Robert Cengr brought this suit against his former employer, Fusibond Piping Systems, Inc. (“Fusibond”), alleging that Fusibond improperly terminated him because of his age. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fusibond and ordered Cengr to pay Fusibond’s costs, and Cengr appeals. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment, but reverse on the issue of costs.
Background
Fusibond is a small, privately owned company which designs, manufactures, and sells lined piping systems. Fusibond’s pipe systems are used to carry primarily toxic chemicals and gases. Robert Cengr began working for the precursor company of Fusibond in April of 1976. When Cengr started work for Fusibond, his primary responsibility was flaring pipes, and eventually he did a variety *449 of duties as a supervisor for Fusibond. From the time he became a supervisor in 1978 until his termination in 1993, Cengr’s primary responsibility was quality control. This entailed examining pipes, fittings, and other items during the manufacturing process and prior to shipment to ensure the pipes met all of Fusibond’s quality criteria.
Cengr received his first major performance warning in a written statement dated May 1,1985 from the Vice President of Operations, Carl Wacker. The warning cited “frequent lapses in Fusibond quality control,” and advised Cengr that “future negligence in this area may be cause for dismissal.” In May of 1989 Carl Wacker died, and Cengr and Fusibond’s president, Richard Krause, took over Mr. Waeker’s responsibilities. According to Krause, Cengr performed his duties well until 1991, when he began to receive repeated censures.
In 1991, Fusibond began receiving complaints from customers regarding manufacturing defects which should have been discovered by Cengr in quality control. One customer sent Fusibond a video of a defective piping system, which showed water spewing from every joint. The pipes shown in the video had passed through Cengr’s quality control.
On November 11, 1991, Cengr received a written warning from Fusibond’s president, Richard Krause, regarding his “failure to follow verbal and written instructions regarding proper QC [quality control].” Krause told Cengr that at Cengr’s age of 49, close to 50, it was hard to find а job, and that Cengr should think about that in considering his job performance. Cengr was placed on thirty days probation.
In March of 1993, Cengr was twice passed over for promotion. George Piotrowski, who previously shared the same level of responsibility as Cengr, was promoted to plant manager and became Cengr’s supervisor. Cengr did not disagree with Piotrowski’s promotion and did not believe the promotion should have gone to him. Piotrowski was 43 years old at the time of his promotion. Steve Boardman, then age 29, was also promoted in March of 1993, to production supervisor. Before Boardman’s promotion, Cengr supervised Boardman. After the promotion, Boardman took over Cengr’s supervisory duties in the machine shop area, Cengr’s duties regarding the ram extrusion process, and his duties regarding any special products.
In June of 1993, Cengr was again reprimanded for his poor work performance. On June 18, 1993, Cengr was given a written warning and was placed on probation for personal problems with another Fusibond employee. Cengr and employee Larry Saw-ieki had engaged in “screaming matches” regarding coordination of their work efforts due to Cengr’s delay in completing his quality control responsibilities. When Cengr’s performance did not improve, his probation was extended “until furthеr notice.” During the summer of 1993, Fusibond encountered several more instances of Cengr’s poor performance, culminating on September 20, 1993, when his responsibilities were limited. Cengr’s duties regarding inventory, production scheduling, and expediting were assigned to Paul Jurasits, then age 29. Cengr’s behavior prompted Richard Krause to inquire about Cengr’s health and whether he was on any medication which might be interfering with his work. Cengr said that he was not.
Cengr’s performance problems continued. On December 3,1993, Cengr received another written warning; this time the warning included a one week disciplinary layoff without pay. Cengr was directed to “reflect on his past performance and determine where his future lies with this company.” The day he returned from his one week disciplinary layoff, Richard Krause ordered a meeting of George Piotrowski, the plant superintendent; Mike Heiens, the marketing manager; Craig Krause, the customer service manager; and Kyle Manowsky, the purchasing agent and corporate secretary. The group recommended to Krause that Cengr be terminated, a recommendation which Krause did not accept. Krause pointed out that Cengr had been with the company for a long time, was once a loyal employee, and had a lot of knowledge about the Fusibond process. The group agreed that rather than terminating Cengr, his duties would be further limited.
*450 When Cengr returned from his disciplinary layoff, he met with Heiens, Craig Krause, Piotrowski, and Manowsky, who explained to Cengr that his duties would be strictly limited to quality control. Although his salary had never been reduced when his responsibilities were limited in the past, Cengr refused to commit to a new job until he knew what his salary would be. The group explained to him that only Richard Krause had the authority to discuss salary, and Krause was not present at the meeting. Cengr then went to the general office area and confronted Richard Krause. Cengr demanded to know what his salary would be, and Krause responded by requesting thаt Cengr commit to accepting the job first. Although Krause claimed to having no intention of reducing Cengr’s pay, when Cengr continued to refuse to commit to the job, Krause placed him on “permanent layoff.” Cengr’s duties were subsequently divided among current Fusi-bond employees.
The day after his termination, Cengr went to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) to report Fusibond for alleged safety violations. He also filed a grievance report with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), claiming in one of the reports that he was terminated because he was “the highest paid employee in the shop.” Cengr reiterated this belief at his deрosition. He had received significant pay raises from the mid-1980s until 1991. From 1986 through 1988, Cengr received bonuses totaling $1,325, $1,400, and $1,400 for each year, respectively. In August of 1989, Cengr received a $1,400 bonus and a $225 bi-monthly pay raise. In December of that same year he received another $500 bonus. Cengr received another bimonthly raise of $100 in March of 1990, and bonuses of $1,500 and $2,366 in August and December of 1990. In 1991, however, Cengr received a bi-monthly pay raise of only $50 and a bonus of only $500. In 1992, Cengr’s bi-monthly pay raise was $45 and his bonus $300. In 1993 Cengr received no raise and no bonus. President Richard Krause described Cengr’s raises and bonuses during Cengr’s last three years with Fusibond as token, noting that Cengr was taken out of the bonus program, but that Krause gave him “a few hundred bucks at Christmas so [Cengr] wouldn’t feel embarrassed.”
On November 22, 1995 Cengr filed an age discrimination suit against Fusibond, alleging a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. On December 12, 1996, Fusibond filed its motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted Fusibond’s motion for summary judgment on January 10, 1997. Cengr filed a notice of appeal on February 4, 1997. On February 6,1997, Fusibond sent its bill of costs to Cengr’s attorney, requesting $2,127.08 in costs. On February 11, 1997, in response to Cengr’s inquiry, the trial court set the schedule for Cengr’s response to Fusibond’s bill of costs. On March 21, 1997, the trial court entered a one sentence order taxing costs in the amount of $2,127.08 in favor of Fusibond. Cengr appeals, arguing thаt the district court erred in both granting Fusibond’s motion for summary judgment and in taxing $2,127.08 in costs against him.
ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo,
and decide all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
B. Age Discrimination Claim
The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees forty years of age or older. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621(b), 631(a). A plaintiff bringing a claim under the ADEA must establish that “he would not
*451
have been treated adversely by his employer but for his employer’s motive to discriminate against him because of his age.”
Denisi,
A plaintiff has two ways of prevailing on a claim for age discrimination. One way is to meet the burden head on by presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that age was the determining factor in the discharge. The second, and more common way, is to utilize the indirect, burden-shifting approach for Title VII eases originally set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
To prevail under the
McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting approach, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. A prima facie ease is established by proving: (1) the plaintiff was a member of the protected class (age 40 or over); (2) the plaintiff was doing his job well enough to meet his employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) the plaintiff was discharged or demoted; and (4) the plaintiff was treated less favorably than younger employees.
1
Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc.,
Once the plaintiff makes out a case of prima facie discrimination:
... this creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, and the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s discharge. If the employer is successful, the presumption dissolves, and the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer’s proffered reasons are a pretext for age discrimination.
Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
Cengr fads to make out a claim for age discrimination by either direct or circumstantial evidence.
2
He offers the following as evidence in an attempt to prove his case: (1) in 1991, president Richard Krause informed Cengr that Cengr was approaching the age of fifty and that jobs are hard to find at that age; (2) in 1993, employee George Piotrowski, then age 43, was promoted to general plant manager; (3) in 1993, employee Steve Boardman, then age 29, was promoted to production supervisor and assumed several of Cengr’s supervisory duties; (4) in 1993, employee Paul Jurasits, then age 29, assumed Cengr’s duties regarding inventory, production scheduling, and expediting; (5) upon his termination, Cengr’s duties were assigned to Richard Krause, then age 63,
3
*452
Craig Krause, then age 26, and Paul Jurasits, then age 29; and (6) in his deposition, Richard Krause described Steve Boardman as a “very young, creative individual.” Krause’s two statements and his actions in promoting three employees do not amount to an acknowledgment of discriminatory intent.
See Chiaramonte,
Since Cengr fails to make out a case of age discrimination by direct or circumstantial evidence, we turn to the second method of proving a claim for age discrimination and loоk to the McDonnell Douglas factors. Because we find that Cengr was not meeting Fusibond’s legitimate expectations, we hold that Cengr has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The record in this case is replete with evidence of Cengr’s repeated performance problems. These problems began as early as May of 1985, when Cengr was served with a written warning which cited his “frequent lapses in Fusibond quality control.” Cengr was warned at that time that “future negligence in this area may be cause for dismissal.” Cengr received his second written warning in November of 1991, citing his “failure to follow verbal and written instructions regarding proper QC.” This time Cengr was рlaced on 30 days probation. Cengr was again reprimanded for his poor performance in June of 1993, when he was placed on probation for engaging in screaming matches with another Fusibond employee. When Cengr’s performance did not improve, his probation was extended “until further notice.” His performance problems continued throughout the summer of 1993, culminating in September of 1993 with the limitation of his duties. Cengr was cited for yet another performance problem in December of 1993. His warning this time included a one week disciplinary layoff without pay, and the directive to “reflect on his past performance and determine where his future lies with this company.”
The evidence offered by Cengr to prove that he was meeting Fusibond’s legitimate expectations misses the mark. Cengr argues that a statement made by Richard Krause during Krause’s deposition, when Krause described Cengr as once being a “loyal employee” and said that Cengr “had a lot of knowledge about the Fusibond process from beginning to end,” as well as the record of Cengr’s pay increases and bonuses, indicate that he was meeting Fusibond’s legitimate expectations. We disagree.
Krause’s statement regarding Cengr’s loyalty and knowledge has no correlation to Cengr’s performance record. Cengr mаy have possessed knowledge and experience, but he was clearly performing poorly. He exhibited deficiencies in an area that was “such an important aspect of [his] job” that he was eventually terminated.
See Mills v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
Further, Cengr is incorrect that the pay raises and bonuses he received are indications that he was performing up to Fusi-bond’s expectations at the time of his termination. In fact, the evidence indicates that Cengr’s raises and bonuses steadily declined in the last three years of his employment. Furthermore, Fusibond president Richard Krause stated in his deposition that in the last few years of Cengr’s employment these raises and bonuses were merely tokens. Krause acted within his discretion in awarding Cengr holiday bonuses and token raises, even when he found Cengr’s performance to
*453
be less than favorable. We are concernеd with neither the correctness nor the reasons for Krause’s actions.
Rand v. CF Indus., Inc.,
Not only has Cengr failed to prove that he was meeting Fusibond’s legitimate expectations at the time of his termination, but he also has not offered any facts to refute Fusibond’s claim that his performance was substandard.
See Sirvidas v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,
Because we find that Cengr was not meeting Fusibond’s legitimate expectations, we need not address the remaining McDonnell Douglas factors. 4 Offering an employee a new job is not tantamount to age discrimination, especially where, as here, the employee was not performing up to his employer’s expectations. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Fusibond.
C. Costs
Cengr’s final argument on appeal is that the district court erred in awarding Fusibond $2,127.08 in costs — $1,932.48 for costs associated with depositions, $182.00 in court reporter fees, and $12.60 in photocopying expenses. In reviewing the district court’s award of costs, we employ an abuse of discretion standard and defer to the district court judge, who is in a better position to determine the reasonableness of the cost.
Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.,
*454 Statutory authority exists for the award of costs in this case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, a federal court may tax as costs:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation servicеs under section 1828 of this title.
The Supreme Court has determined that 28 U.S.C. § 1920 defines the term “costs” as it is used in Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5
Weeks,
Applying the abuse of discretion standard to the cost award in this case is an impossible exercisе given the utter lack of explanation for the award. The district court’s sole language regarding the award of costs consisted of the following: “Costs are taxed in the amount of $2,127.08 in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, Robert Cengr.” With nothing more to go on, we find that there was no discretion for the district court to abuse — it used none. Once again we reiterate our mandate that district court judges provide at least a modicum of explanation when entering an award of costs. We have said as much before.
See, e.g., Weeks,
*455 Plaintiff first argues that the award of costs should be reversed because the depоsitions were not necessarily obtained for use in this case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Plaintiff advances the argument that because the depositions ordered were those of the defendant’s employees, they were not necessary, as those employees were available to the defendant without ordering their depositions. We find such a suggestion ludicrous. The idea that employers should rely on the oral statements or affidavits of their employees rather than depositions which were already taken is a suggestion we will not entertain.
Similarly, plaintiff’s argument that the depositions were used sparingly in defendant’s summary judgment motion and therefore were not necessarily obtained for use in this case is also without merit. The introduction of a deposition in a summary judgment motion or at trial is not a prerequisite for finding that it was necessary to take that deposition.
Finchum v. Ford Motor Co.,
Plaintiff’s second argument against the taxing of costs in Fusibond’s favor is similarly without merit. Plaintiff claims that the copying costs of his EEOC file by defendant should not be taxed against him because the file was not necessarily obtained for use in this case. Plaintiff again raises as proof the fact that the defendant sparingly used the documents contained in the EEOC file. Use of information contained in a file is not a prerequisite to finding that it was necessary to copy the file.
Finc-hum,
Plaintiff next argues that the district court erred in not reducing costs pursuant to Local Rule 45(B) of the Northern District of Illinois. The Rule in effect at the time these costs were incurred provided that:
... the expense of any prevailing party in necessarily obtaining all or any part of a trаnscript for use in a case, for purposes of a new trial, or amended findings, or for appeal shall be taxable as costs against the adverse party. If in taxing costs the clerk finds that a transcript or deposition was necessarily obtained, the costs of the transcript or deposition shall not exceed the regular copy rate as established by the Judicial Conference of the United States and in effect at the time the transcript or deposition was filed unless some other rate was previously provided for by order of court. Except as otherwise ordered by the court, only the cost of the original of such transcript or deposition together with the cost of one copy each where needed by counsel and, for depositions, the copy provided to the court pursuant to General Rule 18 C, shall be allowed.
Local Rule 45(B) (1996). The regular copy rates as established by the Judicial Conference for the time in question (and still currently in effect) set the following prices as outside limits for reimbursement:
*456 Type of Transcript Original Ordinary Transcript $3.00 Expedited Transcript $4.00 Daily Transcript $5.00 Hourly Transcript $6.00 First Copy to Each Party $0.75 $0.75 $1.00 $1.00 Each Additional Copy to the Same Party $0.50 $0.50 $0.75 $0.75
We note that some courts in the Northern District of Illinois have found that these rates only apрly to transcripts ordered from an official court reporter.
See, e.g., Apostal v. City of Crystal Lake,
Defendant submitted, and the district court taxed, costs for deposition transcripts as follows:
Deponent Claimed Cost R. Krause C. Krause K. Manowsky M. Heiens R. Cengr $ 414.85 $ 175.69 $ 73.80 $ 192.74 $1,257.40 Total: $2,114.48
After an unnecessarily detailed scrutiny of the receipts submitted in this case, we find that the amount of $2,114.48 for deposition transcripts is unreasonably high. We therefore turn to discuss the fees sought by Fusi-bond for each deposition.
1. Richard Krause
Fusibond seeks $414.85 for a copy of the deposition transcript of its president, Richard Krause. This bill includes $395.65 for the 193 page deposition transcript, and $19.20 for 60 pages of exhibits. Because Fusibond was already in possession of the deposition exhibits — plaintiff provided extra copies of the exhibits to defendant at the deposition and produced the same exhibits during discovery — we will not allow Fusibond to recover the costs of copying the 60 pages of exhibits ($19.20). As for the 193 page deposition transcript, $2.05 per page 6 is far above the $0.75 rate established by the Judicial Conference for a deposition copy. Accordingly, we reduce the cost to be taxed against plaintiff for a copy of the deposition transcript of Richard Krаuse to $144.75. 7
2. Craig Krause
Fusibond seeks $175.69 for a copy of the deposition transcript of Craig Krause. This bill includes $141.45 for the 69 page deposition transcript, and $34.24 for 107 pages of exhibits. As we explained above, because Fusibond was in possession of the deposition exhibits, we will not allow it to recover for the costs of making additional copies. As for the 69 page deposition transcript, we reiterate that $2.05 far exceeds the Judicial Conference copy rate. 8 Accordingly, we reduce the cost to be taxed against plaintiff for a *457 copy of Craig Krause’s deposition to $51.75. 9
3.Kyle Manowsky
Fusibond seeks $73.80 for a copy of the 36 page deposition of Kyle Manowsky. This charge represеnts a $2.05 copy charge per page. 10 Again, we reduce this cost to conform to the copy rates established by the Judicial Conference. Accordingly, we order the plaintiff to pay $27.00 for the copy of Kyle Manowsky’s deposition. 11
4. Mike Heiens
Fusibond seeks $192.74 for a copy of the deposition transcript of Mike Heiens. This bill includes $168.10 for the 82 page deposition transcript and $24.64 for 77 pages of exhibits. Again, we refuse to tax costs against plaintiff for a copy of the exhibits defendant already possessed. Additionally, the $2.05 per page copy rate 12 far exceeds the $0.75 copy rate established by the Judicial Conference. Acсordingly, we reduce the cost for the copy of Mike Heiens’ deposition transcript to $61.50. 13
5. Robert Cengr
Fusibond seeks $1,257.40 in total costs for the deposition of plaintiff Robert Cengr. This bill represents $182.00 for the services of a court reporter 14 and $1,075.40 for an expedited transcript. The costs of the court reporter were properly taxed against plaintiff. However, plaintiff argues that the cost of his transcript should be reduced because defendant delayed five months in ordering the deposition. Cengr was deposed on May 10, 1996, but Fusibond did not order the transcript until October 25, 1996, and then did so on an expedited basis at a cost of $3.80 per page. Defendаnt counters that it delayed in ordering Cengr’s deposition transcript because it thought Cengr would settle the case. While defendant may have been waiting for the plaintiff to settle, it seems only natural that settlement or no settlement, the deposition of the plaintiff was important to order. Defendant cannot wait until the last minute, incur additional expenses from its delay, and then stick plaintiff with the bill. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff is only responsible for “ordinary” service, or $3.00 per page for an original deposition transcript. Plaintiff should be taxed in the amount of $849.00 15 for the deposition transcript of Robert Cengr, plus $182.00 in court reporter services, for a totаl of $1,031.00. We therefore order plaintiff Robert Cengr to pay Fusibond $1,316.00 in costs. The parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal.
Conclusion
We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in defendant Fusibond’s favor because plaintiff was not meeting Fusi-bond’s legitimate expectations. We Vacate the district court’s award of costs, and Remand with the instruction that the court enter an order awarding the defendant $1,316.00 in costs.
Notes
.As we have stated before, this Circuit has employed various formulations of the fourth element, "largely as a result of the different types of age discrimination."
Mills v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
. We note that Cengr himself relies on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method of proof.
. Cengr contends that it is "highly unlikely” that Richard Krause, as president of Fusibond, assumed any of Cengr’s responsibilities. We express no opinion on this issue.
. We also need not address plaintiff's final argument that defendant proffered a phony reason for plaintiff's termination because plaintiff fails to clear the second hurdle of the
McDonnell Douglas
factors. Specifically, because plaintiff was not meeting defendant's legitimate expectations, he has not established a prima facie case of discrimination and the burden does not shift to Fusibond to present evidence of a noninvidious reason for Cengr's dismissal.
See Coco,
. Rule 54(d) provides, in relevant part, that “costs other than attorney's fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). Fusibond is the “prevailing party” because the district court granted, and we affirm, summary judgment in its favor.
.$395.65 -h 193 pages = $2.05
.193 pages X $0.75 = $144.75
.$141.45 h- 69 pages = $2.05
. 69 pages x $0.75 = $51.75
. $73.80 4- 36 pages = $2.05
. 36 pages x $0.75 = $27.00
. $168.10 -h 82 pages = $2.05
. 82 pages x $0.75 = $61.50
. 7.0 hours x $26.00 = $182.00
. $3.00 per page x 283 pages = $849.00