requested jury charges.
give were ei- “The certain adjusted evidence, law, to the ther not correct statements sufficiently Rogers, charge.” by general 229 McDonald v. covered 844) (1972), grounds, 369, SE2d overruled Ga. 385 447) (1975). Paper James, Ga. 348 Co. v. Gilman no There was error. giving taxpayers of a as error the trial court’s The enumerate
5. capitalization jury charge regarding of the income consideration arriving whole, value. Taken as a factor in at fair market method the § 48-5-2 law. incorrect statement of the OCGA was not an (1) (B) (iv); Henry County supra. Assessors, Tax v. Bd. Dotson McMurray, Pope, Judgment J., J.,P. concur. affirmed. Decided October
Rehearing denied November appellants. Ward, Patrick for
J. Culpepper appellees. Lehman, III, L. for Robert Thomas et al. ROBERT & COMPANY ASSOCIATES TIGNER 72921. 82) Presiding Judge. Birdsong, parties Liability. multiple-day This involves numerous Tort trial (over transcript pages). 3,500 Consider- voluminous record and a ing necessary disposition issues, we conclude facts those following. approximately believing was warranted City expand facilities at Harts- of Atlanta determined city Airport. mid-terminal, the to the field International leased certain addition personal property for and exclusive the airlines their repre- parking employees. use for Eastern Airlines areas airline sented airlines as lessee-owner for construction joint parking venture of lots. Eastern entered into contract with sign engineers Assoc., Howard, Needles, & Co. Tammen and Robert Assoc, (hereinafter Co.”). Bergendoff, Williams, & Russell & “Robert responsibility charged & Co. with the road- Robert ways, parking ramps strips, buildings, landing aircraft, etc. general airport facilities in accordance contractor to construct joint designs Wright, venture, Claussen, with Robert Co. was also a Claussen”). (hereinafter “Wright MacDougald-Warren Matthews, Wright roadway marking stripping and Claussen subcontracted the (hereinafter “Peek”). Marking, with Peek Pavement Inc. roadway litigаtion giving lead- The locale rise to involves the designed ing by private parking Co.,& lots Robert constructed painted by roadway Wright leading Peek. The Claussen and employees parking the use of airline area was intended for but was general public. originally designed not closed to the As and intended roadway strip Eastern, the was a four-lane road with a median go adjacent highways leading airport past that was to from parking leading *2 areas but to and from the mid-terminal. It was in- only pass parking tended that the lanes the southbound would not proceed ramp leading primarily areas but would benefit of the airline to a to 1-85 for the
employеes leaving parking the airline lots. (DOT) Ultimately, Department Transportation the declined permission to connect the southbound lanes to 1-85. As a result the proceeded adjoining highway southbound lanes port property from an onto the air- point adjacent parking to a to the airline area. Instead proceeding merged south, further to the the two lanes into one and adjacent parking came to a deadend to the entrance to the Eastern designed lot. Robert Co. the southbound lanes so as to force south- lane and at the end of the south- right bound traffic to move to the degree design
bound road make a 90 left turn. The called for the word painted roadway eight “STOP” to be on the surface of the letters high Immediately feet word “STOP” the “STOP” and and seven feet nine inches wide. above the
design stop purpose called for a bar. The stop proceeding bar was to traffic direct south to come degree stop lanes, to the end of the southbound make a 90 turn and entering going past before the two northbound lanes the entrance to parking and, the Eastern north, lot further to the the entrance to the parking parking Delta lot and other airline lots. designs prepared by clearly Robert & Co. show the intent for stop painted
the word “STOP” and bar to be at the intersection. For though painted reasons, unknown even the subcontractor Peek the hash marks on the left lane back toward the north from the intersec- forcing right lane, tion in the southbound lane, thus the traffic to the paint stop it did not the word “STOP” nor the bar the median at completed painting the intersection. After Peek had its work the roadway markings, requested general Wright it contractor Claus- (and design engineer Atlanta) City sen and the Robert & Co. inspection prepare punch preparatory make the final list delivery acceptance by employer, of the work Eastern. spite painted stop of the clear direction that the word “STOP” and bar be pavement on the surface of intersection, at the neither Wright deficiency Peek, Claussen nor Robert & Co. noticed the stop word “STOP” or bar. Numerous witnesses testified that the most logical explanation painting simply inadvertently was that the was parties omitted and that omission never detected the several in- cluding testimony the owner Eastern. Also was offered and unrebut- with a technical in accordance designed intersection ted that the of the traffic being expositive parties all the recognized manual That similar intersections. involving this and safety requirements stan- up to be safe the intersection that for suggested manual stop and the mаnual, the word “STOP” addition dards of intersection to the north of the sign have bar there should been approaching motorists AHEAD” to alert “STOP stating person coming because a stop. This was there was indeed would, upon ap- degree left turn the 90 making intersection and the left stop angle bar at an see the word “STOP” and proaching, parking lot across actually made to enter until the turn was north proceed back or to make a U-turn northbound lanes northbound lanes. stop “STOP” and the of the word to the omission addition proceeding
bar, concluded that automobiles could have be visible to a mph would not speed of 40-50 northward at a ratе lanes across from the southbound making vehicle the left turn a curve lot. This was due to parking northbound lanes into the wire and also to the the south of the intersection northbound lanes to would also have parking lots. The circumscribing mesh fences of the intersection concluding been warranted in *3 of the omission of unnecessarily dangerous because incomplete and the word stop sign AHEAD” or addition to the words “STOP some well as because of pavement on the stop painted “STOP” and bar in the road. by the fence and turn the obscured vision caused to East- lot had been surrendered parking The intersection and lot had been used parking 1980. Thе accepted ern and Eastern early July Tigner James daily two-year period. during ramp em- airlines as a employment with Eastern sought obtained he years, approximately evidence that for ployee. Tigner offered musician, playing with and for composing and arranging, had been a country. years, these he worked throughout During various groups which, said, him in without paid he cash employers, for various all of result, not Tigner As a could regular the use of W-2 forms or salaries. earnings during or any testimony wages as to his and did not offer that because he was period. candidly He also admitted 30-year himself he had pertaining paid in cash and had nevеr had a W-2 musi- traveling he been income tax returns. Because had filed that he wanted to during years, much these he determined cian so therefore, he re- family; with his spend quality more time with which he secured steady employment to take turned Atlanta replacement he was to be a summer Eastern. The evidence shows that he would be dis- agreed he advance that for three months and possibility that he the summer but with charged at the end of the summer em- rehired at the termination of would be retained or ployment. week, wage per approximately His contracted was or $358 $15,000 per year. throughout It is noted that musical travels his his wife also worked and contributed towards the support family.
Tigner report day scheduled to for his first of work with Eastern on the morning July 1982. He was instructions given proceed from his home to Riverdale Road airport and enter the area on the two southbound lanes leading parking the Eastern lot and to find parking space in that lot. He would then taken as all employees were to the Eastern facilities buses.
Tigner followed these proceeded directions and testified that he on a motorcycle south on the southbound two He lanes. noted the obeyed them, hash marks and driving right side until he came slowed, turn, end of the road. He made the left and inasmuch as there was no direction stop proceed, proceeded whether to he directly across the two northbound lanes the guard toward shack at the entrance to the Eastern parking lot. He saw no oncoming traffic fact, northbound lanes. there pro- were two automobiles ceeding north on the northbound lanes approaching the intersection. The first operated by automobile was one Malone. There was a dis- pute as to his actual speed, being there estimates from range mph. 25-50 Malone testified that he motorcycle never saw a until af- ter Tigner was on the hood of the sliding up automobile over the au- tomobile windshield. The collision between Malone’s automobile and motorcycle caused Tigner to be approximately thrown 85 feet. There seems to be little dispute that he suffered serious fractures to his right hip, right thigh and his left ankle. years Two after the (at accident suit), time of pain still suffered constant required to walk with crutches. There was evidence which could establish to the jury’s satisfaction personal- also suffered ity changes and loss of mental acuity. accident, As a result of this Tigner brought suit against City of Atlanta as the owner of the property, contending City properly did not inspect the inter- section for safety and allowed a nuisancе to continue because of the dangerous situation inherent the intersection. He contended that Robert & negligent Co. was neg- intersection and ligent in inspection its final by recommending that accept Eastern livery of the parking lot and intersection even though the word *4 “STOP” stop and the bar present. were not He contended that the contractor Wright Claussen was negligent constructing an obvi- ously dangerous intersection and failing to insure that the subcon- tractor Peek carried out the instructions of the design engineer by omitting stop bar and the word “STOP.” He contended that Peek was negligent in failing carry out the design instructions of the en- gineer pаint and failing to the word “STOP” and the stop bar. He contended that Malone was the direct cause of the accident. Mrs. claiming Tigner joined loss of consortium. the suit seeking corporate con- filed cross-claims defendants Each of the any liability indemnity one of established as to should tribution or the jury ten-day a corporate trial, the returned After a defendants. against Tigners liability & Robert Co. and in favor of of verdict specific findings only. jury each of the favor of returned against against Tigner & Co. on its Robert and found defendants cross-claims fendant Malone nants not $100,000 During against trial, the other defendants. exchange $100,000in for cove- with settled by Tigner pursuеd This the other defendants. to be by entered million verdict from the $2 was deducted enumerating appeal brings against & Co. this & Co. Robert Robert by alleged Held: court. the trial ten errors charge error, six deal with the 1. Of the ten enumerations enumerations of these our consideration the court. We commence charged observing parties of the several contentions court first the trial pointed litigation. that as to the Thus, out the court City permitted by Tigner City that the it was contended Atlanta continuing that its It also was contended of a nuisance. the very design existence pro- warning dangerous invitation as to the and lack of stopping through constituted thе lanes without the northbound ceed pointed mantrap. equivalent plained gerous com- The court also out of a improperly Wright prime built a dan- Claussen contractor incomplete accepted negligently work of intersection pri- appellant Co., Robert & As to the the subcontractor Peek. mary designed improperly in- & Co. was that Robert contention inspect completed negligently before work failed to tersection and recommending prime the the Eastern that contractor and owner completed accepted properly short, work. intersection be applicable negligence which were delineated contentions trial court to defendants, co-existent duties of which involve six different some particu- exclusivelyrelated to a of duties and some of which consisted lar defendant. complains Appellant of the & Co. now Robert corporate any one of the five verdict as to
trial court authorized a any performance upon proof negligent defendants based contended effect asserts applicable & in Robert Co. of the defendants. duties charge outlining allowed the the various contentions upon negli- engineer against based to return verdict prime applied gent рerformance construction which predicate negligence likewise, of Robert contractor; would be incomplete acceptance upon negligent when Robert an contract Co. & bility responsi- completed product, accept final work Co. could owner, Eastern. analysis reject & It is not error Robert Co. advanced We
841
parties.
to
jury
the trial court to state
the
the contentions of the
(33
577).
Bennett, 72 Ga.
also Ma-
App.
See McGee v.
SE2d
See
(3) (89
767).
Musgrove,
Viewing
&c.
v.
SE
con
R. Co.
On
charge
review the
must
as
be considered
a whole
each
part
every
connection with
v.
part
charge. Zayre
Ga.
(5) (160
648).
Ray,
App.
117 Ga.
A
torn
charge,
SE2d
to
pieces
may
disjointed fragments
and scattered in
seem objectionable,
although
put
whole, may
when
together
per-
and considered as
it
a
fectly
record,
charge
sound. The full
in the
being
what it lacks when
supplied
divided is
parts
they stand,
when the
all
are
united. United
Matthews,
13);
divided
fall.
they
Brown
where above), no was owed Robert & Co. also asserts professional evidence did not applicable establish a standard it design engineer against jury which the could measure negli- gence.
Even cursory a examination of the court trial re- flects that jury charged separate on three occasions as to the appropriate apply standard as professional to Robert & Co. sign necessity engineer, finding under negligence the facts and performance duty that the its against had to be measured reasona- performance ble by design of similar duties engineers engaged performance of their duties. each instance where the trial court referred & improperly to the contention that Robert Co. designed or negligently inspected the intersection the intersection owner, to recommending acceptance by with a view professional properly applicable informed standard of care to a Moreover, convincing by more engineer. there was evidence by proof than one as well estab- engineer, traffic standard required lished such accepted safety manual on features at an intersection, the obscured vision and the absence of word AHEAD,” “STOP,” bar, stop warning sign, and the “STOP ren- unnecessarily Lastly, dered this intersection we observe dangerous. employees responsible failure to detect admitted stop the result an bar was “STOP” and the of the word omission thorough duty spite during inspection, oversight to make a of a aсcept inspection prior making to the owner a recommendation perform product. reject he failed to If admits work a defendant performed, duty is shown and causation he should have he concedes palpable” may case of “clear and failure, become a from the negligence the case Hudg- required. professional proof is not of a standard 359). App. 856, Therefore we find Bacon, ins v. no merit dard was 859 Robert improper stan- Co. that an the contention *6 applied to it. charge the of the court contained & Co. contends that Robert performance guidelines charging negligent of insufficient on the when presented argument jury was its The Of this is that the contraсt. basis many argues multiple page & Co. contract with duties. Robert with a liability charge if the authorize a return of of the court would any duty required by
jury performance negligent the con- of found again, jury was aware that the tractor. Once two bases were work called for when the that it is mislead a we are satisfied the upon negligence & Co. could be attributed to Robert which inspection design negligent negligent after the the and asserted completed. satisfied, We are had been argument, charge light in the facts and is considered of unlikely considered as a whole would the instructions when ordinary jury intelligence. Barnett, Thomas of 818). App. 717 by telling jury & Cо. contends the trial court erred Robert (the Tigner required that would be to reimburse United States Administration) hospital expenses Veterans furnished to in full for all medical and litigation. Tigner this The basis of both before and after apply the this contention is that the Veterans Administration must Tigner’s determining Thus, if local of its com- law the extent claim. pensation comparative principles negli- could be reduced under gence, likewise the Veteran’s Administration claim amount against Tigner charge degree. would also be reduced to a like Thus the pay- jury Tigner required full would be to make allegedly ment an incorrect statement law. certainly superficiаlly appears ingenious
This contention is and analysis Tigner rep- to have much merit. Closer resented the United States reflects however that litigation. Thus its claim this jury’s automatically any verdict would reflect reduction the total compara- Tigner principles claim awarded to which would reflect automatically negligence. tive This reduce the amount of the would expenses in- claim owed to the Veteran’s Administration. Medical by Tigner litigation is a matter curred between after the date of as to amount
Tigner the Veteran’s Administration and not between Robert Co. and the Veteran’s Administration. trial court charged properly princiрles comparative negligence prop- and also erly charged Tigner required appropriate under federal law expenses to reimburse Veteran’s Administration medical for him. care afforded There is no merit to this contention. failing
Robert & Co. also contends to that the trial court erred charge corporations are entitled to the which same consideration given private to would is individuals. The essence of contention comparing seriously injured (Tigner) against when human impersonal corporation, the financial resources existence jury give plaintiff would to more be inclined consideration to corporate than to the defendants. While it is true the trial requested, language court did not in the we are satisfied the principle suggested by gave Robert & was covered. The Co. trial court complete charge specifically telling they full, a not fair and were upon sympathy party. to base their decision This the trial requiring jury weigh court uttered on several occasions to the evi- objectively. corporate dence We also note that there were four fendants, of whom is three received It not neces- favorable verdicts. sary give language request to the exact when the same principles fairly given general charge. are Atlanta 71). Armstrong, R.&c. Co. v. prejudicial
2. & Co. Robert asserts error the court’s refusal allow & Co. Robert to show had failed to file income tax re- years year preceding litigation. turns for five Robert & Co. jury assertedly impeach wished to show this Tigner’s failure file *7 successfully evidence that he had worked as a musician support family approximately years. of his for 30 The trial court al- Tigner present proof lowed evidence that could no of returns tax but would not the Co. allow Robert & to show the failure to file tax returns
basis this would a act. constitute evidence of criminal It was Tigner shown that if would invoke the Fifth Amendment asked the question, require place Tigner and the trial court not would to such jury. conduct before the We conclude the court not err in its trial did ruling. jury might While a from file re- conclude the failure to a tax Tigner enough support family turn that had not earned to his on his (but amount), musician’s as no is income he had testified dollar it equally jury might true if not he certain that the conclude was a tax open evidentiary evader. It is not error to to refuse to doors such (127 Ellenberger speculation. Rptr. Karr, rank v. 179 Cal. 583 Cal. (2)) (1982). App. Rpt. Particularly is 3d 427 this true where the any prejudicial speculation greatly outweigh jury’s of effect would conceivably might gener- jury’s understanding benefit to which F. from See Fred French ated inferences derived the evidence. 666). Long, Mgt. App. 702, Co. 704 SE2d v. Ga. (which we ruling in the court’s if error
Even were to assume we for Tigner’s as income not), nature to impeaching of an do evidence issue wholly of irrelevant the accident years prior the 30 to of the amount his seek to establish point Tigner At did damages. no best, file tax that he failed to At evidence prior income to 1982. Tigner & less Co. to show that earned Robert returns would authorize (the of a requiring filing tax $1,000 figure minimum year a than return) accomplished he as a inferentially show was not and thus have show. This same information could sought as he to musician simply asking approxi- easily developed by Robert Co. been Such any given year. Tigner he earned figures mate believed any representation In the of questions never asked. absence were year, any particular money during given amount of any earned an tax re- of that he failed to file income purpose evidence of taxes. Tigner out as a criminal avoider turn would be to make relevancy as do constitute acts no to issue and not These have ex- impeachment. properly the trial court proper We are satisfied testimony. cluded such We find no error this enumeration. regard recoupment wages, of inasmuch as there was to lost accident, wages prior of no credible evidence ascertainable jury wages. no for of damages could assess the loss non-existent past wages, charge jury as to of the court limited the a fact were wages subsequent consideration to be earned but lost future limited prior earnings accident but to trial. The loss of future, in the date wages that could be earned after the of the trial. Thus, lost due on after date wages wages were limited and i.e., specific wage, the accident. had before it evidence of a per week, of life. It is plus expected $358 evidence continuance recovery necessity show essential to the of lost income benefits to pattern a if the show that he has ac- prior еarnings, claimant can cepted employment. Leonard engaged upon income-generating is Co., (1) 675); v. Mut. Risk Ins. Preferred Adamson, Group Acc. &c. Hartford 867). Thus, positive ability had earning evidence of accident, specific amount at time of the evidence a lifelong habit, nothing beyond speculation work would not pro- wage-earning capacity throughout retain the remainder of quantum support ductive life. The of evidence sufficient to resulting need or even wages verdict loss not be substantial may is if enough slight direct. It there is evidence rise give which an wages may inference from which lost be drawn and damages *8 629). Rinker, computed. Douglas 3. Robert & Co. also contends that million verdict is ex- $2 denying in cessive matter law and that the trial court erred upon motion for trial ground. new based permanently showing Tigner was and seri- Evidence was offered ously injured concluding and was warranted in disabled. again income that he would never be able to earn substantial because disability, of his at least in the areas at he had earned income which past. expenses prior in the had medical He incurred substantial greater expenses trial and the evidence was clear that even would medical probably after There evidence be incurred the trial. ability wages he and after the lost the to earn substantial both before Tigner trial as a result of the accident. Evidence was submitted personal significant pain had suffered humiliation and constant and years for the two from the time of the accident until the time of trial. Additionally part composite Tigner verdict, aas Mrs. awarded consortium. We cannot conclude that the award Redwing in this case in Carriers v. violates standard established Knight, 686), App. 668, this court where “ ground stated: ‘Before the will on verdict be set aside that it is proof prejudice excessive, bias, where there is no direct thereof, amount when in all facts, considered connection with appear “flagrantly sense, “exorbitant,” must shock the moral outra- geous,” “extravagant.” and “It must be monstrous indeed and such as ready against all mankind must be to exclaim at first blush.” It must carry upon injuries its death warrant its face’. ... view of the suf- damages proved fered and we cannot declare that the verdict is exces- particularly pain suffering sive, in view of the and involved.” Lastly, granted,
4. if Robert Co. a new contends that trial is we grant must also a new trial as to all in the co-defendants relation to requiring the cross-claims. Inasmuch as we find no error a new trial in case, this is enumeration moot and without merit. Judgment McMurray, Sognier Deen, J., J., P. P. and affirmed. Carley, judg- Benham, JJ., J., concur. concurs Division 3 Pope, Beasley, part J., Banke, JJ., ment. C. concur and dis- part. sent in Judge, concurring part dissenting part. Banke, Chief 1. I do not believe the evidence on relied Mr. to estab- earnings lish his claim for future lost was sufficient to enable such damages certainty. Accordingly, to be calculated with reasonable I submitting would hold that the trial court erred that claim to the jury and case would remand the for a new trial on the issue of dam- ages. agree majority, ground however, I with the no has been es- liability. Similarly, tablished for a new trial on the issue basis for I find no granting appellant against a new its cross-claims trial the other case. defendants prove upon The sum total of the evidence Mr. relied (1) earnings testimony
his lost that he future consisted of had *9 (2) years, past for 20 30 family a musician supported his as Air- with Eastern temporary employment fact he had secured wage at a of period days a of 90 prior to the accident for day lines (3) he would be week, testimony he “felt like” his per $358 employee at the end permanent a stay with Eastern as allowed to on — was, however, exposed 90-day period expectation which of an Eastern, that Mr. supervisor at who testified by as ill-founded his group with which temporary employees Tigner and the other 90-day group a at the end of the he hired terminated as were any attempt by Mr. to period. Conspicuous by its аbsence was prior to the during years his acci- provide earnings an estimate of was, however, undoubtedly influ- regard His in this dent. decision any file federal income tax returns for by his evident failure to enced question. years evidence, argued Tigner’s the basis of the above Mr. counsel On say trying knows I not Mr. as follows: “The Lord am As they for of his life. Tigner was to eárn the rest going $358.00 out, employment, and or not he pointed temporary that was whether know, stay I know . . . All we he was the would with Eastern don’t family years. supported for his 20 some odd He his bread winner for anymore. nobody he it family, else did. Jim did. Now can’t do I’m a what simply suggesting at the minimum week is he’s $358.00 worth.” they unless established earnings
Lost cannot be recovered are certainty. with “The must be able to calculate the reasonable since, certainty with such of degree amount loss reasonable ” course, question guesswork. damages cannot be left [Cit.] 629) (1975). Rinker, (216 Douglas v. 134 Ga. 950 SE2d I do App. not in the present upon anything find evidence case which speculative than purely Tigner’s earnings a estimate of Mr. lost future is on could be based. While it true that one need not have worked an everyday regular nor claim even a basis establish a for lost future Co., earnings, Kroger App. see Michaels v. 172 Ga. 280 SE2d 903) (1984), certainly pattern earnings required. some must be I do reasonably not earnings believe that a lifetime of future lost can salary on sole basis earning calculated a claimant was day past he steady job first had ever held in the 20 to years. 30 majority, cases relied on Leonard v. Preferred 675) (1981), Co., Risk Mut. Ins. Adamson, Group Acc. &c. Hartford 867) conclusion, (1985), support do different those necessary quantum proof cases do not to authorize the refer action, recovery earnings personal injury of lost future but quantum proof necessary quite recovery limited to authorize the no-fault accident victims as insurance benefits available automobile compensation past loss of earnings income or during due to disa- (a) (2) bility. (B). See OCGA 33-34-4 §
2. In view of the I foregoing, would not reach the issue of whether the trial court was in denying appellant correct op- portunity to cross-examine Mr. Tigner about his evident failure to file any federal income tax years immediately returns for the preceding the accident. While I am inclined to inquiry believe that this line of was made relevant Mr. Tigner’s insistence always that he had earned enough money to support family, it would not be relevant a retrial which the issue of lost future earnings was no longer before the jury.
I am authorized to state Judge Pope joins this opinion Judge Beasley joins Division of this opinion. *10 Decided October Rehearing denied November Stair,
Kent T. Alan Kyman, Douglas Wilde, B. A. for appellant. Lanham, William C. McGehee, Clark H. Gary Seacrest, L. Thomas S. Bentley, II, Edwin A. Tate Terry Sorrells, A. David D. Blum, Brooks, Marva Jones appellees.
73020. PIERCE v. THE STATE. 781)
Deen, Presiding Judge. appellant, Benny Pierce, was convicted of two counts of sell- ing cocaine and one count of selling marijuana, for which he was sen- tenced to a years’ total of imprisonment and a total fine of $305,000. On appeal, he enumerates as error the admission into evi- dence of two custodial statements and the denial of his motion for acquittal directed verdict of based his defense of entrapment. Beginning in January paid informant of the Georgia Bu- (GBI) reau of Investigation requested several times appellant assist him in arranging drug 13, 1985, deals. On March the informant and a GBI agent undercover appellant’s residence, went to the where appellant sold the agent approximately pound one of marijuana; 25, 1985, on March the informant and GBI agent returned to the appellant’s home, at which time the appellant sold the agent an ounce of cocaine possible and discussed the sale of a kilogram of the sub- stance. Finally, 29, 1985, on March appellant was arrested when agent appeared the informant at the appellant’s home to purchase kilogram of cocaine.
Following arrest, appellant was taken to another room in